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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses questions surrounding the governance of marine fisheries frequented by 
heterogeneous sets of user groups, from a political economy point of view. A review of relevant 
theory explores some of the characteristics of political and economic aspects to economic 
governance decisions, as well as how the relationships between these two facets can be seen to 
impact upon governance decision processes. This review of theory permits an observation that the 
governance of economic activities is frequently closely influenced by the pursuit of short term 
micro rational interests, rather than by a long term macro rational ethic. This, it is argued, results in 
part from a lack of information that is capable of illustrating the long run implications of economic 
decisions that may be based primarily on the pursuit of short term financial or in some cases 
political gain. In an attempt to find a framework that is capable of providing macro rational policy 
orientation to such governance processes, sustainable development is reviewed as a concept, and is 
found to be capable of providing policy orientation that accords with the pursuit of a more macro 
rational ethic.  
 
Subsequently, a multi criterion analysis methodology is developed in the thesis in a view to 
describing the sustainable development implications, accounting for economic and non economic 
implications, of economic policy choices. The methodology offered is named the Sustainable 
Development Directives (SDD) approach, and is applied to the case of the governance of the 
Senegalese maritime fishery.  
 
As a starting point the case study provides significant contextual background to the governance 
situation faced in the Senegalese fishery, which is frequented by a heterogeneous set of user groups. 
Among these groups are a local artisanal sector, a local industrial sector, and a foreign European 
Union (EU) sector. The application of the SDD approach to the case study entails an evaluation that 
permits us to compare some of the economic and non economic implications that the activities of 
each user group have for the sustainable development of the Senegalese maritime fishery. The 
application of the SDD approach to the case study leads to an observation that the heterogeneity of 
the user groups frequenting the fishery can be capitalised upon to a greater extent for the benefit of 
the sustainable development of the fishery. These observations are in turn viewed as providing 
fisheries governance authorities with some important macro rational policy orientation that may be 
able to assist the pursuit of a more sustainable maritime fishery in Senegal.   
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Long résumé 
 
En novembre 2006, Emmanuel Charles Dominique, biologiste de la pêche auprès de l’Institut de 
Recherche pour le Développement, relatait la conversation qu’il avait eue avec un pêcheur 
artisanal sénégalais quelques années avant notre entretien à Dakar. Charles Dominique racontait 
qu’il avait demandé en termes clairs à un pêcheur artisanal d’âge mûr s’il pensait que les 
ressources en poisson étaient devenues plus ou moins abondantes qu’auparavant. Le pêcheur lui 
avait assuré que la réponse dépendait de la façon dont on estimait le nombre de poissons dans la 
mer. Il expliquait que si on fondait ses estimations sur la quantité pouvant être contenue dans les 
pirogues au retour des pêches, on pouvait affirmer  qu’il y avait certainement moins de poisson 
dans la mer que ce n’avait été le cas alors qu’il était enfant. Mais, poursuivait-lui, si vous basez 
votre estimation sur le nombre de Peugeots garées près du débarcadère, la réponse est presque 
sûrement qu’il y a plus de poissons dans la mer qu’à l’époque où il y en avait quand leur 
pirogues étaient pleines. 
 
Le pêcheur utilise l’exemple de la Peugeot qui sert fréquemment au transport du poisson des 
plages de pêche aux marchés et aux usines parce qu’il a remarqué que le nombre de ces 
véhicules a augmenté de façon notoire depuis que, jeune pêcheur, ses prises lors de ses sorties 
étaient plus fructueuses. 
 
Ces cinquante dernières années ont vu la transformation de la pêche sénégalaise qui est passée 
d’une pêche exploitée modérément avec un équipement artisanal non motorisé à une dans 
laquelle une série de pirogues de pêche artisanales motorisées et très mobiles font concurrence 
aux flottes des vaisseaux industriels plus importants d’origine à la fois sénégalaise et étrangère. 
La période comprise entre 1950 et 2005 a connu une augmentation d’environ 25 000 tonnes par 
an à 405 260 tonnes annuelles.16   
 
Parmi les changements qui auront conduit à une augmentation des efforts de pêche au Sénégal, 
on compte l’avènement des accords d’accès sur la pêche signés entre le gouvernement 
sénégalais et les organisations de pêche étrangères venant de Russie, du Japon, d’autres régions 
                                                 
16UNFAO. 2007. Fishery Statistics Programme. www.unfao.org.  
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d’Afrique et en particulier l’Union européenne dont les activités sont les plus transparentes.17 Il 
y est communément fait référence dans les discussions internationales sur la pêche après la 
ratification de la Convention des Nations Unies sur la Loi de la Mer (UNCLOS) en 1982 qui a 
mis en place une provision légale pour des accords d’accès à la pêche entre les États avec la 
création de Zones économiques exclusives (EEZ) de 200 milles marins adjacentes aux États 
côtiers.18   
 
Depuis la participation d’une plus grande diversité de groupes d’utilisateurs à la pêche 
sénégalaise, la répartition des bénéfices liés à l’effort de pêche des différents groupes semble 
être devenue un problème fondamental pour les pêcheries sénégalaises. Cela est exacerbé par la 
conviction que certaines réserves de poisson sénégalais seraient menacés de raréfaction en 
raison de la lourde pression exercée sur les ressources marines vivantes du pays.19  
 
L’anecdote relatée par Charles Dominique va au fond du débat sur la gestion des activités 
pêchières au Sénégal car elle met en exergue l’ambiguïté qui caractérise les tentatives de 
compréhension et de réglementation d’une problématique halieutique en évolution perpétuelle et 
dynamique. 
 
Énonciation du problème     
La pêche maritime du Sénégal concerne une ressource naturelle dont disposent divers groupes 
d’utilisateurs. Ces groupes varient de par les techniques de pêche qu’ils utilisent, les intérêts 
économiques qu’ils représentent, les fonctions de niche socio-économique qu’ils occupent et 
avant tout les coûts et les avantages de leurs activités rejaillissant sur la société et l’économie 
sénégalaise dans leur ensemble. Comme la pêche constitue une activité économique primordiale 
au Sénégal et qu’elle fournit une source importante d’alimentation pour les habitants du pays 
tout en constituant l’exportation la plus importante du pays20, les différentes stratégies de gestion 
des ressources pêchières sont susceptibles d’avoir des résultats divers sur l’économie du pays. 
De même, dans le contexte d’un pays peu développé, l’importance de la gestion des ressources 
naturelles apparaît davantage cruciale que dans les pays développés puisque les pays peu 
                                                 
17Author’s Interview. 2005. La Cellule de l'Etude at de la Plantification. November, Dakar.  
18United Nations. 2007. Convention on the Law of the Sea. www.un.org. 
19 Kaczynski, V.D. & Fluharty, D.L. 2002. European Policies in West Africa: Who Benefits From Fisheries  
Agreements. Marine Policy. No. 26. p 82. 
20 UNFAO. 2005. UNFAO Country Profiles. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation. www.fao.org. 
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développés dépendent bien plus du bien-être obtenu des activités économiques liées aux 
ressources naturelles.21   
 
Les coûts et les avantages relatifs aux activités des différents groupes d’utilisateurs peut être de 
nature à la fois économique et non économique. La distinction entre les coûts et les bénéfices 
économiques et non-économiques peut s’expliquer si l’on affirme que les coûts et les avantages 
économiques sont mesurés en utilisant des techniques d’évaluation économique clairement 
définies, alors que les coûts et les avantages non économiques ne le sont pas. 
 
Une conscience accrue dirigée sur l’importance de la compréhension des coûts et des avantages 
hétérogènes économiques et non économiques associés aux activités des différents groupes 
d’utilisateurs de sociétés de pêche a conduit à une réponse remarquable de la part de la 
communauté de recherche, le projet Ecost. Le projet Ecost est une initiative subventionnée par 
l’UE qui vise à l’évaluation des implications économiques et non économiques des activités 
halieutiques dans les eaux des pays peu développés en utilisant le concept de coût sociétal 
composé de facteurs sociaux, écologiques et économiques.22  Cependant, malgré ces efforts, la 
rareté des méthodes expérimentées et standardisées pour évaluer l’ensemble des coûts et les 
avantages non économiques ou les implications de différentes activités économiques correspond 
à une entrave aux systèmes d’aménagement halieutique capables de prendre en compte des 
facteurs non économiques. 
 
Reijnders avance que cela serait lié au fait que les coûts non économiques demeurent de nature 
qualitative aux yeux de la communauté scientifique, contrairement aux coûts économiques, et 
peuvent être échangés entre individus de la même façon que des espèces non humaines.23  
Partant, les autorités échouent dans l’évaluation des conséquences liées aux choix des mesures 
ayant des implications sur le bien-être écologique et social au sens large. 
 
On peut affirmer que les autorités en charge de l’aménagement des pêcheries sont soumises à 
                                                 
21Schick, A. 1999. A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management. Washington, World  
  Bank Institute. p 38. 
22 Failler, P.  2005. Ecosystems, Societies, Consilience, Precautionary Principle: Development of an Assessment 
Method of the Societal Cost for Best Fishing Practices and Efficient Public Policies. Présenté lors de la conférence : 
People and the Sea. 6-9 July. Amsterdam, Centre for Maritime Research. 
23 Reijnders, J. 1990. Long Waves in Economic Development. Aldershot, Edward Elgar. p 113. 
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cette dynamique et que le manque de politique clairement définie, ambitieuse et cohérente place 
l’avenir de la pêche nationale tout comme ceux qui en dépendent dans une situation précaire. 
Cette dernière peut à la fois résulter de politiques ayant conduit à des dispositions non durables 
concernant les sociétés de pêche, tout comme de l’incapacité des structures de gestion à redéfinir 
ces dispositions par la suite. Cela a lieu en dépit de l’idée substantielle et de plus en plus 
répandue d’après laquelle l’augmentation des bénéfices des activités halieutiques requière un 
choix entre les différents groupes de pêche selon leur importance dans le bien être général de la 
société.24 
 
Objectifs primordiaux de la thèse 
! Développer des moyens théoriquement crédibles et aisés à mettre en place pour comprendre 
à la fois les implications économiques et non économiques que les activités de pêche des 
différents groupes d’utilisateurs auront dans la protection à long terme de la pêche maritime 
sénégalaise. 
! Appliquer cette méthode au cas de la pêche sénégalaise comme moyen d’information 
pouvant être utilisé par des structures gouvernementales pour fournir une orientation de gestion 
aux plans d’aménagement des sociétés de pêche sénégalaises. 
 
Orientation conceptuelle de la thèse   
On peut alléguer que toute tentative de compréhension des implications économiques et non 
économiques des activités économiques, de même que des choix politiques qui soutiennent ces 
activités soulève des questions essentielles sur la façon dont nous voyons l’économie et ce qui y 
est important. En raison de cette optique qui a des implications théoriques fondamentales, une 
analyse théorique a été utilisée dans cette thèse comme moyen nécessaire pour comprendre et 
aborder deux domaines conceptuels larges qui couvrent : 
 
! Les rôles joués par les coûts et les bénéfices dits non économiques pour l’avancement des 
sociétés et la raison pour laquelle l’importance de ces coûts et ces bénéfices a parfois semblé 
être survolée aux niveaux politiques et économiques. 
! L’impact que les coûts et les bénéfices non économiques ont sur l’avancement économique 
                                                 
24 FAO/World Bank 2006. The Rent Drain: Towards an Estimate of the Loss in Resource Rents in the   
World's Fisheries. Rome, FAO/World Bank. p 4. 
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futur des sociétés et comment ces impacts peuvent être compris de telle sorte que ces 
considérations occupent une place pleine de sens au sein des processus de gestion économique 
futurs. 
 
Traiter ces aspects théoriques dans le sujet de la recherche a pour objectif de fournir une 
plateforme de développement vers un outil théorique crédible visant à comprendre les 
implications économiques et non économiques des différentes activités économiques pouvant 
être appliquées à l’étude de cas. L’application du fondement théorique de cette approche à 
l’étude de cas s’attache également à indiquer que l’approche est pratiquement opérationnelle. 
 
Cependant, afin d’appliquer une telle approche dans la pratique, les effets des activités des 
différents groupes d’utilisateurs de pêcheries devraient être situés dans un contexte 
économique, écologique, social, institutionnel et politique où les politiques de pêche sont 
effectuées. C’est pour cette raison que l’étude de cas pour cette thèse fournit une somme 
significative d’information contextuelle qualitative et quantitative. 
 
La relation entre l’étude de cas et l’examen de la théorie peut être tout d’abord décrite comme le 
lieu où le cas souligne le sujet de recherche et fournit les moyens de tester la validité pratique de 
l’approche qui est proposée pour résoudre ce problème. La théorie est aussi utilisée comme 
véhicule d’une meilleure compréhension du problème de recherche au niveau conceptuel et 
offrant un moyen de développer une approche sur le sujet de recherche.  Par conséquent, bien 
qu’un degré de réflexivité existe entre l’analyse théorique et l’étude de cas, les sujets traités par 
chacune des parties peuvent être évoqués séparément. Cette vision sur la relation entre la théorie 
et la pratique s’accorde parfaitement avec la conception de Paulo Freire de la praxis interprétant 
cette relation comme une « réflexion et une action sur le monde de sorte qu’il en soit 
transformé », 25 ce qui résume l’idée que les réflexions théoriques peuvent être utilisées afin de 
mettre en œuvre des changements pratiques. 
 
Depuis que des théoriciens tels que Ragnar Arnson pensent que parvenir à une régulation 
optimale de la pêche est presqu’impossible dans la pratique,26 une redéfinition presque constante 
                                                 
25 Freire, P. 1970. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York, Seabury. p 38. In: Glass, R.D. 2001. On Paulo Freire’s 
Philosophy of Praxis and the Foundations of Liberation Education. Educational Researcher.Vol 30, no 2. p 16.  
26Arnson, R. 2000. Ecosystem Instruments to Achieve Ecosystem Objectives in Fisheries Management. ICES, Journal of 
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des politiques d’aménagement de la pêche est discutable. Vu sous cet angle, le travail effectué 
dans cette thèse peut être considéré comme une contribution théorique à l’amélioration des 
efforts portant sur l’aménagement de la pêche. 
 
Les problèmes centraux traités dans la revue théorique 
! Le contexte historique dans lequel les activités économiques ont évolué et l’étendue avec 
laquelle cette évolution économique est écologiquement durable dans le long terme. 
! Dans quelle mesure le contexte de développement durable fait le jour sur une compréhension 
de la manière dont les avancées écologiques et sociales durables devaient être définies. 
! La dynamique politique et de gestion autour de la mise en œuvre du concept de 
développement durable et de quelle façon elle influence la disposition et les actions de l’Etat et 
des autres institutions importantes aux niveaux à la fois global et local.  
! Les rôles joués par les systèmes d’évaluation monétaire des biens et services économiques et 
comment ces systèmes d’évaluation influencent la disposition et les choix faits par les individus, 
les Etats, les institutions importantes, de même que les autres entités politiques, économiques et 
sociétales.  
! Le développement d’un outil crédible théoriquement et complémentaire aux techniques 
d’évaluation monétaire permettant de comprendre les effets non économiques que font porter les 
activités économiques liées aux ressources naturelles sur la recherche du développement 
durable. 
! La mesure dans laquelle l’utilisation d’un tel système d’évaluation des implications 
économiques et non économiques des activités économiques pourrait être harmonisé avec 
l’économie de la gestion et de la régulation de la pêche. 
 
Les problèmes centraux traités dans l’étude de cas 
! Le contexte historique, macro-économique, écologique et d’aménagement dans lequel les  
activités des pêches ont lieu. 
! Les institutions locales, régionales et internationales qui influencent la régulation des activités 
pêchières du Sénégal. 
! L’étendue des groupes d’utilisateurs présents dans la pêche sénégalaise et l’impact 
économique et non économique qu’ils ont sur l’économie, la société sénégalaise et les 
                                                                                                                                                 
Marine Science. Vol 57, No. 3. pp 742-51. 
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ressources maritimes vivantes. 
! Les différentes forces politiques agissant sur les autorités sénégalaises et comment ces forces 
influencent la politique de pêche nationale au sens large. 
! La mise en oeuvre de l’approche proposée au début de cette thèse permettant d’évaluer les 
répercussions des activités des différents groupes d’utilisateurs de sociétés de pêche sur le 
développement durable. 
! La mesure dans laquelle cette approche contribue à la réalisation d’une gestion éthique et 
politique de la pêche davantage cohérente et généralisée au Sénégal.  
 
L’hypothèse centrale de la thèse 
Ne pas comprendre les implications économiques et non économiques des différentes activités 
de pêche crée un obstacle à l’identification de ce qui est inhérent à la gestion d’une pêche 
durable par des groupes d’utilisateurs hétérogènes. Comprendre les implications économiques et 
non économiques de ces activités différentes peut aider les autorités politiques à identifier des 
stratégies de gestion de la pêche capables de mettre en valeur les avantages du développement 
durable pouvant être associés à l’hétérogénéité des différents groupes d’utilisateurs. 
 
L’argument central présenté dans la thèse 
Les tendances actuelles dans la pêche maritime sénégalaise sont perçues par beaucoup comme 
problématiques en terme de viabilité économique et écologique à long terme et par conséquent 
de la population qui en dépend. Cela est perçu comme le résultat des activités d’un éventail de 
groupes de pêche parfois en compétition et très différents.27  J’avance qu’un élément essentiel de 
la menace au soutien de la pêche maritime nationale repose sur la façon dont le régime de 
gestion des pêches sénégalaises dirige l’effort de pêche selon les résultats économiques et non 
économiques de cet effort de pêche. 
 
Christian Chaboud a remarqué en 1992 que la question de la pêche en Afrique de l’Ouest se 
caractérise par une multiplicité d’acteurs et qu’il en ressort une relation entre cette dernière et 
l’hétérogénéité biologique et économique des ressources de pêche.28 J’affirme que les effets de 
                                                 
27 Author’s INtervoew. 2005. Fenagie Representatives. La Federation Nationale des Gis de Pêche du Sénégal. 
November, Dakar.  
28Chaboud, C. 1992.  Les Interactions et Complémentarités entre Pêches Piroguière et Industrielle en Afrique de 
l'Ouest. Quelques Aspects Théoriques et Examples. Semaine Sous-Régionale sur les Pêcheurs Artisanaaux en Afrique 
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la gestion et de l’expression politique des intérêts hétérogènes de ces acteurs crée un espace 
ouvert sur l’analyse du régime de gestion de la pêche d’un point de vue politico-économique. 
Cet avis correspond à celui de Pascal Lamy sur la gestion comme ensemble de transactions entre 
les parties intéressées et les pratiques de longue date, les intérêts bien établis, les habitudes 
culturelles, les normes et les valeurs sociales qu’ils peuvent représenter.29 
 
Dans la pratique, les intérêts, et particulièrement les intérêts économiques, qui se reflètent dans 
les nombreux processus de gestion des ressources naturelles comprennent les intérêts de 
nombreux groupes d’utilisateurs de même que d’autres acteurs dont certains peuvent viser la 
maximisation de leurs propres intérêts privés à court terme. Dans une partie des cas, la 
réalisation d’intérêts privés (ou d’intérêts micro-rationnels) par certains utilisateurs 
s’accompagne d’un compromis au profit d’autes parties intéressées, de même que de toute la 
société, y compris les générations futures. Ce problème est la résultante de conditions politico-
économiques issues du franchissement des limites géopolitiques Nord-Sud par différents 
groupes d’utilisateurs. 
  
Il est admis qu’afin de servir les intérêts de la société au sens large, l’incidence d’actions 
motivées par la micro-rationnalité soit modérée par des processus de gestion liés aux coûts à 
long terme qui se posent à la société dans son ensemble. 
 
Un élément important de ces coûts est le compromis, ou coûts d’opportunité, imposé sur la 
société comme résultat du manque à gagner qui aurait pu être touché si l’utilisation d’une 
ressource particulière avait été gérée différemment. Comprendre ces coûts d’opportunité perdue 
signifie que les bénéfices qui ne sont pas touchés en raison de la poursuite d’intérêts micro-
rationnels par un groupe d’acteurs hétérogène soient analysés par rapport à une conception du 
bien être social à long terme. Je soutiens que cette orientation peut être proposée par biais du 
concept de développement durable. 
 
Embrasser cet avis signifie que le développement durable peut être utilisé pour donner une 
orientation aux processus de gestion des ressources naturelles en général, et spécifiquement à la 
pêche maritime sénégalaise. Cependant, j’avance qu’il existe des obstacles théoriques et 
                                                                                                                                                 
de l'Ouest. Méthodologies d'Études, Possibilités d'Aménagement et de Développement.Nouadhibou, Mauritanie.  p 75. 
29 Lamy, P. 2006. Towards Global Governance. The Globalist. Available at : www.theglobalist.com.   
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pratiques pour fournir un moyen d’évaluation de la mesure dans laquelle les actions des groupes 
différents (et hétérogènes) s’opposent à la recherche du développement durable. 
 
On peut concevoir que les obstacles pratiques de telles méthodes d’évaluation proviennent d’une 
tendance pratique dans les processus de décision publics et privés visant à ce qu’une micro-
rationalité généralisée retarde le développement des méthodes de compréhension concernant les 
répercussions d’actions macro-rationnelles sur le développement macro-rationnel plus large ou 
durable. A un niveau théorique, l’incapacité des théories sur la croissance économique et des 
systèmes d’évaluation économiques de rendre compte de l’importance de nombreuses conditions 
non économiques du développement durable impose un délai à l’élaboration de méthodes 
permettant d’évaluer les conséquences d’actions motivées par la micro-rationalité en matière de 
développement durable. On avance que ces deux facteurs se répercutent grandement sur des 
structures de gestion qui manquent d’outils d’identification de l’information nécessaire pour 
catalyser un élan politique efficace et gérer les ressources naturelles en accord avec les principes 
du développement durable. Cet avis est étayé par Yves Le Bars qui affirme qu’une relation 
positive forte existe entre la collecte d’information et la force qui trouve sous-tend les processus 
de gestion publique. Les méthodes d’évaluation  sur l’impact des décisions économiques en 
terme de développement durable représentent une condition décisive à la stimulation de l’élan 
politique. 
 
Fondée sur cette idée relative à l’incapacité des théories sur la croissance économique à 
expliquer l’importance des facteurs non économiques dans les processus économique, cette 
thèse propose une approche qui peut être utilisée dans la description (plutôt que la prévision) des 
implications des modèles pratiques appliqués sur les ressources humaines dans le domaine du 
développement durable. Ce faisant, elle offre un instrument d’orientation tendant vers une 
gestion davantage macro-rationnelle aux processus d’aménagement qui sinon pourraient être 
dominés par la poursuite d’intérêts économiques micro-rationnels. Elle fournit ainsi des liens 
considérables entre la micro et la macro-rationalité. Cela peut aussi représenter un moyen de 
tempérer certaines répercussions complexes que la micro-rationalité fait porter sur les processus 
de décision impliquant des parties prenantes économiquement et géographiquement disparates 
réparties sur la ligne nord-sud. 
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Des exemples concrets sur les observations théoriques à propos de cette thèse sont relevés dans 
l’étude de cas qui évalue la gestion de la pêche maritime sénégalaise. L’approche théorique 
permettant d’apprécier les résultats du développement durable des régimes de gestion des 
ressources naturelles est ensuite appliquée à la pêche maritime sénégalaise. Pour corroborer 
l’hypothèse centrale de cette thèse, l’étude montre que l’hétérogénéité existant entre les groupes 
d’utilisateurs artisanaux et industriels de l’UE peut être utilisée en faveur du développement 
durable de la pêche. La relation entre ces résultats et les conditions d’aménagement et de 
politique ayant lieu au sujet de la politique halieutique au Sénégal sont repris à partir d’un point 
de vue politico-économique. 
 
La correspondance existant entre l’analyse théorique et l’étude de cas jette un nouvel éclairage 
sur la gestion des réserves en poisson marin sénégalais. Appliquer simultanément l’approche 
théorique à l’étude de cas justifie l’expérimentation de la mise en place pratique et la validité 
théorique de l’approche. On peut soutenir dans la conclusion de la thèse que les résultats de 
l’étude de cas étaient en général la validité de l’approche par la praxis réflexive au sujet de 
recherche qui a été retenu. 
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Chapter One.  Introduction to the Research Problem, Research Methodology 
   and structure of the Thesis 
 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change 
it.30 
 
Introduction 
In November 2006 Emmanuel Charles Dominique, fisheries biologist with the French Institute for 
Research on Development, recounted the story of a conversation he had had with a Senegalese artisanal 
fisherman a few years prior to our 2006 conversation in Dakar. Charles Dominique explained how he had 
asked an artisanal fisherman whether he thought that, in broad terms, the Senegalese fish resources were 
more or less abundant than they had once been. The fisherman replied to Charles Dominique that the 
answer to his question depended upon how you estimate the number of fish in the sea. He explained that 
if one bases ones estimation on how full fishing pirogues were at the end of fishing outings, then the 
answer was that there were certainly less fish in the sea than there had been when he was a boy. But, he 
went on, if you base your estimation on the number of Peugeots parked adjacent to the landing, then the 
answer was almost certainly that there were more fish in the sea than there had been when their pirogues 
used to be full.  
 
The fisherman used the example of the Peugeot vehicles, commonly used to transport fish from fishing 
beaches to markets and processing facilities, because he had observed the numbers of these vehicles had 
increased markedly since the time when as a young fisher his catches per outing were much larger.  
 
The last 50 years have witnessed the transformation of the Senegalese fishery from one moderately 
exploited by predominantly non motorised artisanal fishing outfits to one in which an array of highly 
mobile, motorised artisanal fishing pirogues sometimes compete with fleets of larger industrial vessels of 
both Senegalese and foreign origin. During the period between 1950 and 2005 fisheries production in 
Senegal increased from around 25 000 tons per year to over 400 000 tons per year.31   
 
Among the changes that have led to an increase in fishing efforts in Senegal are the advent of fishery 
access agreements signed between the Senegalese government and foreign fishing outfits originating in 
Russia, Japan, other parts of Africa, and notably the European Union, whose activities are also the more 
                                                 
30 Marx, K. & Engels, F. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader; 2nd Ed. New York, W.W. Norton. p 145. 
31UNFAO. 2007. Fishery Statistics Programme. www.unfao.org.  
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transparent.32 These agreements became common place in international fisheries discourses after the 
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which made 
legal provision for fisheries access agreements between states with the creation of 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) adjacent to coastal states.33   
 
Since the advent of a greater variety of user groups participating in the Senegalese fishery, the spread of 
benefits associated with the fishing efforts of the different groups can be seen to have become a central 
issue in Senegalese fisheries discourse. This is exacerbated by the belief that certain of Senegal's fish 
stocks are under threat of depletion due to the heavy fishing pressure that is being placed on the country's 
living marine resources.34  
 
The anecdote recounted to me by Charles Dominique cuts to the core of debates concerning the 
governance of fisheries' activities in Senegal. It highlights much of the ambiguity that characterises 
attempts to understand and manage a constantly evolving and dynamic fisheries’ discourse. 
 
Problem Statement 
Senegal's marine fishery is a natural resource that is frequented by a variety of user groups. These groups 
vary in the fishing techniques that they use, the economic interests that they represent, the socio economic 
niche functions that they fulfil, and importantly in the costs and benefits that their activities have for the 
broader Senegalese society and economy. Since fishing is a major economic activity in Senegal, and 
provides an important food source for the countries inhabitants, while being the country’s largest export,35 
different fishery resource management strategies are likely to have different results for the country’s 
economy. Also, in the context of less developed countries, there is greater importance invested in the 
effective management of natural resources than in more developed countries since less developed 
countries depend more heavily upon welfare gained from natural resources related economic activities.36   
 
The costs and benefits associated with the activities of different fishery user groups can be described as 
being both economic and 'non economic' in nature. The distinction between economic and non economic 
                                                 
32 Author’s Interview. 2005.. La Cellule de l'Etude et de la Planification. November, Dakar.  
33United Nations. 2007. Convention on the Law of the Sea. www.un.org. 
34 Kaczynski, V.D. & Fluharty, D.L. 2002. European Policies in West Africa: Who Benefits From Fisheries’  Agreements? 
Marine Policy. no. 26. p 82. 
35 UNFAO. 2005. UNFAO Country Profiles. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation. www.fao.org. 
36Schick, A. 1999. A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management. Washington, World  
  Bank Institute. p 38. 
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costs and benefits can be explained by saying that economic costs and benefits are ones which can be 
measured using clearly defined economic valuation techniques, while non economic costs and benefits 
cannot be easily measured this way. For example economic costs and benefits concerning expenditures 
and receipts can frequently be described using monetary measures, while non economic costs and benefits 
concerning the ecological and social implications of fisheries activities cannot always be assigned 
monetary values in an accurate way.   
 
An increased awareness of the importance of understanding the heterogeneous economic and non 
economic costs and benefits associated with the activities of different fishery user groups, has led to one 
notable response from the research community, the Ecost project. The Ecost project is an EU funded 
initiative which aims to evaluate the economic and non economic implications of EU fisheries’ activities 
in less developed country’s waters using the concept of Societal Cost which encompasses social, 
ecological, and economic factors.37 However despite these efforts, the scarcity of well tested and 
standardised methods for evaluating the broader non economic costs and benefits, or implications, of 
different economic activities can be seen as an impediment to fisheries management systems that are able 
to take non economic factors into account.   
 
Reijnders has argued that this is linked to the fact that unlike economic costs, non economic costs remain 
largely qualitative to the scientific.38 As a result, governance authorities frequently fail to evaluate the 
consequences of policy choices with respect to the broader non economic ecological and social welfare 
implications.  
 
It can be argued that Senegalese fisheries’ management authorities are subject to this dynamic and the 
resulting lack of clearly defined and coherent overarching fisheries politic places the future of the 
country's fishery, and those who depend upon it, in an uncertain position. This uncertainty can be seen to 
be both the result of policies that have lead to unsustainable fisheries arrangements, as well as the 
inability of governance structures to subsequently redefine these arrangements. This is despite a common 
and increasingly important understanding that maximising benefits from fisheries activities requires that 
different fishing groups be preferred on the basis of their importance for the broader welfare of society.39 
                                                 
37 Failler, P.  2005. Ecosystems, Societies, Consilience, Precautionary Principle: Development of an Assessment Method of 
the Societal Cost for Best Fishing Practices and Efficient Public Policies. Presented at: People and the Sea Conference. 6-9 
July. Amsterdam, Centre for Maritime Research. 
38 Reijnders, J. 1990. Long Waves in Economic Development. Aldershot, Edward Elgar. p 113. 
39 FAO/World Bank 2006. The Rent Drain: Towards an Estimate of the Loss in Resource Rents in the    
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Further the realisation of a fishery regime that accords with the principles of sustainable development 
may require that access rights be divided between a heterogeneous set of user groups according to how 
the activities of each of these groups are seen to contribute to the sustainable development of the fishery.  
 
Core Aims of the Thesis 
 
! To develop a theoretically credible and practically feasible means to understanding both the 
economic and non economic implications that the fisheries activities of different user groups have 
for the longer term well being of the Senegalese marine fishery.  
! To implement this method to the case of the Senegalese fishery as a means of providing 
information that can in turn be used by governance structures as a way of providing policy 
orientation for Senegalese fisheries management plans to enable a better account for the 
heterogeneity that exists between different fisheries groups. 
 
 
Conceptual Orientation of the Thesis  
It is arguable that attempting to understand both economic and non economic implications of economic 
activities, and the policy choices that support those activities, poses some important questions to the 
fundamental way in which we view the economy and what is important in it. Due to the perception of this 
view having fundamental theoretical implications, a theoretical review has been used in this thesis as a 
useful way of understanding and engaging with two broad conceptual areas. These areas concern: 
 
! The roles played by so called non economic costs and benefits for sustainable development, and 
why the importance of these costs and benefits has sometimes seemed to have been overlooked at 
political and economic policy levels. 
! The impact that non economic costs and benefits have for progress toward sustainable 
development, and how these impacts can be understood so that these considerations can take a 
more meaningful place in economic governance processes in the future. 
 
Addressing these theoretical aspects to the research problem is viewed as a means of providing a platform 
for the development of a theoretically credible means of understanding the economic and non economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
    World's Fisheries. Rome, FAO/World Bank. p 4. 
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implications of different economic activities that can subsequently be applied to the case study. The 
application of this theoretically founded approach to the case study is also seen to indicate that the 
approach is practically operational.  
 
However, in order to apply such an approach in practice, the implications of the activities of different 
fishery user groups should be contextualised with respect to the economic, ecological, social and 
institutional and governance conditions under which fisheries policies are made. For this reason the case 
study for this thesis provides a significant amount of qualitative and quantitative contextual information. 
 
The relationship between the case study and the review of theory can be described as one where the case 
underscores the research problem and provides the means of testing the practical validity of the approach 
that is proposed for resolving this problem. On the other hand, theory is relied upon as a vehicle for better 
understanding the research problem at a conceptual level and thus providing the means to developing an 
approach to the research problem. As a result, although a degree of reflexivity exists between the 
theoretical review and the case study, the issues addressed by each of these parts can be outlined 
separately. This reflexive view of the relationship between the theory and practice neatly accords with 
Paulo Freire’s conception of Praxis, which interprets this relationship as “reflection and action upon the 
world in order to transform it”40, thus encapsulating the idea that theoretical reflections can be used to 
implement practical changes.   
 
Since theorists such as Ragnar Arnson believe that achieving optimal fishery regulation is near impossible 
in practical terms,41 it is arguable that fisheries’ management regimes will require constant refining. With 
respect to this view, the work offered in this thesis can be seen as a theoretically grounded, practical 
contribution to the refinement of fisheries’ management efforts. 
 
The Central Issues Addressed by the Theoretical Review 
! The historical context in which economic activities have evolved and the extent to which this 
economic evolution is ecologically sustainable in the long run. 
! The extent to which the concept of sustainable development can be relied upon for providing an 
                                                 
40 Freire, P. 1970. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York, Seabury. p 38. In: Glass, R.D. 2001. On Paulo Freire’s 
Philosophy of Praxis and the Foundations of Liberation Education. Educational Researcher.Vol 30, no. 2. p 16. 
41Arnson, R. 2000. Ecosystem Instruments to Achieve Ecosystem Objectives in Fisheries’ Management. ICES, Journal of 
Marine Science. Vol 57, no. 3. pp 742-51. 
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understanding of how ecologically and socially sustainable economic advancement should be 
characterised. 
! The political and policy dynamics surrounding the implementation of the concept of sustainable 
development, and how these dynamics impact upon the disposition and actions of states and other 
important institutions at both global and localised levels. 
! The roles played by systems of monetary valuation for economic goods and services, and how 
these systems of valuation impact upon the disposition of, and choices made by individuals, states, 
important institutions, as well as other political, economic, and societal entities.  
! The development of a theoretically credible supplement to monetary valuation techniques as a 
means to understanding the non economic consequences that natural resource related economic 
activities have for the pursuit of sustainable development 
! The extent to which the usage of such a system of evaluating the economic and non economic 
sustainable development implications of economic activities, could accord with the economics of 
fishery usage and regulation.   
 
The Central Issues addressed by the Case Study 
! The historical, macro economic, ecological and governance contexts in which Senegalese fisheries' 
activities take place. 
! The local, regional, and international institutions that have an impact upon the regulation of 
fisheries' activities in Senegal. 
! The range of user groups that are present in the Senegalese fishery, and the economic and non 
economic impacts that these groups have for the Senegalese economy, society, and living marine 
resources. 
!  The different policy forces that affect Senegalese fisheries' authorities and how these forces impact 
upon the country's broader fisheries politic. 
! The implementation of the approach to assessing the sustainable development consequences of the 
activities of different fishery user groups that was offered in the earlier parts of the thesis. 
! The extent to which this approach may contribute to the realization of a more coherent overarching 
fisheries governance ethic and politic in Senegal. 
 
The Hypothesis of the Thesis 
The non comprehension of the economic and non economic implications of different fisheries’ activities 
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can be seen as an impediment to identifying the hallmarks of sustainable fisheries regimes, characterized 
by heterogeneous user groups. Understanding the economic and non-economic implications of these 
different activities can therefore help governance authorities to identify fisheries policy strategies that are 
able to capitalise on the sustainable development advantages that might be associated with the 
heterogeneity of different user groups.  
 
The Argument Presented in the Thesis 
Current trends in Senegal's marine fishery are perceived by many to be problematic in terms of the long-
term economic and ecological viability of the country's fishery and therefore the populations that depend 
upon it. This is seen by some, to be the result of the activities of a range of very different, sometimes 
competing, fishing groups.42  
 
In 1992 Christian Chaboud noted that at a regional level, fisheries discourse in West Africa was 
characterised by a multiplicity of actors, and that a relationship between this multiplicity and the 
biological and economic heterogeneity of fishery resources can be noticed.43 I argue that today the 
governance consequences of the political expression of the heterogeneous interests of these actors create a 
space for the examination of the fisheries' governance regime, from a political economy point of view. 
This view corresponds with Pascal Lamy’s view of governance as an ensemble of transactions between 
interested parties, and the longstanding practices, entrenched interests, cultural habits, and social norms 
and values that they may represent.44  
 
In practice, the interests and particularly the economic interests, which are reflected in numerous natural 
resource governance processes, include the interests of a range of user groups as well as other actors, 
some of which may aim to maximise their own short term private interests. In certain cases the realization 
of short term private interests – or micro rational interests, by certain users can be seen to accompany a 
trade off for the interests of other contesting parties, as well as for society as a whole, including future 
generations. This problem is compounded by economic and political conditions that result when different 
user groups traverse north/south geopolitical lines. 
 
                                                 
42 Author’s Interview. 2005. Fenagie Representatives. November, Dakar.  
43Chaboud, C. 1992.  Les Interactions et Complémentarités entre Pêches Piroguière et Industrielle en Afrique de l'Ouest. 
Quelques Aspects Théoriques et Examples. Semaine Sous-Regional sur les Pêcheurs Artisanals en Afrique de l'Ouest. 
Methodologies d'Études, Possibilités d'Aménagement, et de development.Nouadhibou, Mauritanie.  p 75. 
44 Lamy, P. 2006. Towards Global Governance. The Globalist. Available at : www.theglobalist.com. 
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It is seen to be in the interests of the broader society that the implications of actions motivated by micro 
rationality be tempered by governance processes in accordance with the long term costs that those 
activities pose to society as a whole. 
 
An important component of these costs are the trade offs imposed upon society as a product of the 
foregone benefits that might have been enjoyed if the usage of the particular resource was managed 
differently. Understanding these trade offs requires that the benefits that are foregone, due to the pursuit 
of micro rational interests by a heterogeneous set of actors, are understood, with reference to an 
understanding of long term societal welfare. I argue that this orientation can be offered by the concept of 
sustainable development. 
 
Adopting this view means that sustainable development can be used to provide orientation to natural 
resource governance processes in general, and specifically to the Senegalese marine fishery.  
 
However, I argue that there exists a significant theoretical and practical obstacle in providing a means for 
assessing the extent to which the actions of different (and heterogeneous) groups discords with the pursuit 
of sustainable development.    
 
The practical obstacles to such assessment methods can be seen to arise from a tendency in public and 
private decision making processes for broad based micro rationality to limit understanding of larger 
macro rational or sustainable development consequences of micro rational actions. At a theoretical level, 
the inability of theories of economic growth, and economic valuation systems to account for the 
importance of a range of non economic conditions for sustainable development also retards the 
development of methods for assessing the sustainable development consequences of actions motivated by 
micro rationality.  
 
It is argued in this thesis that these two factors have important consequences for governance frameworks 
that, as a result, lack the means of identifying the information required to catalyse strong political impetus 
for managing natural resources in accordance with the principles of sustainable development. This view is 
supported by the work of Yves Le Bars who argues that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
provision of information and the force behind public policy processes.45 Methods for assessing the 
                                                 
45Le Bars, Y. 2005. Un Nouveau Contexte de la Decision Publique, de Nouvelles Interactions entre La Recherche et 
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sustainable-development consequences of economic decisions are thus seen as an important condition for 
stimulating this political impetus.  
 
Based on this idea, combined with the inability of economic growth theories to meaningfully account for 
the importance of non economic factors for economic processes, the thesis offers an approach that may be 
used to describe the sustainable development implications of natural resource usage patterns. In so doing 
it offers a means to providing a more empirical policy orientation for governance processes that may 
otherwise be dominated by the pursuit of micro rational economic interests, by providing important 
linkages between micro and macro rationality. This can also be seen as a means of tempering some of the 
complex implications that micro rationality has for decision processes involving economically and 
geographically disparate stake holders that traverse north/south lines.   
 
Concrete examples of the theoretical observations made in this thesis are observed in the case study that 
evaluates the governance of the Senegalese marine fishery. The theoretical approach to evaluating the 
sustainable development consequences of natural resource management regimes is then applied to the 
Senegalese marine fishery. In support of the central hypothesis for the thesis, the study finds that from the 
heterogeneity that exists between the artisanal and EU industrial user groups can be used to the advantage 
of the sustainable development of the fishery. The relationship between these findings and the political 
and governance conditions operating in Senegalese fisheries policy discourse are subsequently discussed 
from a more political economy point of view. 
 
The engagement between the theoretical review and the case study provides the basis for new theoretical 
and practical insights concerning the governance of Senegalese marine fish stocks. Simultaneously 
applying the theoretical approach to the case study can be seen to provide the basis for testing the 
practical application, and theoretical validity of the approach. As such, it is argued in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis that the results of the case study generally support the validity of the reflexive 
‘praxis’ approach to the research problem that has been taken.   
 
 
The Research Methodology employed 
Although this thesis is structured using five sections and fourteen chapters it has only two main parts, one 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pouvoirs Publics. France, IGGREF. p 2. 
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more theoretical and one more practical.  
 
A clear link between the theoretical and practical aspects to the study has led to the adoption of the 
research methodology that has been employed in this thesis. Although post-modern theorist, Stanley Fish, 
has argued that there exists a cleavage between theory and its practical application, so great that it is 
sometimes scarcely worthwhile becoming embroiled in elaborate theoretical endeavours,46 the research 
methodology employed in this thesis is deeply rooted in theory. This approach has been taken because of 
the theoretical deficiencies that are seen to retard attempts to explain and address natural resource 
management challenges that are characterised by complex relationships between interdependent 
economic, social, ecological and political forces.  
 
Fishery regulation is a field in which some fine academe has yielded some interesting and credible 
research regarding approaches to fishery dilemmas. Not only have theorists offered economic models and 
means for understanding and addressing the challenges associated with fishery resource use, but they 
have also outlined some of the causes of these problems through the use of rational choice and game 
theories relating to common property resources. However as Elinor Ostrom has argued, policy mandates 
on common pool resources have been based upon theory which has not connected to the precise nature of 
particular problems in a consequential manner.47  Ostrom suggests that thus far theoretical approaches 
have been somewhat limited in order to provide the best possible approach to resource management, thus 
creating a need in the field for theories which can speak more eloquently to the prescriptions mandated by 
the specificity of particular problems.  
  
In a similar way it is frequently argued that the best research methodology is one which is tailor made for 
the specific objectives of a given research project.48 In keeping with this thinking the research 
methodology for this dissertation has been designed with the specific research objectives in mind. 
Achieving coherence between the theoretical and practical aspects of this thesis has required that the 
research methodology employed, allows for a degree of reciprocal reflexivity between each of these two 
parts at a conceptual level.  
 
                                                 
46Fish, S. 1989. Doing What Comes Naturally : Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary  
and Legal Studies. Durham, NC, Duke University Press. p 4. 
47Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p 7. 
48Babbie, E.  Mouton, J. & Boshoff Prozesky, P.V. 2001.The Practice of Social Research in South Africa.  
Cape Town : Oxford University Press Southern Africa.  p 23. 
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A Grounded Theory approach, which allows for theoretical conclusions and perspectives to emerge from 
the case study,49 has therefore been employed. This has allowed for a degree of dialogue between the 
theoretical and practical parts to the study thereby facilitating greater conceptual coherence. Thus, to 
some extent the theoretical perspectives that are used to ground and orientate the case study are 
themselves grounded and orientated by observations which have emerged from the case study.  
 
The research process for this thesis has therefore been characterised by a simultaneous review of the case 
study and the theories that were seen to be relevant to the questions raised by the case study. While the 
practical approach to the case study section of this thesis has been directed by a view advanced by Donald 
Case who describes how authors such as Yin and Stake point out that case studies can be made more 
rigorous when they include “diverse sources of evidence (for example, written records, filed observations, 
verbal reports etc.), multiple times of observation, and a holistic and process-oriented emphasis.”50 
 
Insights on the case study were therefore attained from published and unpublished books and articles, 
internet websites, conversations with fishers and other fisheries sector actors and researchers and stake 
holders, questionnaires administered to both ordinary fisher folk and policy makers and researchers, and a 
number of more formal interviews with researches and stake holders ranging from EU and Senegalese 
government policy researchers to fishermen on fishing beaches in Senegal.  
 
Simultaneous to this, theoretical insights were retrieved from a range of books, academic articles, internet 
websites, and conversations with academics and researchers. Throughout the research process research 
reports and short essays have been subjected to peer review processes, and the perspectives of these have 
added a great deal of direction and substance to the research project.     
 
One of the main challenges to emerge during this research project has been the difficulty associated with 
retrieving data and statistics that can be used effectively to illustrate the theoretical and practical 
considerations that are seen to be of importance for the research project. To some extent this challenge is 
central to the fundamental research question that aims to explore the implications of natural resource 
management strategies in developing country contexts in which access to information and reliable data is 
frequently poor. This has posed a problem in terms of offering a reliable and detailed version of the facts. 
Theorists such as Michel Foucault have claimed that research processes should engender a process of 
                                                 
49Chamberlain, K. 1995. What is Grounded Theory? Available at: www.kerlins.net.  
50Case, D. 2002. Looking for Information. Paris, Academic Press. 
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deconstructing a research problem to the extent that a maximum number of the possible relevant 
perspectives are fully examined.51 Although the theorist applies this line of thought to jurisprudential 
research and legal practice it can be argued that the perspective remains relevant for research in a number 
of fields. 
 
For Foucault a stumbling block for his approach is the problem of achieving infinite deconstruction of 
perspectives in a finite world where the quest for research outcomes is constrained by the urgency of the 
need for perspectives that may contribute to the resolution of a particular problem. Foucault suggests that 
this leaves researchers and law makers with only one reasonable option: to deconstruct and evaluate the 
necessary or relevant perspectives to the maximum, and then, when urgencies no longer permit, take a 
decision. Hence Foucault asserts: “Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which 
produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A regime of truth.”52  
 
Adopting this view within the context of the current research project has meant that although every effort 
has been made to include all relevant perspectives, findings of the research are not fully inclusive. The 
implications of this for the scarcity of elaborate data that has been encountered in the case study have led 
to the adoption of the view that qualitative insights, regarding the case study and the theories that are used 
to explain it, can be used to make a certain (minimum) number of assumptions that permit the offer of 
information and insights that are at worst partly credible, or a sub set of more credible insights. 
 
Within the context of a developing country’s economy this view is extended in the thesis to make an 
argument for the provision of information that will set a general trajectory for sustainable economy 
activity. It is assumed that as this economic activity is realized it will become possible to refine the 
trajectory based on subsequent information that may emerge over time, and as a product of greater 
economic prosperity, thus serving to sustain and reinforce the procurement of better information.  
 
Analytical Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into five main parts and thirteen chapters. The first part introduces the 
research question, explains the research methodology that is adopted, and provides some background to 
the research question. This part comprises one chapter in which the central argument, that progress 
towards more ecologically and sustainable economic activities, is retarded by an information problem that 
                                                 
51Lenta, P. 2001. Coursework Materials. School of Philosophy, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 
52Rider, S. [No date]. Michel Foucault: Truth and Power. www.wdog.com.    
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is described as being simultaneously the product and cause of political dynamics that fail to recognise the 
importance of a range of important ecological and social considerations. From this base the thesis 
proceeds to unpack the research problem with a view to understanding how this information problem can 
be broken. 
 
As such, the second part of the dissertation comprises four chapters which provide a review of the 
relevant theory. This part of the dissertation discusses the issues surrounding the research question from a 
predominantly theoretical point of view, and for this reason the reader may at times feel remote from the 
topic dealt with by the case study. However, this has been done intentionally as a means of illustrating the 
theoretical generality of the research problem and the approach that is ultimately given for addressing 
both theoretical and practical obstacles impeding a sustainable development approach to the issues 
surrounding natural resource management.  
 
Chapter two provides a general introduction to the theoretical review that is conducted in chapters two to 
five of the thesis. The chapter describes how economic growth has traditionally been driven by an array 
of forces, notably markets, which are orientated by decisions driven by the pursuit of private good, 
measured in terms of monetary exchange values. The availability of natural capital and raw materials 
during and shortly after the industrial revolution, combined with more efficient production processes, led 
to a large supply of goods. Ample supply of inputs supported market prices which allowed for the growth 
of production and consumption of consumer goods. It is described however that these prices failed to 
incorporate the longer term costs of depleting and/or spoiling natural capital assets.  
 
An argument can thus be made that when it comes to the interface between economic activities and the 
well-being of natural capital assets, management decisions should not be led by the pursuit of well-being 
measured exclusively in terms of monetary exchange values. A more appropriate alternative is to 
orientate market activities through economic management decisions that aim for sustainable relationships 
between economic activities and the ecological systems, and other inputs that support them. To this end, 
the chapter adopts a common definition of sustainable development as a concept that engenders 
ecological, social, economic, and governance factors.  
 
The chapter thus recommends that economic policy decisions should depart from the entrenched logic 
underpinned by the pursuit of economic growth and adopt the goal of a more all encompassing concept of 
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sustainable development. Importantly, this in turn requires that we understand the articulations between 
the policy forces that support the pursuit of economic growth and the outcomes that will lead to the 
achievement of economic growth. 
 
Chapter three tackles the question of achieving a shift from a focus on economic growth to one on the 
attainment of sustainable development from a more political point of view by illustrating some of the 
political economy considerations that impact upon economic choices. The chapter shows how the conflict 
between micro and macro rationality is displayed at international levels, where international trade 
arrangements that are led by politically charged economic choices in one country can have a negative 
impact upon the status of natural and social capital in another. In cases where economic and social well 
being are linked with economic activities that employ natural capital as a major input, a trade off in terms 
of the ability of the affected economy or society to generate economic welfare though foregone 
alternative economic arrangements is seen to be incurred. The idea that natural resource management 
problems have implications for societal welfare is thus developed further in chapter four. 
 
From this base the chapter explores the basics of Agency, or Principal/Agent theory. The chapter 
introduces the notion of Identification Systems which has bee advanced by Nicole Saam. Saam suggests 
that these Identification Systems can perform a function for improving agency relations between large 
economic entities. Within the context of this chapter, Identification Systems are discussed as a way to 
help minimise the foregone welfare implications associated with economic choices made by entities that 
are engaged in agency relations.  
 
The extent to which the theory can be applied to the economic fishery relations that exist between the EU 
and Senegal is explored. It is argued that in these relations Senegal's position can be characterised in 
different areas as both simultaneously that of a principal and that of an agent, and this places Senegal in 
an unfavourable position when it comes to articulating the power dynamics that may lead to the 
identification of a more desirable long term fisheries management strategy for the West African state. 
This dynamic is seen to be the result of north/south relations between Senegal and the EU where, like a 
principal in usual agency relations, Senegal suffers the negative impacts of asymmetry in information 
compared with that of the EU. At the same time, due to higher discount rates, and lower financial 
prosperity than the EU, Senegal assumes a role as an agent due to the state's desire to achieve financial 
gain from the sale of fishing rights to the wealthier EU.      
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These asymmetries, in what are at times rivalistic relationships, are not seen to be conducive to the 
development of an overarching set of fisheries governance objectives between Senegal and the EU. This, 
it is argued, is especially the case when considering the domestic political forces that impact on their 
respective policy demeanours on both sides.   
 
Accordingly chapter four revisits chapter two's examination of the dynamics of choice, noting that in 
democratic systems public choice, leading to public policy, is largely the product of an aggregation of 
private choices. The chapter illustrates that attempts to achieve synergy between economic activities, the 
well being of natural capital and the ecological systems that support these activities, and the social 
implications of these relationships, have generally failed to address some of the important challenges 
associated with achieving synergy between what are highly interdependent systems. These failures are 
viewed as being the product of a poor comprehension of the interdependence between these systems and a 
lack of information that is capable of driving policy forces in accordance with the sensitivity of this 
interdependence.  
 
Economic growth theories are subsequently reviewed as a means to providing this insight, but are found 
to be generally unable to provide the information necessary for modelling more synergistic relationships 
between economic activities and associated sustainable usage of natural capital, and the associated 
realization of sustainable societal progress. This is seen as being the result of uncertainty concerning the 
potential for substitutability between unlike capital types ( natural and 'man made' capital), and the failure 
of growth models to measure the production of economic well- being in terms of factors that take 
sufficient account of costs and benefits for which market values are unavailable. As a result of this it is 
recommended that attempts to explain the sustainable development impacts of economic activities should 
focus on descriptive techniques that can identify the impacts of economic activities post hoc, rather than 
aiming to explain impacts through the use of growth models.  
 
This contemplation leads to a description of the importance of alternative systems for measuring the 
broader implications of economic activities that interact with ecological systems, and the potential for 
such systems to have an impact upon systems of valuation that underpin tyrannies of small decisions in 
market and policy environs. 
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This brings us to the third part of the thesis which comprises two chapters, six and seven, and in which 
the theoretical review is engaged with at a conceptual level, and a new approach is given that aims to 
provide a politically persuasive means of orienting policy choices in accordance with the principals of 
sustainable development. 
 
Chapter five is dedicated to developing a framework that is capable of providing some of the insights that 
such an approach should engender. The chapter is important since it develops this framework in sight of 
all of the preceding chapters.  
 
First the chapter summarises the main points that have been made in each of the preceding chapters. The 
second part offers a theoretical description of the economic development process, showing the important 
roles that different types of capital play for economic development processes. The importance of 
investments and depreciation in capital types for the availability of economic opportunities to firms and 
households is outlined. This part of the chapter makes the distinction between economic development and 
sustainable development by describing the important roles that investment in, and depreciation of, an 
array of capital types have for sustained societal welfare through sustainable development.  
 
The third part of the chapter describes the evolution of methods used for assessing the developmental 
success of economies, illustrating a gradual evolution toward the inclusion of formerly excluded 
variables, such as the well-being of human and natural capital assets. The fourth section introduces 
critiques, and develops the concept of Genuine Savings offered by David Pearce and Edward Barbier as a 
means for assessing the ecological sustainability and societal desirability of economic activities. 
Subsequently I recommend that the tool is useful but should include greater sectoral and capital 
specificity if the methodology is to provide decision guiding information for managing the sustainable 
development implications of different economic activities.  
 
The fourth part of this chapter attempts to provide a framework for applying a modified version of the 
Genuine Savings (Sg) indicator to attempts to develop policies for dealing with the sustainable 
development implications of different economic activities. Implementing the modified Sg approach 
within the context of a modified framework describing the economic development process allows two 
information sets to be developed. The information that is given in these two information sets provide the 
basis for what I call Sustainable Development Directives (SDDs), as a means of evaluating the post hoc 
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sustainable development implications of economic activities and providing policy orientation accordingly. 
 
The information provided by the SDD approach accords with the pressure-state-response framework 
developed by the OECD. The idea behind this framework is that human activities can place pressures on 
the natural environment which result in changes in the state of affected ecological systems.53 Information 
concerning the state of the environment that results from these pressures is this interpreted as a means to 
informing the actions that can be taken as a means to responding to the given state of ecological 
systems.54 This pressure-state-response approach is incorporated into the SDD approach as a means to 
explaining the state of the fisheries systems as a result of the pressures placed upon those systems by the 
activities of different groups. A more in depth description of the activities of relevant fisheries groups, 
and the impacts that these groups have is thus seen as a means to providing information necessary for 
determining the necessary governance response. Although this approach is typically applied to ecological 
systems, the SDD approach uses multicriteria analysis as a means to describing pressure-state-response 
characteristics of the ecological, social, economic, and governance conditions for the sustainable 
development of the fishery.  
 
The first information set of the SDD approach provides the basis understanding aggregate pressures and 
state characteristics of the fishery. This the first information set contains general data pertaining to the 
pressures that different user groups have for the ecological, social, economic, and governance welfare of 
the fishery system. This allows for comparisons, in terms of capital investment and depreciation 
implications of the activities of each sector, to be made between sectors.  
 
The second information set is developed for the purpose of assisting natural resource management 
decision responses by providing more detailed information concerning the characteristics of the pressures 
placed upon the fishery’s natural, social, economic, and governance capital stocks by the activities of 
different fishery user groups. This information is provided by deriving important ratios between units of 
resource exploited, and the impact that the exploitation activity has upon the well-being of a different 
capital assets. This second information set therefore allows comparison between the impacts that different 
user groups have upon a given capital stock with respect to the impacts that the same user group may 
have for different capital stocks.   
 
                                                 
53 Notes on Pressure-State-Response Framework. [No Date]. Available at: www.qp.org.nz.  
54 Ibid. 
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It is argued that the application of both of these information sets provides the basis for informing natural 
resource management decisions (governance responses) in terms of their more general implications for 
the sustainable development of the fishery.  
 
Subsequently chapter six aims to explain some of the theoretical and practical aspects of managing the 
fisheries activities in accordance with the SDD approach offered in chapter five. The first part of the 
chapter reviews some of the tools that can be used to manage fishing effort once management objectives 
have been set. The latter parts of the chapter explore the economic and ecological dynamics involved in 
fisheries activities. The Gordon Schaeffer fisheries model is critiqued and found to be a poor indication of 
fisheries dynamics where a number of user groups, with different average cost (AC) functions, are found 
to be operating in the same fishery. The explanation that is given for this is that the model assumes 
unrealistic homogeneity for the economic motives of, as well as the social, socio-economic, and 
ecological implications, of the activities of each user group.     
 
This observation leads us to reflect upon fisheries management objectives with reference to the argument 
for basing natural resource management choices based on their implications for the realization of 
sustainable development. A short review of ecosystem approaches to fishery management is given, and 
the extent to which these approaches accord with the sustainable development approach that was outlined 
in chapter six is evaluated. The chapter concludes that basing fisheries management objectives upon a 
sustainable development approach is compatible with ecosystems approaches as well as the various 
existing tools that can be used to manage fishing effort. Despite this, it is argued that the choice of tools, 
and extent to which ecosystem approaches can successfully be used in accordance with a broader 
sustainable development view, will be dependent upon the specific characteristics of each fisheries 
management dilemma.    
 
An argument for basing fishery management objectives upon the SDD approach is made in accordance 
with the theme of the preceding chapters suggesting that it is rational - from a macro rational point of 
view, to base natural resource management objectives upon the realization of sustainable development. 
This is because sustainable development is seen to satisfy long term rational objective of advancing 
society into the future.    
 
The fourth part of the thesis is dedicated to providing a quantitative and qualitative descriptive overview 
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of the case study dealing with fisheries management policy objectives in Senegal. This part has five 
chapters.  
 
Chapter seven gives an introduction to fisheries discourse in Senegal, describing it in terms of the macro 
economic context in which the fishery operates.  This is done in order to provide a foundation for 
showing how fisheries management authorities in Senegal are confronted by a range of sometimes 
conflicting policy forces. In general terms, these forces can be seen on the one hand to stem from the 
financial impetus for signing fisheries agreements with foreign partners such as the EU, while on the 
other hand from both economic and electoral impetus to support local fisheries activities. The chapter 
does not describe the characteristics of the relevant fishery user groups in detail since this is done in 
chapters ten and eleven. The chapter rather focuses on describing the macro economic, ecological and 
governance context in which Senegalese fisheries activities and fisheries governance decisions take place. 
 
Chapter eight reviews the international, EU, West African and Senegalese institutions that have an impact 
upon EU - Senegal fisheries relations. The 2002 – 2006 fishery agreement between Senegal and the EU 
will be relied upon as a reference for understanding the extent to which institutional arrangements have 
led to concrete outcomes in fisheries relations between Senegal and the EU. The chapter concludes that 
the range of institutions, from local to international, have generally failed to align fisheries management 
policies in Senegal with the realization of sustainable development in the country's fisheries sector. This 
is seen to be the result of policy processes that fail to identify and adhere to an overarching fisheries 
policy ethic. 
 
From this base the case study moves on to provide a qualitative overview of the implications of the 
activities of the different fisheries sectors operating in Senegalese waters. This overview is given in order 
to provide the basis for the implementation of the SDD approach that has been developed in this thesis.  
 
Chapter nine provides an introduction to the descriptive review of the implications of the activities of 
fishery user groups that is given in chapters ten and eleven. The descriptive accounts of the fisheries 
sectors that are reviewed in this chapter are given with respect to four main categories of factors. These 
are: 
! The regulation of the sector's activities, and the government revenues earned from that. 
! The capital investments in machinery and equipment made in each sector.  
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! The catches and post catch usage of fishery products of each sector. 
! The employment benefits accruing to the Senegalese population as a result of the fishing activities 
of each sector.  
 
After providing a general introduction to the descriptions of the fisheries sectors, the chapter gives a 
description of the artisanal sector according to the factors set out in the first part of the chapter.  Chapter 
eleven is relied upon to provide descriptions of the local and foreign industrial sectors operating inside 
Senegal's EEZ. 
 
Chapter ten is thus a follow on from chapter ten which describes the certain characteristics of the local 
and EU industrial fishing sectors according to the same criteria outlined in chapter ten. This is done with a 
view to exploring the impacts that the local industrial and EU fishing sectors have, for what has been 
identified, as some of the important criteria for sustainable development.  
 
Chapter eleven explores the political landscape in which fisheries policies are made. The chapter aims to 
provide an understanding of how fisheries policy dynamics can be articulated with reference attempts to 
ensure that fisheries activities contribute to sustainable development in Senegal. The chapter describes the 
process through which fisheries agreements between Senegal and the EU are reached, and identifies the 
main groups and motives that are represented during these processes. This is done in order to identify the 
power relations between different groups, and their perspectives, and how these power relations are 
reflected in the signing of fisheries agreements. It is argued that fisheries negotiation processes tend to 
reflect the dominance of micro rationality in fisheries management policies in Senegal. The impact of this 
is to see fisheries policy processes leading to situations in which management authorities overlook the 
sustainable development implications of fisheries management choices, while attempting to satisfy the 
needs of all user groups simultaneously. Since this situation is seen to be having a detrimental impact 
upon the well- being of both Senegal's, and to a growing extent, the West African region's fishery stocks, 
a strong argument for evaluating the sustainable development implications of different user groups' 
activities is made. This provides the foundation for the application of the SDD method to the case of 
Senegalese fisheries policies.   
 
The fifth and final part of the dissertation comprises two chapters, chapter twelve and chapter thirteen. 
Chapter twelve applies the SDD approach to natural resource management to the case of the Senegalese 
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fishery with respect to the descriptive observations made in the fourth part of the study. The thirteenth 
and final chapter makes concluding remarks and recommendations for action and further research.   
 
Chapter twelve has three main parts. The first part introduces the first information set that is used to 
describe the sustainable development impacts associated with the activities of different fisheries sectors. 
Subsequently, the indicators that are employed, and the origins of the data used are discussed before the 
tabulated information set is provided. A brief discussion of the results of the first information set 
introduces the second part of the chapter which introduces the second information set employed in 
accordance with the SDD approach. This second part of the chapter follows the same format as the first, 
although a slightly more in-depth discussion of the results is made. The third part of the chapter offers 
some reflection on the results, and identifies a potential fisheries regime that can use the heterogeneity of 
the artisanal and EU industrial sectors to the advantage of the sustainable development of the fishery. On 
this basis, this third part of the chapter provides the basis for validating the central hypothesis of the 
study. The chapter concludes that the results of the SDD approach should be contextualised within a 
broader political economy context, and this task is left for the next and final chapter.    
 
Chapter thirteen has six main parts. The first part provides some refletion on the results of chapter thirteen 
and places these results within a broader political economy context. The particular issue of the non-
renewal of the 2002-2006 fisheries agreement with the EU is discussed, and observations are made. The 
second part of the chapter discusses the extent to which the central hypothesis of the thesis can be found 
to have been validated by the study. The third part discusses the extent to which the core aims of the 
research project have been achieved in a more general way. This part revisits the core objectives that were 
outlined in the beginning of the thesis and discusses the extent to which these aims have been realized. 
The fourth part of the chapter identifies certain limits to the methodology and results of the study which 
should be considered when interpreting the research findings. In turn the fifth part of the chapter makes 
recommendations based upon the findings and limits of the study, while the sixth part discusses the 
originality, theoretical and practical importance of the contributions made. 
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PART TWO: Review of Relevant Theory 
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Chapter Two.  The Economy and the Natural Environment 
 
It is my introductory and, I trust, guiding confession that I believe the greatest error in economics is 
in seeing the economy as a stable, immutable structure.55 
 
Introduction 
After 61 years of teaching economics, and being involved in economic policy making for the greater part 
of that time, John Kenneth Galbraith published a work titled A Journey through Economic Time. In the 
introduction to this publication, the author makes the statement that, in his view, one of the greatest errors 
in economics has been to view the world economy as a stable structure that is not susceptible to change or 
variation in its form or nature. On the contrary, he argues, the economy is susceptible to variations in 
form and nature and is not as stable a structure as many economists might suppose it to be.56 
 
This chapter suggests that one of the key areas where the traditionally ‘immutable’ nature of the economy 
is currently challenged concerns questions surrounding sustainable development.  
 
The chapter has five main parts. The first part briefly describes the development of the global economy. 
The section shows that economic growth has and is still driven by an array of forces many of which are 
driven by micro, rather than macro rationality. The second part of the chapter critiques the concept of 
sustainable development and the extent to which this concept can be relied upon for providing orientation 
for economic progress in accordance with longer term macro rationality. Within this context, questions 
surrounding the choice of an appropriate definition of the word ‘sustainable development’ are explored. 
The conclusion that uncertainty regarding an appropriate definition for the term is directly linked to an 
uncertainty regarding the extent to which substitutability between unlike capital types can be achieved 
and introduces the third part of the chapter. This third part deals with questions of substitutability between 
unlike capital types in production processes. The importance of the link between substitutability and 
complementarity, and their impact upon the cross price elasticity for related goods raises important 
questions concerning the role that monetary valuation, based upon exchange values, plays in attempts to 
understand sustainable development as a concept.  
 
The fourth part of the chapter suggests that much of the debate over the plausibility of substitutability 
between unlike capital types, depends upon which qualities of a given production process are being 
                                                 
55 Galbraith, J. K. 1994.  A Journey through Economic Time. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company. p xiii. 
56Ibid. 
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considered when deciding whether one input can easily be substituted for another. It is argued that there 
exist important differences between different methods for measuring substitution in particular production 
processes. It is also argued that the extent to which substitutability between capital types is confirmed 
depends to a large extent upon what measure is being used to assess the magnitude of changes in a given 
production process.  
 
The fifth and final part of the chapter devotes attention to setting a context for the development of 
parameters that should be used to assess the extent to which economic processes accord with broader 
goals for humanity, or the pursuit of a macro rational ethic. It is argued that this process may require a 
shift in the way that economics is viewed, giving credence to Galbraith's vision of the economy as a 
changing thing. 
 
The History of Economic Development 
A Journey through Economic Time gives a succinct account of the evolution of the world economy from 
the start of industrial capitalism in the late 18th century until the date of publication in 1994. The author 
notes that the economic system that appeared in the late 18th century, after hundreds of years of feudal 
agriculture, was to a large extent the product of improved technology and more precisely the 
mechanisation of industry.57 The textile and garment industries were among the first to adopt new 
technologies and production methods. Galbraith points out that the success enjoyed by these industries 
was not purely the result of demand driven by basic need, but also of demand driven by a basic desire for 
ownership of goods as a way to achieve social distinction.58  Accordingly, theorists such as Alfred 
Chandler have argued that new mechanised production processes saw the initialisation of the commodity 
market, where in its first phase commodities were produced not so much for market demand but for ease 
of supply and production.59 According to this view, many industries’ production processes were driven by 
their ability to supply more goods at a lower cost, and market demand for those goods was thus an 
auxiliary and complementary force behind economic growth. 
 
Once a few industries, like the textile industry, had leapt into mechanised industrialisation, new industries 
such as transport and other supporting manufacture emerged to support the pioneering ones. This 
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combined with the need for increased supply of raw materials that could be procured cheaply in far off 
lands lead to new and elevated levels of international trade.60 A resource rich environment, resulting in 
part as a product of colonial expansion, and poorly developed sense of ecological and social 
consequences of rapid industrialisation, fuelled growth. For this reason, many have used the term 'the 
opulent period' to describe the period during and shortly after the industrial revolution.61 
 
On a social and political level, the industrial revolution had an important impact upon power structures 
within society. A great deal of power was imparted to those individuals who owned the means of 
production, and the ways in which that power was wielded over the larger ‘working class’ initiated a new 
set of social and political dynamics. Central to these dynamics was the important role that capitalist 
means of production played in underpinning the future economic success of nations.62 
 
As a result of changed and still changing societal circumstances, questions surrounding the role that the 
state should play in economic life have gathered momentum. Political mobilisation of the working class 
defined a new and in some cases, politically official, force that tempered forces of rapid and socially 
merciless industrialisation. This change was perhaps one of the initial signs of the realization that the 
market, as it was, was incapable of internalising certain social, and other externalities.63 The inability of 
pure market driven growth to temper ecological catastrophe was also noted relatively early on.  As a 
result of rapid and large scale industrialisation, ecosystems began to protest against their perversion with 
signals that there was something fundamentally wrong with the way that the economy and itself were 
interacting. In 1955 concerns about the way social and natural landscapes were changing were highlighted 
in notable literary work: 
This was a period, as some writers put it, which saw ‘a nightmare growth rate producing nightmare 
towns.’ As W.H. Hoskins recalled in The Making of the English Landscape, in areas such as south 
Lancashire, around St Helens, in the Potteries and the Black Country, ‘the landscape of Hell was 
foreshadowed’.64 
 
This view gives a stark contrast to the imagery conjured by the other expression: 'the opulent period’, 
which has been used to describe the industrial period. Subsequently, and despite the early recognition of 
certain negative social and environmental impacts of industrialisation, basic patterns of economic growth 
can be seen as heavily entrenched in the way economic activity is managed. In 1989 Jim MacNeill noted 
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that since the turn of the 20th century, the world’s population had multiplied more than three times, the 
world economy had grown by twenty times, “the consumption of fossil fuels has grown by a factor of 
fifty”, and most of that growth, roughly four fifths, had occurred since 1950.65  
 
One may argue that it is the fault of a market driven economy with market forces that account for and 
deal poorly with the production of negative externalities. The problem of environmental degradation had, 
and still has not been heeded to.66  However, it is more likely that there exists a multitude of factors which 
have underpinned patterns of economic development as it has occurred in most countries since the advent 
of mechanised industry. One such likely factor is the absence of a shift in the way that the economy is 
viewed relative to the broader economic and social environment. In keeping with Galbraith's view, it is 
arguable that economic expansion should be viewed as a dynamic force, driven not so much by an ideal 
conception of development but rather by a conglomerate of multiple and interdependent forces. In what is 
today a highly interdependent system of international political economy and from the views cited above 
these forces can be seen to engender well organised political representation of diverse interest groups, 
free-rider dynamics, demand driven by individualistic consumer behaviour, supply driven by improved 
technology, and the non-internalisation of environmental and social externalities.  
 
On a global scale the dynamism of the relationships between these multiplicities of forces gives the 
economy certain autonomy as a system or process. I argue on this basis that it is thus for the prudent 
policy maker to interpret the level of dissonance between real and ideal economic trajectories and 
implement appropriate policy tools accordingly.  For this purpose, it is important that the view of the 
economy relative to its broader environment be well articulated. Problematically, today there is still a 
great deal of debate regarding an ideal process for economic development, let alone how to realise such 
an ideal process. It may be argued that many of these problems stem from dissonance regarding the actual 
nature of economic processes, and as such the extent to which an array of such processes can accord with 
ecologically sustainable societal progress.    
 
It is the purpose of the following section to review some of the commonly agreed upon characteristics that 
an ideal economic status quo might possess. Sustainable development is reviewed as a concept, and the 
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extent to which this concept is capable of providing an ideal developmental process, and end game, is 
discussed. As a first measure, the term will be defined. 
 
Defining Sustainable Development 
The term sustainable development is a seductive and slippery one. It is seductive because it implies that, 
even if only at a conceptual level, it is possible for humans to achieve indefinite economic development 
and the welfare gains that are associated with this development. The term is, however, slippery because 
the very notion of development is today, still in question. Despite this element of uncertainty there are 
few challenges to the idea that development is a good thing, hence in colloquial language the term 
sustainable development is hailed as a goal for humanity and an ideal for societal progress. Adopting the 
term sustainable development as a means to providing orientation for societal progress requires that broad 
consensus regarding the meaning of the first part of the term ‘development’ be achieved.  
 
In a book published in 1990, David Pearce, Edward Barbier and Anil Markandya suggested that there 
exists an important particularity regarding the use of the word ‘development’ in ‘sustainable 
development’. The authors purport: 
 
The use of the term ‘development, rather than ‘economic growth’, implies acceptance of the 
limitations of the use of measures such as gross national product (GNP) to measure the well-being 
of nations. Instead development embraces wider concerns of the quality of life – educational 
attainment, nutritional status, access to basic freedoms and spiritual welfare. The emphasis on 
sustainability suggests that what is needed is a policy effort aimed at making these developmental 
achievements last well into the future.67  
 
The above view suggests that the term sustainable development encompasses something far further 
reaching than the term ‘sustainable economic growth’. Although this usage of the term sustainable 
development may be commode for particularistic academic and other media dealing with societal 
progress, it has been argued that the political confusion emerging as a result of the loose usage of the term 
has led to its abuse.68 James Connely and Graham Smith suggest that although in its original usage the 
term sustainable development challenged orthodox political and economic views; its use has been 
broadened to the extent that it has subsequently been used to defend orthodox patterns of industrialisation 
and economic growth.69 Definition and understanding of the meaning of the term therefore remain a 
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priori obstacles to putting the concept into practice at the most rudimentary level.  
 
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of the term is the one that comes from The Brutland 
Report, or Our Common Future. In 1982, ten years after the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, it became evident that the massive rates of environmental destruction were inhibiting 
prospects for long term economic development and threatening the well being of the globe’s inhabitants. 
In 1983 the United Nations General Assembly established an independent commission to make some 
practical recommendations as to how the international community might achieve necessary 
developmental reform. The commission was named the World Commission on Environment and 
Development and former Norwegian Prime Minister, Dr. Gro Harlem Brutland was invited and accepted 
as chair of the commission that produced the well known report: Our Common Future, often referred to 
as The Brutland Report. This report aimed to set practical targets for achieving sustainable development. 
The central themes of the concept were outlined as follows: 
A community’s and a nation’s stock of natural capital should not decrease over time. A constant or 
increasing stock of natural capital is needed not only to meet the needs of present generations, but 
also to ensure a minimum degree of fairness and equity with future generations.70   
 
Another essential condition for sustainable development concerns the nature of production. If growth 
rates of up to 3 or 4 per cent in the industrialised countries and up to 5 or 6 per cent in developing 
countries are to be sustained, a significant and rapid reduction in the energy and raw material content of 
every unit of production will be necessary. At the same time, we must invest heavily not only to maintain, 
but also to increase our stocks of ecological capital, so that future dividends can be increased.71  
 
After a three year global inquiry, The Brutland Report concluded in 1987 that a transition to sustainable 
forms of development would be possible. Importantly, this transition would require major reshuffling of 
production and decision making processes, and political and economy institutions. Such a change 
encompassed the recognition of those processes which may be responsible for problems of environmental 
degradation and some associated societal maladies. Reorganising institutions and decision making 
processes would engender change was not only at institutional and decision making levels, but at ones 
which would address the very fabric of social, economic, and political discourse. Such a move would 
emerge from the articulation of problems such as global warming, desertification, rainforest loss and wide 
array of others.  
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The ensuing definition of sustainable development was thus decided: “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”72  
 
Herman Daly has noted that at the time of The Brutland Report, this definition was sufficiently vague to 
facilitate general agreement, but he suggests that by 1995 its vagueness had become “a breeding ground 
for disagreement” with some arguing that the term was so vague that it was of no use to standard 
economics.73  
 
Daly, in turn, offers the following articulate account of the concept: 
The power of the concept of sustainable development is that it both reflects and evokes a latent shift 
in our vision of how the economic activities of human beings are related to the natural world – an 
ecosystem which is finite, non-growing and materially closed. The demands of these activities on 
the containing ecosystem for regeneration of raw material “inputs” and absorption of waste 
“outputs” must, I will argue, be kept at ecologically sustainable levels as a condition of sustainable 
development.  
 
The account of the concept that is offered by Daly is shrewder than that offered by The Brutland Report 
in one simple way. The Brutland Report speaks openly of ‘natural capital’, when perhaps it would be 
more precise to speak of ecosystem goods and services. Although Daly does himself use the term ‘natural 
capital’ to describe some ecological inputs for economic activity, and it is not the intention of this 
dissertation to deviate from that view, we should be mindful that viewing ecosystem goods and services 
as ‘natural capital’ is limiting in its (over) simplification of the utility derived from resources that are as 
dynamic and complexly interdependent as ecosystem goods and services are. At the same time, the 
neoclassical view of these services as being natural capital arguably goes a long way toward simplifying 
attempts to understand the relationship between economic activity and ecological processes. However the 
substitutability question mandates that this simplification is only useful so long as sufficient closure 
regarding substitutability and interdependence between capital types is achieved. 
 
For the purpose of definition, Daly's definition of sustainable development as being characterised by 
economic activity that keeps the demand for raw materials (inputs) and waste absorbing services (outputs) 
at ecologically sustainable levels will be adopted in this dissertation. However, adopting this definition 
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gives rise to an important question concerning the potential for increasing the provision of ecosystem 
inputs and outputs through substituting ecosystem goods or natural capital for other economic goods, or 
'man made' capital.    
   
Substitution between Unlike Capital Types 
Central to the account of sustainable development offered by Daly, is the matter of keeping the 
regeneration of raw material ‘inputs’ and absorption of waste ‘outputs’ at ecologically sustainable levels. 
And it is on this point that there exists much theoretical dissonance.  
 
Theorists contend in varying degrees that man made capital is substitutable for natural capital in different 
measures. The name sake of the Solow growth model, Robert Solow, saw natural and man made capital 
as perfect substitutes.74 He suggested that technological change could enhance the substitutability 
between natural and man made capital to the extent that sustainable development became an inevitable 
developmental destination. Theorists such as Herman Daly on the other hand view natural and man made 
capital as ones which “fundamentally complements and only marginally substitutes” 75  the other. 
 
Before elaborating on the details regarding substitution and complementarity, it is useful to consult the 
common definitions of the terms. Within these definitions there lies an important assumption that can 
affect attempts to achieve sustainable development.  
Let us begin with a general definition of substitution: 
Substitution is the rational act of choosing a good service or asset. A change in the price, quality, 
desirability or affordability of an item, relative to another, causes substitution among the various 
choices that are available.76 
 
It is important to remember that although within the context of debates about sustainable development, 
the use of the terms ‘substitutes’ and ‘complements’ can create confusion when applied generally 
production. This is because questions surrounding the implied consumption of goods or services are what 
makes debates around substitution and complementarity relevant. This is the fundamental assumption that 
I argue generates ambiguity in the usage of the concept, since goods may well be substitutes in a micro 
economic production process, but not in a macro economic or sustainable development context. This is 
because although one production process may substitute one good for another with relatively little change 
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for the finished product, the subsitution may have a broader impact upon the range of capital stocks 
available to the macro economy or sustainable development context. For example, in the production of 
houses Amazon hardwood may be a good substitute for bricks, wile the widespread usage of Amazon 
hardwood may have greater  consequences for sustainable development than the widespread usage of 
bricks. In this example hardwood can be described as a substitute for bricks in the production of houses, 
but not in the production of ecological goods and services that may be seen to support sustainable 
development processes.   
 
On the basis of this idea it can be argued that we should not assume that goods seen as substitutes in one 
process are substitutable across processes. The picture may be made clearer with an account that defines 
the two terms ‘complements’ and ‘substitutes’ together: 
Goods that are complements are used together, while the consumer chooses between goods that are 
substitutes. An understanding of complements and substitutes is important to comprehending the 
forces behind the demand curve and the market price, as the demand for a product (or factor of 
production) is related to the price of its complement or substitute.77 
 
The conflicting views regarding the substitutability of one capital type for another have given rise to two 
broad schools of though within the sustainable development discourse. Proponents of so called weak 
sustainability claim that natural and conventional capital are substitutes, thus if one divests in one form of 
capital while investing in the other, sustainability can be achieved. Proponents of strong sustainability, on 
the other hand, argue that the two broad capital types are complements and that each must be maintained 
intact for sustainable interaction between the two to be realised.78  Still others such as Francis Laloë argue 
that perceptions and definitions of capital also evolve over time,79 thus supporting the view that the truth 
regarding the weak versus strong substitutability debate probably lies somewhere in the middle ground 
between the two opposed views. Arguments, such as those offered by Daly, for partial substitutability, 
may also occupy this space.  
 
The substitutability debate can be further reduced to questions of comparability of systems of 
measurement. When measured in terms of profit, substituting natural capital for technological progress 
may be relatively easy. Conversely, measuring changes in a production process, that result from 
substituting one capital type for another, in terms of the entropic integrity of that process, might make 
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substitutability a less likely event. For example, exchanging natural capital stocks for economic capital 
may increase the efficiency of an economic or production process, while disrupting the entropic and 
ecological balances of the given system. More acutely, improved fishing technology may allow for larger 
catches in spite of the fish population being smaller than it was before the improved technology. This may 
make fishing technology and fish population size substitutes to some extent, within certain micro 
economic thresholds, when measured in terms of catch. But if we attempt to measure the validity of the 
same substitution effect, between fishing technology and fish population, in terms of the ecological 
balance within the fishery, it is unlikely that we will be able to notice true substitutability between 
technology and abundance of fish. This is because the substitution effect, by its very nature, supports a 
disruption of the ecological balance of the fishery in an attempt to maintain elevated levels of output. And 
this ecological balance plays a role in the macro economic, or sustainable development context in which 
fishing decisions are made.    
 
In the light of this argument, it is impossible to say with certainty whether absolute substitutability exists 
between capital types and/or technological progress at all. Simultaneously, it is difficult to say that 
absolute substitutability certainly cannot exist at some level. Despite this doubt, there exist proponents of 
each view. Proponents of so called weak sustainability claim that natural and conventional capital are 
substitutes, thus if one divests in one form of capital while investing in the other, sustainability can be 
achieved. Proponents of strong sustainability, on the other and, argue that the two broad capital types are 
complements and that each must be maintained intact for sustainable interaction between the two to be 
realised.80  Although, in the light of the preceding argument, absolute substitution of one capital type for 
another seems unlikely, the truth regarding the weak versus. strong substitutability may lie somewhere in 
the middle ground between the two. Arguments for partial substitutability may fill this space, but only as 
long as they take account for the nuances that are implied when the measure of the effectiveness of the 
substitution effect is changed.    
 
However the sustainability question also engenders a political dimension. On the question of political 
implementation of the concept, Olivier Godard has suggested that a political process toward sustainable 
development can neither be derived directly from an inter temporal economic optimisation informed by 
market prices, nor from scientific understandings of biophysical processes upon with the reproduction of 
the natural environment depends. Godard argues this on the basis that imperfect understandings of the 
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complexity of each of these two fields, and the relationships between them, dictate an element of 
uncertainty regarding policy processes toward sustainable development.  For his reason, the author gives 
importance to the precautionary principle as a means to tempering decision processes that may lead to 
ecologically unsustainable economic activities.81  
 
One implication of Godard's view is that predictions based upon complete knowledge of the articulations 
between the relationships between environmental and economic factors as we understand them, are 
unlikely to be credible. I suggest that one response to this problem is to describe the relationships between 
economic activities and ecological impacts post hoc as a means to understanding their consequences. This 
chapter has highlighted, however, that the consequences of economic activities are not only important 
from an economic point of view, but from broader societal ones too. This creates an argument for a 
system of measurement that can be used to describe the societal impacts of given economic policy 
choices with economic, ecological, and social aspects. Pierre Failler's definition of societal cost, 
encompassing ecological, economic, and social costs, 82 provides a sound foundation for bringing these 
related factors together at a conceptual level.   
 
What to Value 
Implicit in the definitions of substitutes and complements lies a very simple but crucial aforementioned 
assumption. This assumption is that two inputs may be deemed as substitutes if an increase in the demand 
for one is related to the price of another and vice versa. Central to this view is the notion of demand and 
supply being driven by market forces.  
 
Fundamental to these market forces are market price and price elasticity. The definition of a complement 
is described by The Routledge Dictionary of Economics as follows: 
A good which is consumed in conjunction with another, e.g. petroleum with a car. Whether two 
goods are complements of each other can be discovered by measuring the cross price elasticity of 
demand between them. If the cross price elasticity is negative then the good is a complement.83  
 
Cross price elasticity of demand refers to the change in demand for one good associated with a change in 
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the price of another.84 This concept is naturally but also inversely relevant to the definition of a substitute, 
described as: 
A good or a service which a consumer regards as providing as much utility as an alternative. The 
character of being a substitute can be established by measuring the cross price elasticity of demand 
between the two goods (services). If that elasticity measure is positive, then the goods (services) are 
substitutes.85   
 
The important consideration here is that according to this neoclassical view, price and price elasticity are 
dependent upon the rate of complementarities or substitution between complements and substitutes. 
Associated changes in demand and supply have a natural and inevitable impact upon consumption and 
production processes. In highly interdependent systems, these inevitable impacts upon production and 
consumption are likely to have direct impacts upon attempts to balance the ecological consequence/s of 
an activity with its economic benefit/s or vice versa. Environmentally and socially undesirable market 
driven economic processes have already shown that the market can be unruly from ecological and social 
welfare points of view. Hoskins’ 1955 description of the changes in the English landscape resulting from 
the industrial revolution are testament to this. Thus, questions surrounding broader societal welfare, 
associated with developmental processes need to be addressed above (or below) and beyond the 
constraints of a free market where money is exchanged for goods and services, and micro rationality 
dominates.  
 
Considering questions of substitutes and complements within the context of sustainable development 
requires therefore that we be sure that the forces urging changes in supply and demand are appropriate. In 
other words, the processes or tools used for adjusting consumption and production patterns in accordance 
with changes in supply and demand must accurately reflect true ecological circumstances and their 
broader economic implications. The question of valuation thus becomes key.  
 
Demand and supply that is driven by market forces are themselves interpreted though their relationship 
with a measure of value, normally monetary. As such the integrity of these forces depends to some degree 
upon the integrity or credibility of this measure of value. If monetary measures are incapable of reflecting 
true, long run supply of ecosystem goods and services, then the value of those goods and services will be 
misrepresented and consumption and production patterns will deviate from optimal levels over time. 
Given the existing and legitimate concern over questions of the ecological sustainability of economic 
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growth, it does not seem an unlikely scenario that market forces interpreted using monetary valuation 
discord with economic development in the long term.  
 
The simple nuance is illustrated in the following account of neoclassical economics: 
Neoclassical economics refers broadly to the main stream microeconomic theory that has developed 
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, particularly the body of economic theory developed 
by British economist Alfred Marshall (1842 – 1924) in the late nineteenth century. The neoclassical 
theory of value explains the value of a good as its equilibrium price, which is determined both by 
utility (demand) and cost of production (supply). The body of neoclassical economic theory also 
includes theories of factor pricing, distribution of income, money and economic growth.86 
 
The trouble with the neoclassical view of valuation is that in common practice, price is determined in part 
by utility, reflected by demand, which fails to incorporate the elasticity of demand that is afforded to the 
broader economic environment in the long run, and the stochastic nature of ecosystem services. At the 
same time prices are also driven by costs of production that are fundamentally reliant upon the value 
imparted to inputs by their perceived utility, which is also determined to a large degree by perceptions 
regarding the potential for substitutability between a particular input or basket of inputs.  
 
If sustainable development is a goal, the forces driving prices must be lead by a system of valuation that 
is inclusive of the determinants of sustainable development. A system of valuation that can in effect 
internalise externalities and take fuller account of the developmental implications of resource loss has one 
principal implication. The implication of the realisation of such a system is that developmental objectives 
would be appreciated for their broader macro economic and systemic worth, thus arguments for 
sustainable economic growth could be made without implying a trade off in terms of sustainable 
development. At the limit, economic growth could then encompass improvements in endowments of 
natural and conventional capital.  
 
For the time being, it is important to set a few boundaries regarding approaches to sustainable 
development that require articulation relative to the weak/strong debate. 
   
Realizing Sustainability   
In 1949 Irving Fisher gave the following account of the fundamental principles behind sustainable 
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development:87 
I shall argue that it is the capital stock from which we derive satisfactions, not from the additions to 
it (production) or the subtractions from it (consumption): that consumption, far from being a 
desideratum, is a deplorable property of the capital stock which necessitates the equally deplorable 
activities of production: and that the objective of economic policy should not be to maximize 
consumption or production, but rather to minimize it, i.e., to enable us to maintain our capital stock 
with as little consumption or production as possible.88 
 
It is important to note that according to this view, capital stock includes ordinary goods such as stationery, 
clothing, and other things. Further, wants are satisfied by the existing capital stock and not by the 
inevitable using up of that stock.89  
 
Based on this view I argue that there are three key transcendental factors that should play a role in 
deciding what kind of approach path one should adopt in an attempt to effect sustainable development. 
The first is that it is quite certain that economic and ecological processes are highly complex both 
separately and interdependently. Thus the implication for substitutability arguments is that one should 
probably not attempt to aggregate welfare in terms of broad savings in either form if one measures those 
savings in aggregate across ‘subtypes’ of capital. Subtypes meaning the different and particular 
ecosystem services or goods, or the different and particular forms that conventional capital may take 
within their broader categories. For example we should not take the view that substituting all the whales 
in the sea for money in the bank (through killing whales and saving profits from that activity) can provide 
a solid foundation for sustainable development.  
 
The second factor to consider is that sustainable development by definition seeks development and not 
necessarily ‘economic growth’ per se. Thus the developmental implications of trade-offs between losses 
and gains in different capital stocks should be considered ahead of the associated implications for 
economic growth.  
 
The third consideration concerns the matter of the precautionary principle. Proponents of strong 
sustainable development might suggest that the precautionary principle should be used to ensure that no 
substitution effect should be deemed credible in the absence of absolute certainty, and efforts should be 
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made to examine relationships between capital types without generalising their particular utilities. 
However, in practice assumptions may frequently be made concerning the substitutability of different 
capital types in the absence of complete knowledge, and these assumptions may sometimes- even if only 
occasionally, be credible.  
 
 In the light of an interest in sustainable development rather than sustainable economic growth, 
examinations into the substitutability between capital types should be conducted with respect to 
developmental implications rather than output associated ones. In attempts to find suitable indicators for 
sustainable development, common ground should be found across the weak/strong sustainability debate. 
Although the approaches are different, the fundamental premise of each approach is the same - to sustain 
development although not necessarily economic growth, well into the future.  
 
If the objective for both approaches is to ensure sustainable development, and an argument for using the 
precautionary principle as a means to protecting the realization of sustainable development from over 
cautious assumptions about non substitutability can be made. The idea here would be that it may be 
necessary to use the precautionary principle as a means to taking precaution against limiting the 
possibilities for realising sustainable development though processes of trial and error, and the evolving 
conceptions of the relationships between complements and substitutes that such processes might permit. 
In this case it may be permissible to allow substitution in the absence of perfect knowledge as a means to 
learning about the implications of the substitution post hoc.     
 
It is the challenging nature of the endeavour toward understanding and realising sustainable development 
that is so central not only to academic effort but also to many of the political and institutional failures to 
achieve a clearly defined path toward sustainable development. The following chapter explores the nature 
of such political and institutional failures and comments on the extent to which these failures can be 
attributed to ineffective economic methods for evaluating the sustainable development implications of 
certain economic activities.     
 
Conclusion 
Almost twenty years since the inception of The Brutland Report many will argue that we are barely closer 
to sustainable development than we were at the time of the publishing of Our Common Future. Since this 
time, there have been significant theoretical advances in economics that address questions pertaining to 
the relationship between economic activities and ecological sustainability, and entire new university 
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syllabuses; some may even argue new academic disciplines have emerged to deal with questions 
surrounding sustainable development. However, it is arguable that the ratio between conceptual and 
practical progress, toward more sustainable economic activities is asymmetrical. This chapter has 
reviewed some academic perspectives concerning methods for achieving more cohesion between the 
economy and its broader environment. The chapter may even have made a small contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge concerning the assessment of substitutability between different capital types. 
These steps forward are a necessary but insufficient condition for realizing practical change because 
practical change requires not only technical know how, but political will.  
 
Some suggest that environmental and sustainable development issues have never been higher on the 
global political agenda than they are today. With mobilized and sometimes easily mobilizable public 
opinion at the centre of political discourse, it is argued that it is scarcely possible for many political 
entities to achieve a democratic mandate without expressing strong views on environmental matters.90 In 
counterpoint, it has been argued that the ecology of planet earth and the globe’s economy are interlinked 
in almost every way except one: the institutions which govern economic activity are not sufficiently 
linked with ecological concerns to enable meaningful economic and ecological synergy.91 This situation 
points to a failure of the political mechanisms which might be thought to safeguard long term economic 
viability. Nineteen years ago The Brutland Report calculated that sustainable development could be 
achieved with allowances for 3 to 4 per cent growth in developed countries and five to six per cent in 
developing ones. Since that time the developmental terrain has changed remarkably.  
 
Today the global economy, for which two cornerstones are, and have always been, natural and human 
capital, is an economy that may not be doing enough to ensure the longevity of these important types of 
capital. This chapter has introduced many of the conceptual considerations surrounding attempts to 
achieve sustainable development or sustainable economic progress, but it has not addressed the practical 
political obstacles preventing many of these useful concepts being put into practice. Political processes 
can play an important role as catalysts capable of bridging the divide between economic expansion and 
the deterioration of natural capital, but this requires political willingness to implement necessary changes. 
Changes in the way that we view what has traditionally been viewed as an immutable economy are likely 
to facilitate better political processes for dealing with sustainable development. However, identifying the 
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necessary changes requires not only conceptual insight into the material workings of economy processes, 
but a deeper understanding of the political economy as well.   
 
This chapter has outline the possibility that traditional systems of valuation or value storing may also 
contribute to lower long run growth by artificially supporting systems that support a decline in the 
cornerstones of the long-term well being of the economy. Chapter three will give some insight into these 
issues from a political economy perspective, showing that questions of economic rationality frequently 
boil down to conceptions of private and public interests that may not be congruent with the realization of 
sustainable development in the long run.  
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Chapter Three.  The International Political Economy and the Pursuit of More    
    Sustainable Economic Relations 
 
At least four major state interests affected by the structure of international trade can be identified. 
They are: political power, aggregate national income, economic growth and social stability. The 
way in which each of those goals is affected by the degree of openness depends upon the potential 
economic power of the state as defined by its relative size and level of development.92 
 
Introduction 
In his essay State Power and the Structure of International Trade, Stephen Krasner explores the 
relationships between the interests and power of states and the openness of the international economy. 
Krasner identifies four main goals that are pursued by states, and explores these goals in terms of their 
implications for domestic and foreign economic policies. The goals that Krasner outlines are political 
power, aggregate national income, economic growth, and social stability.93 
 
Krasner's analysis is useful for understanding international economic arrangements since it clearly 
describes some of the motivation behind certain economic policy choices that are made at state levels. In 
so doing the author provides a basis for identifying relationships between political interests and economic 
policy choices.  
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to describe how the relationship between political choices and resulting 
economic policy decisions impact upon the broader international political economy. The chapter aims to 
explore the relationships between political preferences and economic policy choices in terms of the 
impacts that the realization of these political preferences may have for the sustainable development of the 
international economy. Attention is focused upon the dynamics that can be seen to lead to economic 
choices that reflect political imperatives, and the international manifestation of these dynamics is 
explored as a means of outlining how politically charged international economic decisions can impact 
upon the attainment of sustainable development across countries.  
 
The chapter has five main parts. First it describes trade theory, and outlines that politically motivated 
economic decisions can lead to government subsidies for certain industries. It is described how these 
subsidies represent a departure from free trade. 
 
                                                 
92Krasner, S.D. 2000. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. In Frieden, J, & Lake, D. 2000. International 
Political Economy. London, Routledge. p 21. 
93Ibid. p 19. 
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The second part of the chapter examines Agency Theory as a means to describing the sometimes 
competitive political relationships that result between entities that are engaged in economic arrangements. 
The idea that agency relationships can be more harmonious in cases where parties identify positively with 
one another is discussed, but it is argued that there exists certain fundamental systemic dynamics that 
detract from the realization of more harmonious arrangements. The third part of the chapter describes 
these dynamics and discusses the extent to which they can be overcome in favour of more harmonious 
agency relations through the development of what Nicole Saam has outlined as being identification 
systems between the actors engaged in agency relations. Saam’s offering is developed in this thesis with 
an argument suggesting that at a theoretical level, identification systems provide an important starting 
point for realizing more synergistic agency relations between politically engaged economic entities. The 
fourth part of the chapter discusses some of the practical implications of politically motivated economic 
decisions with direct reference to fisheries relations between Senegal and the EU. It is argued that the 
relationship between the EU and Senegal is unusual from an agency theory point of view because Senegal 
adopts roles as both principal and agent and suffers a weaker bargaining position with the EU as a result. 
The fifth part of the chapter in turn explores the extent to which World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
mechanisms can be used to manage fishery relations in accordance with trade theory.  
 
The chapter concludes that although at a theoretical level it is possible to achieve greater economic 
synergy in international economic relations, the political obstacles to this synergy remain paramount. At 
the centre of questions surrounding the demolition of these obstacles, it is argued, is an information 
problem that prevents the development of effective identification systems for tempering agency relations. 
This information problem is seen to result from, among other things, weaknesses in economic growth 
theory and valuation problems. 
 
As such the chapter sets a back drop for the discussions in chapters four concerning the implications of 
economic growth theory and valuation systems for sustainable development.      
 
International Trade: Theory and Practice 
In the late 18th and early 19th century, Adam Smith and later David Ricardo attempted to provide the basis 
for the rational pursuit of international trade based on free market policy principles. Smith argued that 
states should be viewed like households in that no state should produce any product that costs more to 
produce than it does to import. Hence: 
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It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what will 
cost more to make than to buy. The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them 
from the shoemaker...94 
 
Smith believed that labour was the basis of commodity value, where the value of a particular good was 
determined by the hours of labour that went into its production. This thinking would later be developed 
by Karl Marx and David Ricardo. The theorists held that the opportunity cost of producing one unit of a 
particular good was the cost associated with the foregone opportunity to spend those hours of work 
producing another, possibly less labour intensive and more profitable, good.95    
 
This school of thought has formed the basis of what is today a more complex theory of trade which acts to 
subdue merchantilist tendencies in trade planning, which, perhaps dubiously, are characteristic of 
numerous trade policies today. The view holds that international trade can be beneficial for all traders, 
and thus represents a departure from the merchantilist thinking of trade being a zero sum game.  
 
Despite reduced philosophical support for merchantilism, today merchantilist thinking is not uncommon. 
However, rather than focusing on stockpiling gold and silver, modern merchantilism emphasises welfare 
associated with labour.96 The view holds that exports are good because they support a local demand for 
labour while imports are bad because they undermine this demand. In this view international trade 
becomes a zero-sum enterprise. The notion that international trade may be synergistic, even in terms of 
supporting mutual economic advancement and job security, is largely overlooked or undervalued by such 
proponents.97 This is usually the result of entrenched political forces that coerce policy makers to 
represent the micro rational interests of interested polities. Hence persuasive advocates of merchantilist 
policy approaches inhibit more laissez faire trade policies, sometimes to the detriment of gross economic 
efficiency.  
 
In 1919 Swedish economist Eli Hecksher provided the basis for a theory of international trade in a short 
publication. The core idea would later be developed and published by Hecksher's student Bertil Ohlin in 
1930. The emergent philosophy, which was subsequently supported mathematically by Paul Samuelson, 
is commonly known as Hecksher-Ohlin or H-O trade theory.98 Not unlike Smith’s proposition, H-O 
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theory posits:  
Commodities requiring for their production much of [abundant factors of production] and little of 
[scarce factors] are exported in exchange for goods that call for factors in the opposite proportions. 
Thus, indirectly, factors in abundant supply are exported and factors in scanty supply are 
imported.99   
 
These views that were originally supported by Adam Smith and later by Hecksher and Olin, provide 
much of the basis for the American lead liberalisation of global markets following World War II, which 
ultimately saw the inception of the WTO.  Political leaders of the United States and other industrial 
powers believed that protectionism had lead to the great depression of the 1930s which had amplified the 
political instability that could be partly to blame for the war.100  
 
Decision makers who believed that more liberal trade policies would increase prosperity oversaw the 
Havana charter which created the International Trade Organisation (ITO) on its completion in 1947. The 
ITO which intended to support the International Monetary Fund was never ratified by the United States. 
Instead the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was drawn up in 1947 as a temporary 
substitute for the Havana Charter and was, until superseded by the WTO in 1995, now the most important 
device in international trade.101   
 
WTO negotiations normally progress in rounds and there have been eight rounds since 1947, excluding 
the Doha round which is currently in action. Each round has resulted in a treaty which has been ratified 
by member states “under their individual constitutional provisions”.102 The theoretical framework which 
orientates WTO negotiations is based upon three core principles or 'norms'. Frieden and Lake outline 
these as: 
  
First, all members agree to extend unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN) status to one another. 
Under this agreement, no country received any preferential treatment that was not accorded to all 
other MFN countries. Additionally, any benefits acquired by any one country are automatically 
extended to all MFN partners. The only exceptions to this rule are customs unions, such as the 
European Union.    
 
Second, the WTO is based on the norm of reciprocity – the concept that any country that benefits 
from another's tariff reduction should reciprocate to an equivalent extent. This norm ensures fair 
and equitable tariff reductions by all countries. In conjunction with the MFN (or non-
                                                 
99Ohlin, B. 1933. International and Interregional Trade. Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University     
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discrimination) norm, it also serves to reinforce the downward spiral of tariffs initiated by the 
actions of any one country. 
   
Third, “safeguards” or loop holes and exceptions to other norms, are recognised as acceptable if 
they are temporary and imposed for short-term balance-of-payment reasons. Exceptions are also 
allowed for countries experiencing severe market disruptions from increased imports.103   
 
The Uruguay round of the late 1980s and early 1990s dealt primarily with trade in services and 
agriculture. Expert opinion suggests that greater adherence to trade based upon comparative advantages 
and a corresponding reduction in agricultural protectionism would lead to improved global welfare.  
However, despite prolonged negotiations at the Uruguay round and subsequent focus on the issue of 
agricultural subsidies of the Doha round and G8 Glen Eagles summit, political leaders have illustrated 
that local producers' demands for continued government intervention are more persuasive than arguments 
favouring global economic welfare and trade efficiency.  
 
Government intervention takes many forms. Traditionally protectionist measures have engendered the 
charging of tariffs on unwanted imports. The result of these tariffs is to increase the price of the imported 
goods compared with locally produced ones. In charging tariffs on imports, governments can 
simultaneously protect jobs in local industries and earn tariff revenue. As tariff measures have decreased 
since the inception of the WTO, industrial demands for protection have lead to new forms of non tariff 
protection such as government subsidies. These non tariff protective measures are referred to as Non 
Tariff Barriers (NTBs). In 2000 estimates suggested that nearly 20 per cent of imports to Europe enter the 
EU under some form of NTB.104 The results of all forms of protectionism distort market efficiency and 
often affect developing countries whose economies are frequently geared for producing agricultural and 
primary product exports. A study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1985 suggested that the costs of protectionism far exceed the benefits.105 The 
research argued that protectionist policies increase prices which depress non inflationary growth and 
retards investment. The paper asserts that lower import rents can lead to lower rates of export which in 
turn reduce net export revenue further.106 Diminished access to export markets naturally reduces 
employment in export industries in the middle and long term. At a state level, diminished efficiency 
means that jobs saved in one industry inevitably result in jobs lost in another. However as Coughlin, 
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Chrystal and Wood argue, the jobs saved by protectionism are more easily observed than the ones lost.107  
This is a problematic although by now familiar dynamic.  
 
The rationale behind government subsidies is to offer domestic producers improved comparative 
advantage through government investments in a particular industry.108 There are numerous ways in which 
a government may subsidise an industry, from tax breaks to loan guarantees and in some cases even direct 
payments. Normally subsidies are used to protect employment by strengthening an industry which may 
otherwise be unable to compete effectively in the free market.  
 
The implications of politically motivated economic decisions such as these can in turn be seen to have an 
impact upon the political and economic relations that exist between states and organisations that are 
affected by these arrangements. Agency theory is frequently used to describe such relationships, and can 
be useful for describing the impacts of such relationships with regards to international fisheries 
agreements, such as those between Senegal and the EU that are explored in this study.     
 
Agency Theory and More Synergistic North/South Economic Relations 
Agency theory is a branch of economic theory that aims at describing institutional arrangements in 
relation to the economic activities that are facilitated by these institutions. In a 2007 article, Nicole Saam 
suggested that although agency theory has traditionally been applied in attempts to describe the 
relationships between employees and employers, shareholders and managers, and between creditors and 
stock holders, the theory has been meaningfully put to use in a range of other areas. Two of these areas 
include state policy implementation, and examinations of the relationships between constituents and 
legislators.109 The author gives the definition of an agency relationship as defined by classical agency 
relations writers, Jensen and Meckling who define an agency relationship “...as a contract, under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent), to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making to the agent.”110 Saam shows that this agency 
relationship entails welfare implications for both principal and agent, citing Arrows definition that 
suggests that there are “...two individuals. One (the agent) must choose an action from a number of 
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alternative possibilities. The action affects the welfare of both the agent and another person, the 
principal.”111 
 
The shared welfare implications of agency relations can be seen to add a political dimension to principal 
agent relations that, given the broad applicability of the theoretical branch, can be applied to a range of 
economic relations. For the purposes of this thesis, we will explore the implications of agency theory for 
fishery relations between the EU and Senegal.  
 
Saam explains that power relations, as described by agency theory are frequently viewed as being 
asymmetrical. This asymmetry is thought to result from three main differences between principals and 
agents. The first difference concerns asymmetries in information, where agents assume the benefit of 
informational asymmetry since it is difficult for the principal to possess sufficient in depth knowledge of 
the activities and attributes of the agent as the agent itself. The second difference concerns risk 
preferences, where it is generally assumed that the principal is less risk averse than the agent as a function 
of the assumption that the agent possesses less economic power than the principal. Finally, the third 
difference concerns goal conflicts which emerge as a result of principals and agents having different 
preferences, while aiming to maximise their individual utility. “The agent wants to maximise income 
while the principal wants to maximise returns.”112 The implications of these dynamics see a juxtaposed 
relationship between the principal and the agent as the agent aims to minimise effort while maximising 
rent earnings and the principal aims to maximise the amount of effort put in by the agent while aiming to 
minimise the payments made for that effort.113  
 
The problems that arise from goal conflicts are referred to as agency problems. Saam defines agency 
problems as problems of the principal that arise because the agent has private information.114 The 
principal's information problem is arguably contextualised within an environment characterised by 
differences in risk preferences and goal conflicts. The culmination of these factors in turn leads to a 
hidden intentions situation where the agent seeks to fulfil their individual preferences without disclosing 
either the intentions or the means of fulfilling those intentions to the principal. We can argue that from 
this base, that in the absence of goal conflicts and different risk preferences, problems of hidden 
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intentions would be less significant than in cases where goal conflicts and differences in risk preferences 
are great.    
 
Saam focuses on this issue as a means to providing a new mechanism for overcoming hidden intentions 
and other agency problems. She suggests that if a principal exerts referent power over the agent, hidden 
intentions problems may be avoided. The exertion of referent power is defined by Saam as a process 
whereby the principal acts in such a way as to cause the agent to identify positively with the principal and 
therefore act in greater accord with his/her (the principal's) interests.115  
 
Saam suggests that this approach can solve all agency problems through the establishment of 
identification systems that lead the agent to identify positively with the principal and incorporate some of 
the principal's values, principals, and methods into their own modus operandi. 
 
Although Saam does not elaborate on the idea of her identification systems by applying them to practical 
real world examples, the concept remains useful from the point of view that it may provide a starting 
point for achieving greater synergy between principals and agents in cases where agency problems exist.  
 
We can argue that agency problems can be seen to explain certain aspects of the micro economic 
rationality that typifies certain economic arrangements since each party aims to maximise their immediate 
private utility. As a result this dynamic leads to observations that micro economic rationality can be seen 
as a driving force behind many of the economic policy actions of individuals and institutions at both 
international and more localised levels. The point of view is however contentious if we adopt a more 
macro rational point of view in the long run because the actions of principals and agents can be frequently 
seen as limited to the fulfilment of visible short term goals. The following chapter will elaborate more on 
the disparity between micro and macro economic rationality and will explore some of the implications of 
this for the politics of economic development. For the time being however, the concept of macro 
rationality can play an important role in identification systems that aim to solve agency problems by 
uniting the sometimes conflicting interests between principal and agent. If we assume that in certain 
cases, actions based upon the realization of a macro rational ethic have broad benefits for both principal 
and agent, then it is safe to assume that a macro rational ethic provides a basis for identification systems 
between principals and agents. 
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Extrapolating this view into broader decision processes that have an impact upon a range of factors 
requires in turn that these factors be incorporated into the macro rational perspective. For example if we 
assume an interdependence exists between economic decisions and the well being of not only the engaged 
actors and decision makers, but also broader social, ecological, economic, and governance systems, then a 
macro rational view must aim to assess the impacts of decisions upon these social, economic, ecological, 
and governance considerations. Problematically, economic choices that reflect the private interests of 
decision makers are infrequently sensitive to the implications that these choices may have for the broader 
system – especially when the emergent problems only occur in a far off land or sea. This ‘not in my back 
yard’ approach to international economic arrangements can thus be questioned from ecological and social 
points of view  
 
Achieving an identification system based upon this macro rational ethic succumbs to a number of 
problems however. At the beginning of the chapter we saw that a lack of information and a lack of 
political impetus can be seen as central obstacles to solving sustainable development problems. 
Identification systems offer the possibility of realizing the political impetus for agency problems that may 
manifest themselves in sustainable development dilemmas. However, even if a macro rational approach 
provides much of the basis for defining and developing an appropriate identification system in a given 
case, the problems associated with providing information that will permit principles and agents to identify 
common long term goals in spite of their short term differences remains important. 
 
The next section will illustrate that obstacles to information are underpinned by systemically entrenched 
dynamics that not only fail to allow information to emerge, but also suppress certain forms of information 
and perspectives that may be useful for the realization of a macro rational ethic. 
 
Dynamics leading to the Marginalisation of Important Perspectives 
A fine example of the information problem highlighted above can be framed in terms of intergenerational 
aspects to sustainable development. It is often the case with questions of sustainable development that the 
pursuit of the interests of current generations is in substantial discord with those of future ones, 
particularly where the relationship entails an inter-temporal partition of natural resources.116 At a political 
level serious problem of representation occurs in these cases since the interests of future generations are 
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less well represented than those of current generations. As a result the information pertaining to the 
perspectives that would be offered by future generations if they were present sometimes fails to emerge.  
 
A second example of a similar modality is evident in what may appear a far removed, though relevant, 
discourse. Electoral democracy has been perceived to be insufficiently inclusive of all the relevant views 
that may be held by sometimes-marginalized polities. For this reason deliberative democracy can be seen 
as a means to achieving greater inclusiveness and participation of marginalised minority groups, which in 
turn leads to greater enlightenment among participants.117 Deliberative democracy depends upon the 
creation of discussion groups which aim to strengthen the voice of the agents who may otherwise be 
unheard. As such this process of inclusion attempts to make democracy more democratic, but despite this 
effort in practice deliberative democratic processes tend to be dominated by the more articulate, more 
confident, more concerned, more domineering, more respected, and above all, more present participants. 
The ideal speech that is required for participants to remain rational and objective seldom keeps its 
integrity.118 As a result the outcomes of these deliberative processes tend also to reflect the imperatives of 
these more dominant groups. One example of this is the division that has occurred between the interests 
of current and future generations in sustainable development discourse. This is the case because the 
interests of future generations are easy to overlook at political and policy levels since these groups are 
effectively absent.   
 
In cost benefit analyses, which are often used to determine the merits or de merits of a particular policy 
proposal, a similar dynamic exists. Cost benefit analysis attempts to provide a clear decision criterion to a 
policy proposal based on the addition and subtraction of the cost and benefit points as a means to 
evaluating which are the most and least desirable courses of action.119 In this instance, again, only more 
obvious and more easily accountable factors are considered while other considerations, which may be too 
hard to understand or account for are more or less ignored, despite the possibility of their single or 
aggregate importance being great.120 Such is the case with many natural resource and environmental 
policy dilemmas. Although the micro accounting benefits of producing a product may be clear, the long 
term macro environmental or social costs associated with the production of that good may not be. In order 
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to make cost benefit analyses more inclusive of these factors, economists have attempted to assign values 
to environmental and social goods, but these attempts are often criticized for using valuation techniques 
that themselves fail to account for the complex relationship between important variables. As such the 
outcomes of implementing such techniques may vary depending upon which techniques are used.121 The 
result is that important values are seen to be marginalised by valuation systems. 
 
Garret Hardin's observations in his work, The Tragedy of the Commons, also illustrate how certain 
modalities take precedence over others in economic life. In this instance, which normally deals with 
common pool resources, a free rider effect occurs. The free rider effect is underpinned by a logic which 
suggests that it is relatively easy and personally beneficial to consume an extra unit of a shared resource 
at the shared cost of other users. Although the benefit of consuming an extra unit of the good is direct and 
may be large, the cost to all users, ones self included, is a partitioned cost and thus less grave than the 
personal benefit of the free riding activity.122 Thus: 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man [sic] is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interests in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.123 
 
The examples of the circumstances under which information is subdued or suppressed that have been 
given above have been highlighted because their dynamics and these arenas can be seen as important 
components of international economic discourse. The political implications of economic decisions and the 
economic implications of political decisions illustrate the importance of the failure of democratic systems 
to incorporate a full range of information and perspectives for decision making processes. The failure of 
cost benefit analyses to base recommendations on a fuller range of costs and benefits shows how 
economic choices based on such analyses may lead to the generation of negative externalities in the 
longer run. Hardin's tragedy of the commons dynamics show how individuals and institutions may be 
compelled to ignore macro rational implications of their activities because the information regarding 
impacts of their activities is suppressed through a shared costs mechanism. And finally, the difficulties 
associated with making decisions that accord with the interests of future, as well as present generations, 
demonstrate another area where representation and information problems impinge negatively upon 
attempts to realize sustainable development. 
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Olivier Godard has suggested that this cleavage between the interests of present and future generations is 
subject to two weaknesses. The first is a practical one where the interests of the disenfranchised and non 
present are overlooked in favour of the enfranchised and present stake holders.124 The second concerns 
the theoretical obstacles to dividing property rights, and the onus of responsibility for damage to property, 
between present and future generations – particularly when the property in question concerns ecological 
goods and services, and other factors linked with long term societal welfare.125 The position I shall take 
here concerning the rationality of safeguarding the interests of future generations is simple. The argument 
is simply that the existence of future generations will be product of the desire of current generations to 
ensure their lineage, and this indicates that it would be counterproductive to foster the existence of future 
generations without fostering a set of circumstances that will permit these generations to ensure their own 
lineage. From this point of view, the rationality in producing future generations while simultaneously 
putting their future at risk is paradoxical and characterises the chasm between micro and macro 
rationality. This chasm is one that requires bridging using information that will enable the establishment 
of common goals between future and present generations.       
 
If we look at each of these with respect to the realization of Nicole Saam's notion of identification 
systems for bringing conflicting objectives together, the possibility for subduing some of these situations 
exists. Identification systems between participants of democratic processes could lead to greater more 
synergistic outcomes, and at a theoretical level the same would hold for identification systems for 
Hardin's user groups as well as present and future generations. The problem posed by cost benefit 
analysis is perhaps more severe, and this should be the focus of attempts to deliver identification systems. 
As such this line of thought will be elaborated upon in chapter four and throughout the dissertation.   
 
For now, it is useful to apply the notions surrounding agency problems to the specific case of 
international economic relations between Senegal and the EU regarding fisheries. 
 
Subsidies and Fisheries Relations between Senegal and the EU 
If we apply an agency theory view to fishery relations between Senegal and the EU a number of 
interesting observations can be made regarding the balance of power between principal and agent. 
Although on the basis of extrapolations of the three differences between principals and agents cited 
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above, Saam argues that there is a general perception of asymmetry in favour of the principal in agency 
relations. However, one can argue that based on the three main differences between principal and agent, 
at a superficial level power relations between the EU and Senegal are skewed in favour of the EU. This is 
arguable because Senegal is bestowed with the authority to decide which fishing groups are allowed to 
fish in the country’s waters. This characteristic of the relationship puts Senegal in the position of the 
Principal, which also means that Senegal is subject to weaker power relations in terms of informational 
power. On the other hand, the EU effectively pays Senegal to allow it to fish in Senegalese waters which 
places the EU as the principal from the point of view of risk preferences, since the EU occupies the 
position of the employer. Finally, these bizarre dynamics result in peculiar agency problems as Senegal 
aims to maximise fisheries rents while minimising costs, and the EU aims to maximise their returns 
(catches), while minimising expenses.  
 
In this case Senegal adopts the role of the principal at one level because it has inferior information about 
the operations of the EU fleets, while at another level Senegal acts as the agent since it is the entity being 
paid. Further the EU can be seen to be less risk averse because of the two economic entities, it is the more 
powerful. This north/south dimension to this agency problem is expanded upon when we consider the role 
of discount rates. 
 
North/South economic arrangements have historically been characterised by a northward flow of natural 
resources, poorer southern states are compelled by higher discount rates to sell natural resources wealthier 
northern states that may have lower discount rates.126 The impetus for exchanging natural resources for 
financial gain is stimulated by an understanding that a high discount rate will mean that the returns to the 
money today are greater than those attributed to leaving natural resources in the earth until tomorrow. 
Southern states typically have higher discount rates than wealthier northern ones, and this among other 
factors can be seen as a core determinant of entrenched exchanges of resources for money flowing 
between north and south. In cases where countries have laboured under national debt burdens, the impetus 
to sell resources in order to service national debt is also great.127 Problematically, many of these 
arrangements can be viewed as post-colonial perpetuations of asymmetric Core-Periphery relationships. 
Such relationships have been characterised by colonised periphery areas providing cheap natural 
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resources to the colonial core that derive large profits through processing those resources.128  
 
Most natural resource economists agree that if there is an absence of property rights for a fishery 
resource, open access utilisation of the resource will lead to severe decline.129 For this reason economists 
have developed a system of tradeable quotas, licences or other regulatory measures used to manage 
property rights more acutely. In the case of the perfectly functioning fishery management system, the 
subsidisation of an industry, or a part of an industry, simply serves to transfer rents toward or away from 
consumers or producers depending on the market arrangement.130 In the case where an efficient 
management regime does not exist, and an element of open access remains, subsidies simply serve to 
accelerate the depletion of the resource by undercutting the diminishing marginal returns to fishing effort 
which characterise the marginal benefit curve for the fishery. Thus, in this example of an imperfect 
market, the absence of supply restrictions based upon including fuller costs to production can serve to 
undervalue the resources that may be becoming scarcer.  
 
In some fisheries tradeable quotas or licenses may be prevalent for certain sectors of the fishery though 
not in others. In other cases there may be a broad based absence of effective regulation in which case the 
advent of subsidised fishing accelerates depletion. Among states in West Africa with large fishery 
resources, there exist only loose or loosely enforced fisheries rules, property rights, and management 
regimes. In Senegal for example, the artisanal fishing sector is at present open access.131 Although there 
are attempts to regulate the activities of these fishers, few pay license fees, and licenses are not used to 
limit fishing capacity. In contrast, subsidies are granted for artisanal fishers as a means to boosting the 
supply of fish products to the local market. This will be explored more closely in chapter seven. Since 
access fees under the agreements signed between most West African states and the EU are calculated as a 
percentage of landings,132 the impetus for misreporting landings is obvious and poses a threat to 
regulation efforts.  
 
Additionally the existence of EU subsidies for fishing fleets of EU member states generates questions 
regarding the effects of the activities of these subsidized from an international trade point of view. 
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Examining the WTO regulations that to some extent provide a framework for managing economic 
arrangements such as these, provides an important means to understanding how potential negative 
impacts of politically charged economic arrangements may be overcome.  
 
The Role of the WTO 
During the Uruguay round of WTO talks, the issue of fisheries was omitted from the Agreement on 
Agriculture. As a result fisheries are covered by the disciplines of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM). The ASCM protects the fishery sector from two forms of subsidies: 
prohibited and actionable subsidies. Prohibited subsidies can be defined as those subsidies which are 
intended to create an unfair comparative advantage for favoured industries or enterprises over other 
producers in the sector. Actionable subsidies are permitted subsidies which can warrant counterveiling 
action given a proven causal relationship between the subsidy and a resulting material injury in a 
particular industry. In this case a material injury is defined as the domination of an unreasonably large 
market share by a subsidised industry or group of subsidised industries resulting in adverse effects upon 
the an industry of a WTO member.133 Adverse affects are defined by Article V of the ASCM as: 
 
[1] An injury to the domestic industry of another member. 
[2] The nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly of indirectly to other members 
under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 
1994. 
[3] Evidence of the existence of serious prejudice.134  
 
Although the ASCM provides protection to the fishing industry from a number of subsidies that may be 
found in the sector, it provides by no means for all of the subsidies that exist.135 Roman Grynberg points 
out: 
This definition may not include certain types of payments or subsidies for access by fishing fleets that 
may be 'Flag-of-Convenience' registered and hence defined as 'outside the territory' of the member 
offering the subsidy. Also subsidies that may be offered in the form of foreign aid in lieu of access may 
not be covered under the current definition of subsidy [sic] and hence one of the main forms of fisheries 
subsidies that are under attack by environmental NGOs (WWF and Greenpeace) would not be covered by 
the ASCM.136 
 
The author does concede that there are, however, several forms of subsidies that may for part of distant 
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water fishing fleets’ accounting procedures, which are covered by the ASCM.137 However, implementing 
countervailing action, a state's weapon against actionable subsidies, in response to actionable subsidies is 
not straight forward. There are three key issues to consider. The first is the heterogeneity of fish stocks 
and the second is that certain countries, particularly those which do not import fish products from fishery 
subsidizing countries, have little or no wherewithal with which to take countervailing action.138 Third, 
WTO dispute resolution mechanisms are exclusive since they are typically expensive to initiate and 
complete.139 Grynberg goes on to make a well articulated argument for a careful approach towards 
improved fisheries subsidies disciplines in consideration of small and vulnerable island states that rely 
heavily upon subsidised access agreements. This is a valid argument which is well served by the notion 
for special treatment for states manifesting certain necessary characteristics.  
 
Above and beyond Grynberg's concern, however, remains a need to address the issue of subsidies and 
other NTBs in a concrete way in order to avert the negative impacts that such disciplines currently have 
for many states, particularly less developed countries, which may face an array of developmental 
challenges. These considerations merit an examination of the case of the management challenges faced by 
the Senegalese fishing industry, which exhibits many of the hallmarks of an industry under the grips of an 
inhospitable international economic environment.  
 
The perceived effects for the less developed country, in this case Senegal, are to see an increasingly 
hostile interface between the natural environment and economic activity as underdevelopment, job 
shortages and below efficient regulatory infrastructures augment the depletion of a key economic 
resource.  
 
Conclusion 
At conceptual levels, a more synergistic approach to policy dilemmas involving competing actors, that are 
all aiming to fulfil their own micro rational interests, does exist. H-O trade theory and the development of 
sustainable development discourse is testament to this. However, policy processes that are relied upon to 
give political life to these conceptual whisperings are sometimes stifled by a logic that sees all groups 
attempting to be heard while neglecting the perspectives of others. The extent to which the results of these 
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attempts discord with a macro rational ethic such as the one proposed by sustainable development 
discourse, will depend to a large extent on the provision of information that can lead to greater 
identification between actors. This identification can serve to unite conflicting policy objectives and 
provide some basis for policy processes toward a more macro rational set of outcomes. We have seen that 
the key area where the provision of this information is of paramount importance is that concerning cost 
benefit analyses and other such systems for evaluating the impacts of economic choices.  
 
Anne Isia has argued that the rationality of actors is an important determining factor for determining their 
actions regardless of the institutional environment that they may find themselves in.140 I would argue 
further that institutional and conceptual environs can be, and often are, determined to some extent by the 
rationality of the actors present. 
 
Chapter four will show that some of the shortcomings of cost benefit evaluation systems can be traced to 
some extent to the rationality of actors, inadequacies in existing economic growth theories, and the role 
that rationality of actors plays in underpinning inadequacies in these and other important economic 
institutions and processes.  
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Chapter Four.  Development, Economic Growth, and Politics 
 
Micro rationality often leads to macro irrationality, as evidenced by the paradox of thrift, the 
tragedy of the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma, the tyranny of small decisions, and the arms 
race.141 
 
 
Introduction 
William Odum has claimed that the economist Alfred Kahn’s notion of “the tyranny of small decisions” 
is relevant not only to market economics but to a broader range of systems, including environmental 
issues.142  
 
Odum's theory suggests that society is managed as a conglomerate of public decisions. Individuals and 
small groups form the lower ‘nests’ of decision making while higher levels are occupied by elected 
governments and smaller bodies within governments. The higher levels are theoretically supposed to be 
comprised of experts who collectively make rules that are applied to the decisions and decision making 
processes that occur at the lower echelons of the conglomerate.143  
 
Decisions are, however, not always arrived at in this manner. In some cases small groups or individuals 
arrive at decisions without the supervision of the expert elected authorities. In these cases a big decision 
may be reached post hoc, and the optimality of these decisions is never regulated by the supposed 
authorities.144 This dynamic has been called 'The Tyranny of Small Decisions' and has been blamed for a 
number of problems in market economics. The central theme is the notion that the total of small decisions 
may not lead to a desirable outcome for the total. 
 
This chapter explores the questions surrounding micro versus macro rationality from two different, 
though related angles. The first angle approaches the problem from a political point of view, where 
rationality is explored in terms of governance and policy outcomes. The second angle explores micro 
versus macro rationality from the perspective of economic systems of valuation and models for growth. 
This approach illustrates the impact that placing emphasis upon micro gains in economic growth models 
and valuation systems has in terms of broader developmental consequences.   
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The chapter begins with an examination of the dynamics of choice, noting that in democratic systems, 
public choice is largely an aggregation of private choices. Concepts of rationality are brought into 
questions with regard to divergence between rational wants, short term objectives and rational longer term 
interests. This section reviews the work of Garett Hardin, Mancur Olson and Elinor Ostrom, and 
examines some of the thinking of these theorists with regard to the relevance of their work when it comes 
to practical policy implementation. The second part of the chapter reviews some of the history of certain 
policies aimed at achieving greater synergy between economy, ecology and society, concluding that 
policies have generally failed to address important developmental issues. These failures are seen as the 
product of a complex and interdependent policy environment and a lack of good information capable of 
reflecting the pertinence of these issues, and not as the result of a lack of interest in long term societal 
well being. The third part of the chapter deals with the extent to which models for economic growth have 
been capable of providing information that reflects the pertinence of the relationship between economy 
and ecology. The section gives an account of the importance of the development of new growth theory as 
a departure from the neoclassical approach, but suggests that the complexity of the relationship between 
the endogenous factors for economic growth that are considered by new growth theory, hampers real 
progress toward a more integral system of economic policy decisions. The fourth part of the chapter 
reviews the importance of the precautionary principle while addressing the metaphor of 'governments as 
prisoners' in economic policy arenas due to an apparent lack of information that can bridge the divide 
between micro choices and macro interests. As a result the chapter concludes with a recommendation that 
a system of evaluating developmental process that is capable of bridging the divide between short and 
long term policy interests should be developed.      
 
Private Choices, Public Politics  
Dynamics that fall within the range of tyrannies of small decisions may be illustrated in a number of 
ways. The view simply suggests that in societal life sometimes micro actions can lead to macro 
inefficiencies. Examples of this dynamic such as the paradox of thrift, the tragedy of the commons and 
the prisoner’s dilemma have been given by Herman Daly. Perhaps one of the better known and well 
explained examples is Garrett Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons – which can be described in terms 
of a prisoner’s, or prisoners’, dilemma game. 
 
Since Hardin first published his challenging article titled The Tragedy of the Commons in 1968, the 
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phrase has come to symbolise the degradation of commonly shared resources.145  The paper suggests that 
the benefits received for shared resources are appreciated individually, while the costs associated with the 
degradation of the resource are shared between users. Hence in a commonly shared pasture the rational 
live stock owner or ‘herder’ will be compelled to graze extra livestock to her own benefit, but to the 
detriment of her colleagues. 
 
Hardin was not the first to notice the status quo of the tragedy of the commons, but his thinking has been 
profoundly important for understanding the nature of the individualistic tragedy of the commons, 
especially when formalised as a prisoner’s dilemma game. In a 1990 publication, Governing the 
Commons, Elinor Ostrom artfully describes both Hardin’s individualistic tragedy of the commons 
problem as well as Mancur Olson’s insightful views on the free rider problems that are associated with 
attempting to achieve collective action. Olson's views were published in his 1965 book The Logic of 
Collective Action. Both of these theories have influenced thinking on issues of common pool resource 
use, though Ostrom’s important and different take on the matter has been perhaps one of the most 
exciting developments in the field in recent times. Searching for a new approach to issues surrounding 
common pool resource use, Ostrom holds: 
 
As long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescription will address this metaphor. I 
would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the 
constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than remorseless tragedies.146   
 
Before Elinor Ostrom’s approach to common pool resource management is elaborated upon, it may be 
worth doing as she has done and provide an understanding of the thinking behind the philosophies of 
Hardin and Olson.  
 
Summarising Hardin’s view on tragedies of the commons is perhaps best done by way of a simple 
prisoners’ dilemma game. Suppose for the sake of argument that a fishery is exploited by rational fishers 
who are out to maximise the benefit that they achieve from their fishing effort. At the same time the fish 
population being exploited is, like most fisheries, a renewable but depletable resource, and thus has a 
limited capacity to yield benefits or catches per unit of fishing effort. The upper sustainable limit of 
fishing effort can be denoted by the maximum number of boats that can be sustained by the fishery. In a 
game comprising two fishers, the ‘cooperative’ strategy can be interpreted as each fisher using B1 boats. 
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Thus 2 x B1 boats for the entire fishery, and a maximum profit (Pmax) of 2B. The ‘defect’ strategy on the 
other hand is for each fisher to use as many boats as he/she feels that he/she can use while still making a 
profit from his/her fishing activities. In this case both fishers will suffer a relative loss proportionate to the 
extent of the over fishing. This can be denoted as 2B + X where profit is Pmax – Z(x), with Z denoting 
the profits earned by additional effort X. If fisher G limits his/her capacity to B1 while fisher H uses B1 + 
X boats, fisher G receives B(Pmax - Zx)/2B + X while the defector (H) obtains B + X(Pmax- Zx)/2B + X. 
 
Problematically in the absence of a binding contract, or management regime, the dominant strategy for 
each player is to defect. Ironically when both players opt for the defect strategy, the outcome can be seen 
to have negative impacts for the long term welfare of the fishery system. Ostrom notes the paradox 
contained implicitly within this game as well as other prisoners’ dilemma games, where the optimal 
outcome for each player is achieved through the cooperative strategy. Paradoxically rational choice in the 
absence of communication between players insists that they both defect, thus yielding an inferior outcome 
by way of an outcome that is in effect the preferred choice of neither player.147 This logic is at the heart of 
Hardin’s observations as well as the enormous challenges associated with attempting to regulate fisheries 
and other shared resources. Though Ostrom notes that this can be overcome through the implementation 
of communal management systems which incorporate communication between participants and the 
identification of common objectives.148 
 
Mankur Olson’s argument is closely related to that of Hardin, though his work has been done in the field 
of the logic of collective action. He suggests that an individual who cannot be excluded from the benefits 
of a collective good has little incentive to voluntarily work to provide that good.149 Hence emerges the 
paradoxical problem of the free rider where rational choice may dictate that nobody work to provide a 
collective good, with the result that there is little of the collective good to be shared.150    
 
In fishery dilemmas, fishers are less inclined to contribute to the regulation of the resource, than they are 
to free ride off of the regulatory efforts of other fishers. 
 
Ostrom has argued that it is the premises contained within these two theories of common pool resource 
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use and effort sharing that has led to centralised government control of natural resources as being the 
predominant method for regulating the exploitation of natural or common property resources.  “The 
presumption that an external leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons leads to 
recommendation that central governments control most natural resource systems.”151 In a similar way the 
author notes that privatisation has been hailed as a means to eradicating tragedies of the commons by 
ascribing private property rights to user groups of various resources. In this case the onus of control and 
regulation falls upon those who own the resource. In the case of water resources it is still unclear as to 
what the establishment of private property rights even means,152 though development of systems such as 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) can be seen to have contributed to the assigning of property rights 
for living water resources. One of the key premises of Ostrom’s work has been to look beyond the 
‘rivalistic’ logic behind the two above mentioned approaches and to seek out a more co-operative 
approach to common property resource use in the absence of often inefficient centralised systems of 
control. The author suggests that the challenging problems accompanying the regulation of shared 
resources may be overcome by way of a binding contract between users (referred to in the text as 
'herders') committing themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will figure out. Thus: 
…the herders, who use the same meadow year after year, have detailed and relatively accurate 
information about the carrying capacity. They observe the behaviour of other herders and have an 
incentive to report contractual infractions. Arbitrators may not need to hire monitors to observe the 
activities of the contracting parties. The self-interest of those who negotiated the contract will lead 
them to monitor each other and to report observed infractions so that the contract is enforced. A 
regulatory agency, on the other hand, always needs to hire its own monitors. The regulatory agency 
then faces the principal-agent problem of how to ensure that its monitors do their own job.153 
 
For Elinor Ostrom this approach to resource management avoids many of the problems that are 
characteristic of centralised private ownership or government control, and indeed appears to offer a 
chance at a more efficient system of regulation through the nurturing of cooperative relationships between 
users. This approach may work in some contexts, but is limited in its capacity to deal with a broad range 
of natural resource management dilemmas, especially when resource management schemes must fulfil a 
broad range of politically important interests.     
 
Ostrom’s approach can work well at micro levels, at macro levels individual interests are inevitably 
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represented by smaller groups of elected or non elected officials for the sake of practicality. At these 
macro levels it may not be possible to achieve self regulation since politics is likely to dictate not only 
collective representation of individual interests but also the nature of collective ownership of shared 
resources. In these cases, resource rights may be partitioned between users using quota or licence 
systems. When the interests of user groups with divergent interests enjoy similar levels of political 
influence, achieving an appropriate management regime is a complicated and difficult policy process. 
Further, as we have already seen, the realisation of the interests of the more politically powerful 
individuals or groups mat not accord with the satisfaction of global well being. In international resource 
management arrangements, interdependence between resource stocks, and the economic importance of 
these resources for nations sharing stocks, means that effective management requires effective 
international cooperation. For this reason one might propose an Ostrom type management system for 
local levels where, for example, relations between fishers  might be managed using Ostrom style 
cooperative forums. Simultaneously, at more macro international levels, policy orientation could be given 
by a management system based upon the idea of identifying common macro level objectives, or 
identification systems, between stake holders.     
 
Political theorists such as van Vliet argue that although the solutions to environmental rights issues are 
frequently viewed by both the public and the private sector as requiring intervention on the part of 
government, it is often the case that government effectiveness with regard to such responsibilities is 
low.154 He suggests that there may be several reasons for this, arguing that frequently environmental 
policy failures are the product of bureaucratic inefficiencies and the inability of market measures to yield 
effective results. Further, he asserts that public sector effectiveness with regard to environmental policy 
issues normally lags behind the social and political expectations of its critics. This time lag may be due to 
a variety of reasons including the obstruction of state power by large and powerful institutions.155 On the 
other hand, Nicholas Low argues that it is not so much planning, as it is the idiosyncrasies of political 
processes that determine the nature of policy outcomes.156 Hence for Low, good governance, particularly 
with regard to environmental and natural resource rights dilemmas, must be viewed as a process of 
learning, and fine tuning of institutional arrangements rather than a static and strictly outcome based 
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political process.157 This point is perhaps best illustrated in retrospect of past policy attempts to articulate 
the relationship between economy and society, and the natural environment.   
 
The following section explores some of the historical governmental and intergovernmental approaches to 
the protection of, and investment in natural capital. The purpose of the section is to explore not only the 
trends in governance concerning natural capital but also to elaborate to a limited extent upon the political 
forces that have driven and may continue to drive these trends. 
 
A Sustainable Development Policy Vacuum 
During the period between the two world wars, environmental issues did not form an important part of the 
international policy agenda. Other than some superfluous attempts by The League of Nations to solve the 
problem of marine pollution, precious little attention was paid to environmental matters.158 During the 
post World War II period environmental issues were still not afforded much importance in international 
policy circles because other, more pressing issues dominated international political agendas. This period 
was, however, important for it saw the creation of governance institutions designed for dealing with 
macro level policy issues. The establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, as well as several 
important Non Government Organisations (NGOs) which would play important roles in policy processes 
in the future are examples of this. Subsequently a perceived need for a coherent response to 
environmental problems resulted in at least 47 significant developments in international environmental 
affairs between 1965 and 2002. One development of particular significance was the tabling of Agenda 21 
at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. This agreement recognized that the environmental problems in one 
country could have an effect, directly or indirectly, on the inhabitants of the rest of the world.159 But since 
domestic political pressures within the legislature, the government bureaucracy, and the broader political 
system are immense, and often conflicting,160 a coherent policy approach to environmental issues has 
been difficult for national governments to achieve.161 
 
Thus, despite having been enlightened to the importance of the protection of natural capital, states have 
been slow to implement reforms and to embrace new priorities. It seems as if matters such as 
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environmental security for example, though on the agenda, are rather low on the hierarchy of many 
administrations’ political priorities. When economies are sluggish and matters of national security are 
tainted with incertitude, prioritising ‘green’ policies is unlikely to win elections.162  
 
It is not the case, however, that states, as the supreme authorities in our lives, and other important 
organisations, desire the degradation of natural capital. Conversely these institutions are faced by an array 
of circumstances which constrain their behaviour in such a way as to cause them to repeatedly commit 
tragedy of the commons' indiscretions, and other micro rational but macro irrational actions. As such, 
environmental, and associated crises, may simply emerge as the result of the world’s sovereign decision 
makers simply attempting to perform some of their important functions.  
 
Christopher Pierson has outlined some of the important functions of states as: advancing their economic 
interests; providing the necessary infrastructures for the sustenance and proliferation their societies; 
protecting their citizens and borders from possible threats, both internal and external, and projecting a 
suitable image among other states.163 Ideologically many states may support environmental preservation 
but are unable or unwilling to adhere to their ideological commitments due to any number of practical 
constraints. Often these states pay lip service to environmental issues, but can be slow to follow up with 
concrete action. Although the rhetoric may be true, budgetary and other factors may hamper follow 
through:  
 
In practice states have frequently proven unreliable in representing what we might call 
environmental goods, when faced with short term economic costs such as potential restrictions on 
industrial activities, or added costs to those activities in order to safeguard the environment.164  
 
Effective leadership, however, should surely not be constrained by the advancement of short term 
interests, but also by a wider, longer term vision.165 In an international setting, the presence of a need for 
collective action and the political will to resolve pending environmental calamities is obvious, particularly 
in the light of the assertions of agenda 21 of the Rio Convention.  
 
It is important to consider that in the light of new theories of economic growth, that purport the 
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importance of natural capital for growth, states may be compelled to protect ecological goods and 
services as a means to achieving some of those important functions that may be seen to have created a rift 
between governance and the protection of, and investment in, natural capital. However, this shift is 
unlikely to see the dissolution of conflicts pertaining to natural resource usage at the international level, 
since at this echelon, states may quite easily become locked into a system that is driven by small quasi-
private choices at an intergovernmental level. Thus despite the existence of international institutions for 
dealing with such conflicts, there are likely to remain powerful and conflicting interests that will affect 
the nature of international political responses to such conflicts and the issues that underpin them.  
 
Odum describes this dynamic articulately, showing that when it comes to environmental decision making, 
a number of calamities have resulted from decisions that were never made in an official capacity but were 
rather reached as an aggregation of small decisions. He goes further to suggest that in order to avoid these 
kinds of tyrannies, a holistic rather than a reductionist approach is required. In other words the author 
suggests that decisions be viewed in terms of the satisfaction of total utility rather than attempts to satisfy 
each individual’s total utility. The view therefore offers a utilitarian global ethic which aims to satisfy the 
interests of the maximum number of stake holders. Over time, maximizing the interests of the maximum 
number of stake holders requires intergenerational analysis, and if we extend our definition of a global 
utilitarian ethic to other species, then we are required to extend analyses to the ecological level.  
 
There are a number of reasons for the perceived departure from this harmonious and inclusive state for 
planning economic activities, one of them boils down to small decisions - small decisions that not only 
escape the grips of the experts at the upper levels of decision discourse, but small decisions that are made 
by individuals across the scales of government and power.  
 
Such a system of decisions leading to undesirable outcomes from a global utilitarian perspective may 
indeed result from a failure to take a holistic approach, and this flaw may, as has already been discussed, 
result in large part as from inadequacies in the currency with reference to which most economic, and 
many political, decisions are made. These inadequacies can be seen to emerge from dynamics where the 
aggregation of micro rational small decisions can fail to satisfy a more macro rational ethic or set of 
ethics, and it is these aggregations that require correcting in order to align micro and macro rational 
decision processes.  In order to understand the nature of the potential inadequacies for informing 
economic outcomes that accord with a macro rational ethic, it is important to understand some of the 
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theory behind the determinants of economic growth.  
 
 
The Role of Theories of Economic Growth  
Previous chapters have highlighted the point that development does not equate to growth, however, in the 
developing country context, a strong argument may be made for discussing growth within the context of 
development because the minimum thresholds of economic well being are generally perceived to be to 
low support development without realizing at least some economic growth.  
 
Since the mid 1980s a huge amount of research has been produced concerning the applied economics of 
growth. This research has attempted to explain the difference in production and income growth between 
countries of the world, and much of it has been inspired by endogenous growth theory.166  
 
A.P. Thirlwall has suggested that the proliferation of research on the topic of endogenous growth theory 
can be seen to have arisen from several key factors, he highlights three: The first was a growing concern 
about growing income discrepancies across countries and regions of the world. The second was the 
improved availability of data that could facilitate econometric studies on growth patterns in various 
regions. The third were some pioneering studies (such as Baumol’s 1986 work167) that found little 
convergence of per capita incomes in the global economy. This ran contrary to the predictions of 
neoclassical growth theories which assumed diminishing returns to capital, and associated faster growth 
in poor countries as a result of homogeneous technology and developmental preferences.168  
 
Thirlwall suggests that it is the third finding that has given much momentum to the development of 
endogenous, or ‘new,’ growth theory as purported by Robert Lucas and Paul Romer in particular. 
Endogenous growth theory: 
…relaxes the assumption of diminishing returns to capital and shows that, with constant or 
increasing returns, there can be no presumption of the convergence of per capita incomes across the 
world, or individual countries reaching a long run steady state growth equilibrium at the natural 
rate.169  
 
The rationale here is that if capital returns are not diminishing, then investment is an important driver of 
                                                 
166Thirlwall, A.P. 1999. Growth and Development. 6th Ed. London, Macmillan. p 115. 
167For detail see:  Baumol, W. 1986. Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare, American Economic Review. 
December.  
168Thirlwall, A.P. 1999. Loc Cit. 
169Ibid 
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economic growth, which thus becomes endogenous as a result of the role of investment.170 According to 
this view, positive externalities can be produced by investments in human capital that improve the capital 
output ratio, by preventing it from rising, while preventing the marginal product of capital from falling.171  
 
Thus a key difference between new growth theory and neoclassical growth theories concerns growth of 
output and the initial capital per head. The thinking goes that if new growth theory is correct this 
correlation should be positive. If the ratio is found to be negative, then neoclassical approaches will be 
affirmed along with the implication that rich countries grow more slowly than poor ones do. If the ratio is 
positive, the new growth theory assertion that the marginal product of capital, or the change in 
productivity associated with the change in capital does not diminish and will be found true.172 
 
The impetus driving the main theoretical departures of new growth theory from the neoclassical view 
stem, in part, from the lack of evidence illustrating that poor countries generally grow faster than do rich 
ones. This effect is the result of an inverse relationship between capital per head and the growth of output. 
The other motivation for the departure from the neoclassical view is that the savings and investment 
ratios, population growth, technological advancement, and all the factors that affect the productivity of 
labour are held constant across all countries in the neoclassical view. Thirlwall asserts that these 
assumptions are however “manifestly false” and that this is in no small part why we have seen a shift 
toward new growth theory.173  
 
In growth theory an essential point has been overlooked for some time, and it is the overlooking of this 
basic point that has lead to much confusion. The essential difference between the neoclassical and the 
new approaches emerges from the fact that developed and developing countries, and even countries 
within those categories, do not have the same production functions.174 Factors such as population growth 
and investment ratios do affect the growth of income per capita, as do variables such as education, 
expenditure on research and development, trade, political stability and other ‘non-economic’ variables 
influence the productivity of labour.175  
                                                 
170For detail see: Lucas, R. 1988 On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol 
22; Romer, P.M. 1986. Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth, Journal of Political Economy. October; Romer, 
P.M. 1990. Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy. October. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. p 16. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. p 117. 
175 Ibid. p 116.  
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The basic implications of the new paradigm in growth theory are several. The first implication is to see a 
nuanced role for capital and investment as engines for economic growth over time, where investments in 
various capital types can be viewed as offering important returns for sustainable growth in the long run. 
This boosts the impetus for sustaining investment. The second is to incorporate factors such as human 
capital, political stability and other formerly ‘exogenous’ factors into growth functions. In the light of the 
first implication this incorporation of formerly endogenous factors creates a drive to invest in these capital 
types – even if they may be apparently non economic in the traditional sense. The result of these factors is 
to create space in economic growth theory for an important role of ecological goods and services or 
natural capital, as well as social goods like good governance, health and nutrition. Problematically, the 
dynamics of growth are complex and it is difficult to predict exactly which capital types should be 
invested in and in what quantities.  
 
This point is indicative of the limitation of new growth theory to accurately answer questions concerning 
substitutability between unlike capital types, and thus solve an important part of the sustainability debate. 
Given that endogenous growth models essentially provide insight into the nature of the economic growth, 
that has traditionally been measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), these new growth models will be 
restricted to giving measures of substitutability in terms of this same measure - GDP. This, as we have 
already seen in chapter three is problematic from a sustainable development point of view. It is quite clear 
that issues of measurement are key to solving questions over substitutability, and should therefore be a 
focal point of the debate over substitutability between capital types. Despite these weaknesses, the shift 
toward endogenous growth theory indicates growing awareness of the importance of a broader spectrum 
of capital types for economic advancement, and this is good.  
 
As we have already seen, however, achieving breakthroughs in economic theory are only one part of the 
challenge to solving sustainability problems, another part is achieving the necessary political cooperation 
that will allow these advances to take shape in practice. 
 
Governments as Prisoners 
In a sense the debate over new versus old growth theory or exogenous versus endogenous growth is 
indicative of the question that asks which concept should be pursued by humanity: development or 
growth. There can be little doubt that exogenous theory has contributed to and explained economic 
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growth in many parts of the world. As a result of the environmental and social infractions that are not 
fully internalized by the exogenous growth model, the costs of this growth are closely linked to the (un) 
sustainability of the growth. New growth theory attempts to internalize the costs of such infractions, thus 
providing a view of economic growth that accord more closely with a conception of economic growth as 
growth that accords with a conception of sustainable development. The central issue of measuring this 
growth remains key. If GDP is retained as a measure of growth, then many of the benefits associated with 
investment in or protection of diverse capital types may not be reflected in growth estimates. An 
alternative to GDP may be a measure that aims to measure development and not economic growth in the 
neoclassical sense of the term. The monetary measures that are frequently employed in GDP measures 
can be seen as being politically persuasive, and questions concerning the points of convergence and for 
this reason divergence between ‘softer’ measures of development and GDP are likely to be politically 
important. 
 
We remember from chapter two that Olivier Godard has suggested that a political process toward 
sustainable development can neither be derived directly from an inter- temporal economic optimisation 
informed by market prices, nor from scientific understandings of biophysical processes upon with the 
reproduction of the natural environment depends. For this reason he argues this on the basis that imperfect 
understandings of the complexity of each of these two fields, and indeed the relationships between them, 
dictate an element of uncertainty regarding policy processes toward sustainable development.176 It is thus 
that the author gives importance to the precautionary principle as a means to tempering decision processes 
that may lead to ecologically unsustainable economic activities.177  
 
The discrepancies between the benefits accrued by economic planning based upon nuanced notions of 
development or ‘developmental benefit’ as opposed strict monetary measures such as GDP create an 
interesting dynamic, especially if governments are not all prudent enough to adhere sensibly to the 
precautionary principle. Basing economic policy decisions upon the aggregation of monetary wealth, or 
improving GDP, is not guaranteed to ensure longer term developmental well being for a nation’s 
inhabitants – especially not if all nations adhere to such thinking. This is evidenced by the numerous 
questions surrounding the economic sustainability of traditional growth patterns. Basing economic policy 
decisions upon the aggregation of broader developmental benefit is likely, even very likely – depending 
                                                 
176 Godard, O. 1994. Op cit. pp 316-317. 
177 Ibid  
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on the appropriateness of methodological approaches, to result in longer term developmental benefit. 
However, opting for developmental benefit over GDP based benefit is not guaranteed to enhance 
monetary gains across the board. Thus in an interdependent international political economy, where the 
procurement of monetary wealth is extremely politically persuasive, and rational, from short run 
individualist perspectives and so called sustainable development, initiatives are rationally motivated by 
collectivist logic, subjecting governments’ policy decision makers to the laws of the prisoners’ dilemma. 
The fact that trade offs exist for choosing between approaches, combined with the fact that ecological and 
economic interdependence will dictate the extent to which choosing a development approach yields 
dividends for individual states, makes achieving mutual and unanimous cooperation a prisoners’ 
dilemma. This, combined with the fact that governments generally pander to the wishes of given 
constituencies – who are unlikely to choose global well being over personal benefit, as evidenced by 
numerous tyrannies of small decisions, makes it unlikely that governments pursue a development agenda 
ahead of a GDP focused one. And these reasons, among others, may be seen as the central causes of what 
is today a brewing debate over the ecological sustainability of modern civilization and economic 
processes on a non expanding planet.    
  
Conclusion 
A cooperative strategy among states regarding the choice between GDP or development would require 
one or more of the following developments: Firstly, a shift in the hearts and minds of the world’s electoral 
constituencies away from personal monetary gain towards global developmental progress. Secondly, a 
political miracle that allowed such a shift to occur without a change in the hearts and minds of the world’s 
electorates. Thirdly, a break through in growth theory that proved the limits and extent to which 
substitutability exists between natural and man made capital types. Finally, a system of evaluating policy 
choices based upon developmental impacts of decisions, while showing persuasive monetary benefits 
associated with approaches that favour development over GDP per se. An approach that favours 
development over time requires intergenerational analyses to be made. 
 
Achieving any of these goals is an endeavour worthy of devoting energy and time resources to. This study 
focuses attention on achieving the latter of the four objectives. This objective has been chosen, because, 
given the severe problems with money as a measure of wealth, the choice between GDP and development 
may not be as simple as it may appear on the face of it. Simply put, a choosing development over GDP is 
unlikely to yield significant benefit if money is retained as a means to evaluating either the aggregation of 
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GDP or the aggregation of sustainable developmental well being.  
 
The next chapter will review some of the existing alternatives to GDP, and will introduce a new system 
for assessing the sustainable development implications of economic activities based upon the impacts that 
a given activity may have for the capital stocks that are seen to support the sustainable development 
process. 
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PART THREE: A New Model 
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Chapter Five.  A New Approach to Assessing Sustainable Development Impacts of Economic 
Activities: Sustainable Development Directives 
 
To measure progress (or welfare) in monetary terms also neglects the welfare contributions of non 
monetizable social and environmental services, from parents, neighbours and friends, from 
communities, and from 'nature': the sun, the air, the climate, the scenery, the biosphere.178 
 
Introduction 
Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated that being able to align the role of markets with the implications 
that market activities have for the productivity of ecosystems, and thus the production of numerous goods 
and apparel, requires that markets be guided by a system of (e)valuation that can take account of the 
impact that market activities have on a range of diverse capital stocks. These capital stocks are important 
since they perform crucial functions in supporting simultaneously ecological and economic systems. At 
the same time, the diverseness of these capital types means that evaluating their importance in terms of 
monetary exchange values implies unrealistic homogeneity between capital types and the broader 
economic and ecological roles that they play. Problematically, monetary exchange values are politically 
important since they form much of the basis on which many of the decisions that form the fabric of social 
and economic governance systems are made. Transcending the decision processes that occupy the domain 
of monetary exchange values requires information that can illustrate the pros and cons of policy choices, 
from a broader sustainable development point of view. Doing this will firstly provide the means to 
evaluating the implications of market activities, and secondly, in so doing provide an alternative 
rationality to systems of governance that are today dominated by micro rationality based on short term 
gains. This step will at least go some of the way towards providing the practical basis and political will 
required for the realisation of policy decisions that take account of the longer run sustainable development 
implications of economic arrangements, particularly concerning the direct exploitation of natural 
resources. 
 
This chapter is dedicated to developing a framework that is capable of providing some of the insights that 
such an approach should engender. The chapter is important since it develops this framework in sight of 
all of the preceding chapters. The chapter has five main parts. The first part summarises the main points 
that have been made in each of the preceding chapters. The second part offers a theoretical description of 
the economic development process, showing the important roles that different types of capital play for 
economic development processes. At the same time, the importance is outlined of investments and 
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depreciation in capital types which provide economic opportunities to firms and households. This part of 
the chapter makes the distinction between economic development and sustainable development by 
describing the important roles that investment in, and depreciation of, an array of capital types have for 
sustained societal welfare through sustainable development. The third part of the chapter describes the 
evolution of methods used for assessing the development success of economies, illustrating a gradual 
evolution toward the inclusion of formerly excluded variables, such as the well being of human and 
natural capital assets. The fourth section introduces critiques and develops further the concept of Genuine 
Savings (Sg) as a means for assessing the ecological sustainability and societal desirability of the 
economic activities of economies. The recommendation is made that the tool is useful but needs to be 
used with greater sectoral and capital specificity.  
 
The fifth part of this chapter attempts to provide a framework for applying a modified version of the Sg 
indicator to less developed economies. Implementing the modified Sg approach, within the context of a 
modified framework describing the development process, allows two tools to be developed.  
 
The first tool provides the basis for assessing the impacts that the activities of different economic sectors 
have for a given range of important capital assets. This allows for comparisons, in terms of capital 
investment and depreciation implications, to be made between sectors. The second tool is developed for 
the purpose of assisting natural resource management decisions by providing information that illustrates 
the alignments between resource exploitation by each sector and the capital investment and depreciation 
schedules that are associated with those exploitation processes. The tool does this by creating a ratio 
between units of resource exploited, and the impact that the exploitation activity has upon the well being 
of a given capital asset.  
 
Application of both tools provides the basis for informing natural resource management decisions in 
terms of their more general broader developmental implications. These ‘developmental implications’ can 
either be oriented by long run sustainable development or shorter term economic growth depending on the 
spread of capital assets being compared. It is recommended though, that assessments be conducted with 
reference to the specific capital portfolio of the region in question in order to enhance applicability. 
    
Summary of Key Points in Previous Chapters 
We have seen that economic management decisions have an impact upon the well being of societies. 
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Economic management decisions are driven to an important extent by different representations of private 
interests in political and market systems. The untempered representation of these interests in economic 
policy outcomes can easily lead to ecologically unsustainable relationships between economies and 
ecological systems that support them. These unsustainable relationships can lead to undesirable societal 
circumstances through the imposition of trade offs in terms of not having structured economic activities in 
a way that enhances the generation of societally desirable developmental circumstances. It is clear that 
articulating the relationship between economic activities, ecological systems and societies requires that 
the social and economic format being striven for is well defined. At present this format is not well 
understood, this is partly because, thus far political processes have not needed to address the question of 
ecologically sustainable economic and social progress to any significant extent. Simultaneously, greater 
information dedicated to understanding an ideal format for the relationships between society, economy 
and ecology could lead to improved political consciousnesses concerning the issue, and ultimately policy 
outcomes.  
 
The Development Process 
Jeffrey Sachs explains that within less developed contexts the prevalence of assets that can be put to use 
in productive economic systems is a large determinant of the potential for economic development. He 
annotates further that it is not only the capital stock or prevalence of capital assets that is important for 
economic development but that the prevalence of capital per person, or the capital per capita ratio, is 
critically important and can either decline or increase as a result of economic and societal activity.179 For 
example, the capital per capita ratio declines when the relevant population grows faster than capital is 
accumulated. In turn the ratio increases when capital is accumulated faster than the population grows. It is 
the accumulation and depreciation of capital, and the capital per capita ratio, within these contexts that 
can give us the biggest clues as to the potential for societal progress to be made through the realisation of 
economic activity that simultaneously employs and creates capital. The ways in which this capital is 
employed and created by different economic activities can indicate the likely direction that pursuing 
particular activities has for future economic possibilities, and allow us to make educated guesses about 
the longer term viability of those possibilities. 
 
Sachs believes that the accumulation of capital depends to a large extent upon the actions of households 
                                                 
179Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty. London, Penguin. p 245 
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since households can contribute to capital accumulation in numerous ways.180 This is probably true but 
capital accumulation is not the sole responsibility of households. Capital accumulation is reinforced by 
government actions designed to make capital investments in goods that private entities would be unlikely 
to invest in. As a result it has been argued that in less developed countries, improvements or 
deteriorations in budget allocations may mean the difference between “abject poverty and the capacity to 
satisfy basic needs”.181 Such goods normally include common property goods that individuals or groups 
are disinclined to invest in as a result of micro rationality and free rider dynamics. Hence the role of 
public expenditure on investments in those goods is important. Diagram 5.1 shows the role that public 
and private investment in capital goods plays for the growth of an economy.  
 
The diagram describes the basic mechanics of capital accumulation as a circular flow of economic 
benefits, and can be understood by examining these flows with household income as both the starting and 
ending point. The two forces that are exogenous to the model are population growth and household 
consumption. The Figure can be understood by viewing a hypothetical, initial, household income as the 
staring point. When this income is taxed by the government, public moneys then enter the public budget. 
These moneys can be spent by the government on capital investments for the economy; thus serving to 
increase the capital per capita ratio. Simultaneously, household savings increase the capital per capita 
ratio without government intervention. We have already seen that increasing the capital per capita ratio 
increases the number and quality of economic opportunities available in the economy. When these 
opportunities are seized, the improved capital per capita ratio translates to economic growth. Economic 
growth in turn stimulates household incomes and the cycle repeats itself off the base of higher household 
incomes.  
 
If population growth outstrips capital investment, fewer economic opportunities will exist at the end of 
each period, household incomes will diminish per person, and negative economic growth can occur. This 
can set the wheels in motion for an economy to become trapped in self perpetuating poverty. However, if 
population growth is lower than the rate at which capital is accumulated, more economic opportunities 
exist per person; household incomes will increase along with consumption which, in turn, provides 
further economic stimulus to other sectors. In the long term, the danger of this situation is that economic 
expansion will yield short term benefits for a while, but will be coupled with capital depreciation that 
inhibits the potential for safeguarding future economic possibilities. This is why capital accumulation is 
                                                 
180Ibid. p 247. 
181Schick, A. 1999. Op cit. p 38. 
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so central to questions surrounding the sustainability of economic development. 
 
Diagram 5.1 Basic Mechanics of Capital Accumulation 
 
(From Sachs, J. 2005. Loc cit) 
  
While diagram 5.1 shows that public and private sector entities play an important role for capital 
accumulation, it does not show which types of capital are seen as important for achieving economic 
development at a basic level. Sachs responds to this with an explanation of the process of economic 
development in terms of the capital that is required as a first step toward initiating positive economic 
development. He breaks these capital endowments down into six broad categories:  
 
! Human Capital: health, nutrition and basic skills required for individuals to be economically 
productive. 
! Business Capital: machinery, facilities, transport. 
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! Infrastructure Capital: roads, power, water and sanitation, airports and sea ports and 
telecommunications networks. 
! Natural Capital: arable land, healthy soils, biodiversity, and healthy ecosystems capable of 
producing important ecological services. 
! Public Institutional Capital: judicial systems and government services. 
! Knowledge Capital: scientific and technical know how.182     
 
These capital types are generally representative of the three broad capital types that are identified by other 
scholars. Nick Hanley describes these as including manmade capital, human capital, and natural 
capital.183  As such Knowledge Capital can be seen as nomenclature for human capital, while Business 
Capital and Infrastructure Capital can be seen as nomenclature for manmade capital. Public Institutional 
Capital however, does not fall under any of the three broad categories, and would perhaps not be 
considered as capital by numerous authors. However for the purpose of this study, Sachs’ view will be 
adopted in that Public Institutional Capital will be considered along with the three other capital types as 
playing an important role in the development process.      
 
Various and diverse forms of capital and non capital factors, such as systems of governance and so on, all 
play important functions for economic activity. If future economic activity is desired, those who benefit 
from it today are largely responsible for assuring investments in the capital stocks that will enable it to 
continue functioning tomorrow. We have seen however in previous chapters, through an examination of 
the dynamics of micro rationality, that private entities may be disinclined to make investments in 
commonly used capital goods. As a result, governments and public budgets play important roles for 
managing investments in goods and services that can help stimulate economic growth,184 and this 
provides much of the impetus for considering what Sachs refers to as Public Institutional Capital along 
side the three main capital types that have been identified. Diagram 5.2 shows the basic mechanics of 
capital accumulation where households and the public budget play central roles. 
 
Sachs’ suggests that household investment may take place directly through direct expenditure on capital 
goods or indirectly through the payment of government taxes, which may in turn be invested in capital 
                                                 
182Sachs, J. 2005. Op cit. p 245. 
183Hanley, N. 2000. Macroeconomic Measures of 'Sustainability'. Journal of Economic Surveys. Vol 14, no. 1.  
p 1. 
184Schick, A. 1999. Op cit. p 43. 
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accumulation.185 He suggests that different entities, public and private, are inclined by their particular 
functions to make investments in different capital types. 
 
Diagram 5.2 shows that households are more inclined to making investments in Business Capital, Human 
Capital, and Knowledge Capital.  
 
Diagram 5.2 Basic Mechanics of Capital Accumulation: The Role of Households 
 
(Adapted from Sachs, J. 2005. Loc cit) 
 
Governments on the other hand are described as being inclined toward investments in Knowledge Capital, 
Infrastructure Capital, Natural Capital, and Public Institutional capital. As a rule, these trends may not 
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always hold and it is therefore important, when comparing the model to actual economies, to observe the 
specific trends that exist in each example. It is equally important to acknowledge that tax revenues are not 
the sole sources of income for public authorities. The diagram shows that public money can come from 
external sources as well as internal tax systems. These external sources can come as the result of foreign 
aid, bank loans, or other means. As the case study will show, these ‘other means’ can encompass 
payments made to governments by external sources for the rights to exploit certain of a countries capital 
assets. 
 
In these cases it is important to view the public credits that are attributed to access fees or licence 
payments as coming hand in hand with trade offs that can be linked with the depreciation of capital, 
stemming from its exploitation by external forces. Management authorities therefore, have the 
responsibility of ensuring that the capital gains, of granting access to capital assets to external bodies, 
counterweight the foregone opportunities to exploit those capital stocks differently.  
 
Identifying and managing these balances in capital gains and losses, and the associated economic 
implications, is a difficult task and it is thus important to identify and monitor the impacts of these 
changes at a level that is capable of indicating their broader economic impact. 
 
For Sachs, households play such an important role in these processes because household savings are 
frequently invested directly in businesses, or indirectly using financial intermediaries such as banks.186   
 
Households also play important roles for direct investments in human capital, and an array of indirect 
investments through the payment of taxes. Businesses or firms also play important roles for the 
accumulation of capital since these entities also support direct and indirect investments in different types 
of capital. Firms pay employees, invest in machinery and other resources, pay government taxes, and also 
stimulate other sectors through general consumption. All of these actions can be linked with reinvestment 
in productive capital. The role played by firms is therefore important and can be incorporated into a 
model for capital accumulation. Diagram 5.3 shows some of the basic mechanics of capital accumulation 
through a description of the role of households and firms.     
 
                                                 
186Ibid. 
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Diagram 5.3 Basic Mechanics of Capital Accumulation: The role of  Households and Firms 
 
 
This Diagram is an elaboration on Diagram 5.2, which outlines the role that firms play for the dynamics 
of capital accumulation in an economy. Firm revenues are shown to lead to households through the 
payment of salaries, while serving other important functions such as general consumption, savings, and 
tax payments.  
 
The diagram clearly shows how it is possible to ensure reinvestment in capital goods by channelling some 
of the benefits of economic activity back toward capital stocks. The diagrams do not show why it is 
necessary to reinvest in capital in the first place, since they do not show how capital is diminished by 
economic activities. 
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Outlining how capital is diminished shows the central paradox of these reinvestment schemes. The 
paradox is that in order to invest, economic gains must be made but in many cases the processes for 
making economic gains may frequently cause the depreciation of capital.  
 
Capital Investment and Depreciation 
Capital is diminished by a number of processes. Sachs outlines some of these processes as being the result 
of the passage of time, wear and tear or the death of skilled workers.187 There are of course other 
important processes that reinforce and underpin the degradation of capital, many of which concern the 
nature of production processes. The extent, to which the new capital can be substituted for depleted 
capital, as is proposed by the Hartwick rule, remains a question for debate. Though a growing number of 
theorists suggest that the assumption that capital that is used up in a production process can inevitably be 
replaced by new capital, is manifestly false.188 
 
If we can show that capital stocks that are diminished by a production process can be replaced by capital 
that is created during that process, then the issue of capital accumulation and capital per capita is less 
serious. Unfortunately experience suggests that this substitutability is limited. Without a more detailed 
explanation of how capital ratios might be maintained in the face of the paradox of production and 
reinvestment, Sachs' model for economic development is unable to provide for long term development, 
rather falling into the category of models for economic growth. What the model does offer though is a 
basic understanding of the interdependence between different capital stocks and economic activity. 
Combining an understanding of these dynamics with a method for assessing the quality of capital 
investments relative to associated capital depreciation, will provide a means to describing some of the 
broader developmental consequences of a given economic activity.         
 
David Pearce and Edward Barbier have developed a technique for assessing capital depreciation and 
investment ratios in an economy that, when combined with Sachs' model, can provide the basis for 
assessing developmental consequences of economic activities. The authors have dubbed their approach 
Genuine Savings (Sg).  
 
 
                                                 
187Ibid. 
188Ashrem, G. B., Buchholz, W., and Withagen, C. 2003. The Hartwick Rule: Myths and Facts. Environmental  
and Resource Economics. no. 25. 
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Measuring Depreciation and Investment 
Pearce and Barbier have argued that sustainable development requires economic activity that produces 
Genuine Savings, where capital stocks are reinforced through investment and transfer of technology.189 
Genuine Saving has been the result of attempts to improve GNP measures so that they are more sensitive 
to the well being of an array of important capital stocks. GNP can be defined as the sum of all the 
incomes in an economy and equitable to consumption (C) plus savings (S) since incomes are either spent 
on consumption or are saved.190 GNP can therefore be denoted: 
 
GNP = C + S 
 
Although the GNP measure can say a great deal about the market conditions, the measure is unable to 
produce meaningful insight concerning the well being of a range of capital stocks. Some theorists such as 
Hans Messinger have argued that “Simon Kuznets and other pioneers in the field of National Accounting 
never conceived that Gross National Product could or should serve as a measure of economic or social 
welfare.”191 As a result of this apparent shortcoming of GNP, Net National Product (NNP) was 
developed. NNP emerged as an attempt to account for the economic impact of the depreciation of man 
made assets, and can be described as GNP minus the depreciation (d) of Man Made Capital (Km). Thus: 
 
NNP = GNP - dKm  
 
Conversely, appreciations in Km could also be taken account for by this approach by giving dKm a 
negative value, of by adding aKm rather than subtracting dKm from GNP. 
 
An acknowledgement of the importance of other non synthetic capital assets, namely Natural Capital 
(Kn), has let to the development of a unit of measure that includes the state of these stocks into national 
accounts. NNP*, also known as Modified National Product or Green National Product incorporates the 
depreciation of Kn to the NNP measure, giving a measure of an economy's national product that takes the 
depreciation of ecological capital assets into account. The * in NNP* denotes the modification of NNP to 
incorporate the depreciation of Kn.192 
                                                 
189Pearce, D. & Barbier, E. 2000. Op cit. p 95. 
190Ibid. p 88. 
191Messinger, H. 1997. Measuring Sustainable Economic Welfare: Looking Beyond GDP. Presentation delivered  
at the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Economics Association. St John's Newfoundland. 
192Pearce, D. and Barbier, E. 2000. Loc cit. 
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Natural Capital comes in two types: renewable and non renewable. Depreciation in non renewable 
Natural Capital is measured by subtracting the yearly discovery of new resource stocks (D) from the 
extraction rate (Q). Depreciation in, or loss of, non renewable resources is thus derived: 
 
Depreciation = Q – D 
 
For renewable natural assets the same logic applies, but instead of counting the discovery of new assets, 
the natural rate of replacement or biological growth (B) is counted. At the same time Q is replaced by the 
harvest rate (H),193 meaning: 
 
Depreciation = H – B 
Applying these modifications to the NNP measure implies that:  
 
NNP* = GNP – dKn.  
 
Subsequent to NNP*, Genuine Savings was offered as a means to improving the NNP* measure. The 
equation for calculating Genuine Savings is as follows:  
 
Genuine Savings = Savings – Depreciation of Man Made Capital – Depreciation of Natural Capital + 
Accumulation of Human Capital + The Present Value of Future Technological Change. It is easy to 
notice that the new indicator was developed along the same lines as NNP*, while attempting to overcome 
some of its main shortfalls in four areas.194   
 
First, Sg was modified to improve upon NNP* by taking changes in Kh into account. The Sg measure 
does this by considering Kh as a non depreciating asset. This was done since the authors argue that 
Human Capital normally appreciates but doesn't often depreciate, hence Kn is denoted in the equation: + 
aKn.195  
 
Second, Sg and NNP* are different in that Sg takes account of the geo economic origin of domestic 
                                                 
193Ibid. p 89. 
194Ibid. p 95. 
195Ibid. pp 92-93. 
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investment expenditure. Pearce and Barbier suggest that since many countries borrow finances from 
foreign entities in order to fund local investment initiatives, a distinction should be made between local 
and foreign money. Thus gross savings are calculated:  
 
Gross Savings (GS) = Gross Domestic Investment – Net Foreign Borrowing.196 
 
Third, the inclusion of PV(T) has made it possible to account for technological advances that might 
increase the productivity of existing capital stocks.  
 
Fourth, the indicator offers the possibility of comparing the Genuine Savings of one economy with those 
of another. Thus if Sg is greater than 0, an economy is assumed to have positive genuine savings and be 
sustainable, Sg less than 0 therefore represents unsustainability. The authors suggest that although there 
are some technical problems with this manner of calculating sustainability from the origin (0), the general 
rule is solid.197 Perhaps it is due to these technical issues that Pearce and Barbier do not explain the 
implications of having a Sg rating equal to 0. On the positive side though, the theorists argue that giving 
the indicator and origin allows for countries to be easily ranked according to the sustainability of their 
economics. This has drawn, and continues to draw critical political attention to sustainable economic 
activities as countries are inclined to avoid having a low ranking on such an index.198 The Sg indicator is 
thus calculated: 
 
Sg = S – dKm – dKm + aKh + PV(T)199 
 
The Genuine Savings approach has been popular with some international economic institutions. Since the 
idea was first introduced in 1993, the World Bank has estimated it for over 100 countries.200 Despite this 
acclaim, the indicator has several important weaknesses that must be addressed if it is to achieve more 
credibility. 
 
Genuine Savings and Sustainable Development   
The Sg approach is weak in four important ways. First, it assumes that adding and subtracting unlike 
                                                 
196Ibid. p 94. 
197Ibid. p 93. 
198Ibid. 
199Ibid. p 95. 
200Ibid. p 92. 
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capital types to and from one another can produce a credible estimate of the future productivity of an 
economy's capital stock. This is a problem since the debate concerning substitutability between different 
capital stocks is not resolved and pervasive alternative, the precautionary approach, suggests that we 
should not make potentially harmful assumptions regarding substitutability. Second, the approach gives 
Kh an exclusively appreciating nature. Poverty trap conditions and the Aids epidemic are testament to the 
fact that Kh can and does often decline. Third, the Sg method does not allow for per sector analysis. This 
means that even if only one industry or smaller sub sector of an industry is to blame for a generally poor 
sustainability rating of an entire economy, that industry remains more or less unidentified. As a result of 
this and other factors, we can identify a fourth limit to the approach. The Sg approach offers a means to 
evaluating the sustainability of an entire economy without offering any more detailed policy advice on 
when, where or how a particular situation could be improved. Thus, the authors themselves state that their 
approach does not achieve a means to turning “sustainability indicators into ex ante decision guiding 
measures.”201 
 
Modifying the Sg Approach 
The short falls of Sg, though serious, can be overcome by using a nuanced version of the Sg indicator in 
conjunction with a revision of the dynamics of capital accumulation. At the same time the first three 
pitfalls of the Sg approach can be addressed in order to give a more credible quality to the new combined 
approach.  
 
Sachs has shown that households play an important role in the accumulation of capital. This capital in 
turn plays an important role in economic development. This view is sound since households certainly do 
play an important role for economic activity. However, the role that firms play for economic development 
processes is not expanded upon by Sachs and the importance of these entities should not be overlooked 
since firms can be seen to play important roles in producing economic benefits by producing output. At 
the same time, the activities of firms and households can contribute to the depreciation of capital assets 
that are used as inputs. This makes the work of Pearce and Barbier important because their Genuine 
Savings approach offers a means of assessing the nature of the relationship between economic entities and 
the capital that they use and produce. Within the broader context of development, deriving a description 
of the capital that is available to households and firms across time can provide a means to assessing the 
developmental opportunities that are available to these important entities.  
                                                 
201 Pearce, D. and Barbier, E. 2000. p 100.  
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Diagram 5.4 relates the process of economic development as it is described by Sachs with reinvestment in 
various capital types in a more detailed way. The Diagram is an elaboration on Diagrams 5.1, 5.2, and 
5.3. It shows the production of a commodity emerging from a production process that uses the six noted 
capital types as inputs.  
Diagram 5.4. Revised Production and Investment Cycle 
 
 
The product flows into the market where it is sold and profits generated flow into the firm that produced 
it. Firm income is then channelled into households, through the payment of salaries, and into the public 
budget through direct tax payments and indirectly through taxes paid on other firm expenditures. At the 
same time, the firm may make direct capital investments as part of its operation. Household revenues, on 
the other hand are also taxed directly, as income taxes, and indirectly, through tax payments on general 
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expenditure. Households may also make capital investments through healthcare payments, investments in 
education, private business investments, as well as through other means that form part of the societal 
functioning of households.   
 
As a result of the tax payments, made by both households and firms, governments are able to make 
capital investments according to their investment priorities. Thus, total investment in an economy’s 
capital assets stems from households, firms and government. Note also that general expenditure by firms, 
households, and government serves economic expansion in other sectors, and this catalyses part of the 
economic interdependence between sectors within an economy. Another part of this interdependence is 
catalysed by competition for resources or capital assets, which makes government’s ability to manage the 
capital portfolio in an economy very important.  
 
A production and investment cycle is comparable to a development process, where changes in the capital 
that is available in the economy, imply changes in the economic opportunities that are available, and 
therefore the changes in the developmental status of the economy. Attempts to maximise developmental 
opportunities, by fine tuning the relationships between forces in the relevant economy, make it desirable 
to derive a production function that is capable of explaining the development process.  
 
However, the massive interdependence between economic, social and ecological forces that interact 
within an economy makes it extremely difficult to determine a remotely precise production function for 
development processes. This, and uncertainty regarding the fungibility of capital types in production 
processes, make attempts to derive a production function capable of outlining the necessary conditions for 
sustainable development unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future.  
The current reality is therefore that we do not have a production function that is capable of guiding 
economic and other related policy decisions toward the realization of economic optimality over time. For 
the time being roles played by nature, politics, social forces, other economically important influences, and 
the relationships between them are too complex for this to be done. Godard has argued this on the basis 
that imperfect understandings of the complexity of each of these fields, and the relationships between 
them, dictate an element of uncertainty regarding policy processes toward sustainable development.202 
As a result, alternative means to addressing the problematic relationships between economic activities, 
social, and ecological well being, must be found. 
                                                 
202 Godard, O. 1994. Op cit. pp 316 & 317. 
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One such alternative that we can propose is a series of process directives, based on the implications that 
economic activities have in terms of the capital assets in an economy. These implications should be 
compared with the important capital endowments of each economy.  Economic processes should be 
favoured that best support the well being of important capital types that are in danger of depletion, though 
necessary for the relevant production process. This provides a means to ensuring that economic resources 
are allotted to economic activities that support the development of economic opportunities in an economy, 
by operating without diminishing capital stocks beyond recovery levels. In cases, such as the extraction of 
non-renewable resources, where capital depreciation is inevitable, where possible activities that maximise 
a range of benefits per unit of resource extracted, while allocating investments to substitute activities 
should be favoured. 
 
It therefore becomes important to be able to calculate the savings, investment, and depreciation patterns 
for capital that is utilised by the economic activities of different economic sectors. At a theoretical level 
these savings, investment and depreciation patterns for utilised capital may be calculated as follows:  
 
Total Savings (TS) = Original Capital (Ko) + Total Investment (TI) – Depreciation (D) 
 
TS = Ko + TI – D  
 
It is important to not the that measuring savings, investments and depreciation patterns should in money 
values implies the assumption that the goods being measured are economically substitutable with money. 
It is also important to take account of the origin of investments, savings and depreciations in capital 
stocks. Direct investments in capital can be seen to stem from three main sources. Namely government, 
firms and households. Therefore, calculating investment requires that all three investment processes be 
considered. Hence: 
 
Total Investment (TI) = Public Investment (Ip) + Firm Investment (If) + Household Investment (Ih) 
TI = Ip + If + Ih 
Further, depreciation of capital assets may occur as the result of activities of numerous economic entities 
or economic sectors. For the sake of simplicity we will lot depreciation by sector. Thus: 
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Total Depreciation (TD) = Depreciation Sector 1 (Ds1) + Depreciation Sector 2 + (Ds2) + Depreciation 
Sector 3 (Ds 3) + ... 
 
TD = Ds1 + Ds2 + Ds3 ... 
 
In the light of criticisms levelled at the Sg approach for over generalizing the determinants of sustainable 
development, an improved, more accurate Genuine Savings indicator might be expressed per capital (K) 
per Sector (C):  
 
SgK*C* = TS + TD + PV(T)   
 
Although the real import of PV(T) is difficult to know until debates over the role of technological change 
are more fully developed, the importance of these changes remains significant.203 As a result the variable 
should not be abandoned. But at the same time, and as a result of these theoretical and practical 
uncertainties, concerning the substitutability of technology for other types of capital, PV(T) will be 
assumed to be zero.  
 
Despite this consideration, the approach offers the potential to examine broader developmental impacts of 
the economic activities undertaken by different sectors by identifying the impacts that those activities 
have upon available capital stocks. Since available capital stocks play a defining role for opportunities to 
realise developmental well being, using the approach allows impacts of exploitation, and investment 
decisions may be compared according to the developmental impacts of specific sectors. Economic 
analysis across sectors and capital types may therefore be envisaged with a view to assessing the impact 
of policy decisions.  
 
SDD, a Revised Method 
Being able to assess the impact that economic activities have for the well being of a range of capital assets 
in an economy can be useful for natural resource management dilemmas as a means to aligning the 
implications of those activities with the conditions for sustainable development. This is the case because 
understanding the impact that natural resource use has for a fuller range of capital stocks helps us to 
understand the broader developmental impact of the preceding natural resource management decision/s. 
                                                 
203Faucheux, S., Pearce, D., and Proops, J. 1996. Models of Sustainable Development. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. p 
26. 
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However we have seen that due to problems with substitutability it may not always be possible to 
measure changes in capital stocks using monetary measures. A feasible alternative to measuring these 
changes according to a monetary measure would be to evaluate them separately using measures that are 
appropriate for each capital stock. Although this poses a problem for aggregating changes the 
substitutability problem indicates that aggregating changes in cases where the fungibility between capital 
types can be questioned will lead to inaccuracy.  
 
Using the SDD approach, it becomes possible to plot the impacts that the activities of different sectors 
have upon a chosen range of capital stocks. Table 6.5 below shows how it may be possible to compare the 
impacts that the activities of each sector have for each capital type, where i denotes 'impact' in Table 6.5 
below.  
 
In the table below, columns represent economic sectors and the rows represent capital types. The cells in 
the sector columns show the impact for different capital types that result from the activities of the gives 
sector. Within the context of studies focussing on natural resource management, the impact of each sector 
upon each capital type can be illustrated in direct comparison to the amount of natural capital used up 
during the production process for that sector. 
 
 
Table 5.5  Per Sector Impacts on Capital Types 
 
Capital Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
Kn i Kn(1) i Kn(2) i Kn(3)
Kh i Kh(1) i Kh(2) i Kh(3)
Km i Km(1) i Km(2) i Km(3)
Ki i Ki(1) i Ki(2) i Ki(3)
Kpi i Kpi(1) i Kpi(2) i Kpi(3)
 
 
This approach is beneficial since it makes it possible to derive a ratio between consumption of Kn and 
investments and/or depreciation in a full range of capital types which can be linked, through investments 
or depreciation, or both, to the relevant economic activity. 
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For example, we can compare the quantity (Q) of Kn that is appropriated during the economic activity of 
a given sector to the changes that the removal of the given QKn has had for the other types of capital that 
are employed during the production process employing Kn.  
 
This approach is coherent with the proposal for a Sustainable Development Reference System (SDRF) 
proposed in the 1999 UN FAO report on Indicators for Sustainable Development of Marine Capture 
Fisheries. The report argues for a multi criterion framework for evaluating the sustainable development of 
marine capture fisheries as a means to enabling policy decision making processes.204 The authors of the 
report propose that it may be necessary to “relate the scale of the indicator to value judgements about the 
extent to which it meets societal objectives.”205 To this end, the ratios proposed in the SDD approach can 
be seen to be coherent with the SDRF proposal as they enable comparison between the values of given 
indicators those of other chosen indicators. These relationships can in turn be interpreted in accordance 
with a given set of societal objectives. 
 
The proposal for a SDRF approach also accords with the SDD approach in that both support the use of a 
pressure state response framework for interpreting the sustainable development status of a given fishery 
system.  
 
The idea behind the pressure-state-response framework is that human activities place pressures on the 
natural environment which result in changes in the state of affected ecological systems.206 Information 
concerning the state of the environment that results from these pressures is this interpreted as a means to 
informing the actions that can be taken as a means to responding to the given state of ecological 
systems.207 This pressure-state-response approach is incorporated into the SDD approach as a means to 
describing the state of the fisheries systems as a result of the pressures placed upon those systems by the 
activities of different groups. Although this approach is sometimes applied exclusively to ecological 
systems, the SDD approach uses multi criterion analysis as a means to describing pressure-state-response 
characteristics of the ecological, social, economic, and governance conditions for the sustainable 
development of the fishery.  
 
                                                 
204 UNFAO. 1999. Indicators for Sustainable Development of Marine Capture Fisheries. Rome, UNFAO. p iv. 
205 Ibid. p 22. 
206 Notes on Pressure-State-Response Framework. [No Date]. Loc cit. 
207 Ibid. 
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In accordance with this approach the SDD method proposes two key sets of information. 
The first information provides the basis understanding pressures and state characteristics of the fishery. 
This allows for comparisons, in terms of general capital investment and depreciation implications of the 
activities of each sector, to be made between sectors.  
 
The second information set is developed for the purpose of assisting natural resource management 
decision responses by providing more detailed information concerning the characteristics of the pressures 
placed upon the fishery’s natural, social, economic, and governance capital stocks by the activities of 
different fishery user groups. This information can be provided by deriving important ratios between units 
of resource exploited, and the impact that the exploitation activity has upon the well-being of a different 
capital assets. This second information set therefore allows comparison between the impacts that different 
user groups have upon a given capital stock with respect to the impacts that the same user group may 
have for different capital stocks.   
 
In theory this approach allows us to compare the quantity of natural capital that is extracted with the 
direct impact that the extraction of this natural capital has for the well being of an array of capital types 
affected by the activity. In practice it is more difficult to achieve this comparison. One of the main 
reasons for this is that the activities of different sectors or firms are interconnected through their usage of 
capital resources. This interconnectedness between sectors and or firms means that sometimes an 
opportunity (to extract natural capital) gained by one sector results in an opportunity lost by another.  
 
This opportunity lost by the relevant sector may in turn have a negative impact for the long term welfare 
of the interdependent system. At a micro level the opportunity to extract natural capital is lost by the 
sector/s that did not gain the given opportunity, and this equates to the private opportunity cost of 
foregone economic activity. At a macro level, the impact that another sector would have had for the 
broader economic system and, particularly, the well being of the chosen spread of capital assets, is 
foregone. This means that in practice, choosing an appropriate distribution of access to natural capital is 
more complex than simply tabulating the cross sectoral impacts that an economic activity has for the 
given spread of capital assets. Because producing a production function that is capable of providing the 
necessary guidance is not possible, a less labour intensive approach is to make rough estimations based on 
best knowledge at first, while allowing information to emerge as the development take place. Diagram 5.5 
describes this process where the X axis denotes time and the Y axis denotes the sustainable development 
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benefit that can be realised as a function of the capital endowments available for the sustainable 
development process. The point ‘SD Objective’ can be interpreted as an ideal attainable point on the 
trajectory toward sustainable development, at this point available capital endowments accord with the 
realisation of a sustainable development continuum. However, since decision processes driving economic 
activities may not always lead to an situation that accords with the realisation of sustainable development, 
it is necessary to assess the sustainable development status of a given activity at a given point in time. 
Point A represents a first assessment of the sustainable development status of a given economic activity 
where the economic activity is found to discord with a given conception of the conditions for sustainable 
development.  
Diagram 5.6 SDD Trajectory Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result, at point A, a decision is made to adjust the nature of the activity in order to place it on a more 
sustainable trajectory. At point B, a subsequent examination of the extent to which the economic activity 
accords with the perceived conditions for sustainable development is made. The assessment finds the 
trajectory of the activity to accord more closely, though not entirely, with the conditions for sustainable 
development and another decision is made to fine tune the trajectory for the economic activity in 
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B
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accordance with the perceived conditions for realising sustainable development. According to the SDD 
approach this process should be repeated indefinitely as a means to continuously fine tuning the 
correlation between the implications that an economic activity, such as fishing, has for the capital 
endowments available for the realisation of sustainable development, and the perceived conditions for the 
realisation of sustainable development. One of the key advantages of this approach is that it also allows 
for an evolving conception of the conditions of sustainable development.        
 
Thus from a starting point such as A, if the given directives point an economic activity in the general 
direction of sustainable development, according to Sachs' view, the means to providing the information 
necessary for subsequently fine tuning the trajectory, as well as the conception of the conditions for 
sustainable development, will become available as the process toward sustainable development is realized 
over time.208 
 
Although it may be extremely difficult to assess the exact impact that the fishing activities of different 
sectors have for each of a given set of capital types, what we can know are general indications about the 
impacts that the activities of each sector may have. Thus Kh may be measured in terms of job creation, 
and Km can be measured in terms of GRT. Hence we could say for each sector what the ratio is between 
QKn and numbers of jobs created, and the amount of investment in GRT for the fishing fleet. Investment 
in Kn is difficult to measure for renewable resources as investment occurs so long as the resource is 
allowed time to recover from exploitation. Allowing the resource time to recover from exploitation 
requires the action of all relevant sectors. As a result it can either be is extremely difficult or extremely 
simple to measure investment in Kn by each sector. The best that can be done in the absence of this 
information is to base policy decisions on attempting to generate maximum sustainable development 
benefit per unit of fish removed, thus aiming to maximise capital investment while minimising pressure 
on the resource. Doing this requires that we understand the capital endowments of the given economy 
well enough to know which areas require greatest investment, and which channels are best suited to 
facilitating those investments.  
 
In Senegal for example, the economy has a high rate of unemployment, some food security problems, and 
declining fishery resources. The best option in this case is therefore to maximise investment in Kh 
through maximising employment per quantity of fish harvested. Higher employment rates will increase 
                                                 
208Sachs, J. 2005. Op cit. p 245. 
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average household incomes which will help ease food insecurity problems. Investments in Km, in this 
case fishing gear, must then accord with the objective of maximising employment.  
 
Although the approach offered by the SDD approach is similar to that offered in the FAO proposal for a 
SDRF, notably in that both aim to guide decision processes through the provision of meaningful 
information about the achievement of sustainable development, while insisting that the frameworks used 
for doing this must be as inexpensive and simple to use as is possible, there are some key differences.209   
 
One key point of divergence between the approaches is that unlike the SDRF approach, the SDD 
approach does not aim to aggregate indicators.210 This is not done in the SDD approach because it is seen 
to have potential for oversimplifying the key issues (and approaches for handling these issues) across 
different and complex fisheries contexts. One example of this is the proposed usage of kite or radar 
diagrams. Unlike the proposed SDRF the SDD approach does not use kite or radar diagrams because the 
view is taken in this thesis that these graphic representations can contribute to the oversimplification of 
the sustainable development implications of complex and different fisheries activities. This view is taken 
because the qualitative insight offered by such representations are seen to denote qualitative 
characteristics of the fishery system without taking sufficient account of non-quantitative qualitative 
contextual information.  
 
Due to the lack of clear answers to questions concerning the substitutability between different capital 
types, combined with the view that fisheries problems typically involve complex and poorly explained 
interdependencies between a range of factors the SDD approach makes no attempt to aggregate indicators 
or provide representations of the sustainable development characteristics of a given fisheries system that 
may nurture such aggregations. Support for this multi criterion approach can be found in an argument 
presented by Boulanger for an index of reliable sustainable development indicators.211 In providing the 
basis for a multicriterion assessment of the sustainable development of fisheries systems, the SDD 
approach can thus be seen to make an auxiliary contribution to a trial and error process whereby a reliable 
index of sustainable development indicators can be developed. 
 
                                                 
209 For detail see : UNFAO. 1999. Op cit. p 22.   
210Ibid. p 14.  
211 Boulanger, P.M. 2006. Political uses of social indicators: overview and application to sustainable development 
indicators. International Conference on  “Uses of Sustainable Development Indicators.” Montpellier, 3-4 April 2006. 
p 13. 
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Conclusion 
It is commonly held that suitable indicators provide a necessarily solid basis for public decision 
making.212 It is on this basis that it is important to identify the indicators employed in the SDD approach 
with respect to the case in questions. Problematically, there exist a number of constraints upon the variety 
and types of indicators that may be available in different contexts. 
 
Policy success normally requires a highly efficient implementation of a research tool. Problematically 
again, levels of efficiency and thus policy success often have a positive relationship with information 
requirements, and information is often costly to procure. As a result, in less economically developed 
contexts, where good policy advice is often urgently needed, the means to procuring this advice are 
frequently unavailable. Thus it is desirable to have a tool that is capable of providing relatively low cost 
information for pointing policy processes in the right direction, while making provision for providing 
increasingly accurate information as the financial and research means become available. In this way, such 
a system can act as a compass, indicating a general direction at first and giving more and more precise 
instruction as the destination moves closer. If the compass directs policy decisions toward sustainable 
development, it is likely, though not certain, that the means to realizing more accurate research initiatives 
will come hand in hand with greater as the given sustainable development objective is approached..  
 
The next chapter explores the feasibility of applying the SDD approach to fisheries contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212Garcia, S.M., Rey-Valette, H., Bodigel, C. & Bianchi, G. 2007. Loc cit. 
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Chapter Six.  The Economics and Management of Fishery Resources. 
 
The basic economic choice to be made with respect to living resources such as fish stocks is to know 
how intensively they should be exploited. Fishing requires the application of manpower, fuel, and 
various implements, all of which could be used for some other purpose. The question we must 
consider is whether we are getting as much value in return for our efforts when fishing as we would 
be getting otherwise.213  
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to explain some of the theoretical and practical aspects to managing the fisheries 
activities. The first part of the chapter reviews some of the tools that can be used to manage fishing effort 
once management objectives have been set. The latter parts of the chapter explore the economic and 
ecological dynamics involved in fisheries activities as a means to better understanding how management 
objectives can be decided. The Gordon Schaeffer fisheries model is critiqued and found to be a poorly 
equipped to explain fisheries dynamics characterised by heterogeneous fisheries groups. The explanation 
that is given for this is that the model assumes unrealistic homogeneity for the economic motives of, as 
well as the social, socio-economic and ecological implications of the activities of each user group.     
 
This observation leads us to reflect upon fisheries management objectives with reference to the argument 
for basing natural resource management choices on their consequences for sustainable development. A 
short review of ecosystem approaches to fishery management is given, and the extent to which these 
approaches accord with the sustainable development directives approach that was outlined in chapter six 
is evaluated. The chapter concludes that basing fisheries management objectives upon a sustainable 
development approach is compatible with ecosystems approaches as well as the various existing tools that 
can be used to manage fishing effort. Despite this, the choice of tools and the extent to which ecosystem 
approaches can successfully be used in accordance with a broader sustainable development view will be 
dependent upon the specific characteristics of each fisheries management dilemma.    
 
An argument for basing fishery management objectives upon the sustainable development view is made 
in accordance with the theme of the preceding chapters suggesting that it is rational, from a macro 
rational point of view, to base natural resource management objectives upon the realization of sustainable 
development.   
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Regulating Fishing Effort 
 
The logic behind the tragedies of the commons dictates that in general, fishers will fish above the 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) level for a given fishery in attempts to maximise economic rent 
gains. This modality operates not only against the well being of future generations of fishers, but also to 
the detriment of the size of fish populations. An impetus is thus created for the formation of mechanisms 
designed to regulate the rent seeking behaviour of fishers.  
 
Colin Clark makes a strong argument for the regulation of fisheries through his clear explanation of the 
economic life cycle of the unregulated open access fishery. Clark shows that unregulated fisheries are 
inclined to reach ‘bio economic’ equilibrium where revenues earned from fishing are equal to the 
opportunity cost of the activity. At this point the economic rents are almost completely depleted,andfish 
stocks may be under heavy pressure.214 This view is supported by Simmons215 and in much of the 
fisheries literature. Thus the ‘boom-and-bust’ cycle has become a distinct part of the biology of a fishery 
where the initial profits from harvest far exceed those appreciated during the sustainable yield phase.216 
Heavy industrial over capitalisation is typical of the first phases of fishing in a new fishery, and unless the 
excess fishing capacity is removed once the initial reduction of the population is complete, severe over 
fishing is probable.217  
 
 
John Kahn suggests that the best way to manage fisheries is by affecting a significant opportunity cost of 
fishing.218 This is done in two ways. The first, known as Open Access regulations, increases the cost of 
fishing by placing restrictions on the numbers and type of fish caught, the methods used, and the areas 
fished. Such regulations outlaw highly lucrative indiscriminate fishing, thus increasing the cost of fishing, 
and squeezing out competing fishers until only the optimum number of fishers remains. The second 
method involves charging tariffs on fishing licences, and limiting the number of licences available.219 
This technique is known as Limited Entry and is favoured by economists because simultaneous to 
increasing the costs of fishing, revenue which is earned from the sale of licences can be used for the 
                                                 
214Clark, C.W. Renewable Resources: fisheries. in van den Bergh, J. 1999 Handbook of Environmental and Resource 
Economics. Northampton, Edward Elgar. p 109. 
215Simmons, I.G. 1991. Earth, Air and Water. New York, Routledge. p 112. 
216Clark, C.W.1999. Op cit, p 119. 
217Ibid. 
218 Kahn, J.R. 1998. The Economic Approach to Environmental and Natural Resources. Orlando, Dryden Press. p 
314. 
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welfare of the local economy.220  
 
However, these means for fishery regulation are especially difficult to enforce. “Coastlines are typically 
long and rugged; it is not difficult for fishermen to avoid detection if they are exceeding their limits or 
catching species illegally.”221  
 
Thus it is argued that: “Policies should be designed to make compliance as inexpensive as possible.  
Regulations which impose very high costs are more likely to be disobeyed than regulations that impose 
cost in proportion to the purpose.”222 Therefore, as Tietenberg argues, regulations should also be able to 
deal with non compliance. Although a common approach is to sanction transgressors monetarily, the level 
of these sanctions for non compliance must be in line with the costs of compliance.223 Otherwise non 
compliance may become profitable. The optimistic implication of these models is that fisheries can be 
rehabilitated beyond the initial ‘boom’ phase, but only so long as effective regulation is achieved.  
 
Although Kahn has advocated regulating fisheries through open access and limited entry restrictions in 
order to avoid the rigours of the boom-and-bust cycle, he also suggests that effective fishery management 
requires consideration of some factors that transcend the optimal level of catch and effort which is so 
characteristic of most fishery economics literature.224 These considerations concern: the incidental catch 
of other fish species and marine animals; the pollution of fishery habitats; conflicts between user groups 
such as industrial and artisan fishers; and international cooperation regarding the harvesting of migratory 
species.225 Basing management on consideration for each of these factors can be seen as according with a 
more encompassing sustainable development approach. As an initial step it is important to understand 
how a fish population itself might be harvested on a sustainable basis. 
 
Attempts to quantify sustainable yields of fish for particular fisheries have produced concepts such as the 
MSY, which denotes the maximum amount of fish which can be removed from a particular fishery in a 
sustainable way. Simmons shows that this concept can be viewed as being flawed because of its inability 
                                                 
220Connely, J & Smith, G. 1999. Op cit, pp 287-300. 
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to take into account annual variations in fish stock sizes.226 However, in the absence of perfect 
knowledge, MSY estimates can be seen as being pertinent and as providing a practical reference point for 
understanding the general ecological viability of given fish stocks.  That being said, a response to the 
weaknesses of the MSY measure has been to develop the concept known as Optimal Sustainable Yield 
(OSY) which attempts to account for changes in fish populations through combining economic 
management techniques with the biological constraints that are characteristic of fisheries.227 Colin Clark 
shows how the inception of OSY indicators has had implications for the total allowable annual catch 
(TAC) for a fishery. Here the fishery is regulated through establishing the TAC and limiting catches 
accordingly. This is done through tracking the cumulative catch levels for the year, and closing the 
fishing season as soon as the limit has been reached. Alternatively the length of the fishing season is 
predetermined according to the capacity of fishing vessels and expected catch rates.228 Clark suggests that 
such methods can however be seen to perpetuate competition between fishers leading to catch levels 
being reached extremely quickly, therefore requiring the fishing season to be shortened. In response to 
this problem individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been developed in order to provide licensed 
fishers with taxable quotas that can be bought and sold between fishing enterprises.229 The results of this 
technique have been to improve fishing profits among formerly competing fishers, and to ensure that fish 
resources are available all year round.  
 
An alternative to ITQs has been to impose taxes upon the fisher for landed catches, the effect of which is 
to tailor catch levels and to provide government with tax revenues. Forecasts of catch levels are necessary 
for achieving a biological sustainability of the resource.  Thus, it is argued that the tax rate must be set at 
a level which will inhibit fishing above a particular catch threshold. Problematically this approach 
requires vast amounts of scarce information pertaining to catch rates and population sizes. Not only does 
this technique appear to be a blunt instrument for achieving the necessary results as a product of the 
difficulties associated with forecasting, but also the benefits to fishers are extremely uncertain.230 “In 
contrast, ITQs can be effective, provided only that the management authority has a reasonably accurate 
model of the biological resource. How to manage a fishery when even this knowledge is lacking is a 
difficult but important issue.”231 Perhaps equally important from a sustainable development point of view 
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is how to manage the fishery with respect to profit as well as longer term social and ecological welfare. 
 
Fisheries Models 
Fisheries have been described by economists as renewable, but depletable resources. This means that 
although fish stocks can recover from exploitation, they can also be depleted to the extent that they may 
not recover.232 The biology of fish populations has been described by several models. One of these was 
proposed by Schaefer, and is commonly known as the Schaefer model. Similar to a standard utility 
function, Schaefer's model uses a basic parabolic function to depict the population growth of a fish stock; 
this is shown in Figure 6.1 below.  
 
The X axis denotes the size of the fish population and the Y axis denotes population growth. The bell 
shaped form of the fish population function rises from the origin where both population and population 
growth are zero, and falls back to the X axis where population growth is equal to zero, but at a larger 
population size corresponding to the carrying capacity or virgin biomass denoted by K, with B denoting 
biomass and T denoting time. Thus: 
 
dB/dT = rB(1-B/K)  
 
The graph is parabolic in nature because of the diminishing marginal returns to population growth 
associated with the size of the population. In other words, as the population size increases beyond a 
threshold point the population growth rate begins to decrease until population growth is static.  
 
As the function moves upward from the origin and to the right, both population and population growth 
increase at an increasing rate. After a point (point B in the diagram) diminishing returns to population 
recruitment can be noticed and the function moves toward its turning point. At the apex (point C) the 
population growth is maximised, while “growth in population growth” ceases to be positive because at 
this level the food, space and other resources used by the fish to survive become scarcer per fish and 
reproduction slows. After this population level has been reached, the fish population grows at a 
decreasing rate until eventually equilibrium is achieved and population growth equals the mortality 
rate.233  
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233 Kahn. 1995. The Economic Approach to Environmental and Natural Resources. Orlando, Harcourt Brace. p 269. 
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Since fisheries are renewable resources and population growth is related to population size (in parabolic 
form) there exist possibilities for large catches to be sustained by a healthy fish population. Point C 
represents the MSY for a fishery, where catch can be maximised over time by balancing the fish mortality 
rate, including the catch, with the population’s ability to reproduce. Points B and D on either side of point 
C also represent sustainable catches, although these catches are smaller than those appreciated at when 
fishing activity takes place at the MSY level.  
 
Figure 6.1 Schaefer Model for Describing the Bionomics of a Fishery 
 
On the one hand, fishing at point B entails fishing below the MSY level, giving fishers high catches per 
unit of fishing effort. Fishing at point D on the other hand entails fishing where the fish population size 
has been diminished below the level capable of producing MSY. At this point population growth has 
begun to decrease, and as a result of this, fishers must dedicate more fishing effort (than at point B) for 
the same sized catch. This is because as we have seen with the equation (dB/dT = rB(1-B/K) ) population 
Population Size
Population
Growth
B
C
D
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growth has a parabolic relationship with population size. 
 
t is important to note that the model is based upon an analysis of a long term average relationship between 
population size and population growth rates for fisheries and should not be viewed as offering a universal 
account of the fishery population dynamics.234  
 
Subsequent to Schaefer’s model, Gordon derived what is today known as the Gordon Schaeffer (GS) 
model. On the X axis of the GS model Gordon placed fishing effort as the independent variable, with 
catch on the Y axis. Doing this allowed for the insertion of an Average Cost (AC) function into the model 
that allowed the depiction of the costs of fishing relative to the catch. Let dfB denote catch and we can 
describe the GS model thus: 
 
DB/dT = rB (1 – B/K) – qfB, where at equilibrium 0 = rB (1 – B/K) – qfB, 
 
Hence rB (1 – B/K) = qfB wich means that catch equals growth.  
 
The GS model is thus also parabolic in shape but with effort on the X axis and catch on the Y axis. 
Gordon thus introduces a cost function (AC) to the model, with open access equilibrium being reached 
where AC = revenue. The implication of this is that is has become possible to identify a point where 
economic yield is maximised. This point,known as Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) corresponds with 
that where the difference between the revenue and AC functions is greatest. 235 Figure 7.2 depicts these 
changes. 
 
Average Costs can be measured in a number of ways, the most obvious of which is to measure the 
amounts paid on inputs for fishing effort, such as fishers’ salaries, the cost of capital equipment and fuel. 
When compared with the Schaefer model, Gordon’s model allows us to understand the relationship 
between catch and effort where the fish population size plays a defining role in the returns that are 
appreciated per unit of fishing effort expended. As we will see, technological advances and external 
support to fisheries can also play important roles for supporting levels of fishing effort that transcend the 
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economic limitations imposed by the AC function. The implication of these factors will be discussed 
further in the next section, for the moment their meaning will be contextualised with regard to their 
impact upon the fish population.  
 
Figure 6.2 Gordon Schaeffer Revenue and Average Cost Functions for a Fishery 
Point A represents entry to the fishery. At this point fish stocks are abundant and catches exceed the  
natural rate of reproduction, returns to fishing effort are large. As fishing continues, and the initial large 
catches are dissipated by persistent fishing activity, catches are brought into line with the natural rate at 
which the fish population reproduces. 
 
This causes a shift on the graph to point B, where catches have fallen though effort has remained 
constant. 
 
Despite the fact that catches have fallen since the initial entry of fishers to the fishery, fishing at point B is 
Average 
Cost (AC)
B D
C
A
AC*
Revenue
Effort
Total Revenue (TR)
 107 
 
economically efficient since the difference between AC and catch is maximised. When the difference 
between catch revenue and average cost is maximised at equilibrium, as it is at point B, sustainable catch 
per unit of fishing effort is highest. Maximising economic returns to fishing effort naturally imply that 
economic efficiency is maximised, but this does not mean that fishing at point B is desirable under all 
circumstances. 
 
At point B, catches are smaller than at the MSY levels of point C. Although at point B, benefits per unit 
of fishing activity are great, total benefits may be smaller than those that could be realized at point C. As 
a result it may be argued that fishing at point B is most desirable in contexts where the economy's capital 
assets are more or less fully exploited and the opportunity cost of maximising total catch at the cost of 
economic efficiency implies unreasonable opportunity costs in terms of how capital used for fishing could 
be put to better use. 
 
For economies that do not exhibit full and efficient employment of their capital assets, the temptation to 
extract additional benefit from a fishery resource can be compelling. This compulsion will lead to fishing 
activities that aim for larger catches. As we have seen, catch is maximised at point C on Figure 6.2 where 
the difference between catch and the AC function is small. The small difference between catch and AC 
implies smaller profits per unit of fishing effort, while larger catches may have positive impacts for the 
economy such as high employment of business capital and high employment of human capital, measured 
in terms of labour.  
 
Although fishing at MSY point C is not the most economically efficient of effort levels, there are these 
other benefits, including the fact that fishing at MSY does not tip the fish population into decline. 
Unfortunately, in practice MSY is seldom measured effectively. This, combined with pressures to 
maximise employment of business and human capital, and the impulse to maximise other benefits of large 
catches such as food security and gross earning can lead fishing activity beyond MSY levels.  
 
At point D, where returns to fishing effort are equal to the average cost of increasing effort to that point, 
fishing becomes unprofitable. Despite this fact, fishing activity in many parts of the world has been led by 
political and economic forces to point D and beyond, where returns are smaller than costs. There are a 
number of circumstances that can lead to this situation, but only a few can sustain it, two of which are 
government subsidies and very low opportunity cost of fishing. The first is possible since states may be 
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inclined to support the activities of fishing enterprises by using a number of methods, all of which boil 
down to a subsidy in the form of a financial transfer to the fisheries sector. This may arise as a result of 
politically persuasive lobby groups placing pressure on government authorities to provide support for a 
fisheries sector. Typically these tactics engender attempts to protect jobs, or secure some benefit from 
capital investments in machinery or infrastructure, and cause a consequent downward shift in the AC 
function for relevant fishery users. The latter example of how fisheries might be exploited beyond 
economic feasibility concerns fishing having little or no opportunity cost. In situations where people are 
desperate to secure food and/or some economic revenue, but have no alternatives means to doing this but 
fishing, populations may be inclined to fish beyond points where catches offer sufficient compensation 
for effort spent. This scenario also engenders a shift in the AC function for the relevant users, but only 
when the very low opportunity cost of fishing is taken into account.  
 
The AC curve for fishing activity can also be shifted by technological advances in fishing gear and fish 
finding equipment. In these cases, fishing activity becomes highly efficient and it is possible to make 
catches that would otherwise be impossible. Although strictly speaking this does not encompass artificial 
support to fishing activities, the affect is similar in that the AC function for affected enterprises is likely to 
shift downward and to the right. 
 
The impacts of these advents are serious since they generate a larger need for fisheries regulation. Fishing 
activities can not simply be left to self regulate as costs rise and catches fall as this logic does not hold, 
given the presence of normative economic influences in fisheries activities. Attempts to manage fisheries 
activities are further complicated when there exist numerous user groups, with sometimes conflicting 
interests, operating within a single fishery.   
 
The Gordon/Schaeffer Model and Multiple User Groups   
The Gordon model shows the dynamics that exists between catch, effort, and the costs of fishing in terms 
that allow us to understand the how and why a particular fishery user or, group of users facing similar 
circumstances, may be inclined  to change effort levels depending on their cost functions. In reality, fish 
populations may be exploited by a number of users and user groups who face different circumstances.  
 
As a result of their different circumstances their actions and choices regarding effort and desired catch 
levels are different. At the same time, the resource being exploited remains common to all users, and as 
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such the biological impacts of the decisions of each user or user group are shared. According to 
traditional approaches to fisheries problems, when more than one user or user group with different cost 
functions utilise a common resource, the most efficient user or group will out compete the less efficient 
ones, this is illustrated  on the graph above by user 3 out competing users 1 and 2. This means that at 
equilibrium only the most efficient user/s will be able to continue fishing activity, and the AC curve of the 
most competitive user will be the only AC curve for the fishery.  
 
However, this is only true if fishing tactics, economic constraints, knowledge, barriers to entry, and 
biological factors are homogeneous. In cases where any one or any combination of these considerations is 
heterogeneous across sectors, there exists a possibility for ‘less efficient’ sectors to gain an advantage and 
occupy a niche in the given fishery’s production of catch. This means that in practice a fishery can 
frequently accommodate more than one user group, each of which may face different effort/catch, and or, 
effort/cost ratios. This also means that in practice, and under certain conditions, the Gordon Schaefer 
model becomes relatively impotent.  
 
Calculating the biological impacts, which an ensemble of activities such as this may have for the 
resource, and the catchability of the fish stock, is so complex that it is impossible to achieve considering 
the optimisation of a single variant. The coexistence of several user groups can be described by taking 
numerous criteria into account, where each group may appear efficient on the basis of a given criterion, or 
combination of criteria. This question appears to be all the more important from a sustainable 
development point of view since definitions of sustainable development take account of the importance of 
a range of capital types that are not seen as being fungible beyond a certain extent. The implication of 
these views is that managing fisheries in accordance with the principles of sustainable development is 
inherently a multi criterion problem. This poses a problem for attempts to provide decision guiding policy 
advice for policy measures aiming to distribute access to fishery resources in accordance with broader 
macro economic, or societal development goals.       
 
The previous section identified three possible scenarios that might impact upon the decisions taken by 
fishery users to operate at different effort levels. The first situation is that of economic optimality where 
the opportunity cost of fishing activity is high and fishers are thus driven to maximise profits by 
maximising revenue while minimising costs. In the second situation, labour and capital are less easily 
transferable to different sectors, and as a result the opportunity cost of fishing is relatively low.  
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Figure 6.3 Multiple User Groups for a Common Fishery 
 
Catch is maximised at MSY and fishing at this point can maximise total revenue so long as the price of 
fish is supply inelastic, and AC is favourable. Despite the comparative economic inefficiency, fishing 
activities being conducted at these levels have other benefits related to employment of capital and labour 
and associated distributions of benefits. Further, fishing activity at these levels is not only sustainable, but 
also supports a large and healthy fish population. The third situation that has been identified concerns 
fishery activities that also have a low opportunity cost, but above and beyond that are driven by normative 
economic imperatives. In cases like these, fishing activities well exceed economically efficient effort 
levels, and are normally driven to do so by financial support from politically interested entities, such as 
governments. 
 
The important question in cases where user groups base their choices of effort levels upon more than one 
of these sets of interest, concerns the impact that fishing activities occupying different effort levels have 
upon one another, and the ecological and societal implications of fisheries activities. 
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The answer to this question naturally depends upon the nature of the fishing activities taking place and the 
nature of the fish population being exploited. In all cases where the different tendencies toward fishing 
effort exhibit themselves with respect to the usage of a common resource, some trade off will exist. The 
extent and size of this trade off is impossible to measure as a single variable due to the complexity of the 
relationships between economic, ecological, and broader environmental variables. In cases where 
fisheries activities are seen as being important for generating public welfare, the advent of such dynamics 
has made the development of fishery regulation devices necessary.  
 
The following section reviews some of the more commonly used tools for fishery regulation. Some of 
these tools are capable of adjusting fishing effort in line with what are perceived to be desirable resource 
allocations between groups, but none are capable of providing significant insight as to what qualities 
desirable resource allocations should have.      
 
Ecosystem Approaches to Fishery Management 
Today ecosystem approaches to evaluating the implications of fishing effort represent a trend which 
recognises the interdependence between human fishery activities, target species, and the broader 
ecological and societal system in which fishing may be taking place.  
 
Philippe Curry and Villy Christensen summarise the ecosystem management approaches as mandating the 
inclusion of target species as well as their effects on “depending or competing non-target species” when 
considering the impacts that fishery activities have for an ecosystem.236 As a result of this view, the 
authors note that an important question regarding trade offs of one species that fulfils one purpose for 
another that might fulfil a separate but important role in the ecosystem. Evaluating this trade off with 
respect to the direction that that society should go with respect to marine ecosystems requires an 
articulation between well founded science and information on social priorities.237 
 
The authors suggest that ecosystem approaches to fisheries management requires consideration of the 
interdependent way in which marine ecosystems are exploited. The components that require consideration 
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under such an approach include ecological, economic, social, technological, and governance aspects.238  
 
Cury and Christensen have also argued that the development of ecosystem approaches to fisheries 
management has resulted from a growing awareness that “exploited fish populations must be considered 
as integral components of ecosystem function, rather than units that operate independently of their 
environment.”239      
 
Ragnar Arnson provides a more technical explanation, explaining that as firms aim to maximise their own 
profits, through the capture of higher value species, they tend to take insufficient account of the shadow 
value of the biomass.240 Shadow biomass refers to the ecological biomass within which target species 
play niche functions. As a result of this the author explains that fishing firms and fishing industries 
behave sub optimally since they “do not take full account of their impact on the biomass growth and 
therefore they apply the wrong fishing effort.”241  
 
Arnson suggests that biological fisheries management measures such aspects as mesh size, TAC limits, 
and protected areas and so on, which can conserve and amend fish stocks, although failing to enhance the 
economic performance of the fishery by not imposing an appropriate shadow cost of harvesting on the 
fishing firms.242 This shadow costs pertains to the longer term implications of the impacts that  fishing 
activity may have for the integrity of affected interconnected ecological resource(s). In other words such 
measures do not provide the basis for fishing firms to align their effort with the ecosystem consequences 
of that effort. Arnson argues further that developing and enforcing biological and economic restrictions 
on fisheries’ activities is costly. This combined with the fact that unlike other systems such as saleable 
fishing rights based systems; such measures do not generate income which leads the author to suggest that 
in some cases such management methods may be worse than nothing.243 As a result, he argues that the 
only fisheries’ management tools that have any chance of success at a theoretical level are corrective 
taxes such as fees based on catches, and property rights systems such as ITQs.244 
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While it may be possible to identify appropriate tools for regulating fishing effort in accordance with an 
ecosystem view, attaining the appropriate information for directing the application of such tools implies 
its own challenges. These challenges stem from the difficulty associated with modelling the relationships 
between species within their broader ecological context.  
 
A new generation of simulations models, such as Ecopath and Ecosim, have been developed as a means 
to tracking the ecosystemic implications of fishing effort upon certain species.245 Although these models 
represent an important step in the direction toward managing fishing effort in accordance with broader 
ecosystem implications of that effort, the approaches are described as having some notable weaknesses. 
Villy Christesen and Carl Walters describe a number of technical limitations to the Ecopath/Ecosim 
approach that probably transcends the scope of this thesis. As a result the authors warn that due to some 
of these problems, notably potential confusions between biomass changes in terms of the effects of 
fishing when they may be caused by other environmental factors such as habitat changes, these simulation 
techniques should be used cautiously in policy environs.246 
 
This point, which is elaborated on in Christensen and Walters' 2003 article: Ecopath with Ecosim: 
Methods, Capabilities and Limitations, is important since it highlights that although ecosystem 
approaches to fishery management are desirable from a theoretical point of view, practical 
implementation still presents a number of challenges. That being said, the trend toward ecosystem 
approaches to fisher management is a positive shift in accordance with fishery management approaches 
that view fisheries activities as taking place within what are clearly heterogeneous and interdependent 
systems.        
 
Conclusion: Managing Fisheries using Sustainable Development Directives  
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a basic understanding of the biological and economic 
relationships that have been used to describe fishery population dynamics and the relationship between 
these dynamics and fishing effort. 
 
In examining the GordonSchaefer model we noticed that the assumption of homogeneity that 
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characterises this approach fails to explain how and why multiple user groups with different average cost 
functions may be able to subsist in a common fishery. The response to this observation is that the 
GordonSchaefer model assumes unrealistic homogeneity at a number of levels and across user groups. In 
cases where fishery user groups serve heterogeneous economic, social, tactical, and /or a range of other 
niche functions, the model fails to describe how and why these different user groups may achieve 
sufficient efficiency at one or other level to warrant continued fishing effort. As such the GS model 
remains incapable of providing insight as to the broader implications of fishing activity in an environment 
that is characterised by interdependence between not only fishers and fish, but a range of other social, 
economic, cultural, political and environmental factors. 
 
Chapter five of this dissertation recommended that understanding the implications that a given activity 
may have for contributing to sustainable development within a given context requires that the activities in 
question be evaluated on the basis of their impact upon a range of criteria for sustainable development. It 
was on this basis that an argument for evaluating and comparing the impacts of economic activities using 
a system of evaluation that takes into account the broad heterogeneity associated with economic, 
ecological, and social implications of the activities was made. Sustainable development directives were 
offered as one such approach. 
 
Adopting this view in the context of fisheries, accords with the approach of Anthony Charles who, at a 
basic level, identifies conservation, economic rationalisation, and social or community paradigms as 
central to fisheries’ conflicts.247 
 
Implementing the SDD approach in a policy environment which appears to be increasingly advocating the 
management of fishing effort based upon a broader sustainable development and ecosystem view is 
beneficial. This is because adopting an ecosystem view of the relationship between fishing effort and the 
fishery is coherent with the idea of managing fishing effort in accordance with the conditions for 
sustainable development because ecosystem considerations do themselves form an integral part of the 
sustainable development view. 
 
The extent to which an ecosystem approach can be integrated successfully into a sustainable development 
approach will, however, be limited by the extent to which the provision of ecosystem information is 
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accurate and reliable. In cases where such information is available, accurate and reliable ecosystem 
considerations can be taken into account along with the range of other economic, social, and political 
factors when choosing fishing effort management guidelines.  
 
In cases where ecosystem information is not available and/or reliable, the sustainable development 
directives approach can revert to the principle of optimising broader sustainable development benefits per 
unit of catch. Although this approach may be technically imperfect, in data poor environs where accurate 
information is scarce and the need for more effective management regimes is urgent, it is probably a 
reasonable compromise. 
 
In either case, data poor or data rich, a range of the tools for managing fishing effort, that were described 
in the early parts of the chapter, can be applied once management objectives have been set. Although 
there are arguments for and against each of the tools described in this chapter, we can recommend that the 
choice of tool be made with due regard to the constraints imposed by the given context.  
 
Similarly, implementing a sustainable development directives approach for identifying the implications of 
different fishing effort levels of different fishery user groups should be done in accordance with the 
characteristics of the relevant context. Chapter five gave a basic understanding of the principles behind 
such an approach, and chapter twelve will apply these principles to the case of the Senegalese fishery in 
more detail. However, before this can be done it is important to provide a qualitative understanding of the 
broader economic, social, political, and institutional context in which Senegalese fishery discourse is 
immersed.  
 
It is the task of the following chapter to provide a general and qualitative overview of these considerations 
based upon the macro economic, environmental, and governance environment in which Senegalese 
fishery discourse takes place.  
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PART FOUR: Case Study Context and Detail 
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Chapter Seven.  The Context of Fisheries’ Governance in Senegal 
  
From the early years of Senegal's independence up to the late 1980s the State played a major 
role in economic and social development, due to the dearth of an indigenous private sector and the 
necessity to meet some of the most pressing needs of the population. The legitimacy and stability of the post-inde
 
Introduction 
Senegal's approximate 196 190 km² surface area, is situated flanking the south western edge of the Sahara 
Desert. The country does not have significant mineral wealth, and as a result of dry conditions, large scale 
commercial agriculture is limited to a few crops, notably ground nuts and cereals. 
Figure 7.1. Map of Senegal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The country's coast line is approximately 700 kilometers in length, and the waters that cover the 27 600 
square kilometers of continental shelf adjacent to this coast benefit from a seasonal up welling of  cold, 
                                                 
248 Dembele, D. M. 2003. Debt and Destruction in Senegal: A Study of Twenty Years of IMF and World Bank 
Policies. Available at: www.wdm.org.uk.   
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nutrient rich water that afford the area significant natural wealth in marine life.249 Fisheries’ activities 
therefore form an integral part of both social and economic life in and around Senegal.  
Due to the importance of fisheries’ activities, the post independence state has played a major and 
changing role in fisheries’ activities as a means of satisfying some of the needs of its population. At a 
political level, satisfying these needs has played an important role in the electoral success of governments. 
Today fisheries remain an important aspect at many levels of Senegalese society, from cultural and 
culinary, to subsistence and balance of payments. As a result the role of the state is as important as ever. 
 
However, it is widely thought that Senegal's fish stocks are under severe threat of depletion due to heavy 
fishing pressure on the country's living marine resources.250 This fishing pressure results from the 
activities of three main fishing sectors; these are the local artisanal sector, the local industrial sector, and 
the foreign industrial sector. The perceived decline in the resource is seen to be affecting the productivity 
of each of these sectors negatively. 
 
This chapter aims first to describe the macro economic context in which Senegalese fisheries’ activities 
take place. This is done in order to provide a foundation for showing how fisheries’ management 
authorities in Senegal are confronted by a range of sometimes conflicting policy forces. In broad terms, 
these forces stem on the one hand from the financial impetus to sign fisheries’ agreements with foreign 
partners such as the EU, while on the other hand there is important impetus to support local fisheries’ 
activities. The chapter does not describe the characteristics of the relevant fishery user groups in detail 
since this is done in chapters nine and ten. The focus of the chapter is rather to describe in broad terms the 
macro economic, ecological and governance context in which Senegalese fisheries’ activities and 
fisheries’ governance decisions take place.    
 
The Macro Economic Context 
During the period between 1990 and 2000 the fishing sector accounted for 11% of the primary sector 
contribution to the country's GDP. During the same period, with an average of between 2% and 2.5% the 
fishing sector took third position after agriculture and livestock farming for sectoral contributions to the 
countries total GDP. In terms of foreign exchange earnings the fishing sector scored highest with 37% of 
                                                 
249Dione, D., Sy, A.B., & Ndiaye, D.M.S. 2005. Contribution Économique et Sociale de la Pêche 
      Artisanal e au Sénégal. Rome, UNFAO. p 8. 
250    Kaczynski, V.D. & Fluharty, D.L. 2002. Op cit. p 82. 
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export value, earning it top position ahead of peanut products at 12% and petroleum products at 11%.251 
 
The most commercially valuable exports are frozen fish products representing 67% of the commercial 
value of Senegalese fishery exports. Frozen goods may stem from any sector and may comprise a range 
of species. Frozen fish exports accounted for 44 659 tons in 2003, while crustaceans and molluscs 
accounted for 6 475 tons and 20469 tons respectively.252 Other frozen fish exports may be exported 
directly by vessels with on board freezers, though it would be difficult to estimate the quantities exported 
this way due to illicit and unreported catches and exports.  
 
The provision of fresh fish exports, representing 21% of commercial value may stem from all of the three 
sectors of the Senegalese fishery. In 2003 these products were composed of 7000 tons of Fresh fish, 49 
tons of crustaceans, and 162 tons of molluscs.253 Although the artisanal sector is capable of providing 
significant quantities of each of these products the sector is subject to hygiene problems which acts as an 
obstacle to increasing the sectors export capacity. This and other issues related to exports will be 
discussed in more detail later. For now it is important to note that the remainder of fishery exports by 
commercial value are composed of processed products at 4% and tinned products at 8%. In 2003 artisanal 
processing accounted for 6 387 tonnes of the processed fishery goods, while 1032 tonnes of fish meal 
provided the remainder of these products. Preserved product exports accounted for 9 459 tonnes in the 
same year.254   
 
In 2002 Senegal exported 87 564 tonnes of fish products with an estimated commercial value of 181 
million francs CFA. The European market absorbed 60% of these exports. The 1994 devaluation of the 
franc CFA stimulated Senegalese fishery exports though the imposition of international hygiene 
regulations for fish exports has been an obstacle for local exporters.255  
 
The African market, comprising mostly neighbouring Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), absorbs 35% of total exports of frozen as well as transformed fish products.  A UNFAO 
                                                 
251Catanzano, J. & Samb, A. 2000. Réflexions pour une Stratégie Opérationelle et Programme d'Actions pour le 
Secteur des Pêches Maritimes. UNFAO. TCP/SEN. 
252 Calculated from: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes 2003. 
Dakar, Ministère de l'Économie Maritime de Senegal. p 88. 
253Calculated from: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Ibid. 
254Ibid. 
255UNFAO. 2005. Country Profiles: Senegal. Available at: www.fao.org. 
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report suggests that although industrial enterprises do not find exports to the African market profitable, 
the activity is maintained as a means to providing for the fixed costs associated with their activities.256 
This is however a claim that seems strange since at face value if the activity is economically unprofitable 
there is surely little reason to keep it up. I suggest that there are two potential responses to this.  First, 
keeping exports to African markets is beneficial from a scale of economy point of view as it allows 
companies to run their businesses at a lower cost and thus derive larger profits from more profitable 
markets. Second, fisheries related activities can be seen to serve a spread of important functions in West 
Africa that transcend the pursuit of profit. These functions might include job creation and the provision of 
food security among others. When examined with respect to the chapters that follow, the answer to the 
question is that it is probably a mixture of both factors that keep exports to ECOWAS states flowing 
despite poor profitability. 
 
Asian markets are underdeveloped by Senegalese exporters and absorb around 5% of fish products 
produced in Senegal. The main exports to Asia comprise shark fin, cephalopods, and gastropods.257 
Although the American market has potential for development, exports to the region currently constitute 
less than 1% of total exports. The products that are exported to America consist of fresh or frozen whole 
fish and molluscs.258 
 
Although Senegal imports some equipment and other fishing materials which are relatively easy to 
account for, the quantities of fish products imported into Senegal are poorly understood. It is understood 
that some imports originating in Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, and increasingly from Guinea Conakry do 
find their way to Senegalese markets, but the exact amounts are uncertain. Despite this uncertainty, the 
central fish market of Dakar - Senegal's main fish market, estimates that up to 7% of fresh and processed 
products sold at the market are of foreign origin.259 Although there are a number of fish markets in 
Senegal, the central fish market in Dakar is the main and the largest one. This market receives fish 
products from all over the country and in turn supplies much of the country's interior as well as some 
neighbouring countries, notably Mauritania and Guinea.260  
 
As a result of the perception that the fisheries’ sector has strong export potential, in 2000 there was a 
                                                 
256UNFAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
257Ibid. 
258Ibid. 
259Dione, D., Sy, A.B., & Ndiaye, D.M.S. 2005. Op cit. p 30. 
260UNFAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
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massive development in the processing and storage fisheries’ sub sectors as landings of catches destined 
for export to Europe increased. European countries consumed 58% of these exports which accounted for 
80% of the value of these catches. Demersal species formed the greater part of these exports at 72%. Most 
of these fish were exported frozen by sea, while the rest were exported fresh in cool storage by air.261 This 
development saw the sale and processing of fish products becoming economically important in 
comparison to the primary fishing sector. As a result 33.5 million francs CFA were invested in fish 
market markets, storage and processing infrastructures. However, as a result of decreased catches in 
recent years, many of these new plants have operated at levels far below their capacity. In turn, many of 
these facilities have faced severe financial difficulties and certain of them have even been forced to close 
down. At the beginning of 2002 only forty nine such facilities were operating at full capacity as compared 
with sixty one in July of 2001.262   
 
Despite the positive effects of the foreign exchange earnings stemming from the sector, Oli Brown has 
highlighted in a 2005 UNEP report that the shift in fishing effort toward export oriented species is putting 
the supply of fish products to local markets at risk.263 This has also arguably contributed to higher prices 
and reduced variety for fish products in the local market. Simultaneously, fishery products have been 
concentrated to a greater extent in Dakar, which is seen by some to have implications for the supply of 
fresh fish products in decentralised areas. An indication of this is that FAO estimates suggest that average 
consumption of fish in Dakar is 43 kg per person per year, while the average for the country is 26 kg per 
person per year.  Further, the products that remote markets receive tend to be characterised by less variety 
and poorer quality.264  
 
Fish products comprise an important part of the animal protein intake for the Senegalese population. 
Estimates suggest that the proportion may be as high as 75% of animal protein intake.265 Thus the market 
for fresh fish is extremely important in Senegal from a food security point of view. An FAO report also 
argues that reduced state control and a freer market have resulted in an increase in the consumption of 
these products since fish selling activities were liberalised by the state in the 1990s, and since the state 
                                                 
261Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Evaluation de l'Accord de Pêche Signé entre la Communauté 
Européen et le Gouvernement de Sénégal pour la Période Mai 1997 – Avril 2001. MGP, Afrique et IDDRA, France. p 
20. 
262Ibid. 107. 
263 Brown, O. 2005. Policy Incoherence: EU Fisheries policy in Senegal. New York, UNDP, Human Development Report 
Office. p 4. 
264Ibid. 
265UNFAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
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ceased its support of the cold chain.266  
 
For Senegal, however, fisheries’ related foreign exchange earnings are not limited to export rents earned 
by the local fishery sectors, but also include payments made by foreign fishing nations for access rights to 
stocks found within Senegal's EEZ. Thus, above and beyond receipts that may be earned through 
regulating local fishing activities, the Senegalese government, and more specifically the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, has the opportunity to earn public receipts from the sale of access to marine 
resources to foreign nations. Since national fisheries’ sectors do not provide a great deal of revenue for 
the fisheries ministry, the payments earned from these access agreements with foreign nations have 
become enshrined in the Ministry of Fisheries' and Finance's financial planning. Access fees paid by the 
EU are by far the greatest among those paid to the Senegalese government. These EU access fees have 
been estimated to provide for more than 90% of the Ministry of Fisheries running costs, while residual 
amounts are used to finance certain other state functions.267 These financial dividends have lead to a 
situation where EU financial compensation for fishery access is extremely important to Senegal.   
 
However, simultaneous to the Senegalese government's signing of fishery access agreements with foreign 
partners in order to achieve financial gains for the country, economic conditions have compelled growing 
participation in artisanal fishing as a means for citizens to secure their own economic welfare. The result 
of this is that serious management issues concerning the division of resources between user groups have 
arisen.   
 
The dependence upon the artisanal sector for employment when other jobs are not available shows that in 
addition to the food security benefits associated with fisheries’ activities, the fisheries’ sector provides 
important employment benefits to local populations. Since artisanal fishing activities can be flexible in 
terms of capacity, many of these fishers may have other professions, and thus turn to fishing when certain 
economic conditions persist. In the 1970s during the period of drought in the region, the fishery sector 
played an important role as an industry that mobile populations could take advantage of while other 
activities were unprofitable. This was largely the case because fisheries’ activities do not have stringent 
requirements in terms of know how or equipment needs.268 
 
                                                 
266Ibid. 
267Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op Cit. p 14. 
268Dione, D., Sy, A.B., & Ndiaye, D.M.S. 2005. Op cit. p 40. 
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Available statistics on the numbers of fishers employed by the fisheries’ sectors do not distinguish 
between professional and occasional fishers. It has been argued, however, that maritime artisanal fishing 
in Senegal is composed primarily of professional fishers who earn most of their incomes from fishing 
activity.269 Problematically, it is infrequently the case that artisanal fishers are able to leave fishing for 
other activities.270 
 
The economic importance of marine resources in Senegal is naturally not limited to the activities of 
fishers, but extends to the activities of fish mongers and fish processing activities. The state of Senegal's 
marine ecosystem/s therefore has extended economic and developmental importance for the country's 
inhabitants.  
 
In a series of sixteen author interviews conducted among artisanal fishermen in Dakar in November 2005, 
fishermen seemed acutely aware that the fisheries’ sector is oversubscribed. All sixteen respondents gave 
accounts of how their catches had declined over the last ten years, and how fishing had become less 
profitable for them as a result. When asked whether they would like to change professions if they were 
given the opportunity, the characteristic of the artisanal fishing sector as being the 'last port of call' for 
unemployed and underemployed was clear. Seven respondents said that they would like to change 
professions; one fisherman said that he would change 'today' if he could. Of the other nine respondents, 
five said that they would not change professions because there was nothing else for them to do: “Fish are 
the only resource.”271    
 
A discussion with two directors of the Senegalese Fish Workers Association, FENAGIE (la Federation 
Nationale des GIEs de Pêcheurs du Senegal), supported the results of the survey. The Fenagie 
representatives affirmed that there has been a sizable fall in catches and a marked increase in the number 
of fishermen in the artisanal sector in the last ten years. This is largely due to the droughts that have 
plagued the interior of the country and the fact that there is little work to be found elsewhere. Another 
factor has been the financial assistance that the Senegalese government has provided for certain fishing 
projects.272 
 
                                                 
269Ibid. p 31. 
270Cunningham, S. & Gréboval, D. 2002. Loc cit. 
271Author's Survey. Artisanal Fishers. 2005. Dakar, November. 
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The complex macro economic and economic development dynamics of this situation raise a number of 
questions over the role that fisheries’ activities can and should play for the Senegalese economy. 
 
The Economic State of the Fishery 
It is commonly held that in most West African states, notably Senegal, living marine resources are an 
important economic asset with great potential for development.273 The view suggests that developing 
local fisheries’ sectors could have wide ranging benefits including increased employment opportunities, 
enhanced food security, greater potential for earning foreign exchange though fisheries’ exports, the 
potential to earn public revenues from improved regulation, and the possibility of ensuring better resource 
management systems.274  
 
Authors such as Kaczynski and Fluharty suggest that by promoting investment in land infrastructure of 
developing states, employing local labour, unloading harvests in those countries and effecting proper 
remuneration for access to the resources, fishery agreements could be used to boost development and 
poverty alleviation in signatory developing states.275 However, circumstance indicates that for one reason 
or another, this is not the case. 
 
An important part of the benefits associated with fisheries’ activities are the result of the 
commercialisation of fishery products since the processing and sales sectors for fish products form part of 
the downstream benefits that are derived from the primary fishing activity. However, since the internal 
liberalisation of fish mongering in Senegal, it is difficult to estimate the precise characteristics of the sub 
sector.  
 
The quantities of fish passing through these commercialisation systems increased dramatically between 
1990 and 1997, but subsequently began to decline. In 1990, 126 000 tonnes were commercialised as 
compared with 248 500 tonnes in 1997, and around 196 100 tonnes in 2003.276 The commercialisation of 
fish products involves a number of actors. These include fish sellers, couriers, collectors or buyers, and a 
                                                 
273For details see: Kaczyncki, V.M. & Looney, S.W. 2000. Coastal Resources as an Engine of Growth and Reduction 
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274Chaytor, B. 1999. Op cit, p 1. 
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range of other intermediaries.277 
 
The artisanal processing of artisanal catches is a sub sector that is predominantly run by women. The 
artisanal processing sub sector absorbs between 30% and 40% of landings made by artisanal fishers. The 
species processed may range from molluscs and crustaceans to various species of fish, and it is these 
activities that provide a large part of the animal protein needs of the Senegalese population. Traditionally 
the artisanal sales and processing sectors have provided an array of smoked, braised, dried, fermented and 
salted fish products that form an important part of traditional Senegalese food culture. Processing 
normally takes place outdoors where products might be dried in the sun or processed while being exposed 
to the elements, thus generating hygiene concerns.    
 
The Ecological State of the Fishery 
Senegal's EEZ is characterised by notable biological diversity. The resources that are exploited in Senegal 
represent four groups, each with biological particularities. These groups are: large pelagic species, coastal 
demersal species, deep dwelling demersal species, and smaller coastal pelagic species.278 A wide range of 
both scientific and anecdotal reports suggest that these once plentiful fish stocks are faced by decline. 
 
The author's interviews conducted among artisanal fishermen in Dakar in 2005 suggest that fish stocks in 
Senegal's EEZ have been subject to decline in recent years. Of the sixteen fishermen interviewed, all 
sixteen suggested that catches had fallen since 1995; two respondents noted that as children they used to 
see their boats full of fish but that one never sees that anymore. Others say that now you must travel far to 
have good catches.279 
 
When asked if the numbers of artisanal fishermen had increased in the last ten years, twelve respondents 
said that numbers had increased significantly, four of them suggested that there were more fishermen 
nowadays because there is no work to be found in other economic sectors.280 The decline in fish stocks 
that has been perceived by these fishermen could therefore be attributed to lower returns to effort as the 
result of increased pressure on fish stocks. For this and other reasons it is important to consult more 
scientific evidence regarding the state of fishery resources in the region.   
 
                                                 
277Ibid. p 12. 
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Scientific reports generally indicate that the state of marine resources off the coast of West African states 
is characterised by decline in fish populations and the degradation of coastal habitats. For example a 
recent study on the health of West African marine fishery stocks found almost complete over exploitation 
of demersal stocks and the beginnings of over exploitation of coastal pelagic species.281 This, as it has 
already been noted, is seen to contribute to the accentuation of poverty among West African states where 
marine fishery resources are a primary source of protein for populations.282  
 
When consulting scientific information it is important to note that the fishery is characterised by 
ecological interdependence between stocks. Changes in one stock may have implicit impacts upon the 
abundance of another.283  This can make estimates a little inaccurate.  
 
That being said, the MSY estimates for each of the four main species groups that can be found in 
Senegal's EEZ, have bee described by the UNFAO for 2005 as follows: 
! Coastal demersal species for which the annual MSY has been estimated at 130 000 tons. 
! Deep dwelling demersal species for with the MSY has been estimated at 20 000 tons, of which 
nearly 40% are Senegalese cod. 
! Coastal pelagic species for which the total MSY has been estimated at between 200 000 and 450 
000 tons per year. The prevalence of these resources is sensitive to environmental changes, which 
explains this large discrepancy. 
! Large pelagic species, for which the exploitable potential is difficult to measure due to their 
migratory nature throughout the high seas. All the same the exploitable potential for those stocks 
found within Senegal's EEZ is estimated at between 15 000 and 20 000 tons per year.284  
 
Annual MSY for coastal demersal species is estimated at 130 000 tons and these stocks are thought in 
general to be completely exploited, and even over exploited in certain areas. At intermediate depths 
between 30 and 60 meters, stocks, particularly of larger specimens, are clearly devastated as a result of 
intense trawling. Some stocks such as Senegalese sole, small moth sea catfish, Senegalese tounguesole, 
lesser African threadfin, black spot sea bream, and dungat grouper show numerous signs of 
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overexploitation.285 Preliminary evaluations emerging from the sub-regional project System d'Information 
et d'Analyse des Pêches (SIAP) (Fisheries Information and Analysis System) confirm that stocks of 
species such as white grouper, red pandora, lesser African threadfin, and blue spotted sea bream are 
overexploited and even heavily overexploited in some cases.286 One analysis of data taken over the years 
1981 – 1999, concerning five stocks, even suggests that catches of these demersal species have decreased 
despite a noted increase in fishing effort targeting those species. Subsequently West African goatfish 
stocks appear to be fully over exploited as a result of excessive fishing during the years 1990 and 1998. 
The situation regarding Cephalopods is more variable due to their population recruitment depending 
heavily upon environmental factors such as Atlantic biological up welling.287 
 
The MSY for deep dwelling demersal species is estimated at 20 000 tons per year with 40%-50% of this 
exploitable stock being constituted of Senegalese hake and 15%-20% accruing to deep dwelling shrimps. 
Despite insufficient biological information on these stocks, recent studies suggest that there are no signs 
of biological over exploitation among them. Despite this, a precautionary approach has been 
recommended regarding the capture of hake stocks that are shared with Mauritania, while 
recommendations suggest that effort levels of activities targeting deep dwelling shrimps should be 
stopped.288 
 
Although the abundance of smaller coastal pelagic species is also heavily dependent upon environmental 
factors and migration patterns, an MSY estimate of 450 000 tons has been made on the basis of average 
biomasses over a five year period. In general these species are thought to be moderately exploited.289  
 
Due to their migratory behaviour and vast dispersion throughout the Atlantic Ocean, MSY estimates for 
large pelagic species in Senegal's EEZ remain difficult to achieve. Although some principal stocks such 
as yellow fin tuna, skipjack tuna, bigeye tuna, sword fishes, and Atlantic sailfish are heavily exploited in 
the Atlantic, other species such as little tunny, West African Spanish mackerel and some others that are 
also targeted by artisanal fisheries are poorly exploited.290     
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In March 2001 the Centre for Oceanographic Research of Dakar – Thiaroye (CRODT) produced a report 
recommending that local and foreign fishing efforts aimed at coastal demersal species be stopped 
completely and that licences for small pelagic species not be granted due to the fragility of stocks. These 
recommendations were followed by the Senegalese government granting EU fleets access to 8 000 GRT 
for demersal species. The EU had requested access to 16 000 GRT, of which 15 000 GRT was demand 
for coastal demersal species,291 which are important to artisanal and national industrial user groups. 
 
The failure of governance authorities to heed the scientific advice of their policy advisers provides insight 
into the gravity of governance issues in Senegalese fisheries’ discourse. 
 
Senegalese Fisheries’ Governance 
Steven Cunningham and Dominique Gréboval argue that despite conditions that may have exacerbated 
the problem, overcapacity in fisheries has occurred in the first instance as a result of free access to fishery 
resources and it is unlikely that approaches to efficient fishery management will be effective until this 
problem is addressed.292 The question of regulating over capacity in fisheries boils down to the ability of 
institutions to implement and facilitate the reduction of fishing capacity. 
 
In 1992 Christian Chaboud noted that at a regional level, fisheries’ discourse in West Africa was 
characterised by a multiplicity of actors. Chaboud observed that a relationship between this multiplicity 
and the biological and economic heterogeneity of fishery resources existed.293  
 
In some cases, and especially where common resources are shared between users, the multiplicity of 
actors taking part in the fisheries’ discourse makes it politically difficult to identify one overarching 
public policy for the governance of the resource. The influences that play a role in determining the 
governance environment for fisheries’ authorities in Senegal include a range of interdependent actors and 
institutions at both local and international levels. One institution, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, plays a very important role in setting the foundational terms of reference for fisheries’ 
management as a product of its international legal legitimacy. And it is from this foundation that 
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fisheries’ governance landscapes are inclined to propagate.  
 
In 1970, the United Nations held the Conference on the Law of the Sea that has since become known as 
the UNCLOS.  As a result of the ratification of the UNCLOS in 1982, states now have legal jurisdiction 
or property rights over 95% of fish stocks and 35% of the world’s oceans.294 This advent has means that a 
clear relationship between fisheries’ management and national governance has been created.  
 
As we have already seen in chapter three, some theorists have examined international fisheries’ 
agreements in terms of Principal Agent Theory which suggest that a principal (coastal state), grants 
access rights to an agent (foreign fishing entity). According to this view, the principal is responsible for 
the actions, or implications of the actions, of the agent who is contracted to perform a particular 
function.295 When applied to north/south fishery agreements, such explanations usually explain that 
poorer coastal states are compelled by higher discount rates to sell access to their fishery resources to 
wealthier 'agent' states that may have lower discount rates.296 The impetus for exchanging natural 
resources for financial gain is stimulated by an understanding that a high discount rate will mean that the 
returns to the money today are greater than those attributed to leaving the fish in the sea until tomorrow. 
Since poorer southern states typically have higher discount rates than wealthier northern ones, many of 
which also have over capitalised fisheries’ industries, there has emerged a characteristic exchange of fish 
for money flowing between north and south. In cases where countries, such as Senegal, have laboured 
under national debt burdens, the impetus to sell resources in order to service national debt is also great.297 
Problematically, many of these arrangements can be viewed as post colonial perpetuations of asymmetric 
Core-Periphery economic relationships. Such relationships have been characterised by colonised 
periphery areas providing cheap natural resources to the colonial core that derive large profits through 
processing those resources.298 Béatrice Gorez has noted that in the 1990s EU fishing agreements with 
southern nations generated an average annual value added of € 694 million in EU member states. Most of 
this value was added through the processing industries, and these benefits represent approximately three 
times the benefits derived by southern states from fishing agreements.299 
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North/south compensation issues only describe one part of the natural resource management dilemma 
faced by southern fisheries nations since, in addition to their financial needs, these coastal states face an 
array of local pressures pertaining to the livelihoods of their electorates. Dealing with an array of 
sometimes conflicting pressures is thus part and parcel of a government's effort to manage a natural 
resource in accordance with the fulfilment of a state's important functions. Christopher Pierson has 
outlined some of the important functions of states as: advancing their economic interests; providing the 
necessary infrastructures for the sustenance and proliferation their societies; protecting their citizens and 
borders from possible threats, both internal and external, and projecting a suitable image among other 
states.300 In light of this view, Nwabufo Uzodike and I have argued that states' management (or 
mismanagement) of their natural resources, and other environmental issues, can be seen to emerge from 
decision makers simply attempting to fulfil complex sets of interests.301 
 
Controversy surrounding fishery access agreements are a good example of this since such agreements are 
frequently signed by states who already have fisheries’ groups relying upon fishery resources as a means 
to provide for certain social and economic needs. States therefore have a role to play in ensuring the 
livelihood of those populations, while simultaneously aiming to fulfil other needs. Accordingly Article 62 
of the UNCLOS mandates that a nation cannot sell access to already fully exploited resources, though 
they should make resources that are not fully exploited available to foreign entities.302  
 
Joseph Catanzano has argued that concurrent usage of a common fishery resource by numerous user 
groups that emerges as a result of implementing Article 62 of the UNCLOS can be lead to inefficiency in 
fishery use.303  The view suggests that Article 62 fails to recognize that some groups may be more 
efficient than others in the production of fishery products. The legal mandate prescribed by this article of 
the UNCLOS therefore prevents fishery management authorities from allocating access to fish stocks in 
accordance with the comparative advantages that some users may have over others in the production of 
certain fishery products. This in turn leads to sub optimal exploitation of the fishery. 
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These situations raise very important questions about how fishery resources are allocated between user 
groups who fulfil different social and economic niche functions. Management decisions in Senegal 
therefore boil down to a principal's ability to balance complex forces in accordance with some concept of 
how to maximise national welfare as a product of fishing activity. If the principal cannot satisfy the needs 
of all user groups, it must prioritise one over the other.  
 
In his 2005 report, Oli Brown suggested that often less developed country governments are only able to 
gain revenue from their domestic fisheries’ sectors if their governance infrastructures are well developed. 
According to Brown, Senegal has tended to prefer short term financial compensation for fisheries’ 
agreements.304 This does not mean that Senegal's governance infrastructure is weak, though the failure of 
these funds to contribute to a sustainable and economically viable fishing sector for the local economy 
might.  
 
The fiscal motivation for Senegal to sign access agreements is clear upon consulting a study by the 
Senegalese Caisse d'Encouragement à la Pêche et à ses Annexes (CEPIA) (Facility for Supporting 
Fishing and Associated Industries), which shows that of the direct public revenues earned from the 
fisheries’ sector in 2003,  845.8 million francs CFA were brought in by national fisheries’ activities, while 
10 495.11 million francs CFA were contributed by the European Union as compensation for access to 
Senegal's marine fishery resources – and this figure excludes payments made by individual vessels on the 
basis of catches made.305  
 
Since catch reports are generally viewed as being inaccurate or unavailable, it is also difficult to contrast 
EU financial compensation with the impact that EU activities have for fish stocks and the national user 
groups that rely upon them for their livelihoods and food security. The disparity between perceptions 
regarding EU catches is manifest in both EU and Senegalese fisheries’ policy discourse. One report 
emerged in 2002 at an EU parliamentary debate on EU fisheries’ activities, where a Commissioner for the 
Commission of the European Union, Mr Franz Fischler, stated that “The Senegalese authorities have 
confirmed that our fisheries will not endanger stocks because, even during the period from 1997 to 2001, 
community catches only accounted for between 1.7% to 3.3% of total catches in Senegal.”306 Conversely 
we can revisit the March 2001 CRODT  report recommending that local and foreign fishing effort aimed 
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at coastal demersal species be halted completely and that licences for small pelagic species not be granted 
due to the fragility of stocks. These recommendations were followed by the Senegalese government 
granting EU fleets access to 8 000 GRT for demersal species. The EU had requested access to 16 000 
GRT, of which 15 000 GRT was demand for coastal demersal species,307 which are important to artisanal 
and national industrial user groups. 
 
Despite the existence of fisheries’ regulations in West African states, many of them “lack the 
infrastructure, personnel, financial resources, communication systems, and institutional structures needed 
to establish monitoring and surveillance systems.”308 As a result, although access agreements subject EU 
activities to the national fisheries’ regulations of the third country, these fleets can easily transgress 
national rules, and reports indicate that they frequently do.309  
 
These factors combined with the Principal/Agent implications that result from the UNCLOS for fisheries’ 
management, can be seen to have contributed to an economic development dilemma for southern states 
such as Senegal, at the heart of which is a question of governance underpinned by important social, 
ecological, and economic questions. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served as an introduction to the case study. The chapter has aimed to provide a basic 
understanding of the fisheries’ context in Senegal that can be elaborated upon in the subsequent chapters. 
 
The chapter has illustrated that the multiplicity of actors, and the relationships between this multiplicity 
and the biological and economic heterogeneity of fishery resources that Christian Chaboud noted in 1992 
as being characteristic of West African fisheries’ discourse, continue to present challenges for fisheries’ 
management efforts in the region. In some cases, and especially where common resources are shared 
between users, Senegalese, EU and others, the multiplicity of actors taking part in the fisheries’ discourse 
makes it politically difficult to identify one overarching public policy for the governance of the resource.  
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We assume that there are sometimes serious trade offs that occur when one user group is dominated by 
another in terms of access to the resource. Problematically these trade offs are particularly difficult to 
measure when the nature of the contributions of sometimes informal fisheries’ sectors are poorly 
understood. Hélène Rey has suggested that for this reason attention has been focussed on attempting to 
understand the contributions of less formal sectors better.310 Such efforts have culminated with numerous 
local and international institutional efforts to curb the opportunity cost of managing fisheries 
ineffectively. Unfortunately these efforts appear to be only partially effective. This creates impetus for 
examining the balances of power that exist between the multiple and interdependent actors within 
fisheries’ discourse.  
 
In terms of Principal Agent theory, although the EU is the largest foreign fishing partner to Senegal, it is 
not necessarily the responsibility of the EU to ensure that its fishing deals with third countries are 
managed according to any principles other than those espoused by the principal state from which they 
procure resources. That being said, at macro levels it is not necessarily in the best interests of any group 
that fishery resources in Senegal are in decline as the result of the activities of a range of actors in an 
interdependent international environment.  
 
This logic is especially evident when we observe trends in illegal immigration to Europe of people from 
West Africa. The issue has been receiving increasing attention from political organisations as well as the 
media. The immigrants and their families’ claim that they would not attempt to immigrate to European 
countries were economic conditions in their own countries better. European states argue that their 
economies cannot support such numbers of immigrants and therefore discourage it using various 
measures.311 A political economy argument that is gaining momentum is that illegal immigration is a 
symptom of a larger economic problem concerning the status of economic development in developing 
countries, notably Africa, and as such the immigration problem can only ever really be solved if action is 
taken supporting economic development in least developed countries.312 
 
For these reasons it is logical from a political and political economy point of view that the EU has a 
development cooperation Directorate General and is also a signatory to the UNFAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries. In terms of this logic, the EU is and should be committed to ensuring the 
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sustainable development of fisheries’ activities in third countries.  
 
A range of other actors and institutions also subscribe to the belief in the importance of sustainable 
development of fisheries, though many of these actors may do so for any number of reasons. Exploring 
the institutional environment in which fisheries’ discourse has evolved is an important condition for 
understanding the dynamics that characterise the political aspects to fisheries’ discourse, which in turn is 
an important condition for realising sustainable fisheries in Senegal.  
 
It is the task of the following chapter to describe the institutional environment in which the fisheries’ 
agreements exist between Senegal and the EU. 
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Chapter Eight.  Institutional Context Impacting upon the Governance of Senegal’s Marine 
Fishery 
 
Institutions are rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour that structure 
repeated human interaction. Hence, they limit and define the choice set of neoclassical theory. We 
are interested not in the institutions per se, but in the consequences for the choices individuals 
actually make.313   
 
Introduction 
The first official acte de naissance for fishing agreements in Europe was a decision taken by the 
European Economic Community (EEC) on the 3 November 1976, which recognised a 200 mile EEZ for 
adjacent countries of the North Atlantic and North Sea. This resolution suggested that access to living 
marine resources could be granted on a reciprocal basis between states, and if reciprocity was not 
possible, access would be granted on the basis of financial compensation.314  
 
Later, in 1982, the granting of a 200 mile EEZ over oceanic resources adjacent to coastal states, as well as 
the right to sell access rights to resources that they do not or cannot exploit themselves, was enshrined in 
international law by the UNCLOS. 315 This development gave legal authority to what was at the time the 
growing phenomenon of fishing deals or access agreements.  
 
There have been a number of subsequent developments in the institutions that have consequences for 
fisheries’ management regimes and as Douglass North puts it ‘the choices individuals actually make’316 
with regards fisheries’ regulations. This chapter will review some of the institutional developments that 
impact upon fisheries discourse in Senegal with a view to identifying the areas where institutional 
arrangements can be seen to have a positive effect for the Senegalese fishery, and in turn where such an 
arrangement can be seen to have a negative or negligible effect. The chapter reviews international 
institutional frameworks first, and follows on to review regional European, regional African, and 
Senegalese fisheries’ institutions respectively.  
 
The 2002 – 2006 fishery agreement between Senegal and the EU is relied upon as a reference for 
evaluating the extent to which fisheries’ institutions have successfully placed fisheries’ activities and 
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policy choices in Senegal on track towards securing the sustainable development of the fishery. 
 
This chapter will review in turn the international, EU, West African and Senegalese fisheries’ institutions 
that have an impact upon EU Senegal fisheries’ relations. The 2002 – 2006 fishery agreement between 
Senegal and the EU will be relied upon as a reference for understanding the extent to which institutional 
arrangements have led to concrete outcomes in fisheries’ relations between Senegal and the EU. 
 
The International Institutional Context 
Post UNCLOS, one of the first major institutional attempts to address the global overcapacity in fisheries 
was the development of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) in 1995.  
 
The point of departure for the CCRF is that aquatic resources have been a major source of food and 
economic benefits since ancient times. However, since the end of World War II, improved scientific 
knowledge and the development of fisheries’ industries has led to an increasing realization that aquatic 
resources, though renewable, are finite and thus need to be managed well in order to ensure that their 
contribution to the nutritional, economic and social well being of the world’s population is to be 
sustained.317 The CCRF therefore states: 
 
The widespread introduction in the mid-seventies of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the 
adoption in 1982, after long deliberations, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
provided a new framework for the better management of marine resources. The new legal regime of 
the ocean gave coastal states rights and responsibilities for the management and use of fishery 
resources within their EEZs which embrace some 90% of the world’s fisheries. Such extended 
national jurisdiction was a necessary but insufficient step towards the effective management and 
sustainable development of fisheries.”318  
 
Noting that fisheries’ industries had become a market driven, dynamically developing sector, that is 
driven by growing international demand for fish and fishery products, and that fishery resources could not 
sustain such growth indefinitely, the United Nations Committee on Fisheries (COGI) and the FAO 
developed a strategy for the development of responsible fisheries’ management.319  
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This code sets out principles and international standards of behavior for responsible practices with a 
view to ensuring the effective conservation, management and development of living aquatic 
resources, with due respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity. The Code recognizes the nutritional, 
economic, social, environmental and cultural importance of fisheries and the interests of all those 
concerned with the fisheries’ sector.320  
 
EU and ACP states are all members of the FAO and have signed the CCRF. The priority issues for the 
code are: 
! To improve participation of stake holders, information sharing and transparency. (Articles 7, 9 & 
11) 
! To improve information for management though research biological, economic and social 
components to fisheries as well as to improve data collection and regional cooperation on 
information issues. (Articles 7, 8 & 10) 
! To address the need to minimize the negative impacts of ecologically harmful fishing            
methods and aquaculture, as well as to minimize by catch. (Articles 7, 9 & 11) 
! To reduce excess fishing capacity. (Articles 7 & 10.) 
! To improve monitoring, control and surveillance systems. (Articles 7, 8 & 9) 
! To improve the management of trans boundary stocks. (Article 10) 
! To address the special needs of developing countries. (Article 5.)321 
 
Although certain parts of the CCRF are based upon relevant rules of international law, it remains 
voluntary, and thus only provides guidelines for responsible fishery management.322 For example Article 
5 simply states that: “States, relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and financial 
institutions should work for the adoption of measures to address the needs of developing countries.”323 By 
making recommendations without identifying many of the causes that have led to the need for these 
recommendations, the code does not address all of the systemic causes of weak fishery management 
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regimes, but rather presents a prognosis of the symptoms. As such, the CCRF remains a necessary but 
insufficient step toward the sustainable development of fisheries.   
 
EU member states are also signatories to the 1992 Rio Convention, the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and the 1995 Kyoto International Conference on the sustainable contribution of fishing to food 
security, all of which deal with fishing, food security and sustainable development.324   
 
Attempts to improve EU fisheries’ agreements with southern nations have generally accorded with 
broader goals for developing more desirable fisheries’ relations between north and south. These are in 
accordance with international conventions dealing with fisheries’ issues, as well as those highlighted by 
the first objective of the Delivery Plan for Fisheries of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD), which aims to maintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce 
the maximum sustainable yield for depleted stocks and where possible not later than 2015.325  
 
However European commitments to sustainable fisheries’ activities can also be contextualised within a 
number of EU institutional arrangements. Some of these arrangements highlight the EU's commitment to 
sustainable fisheries in EU waters as well as those of third countries, while others highlight conflicting 
pressures on fisheries’ institutions.   
 
Since the advent of fishery access agreements, more than thirty have been signed by the EU, of which 
twenty six have survived into recent years. Most of these agreements were signed between North Atlantic, 
Indian Ocean and African countries, with only one agreement being signed with a Latin American 
country. Between 1981 and 1997 the amount budgeted by the EU for fishing access agreements rose from 
5 million to 300 million euros, with the 1998 budget showing that the amounts spent on fisheries’ access 
agreements accounted for 5% of money budgeted for the EU's foreign activities.326 
 
In the mid 1990s, after many years of so called cash for access agreements between the EU and West 
African states, concern arose that the one to two year access agreements may be having a detrimental 
effect upon the livelihoods of coastal populations in African states. The African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) 
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countries-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 7 October 1993 suggested that the sixteen cash for access 
agreements signed between West African states and the EU had had beneficial effects upon the coastal 
states from a financial point of view, but may have contributed to the impoverishment of local 
populations, and the detriment of artisanal fisheries as a result of increased fishing pressure and 
competition for resources.327  
 
In November 1997 the Agriculture and Fisheries’ Council of the EU adopted a set of conclusions that 
recognised the importance of adapting policies in accordance with environmental and social concerns, as 
well as budgetary constraints regarding agreements with third countries.328  
 
Relations between the EU and ACP countries form an important part of EU development cooperation 
policy and also its broader external action. Between 1975 and 2000 EU-ACP relations were governed by 
the Lomé Convention that was regularly adapted. The Lomé Convention recognised the role that EU 
fishing industries can play for the development of fishing industries of the ACP, though it remained silent 
on the matter of investments in land infrastructure for adding value through disembarking and processing 
fish harvested in the waters of ACP states within those states.329  
 
Also in the 1990s, improved awareness of the difficulties being encountered in attempts to use fishery 
relations as a means to boost development among ACP states, the EU’s DG VIII for international 
cooperation and the European Parliament called for fishing agreements with ACP countries that have a 
greater level of cooperation between the two regions and thus involved cooperation between DG XIV 
(fisheries) and DG VIII (international cooperation).330 
 
New 'second generation' agreements were proposed in the mid 1990s as a means to overcoming the 
asymmetry of the benefits accrued as a result of the access agreements between north and south. These 
second generation agreements generally implied joint venture agreements between European and 
developing country vessel operators. However, these agreements were usually restricted to more 
developed Third World countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Namibia, and thus had little direct impact 
upon West African coastal communities. Indirect impacts could however be felt as a result of the market 
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supply effects stemming from the heavily subsidised fishing activities that usually characterised second 
generation agreements, since in some cases European vessels were subsidised by both the EU and the 
country from which the vessel originated.331    
 
Theoretically fisheries’ agreements between the EU and West African coastal states are seen as a means 
to boost the EU's cooperation policy with third world countries. Article 178 of the European Community 
Treaty mandates the obligation of coherence between development cooperation and fisheries’ 
agreements.332 The main policy guidelines are prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty and commit the EU to 
ensuring that their relations with less developed countries assist in the reduction of poverty and the 
promotion of sustainable development.333 However, although the EU is encouraged by the Maastricht 
Treaty to ensure that fisheries’ agreements are used to the developmental advantage of coastal states, the 
Directorate General for Fisheries’ claims that fishery agreements are business arrangements that 
recognise the sovereignty of coastal (signatory) states. Further, EU compensation of fisheries’ agreements 
have infrequently been used to the benefit of local fisheries’ sectors, despite the fact that the laws of many 
coastal states mandate that such finds be used for the good of the fisheries’ sector.334  
 
Furthermore, article 130U of the Maastricht Treaty obliges the EU to ensure that coherence exists 
between policy objectives for development cooperation and the policy objectives for other departments,335 
but EU fisheries’ cooperation agreements are negotiated by the Department of Fisheries (DG XIV), and 
DGXIV claims that these agreements, which are purely commercial arrangements are not linked to 
development or poverty reduction in less developed countries with whom agreements are signed.336 This 
position also conflicted with that of the Lomé Convention which stipulated that fisheries’ development 
policies fall under the responsibility of the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGVIII).337 
For the EU, fisheries’ cooperation agreements with developing countries are an important means to 
exporting overcapacity in their own fishing industries as well as satisfying European consumer demand 
for seafood: “In Europe, the market demand for seafood and the capacity of fishing fleets for extracting 
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living marine resources from its EEZ far outstrips available reproductive capacities.”338 Thus, fisheries’ 
agreements are by nature commercial and there exists administrative difficulties in changing the nature of 
these arrangements in order to comply with broader development cooperation goals. 
 
In addition to the EU commitments to ensure policy coherence between the operations of DG  Fisheries 
(XIV) and DG Development Cooperation (VIII) under article 130V of the Maastrict Treaty, EU member 
states are also obliged to abide by the prescriptions of the FAO CCRF, which gives priority to the 
nutritional needs of local populations in fisheries’ agreements, since signing the convention in 1995.339  
 
When access agreements are negotiated on behalf of the EU, the EC is responsible for the negotiation of 
the agreement and the agreements are therefore subject to the principles of international negotiation as 
outlined by the laws of the European Community. The European Parliament is consulted about any 
agreement resulting from negotiations. During negotiations the Commission is charged to paraphrase 
relevant protocols and exchanges between parties, as well as being responsible for the resulting financial, 
administrative and technical management of agreements. These tasks are carried out with the assistance of 
DG XIV.340 
 
In the late 1990s, due to a perceived lack of progress in the international economic and developmental 
environment, notably economic and political instability and the rapid expansion of poverty, and a 
growing awareness of a lack of institutional and systemic capacity for supporting development 
cooperation, a need for a change from the Lomé Convention was identified. As a result, when the Lomé 
convention expired in 2000, it was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, which is set to last between 2000 
and 2020. The agreement is based upon five independent pillars for the fight against poverty. These 
pillars were: an enhanced political dimension, increased participation, a more strategic approach to 
cooperation focusing on poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships, and improved financial 
cooperation. The Cotonou Agreement makes provision for adaptation every five years. In accordance 
with this, it was revised between May 2004 and February 2005 with a view to enhancing the effectiveness 
of the EU-APC partnership.341 However, Oli Brown argues that while the growth in fisheries’ exports has 
helped to improve Senegal's trade balance, and fisheries’ incomes have been an important source of debt 
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repayments, the value of the fisheries’ sector is being eroded by multilateral trade liberalisation. This is 
engendered by the phasing out of trade advantages for ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement as of 
2008, and WTO led efforts to reduce international customs tariffs which will undermine the benefits of 
Senegal's duty free access to EU markets.342  
 
In November 2001 the Council of the European Union accepted the European Commission (EC) 
Communication (number 724 of 2000) on Fisheries and Poverty Reduction. The move illustrates that the 
EU views poverty reduction as a central aim for DG VIII, and that fisheries’ activities can play a role in 
the realization of this aim. At a policy level this implies recognition that fisheries’ agreements should 
accord with the development of fisheries’ industries in third countries. The communication also 
recognizes that EU policies on fisheries, trade, consumer protection and the environment can impact upon 
the extent to which fisheries’ activities in third countries contribute to poverty reduction.343  
 
In 2001, an EC Green Paper on Fisheries highlighted the following weaknesses of fishery access 
agreements between 1996 and 2000:344 
! Unsatisfactory control and surveillance procedures meant that information regarding primary and 
by catch levels is not always accurate. 
! A lack of biological assessments for fish stocks meant that fishing access agreed to under access 
agreements was not always based on accurate reflections of MSY levels. 
! Certain agreements made it impossible to react timeously to sudden changes in fish stock levels. 
! Certain agreements did not offer sufficient protection to the interests of small scale  
coastal fisheries.345  
 
In December 2002 the European Commission published an Integrated Framework for Fisheries’ 
Partnership Agreements with Third Countries (in communication 637 of 2002).  This signified an impetus 
for moving away from traditional cash for access agreements and towards new partnership agreements. 346 
These fisheries’ partnership agreements are intended to accord with the framework for more general 
Economic Partnership Agreements. These will manage trade and development cooperation as the system 
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of preferences, characterising the Cotonou Agreement, is phased out towards the end of 2007. “The 
commission promises that such agreements will protect distant water fishing fleets while strengthening 
the conditions to achieve sustainable fisheries in the waters of partner country [sic].”347 
 
From 2003 the EU Common Fisheries’ Policy (CFP) was modified in the following ways: 
 
!      Subsidies for building new fishing boats were abolished after the end of 2004 and conditions for 
subsidies for modernising existing boats became more exigent. This forms part of a broader plan to 
eliminate overcapacity in the EU fleet by 2014, with the objective of reducing fleet capacity by 40% 
by 2009. This new system establishes a maximum fleet capacity for each member country in a view 
to further reducing capacity as public financial support is done away with, and a special fund 
established for those wishing  to reduce fleet capacity voluntarily. 
!     Incorporating more ecosystem based approaches to fisheries’ management by introducing recovery 
plans for threatened stocks and management plans for nonthreatened ones. This aspect to the new 
CFP constitutes greater adherence to the precautionary principle in fisheries’ management 
arrangements. 
!     Paying larger rewards for vessel owners wishing to scrap their boats. In addition, funds saved on boat 
building subsidies will be channelled towards European coastal communities facing catch restrictions 
and the retraining of fishers facing retrenchment.348 
 
Attempts to mix fisheries’ agreements with purely economic objectives and economic development aid 
can result in a lack of a coherent European strategy regarding fisheries’ agreements.349 Importantly, 
Brown notes that the CFP is a work in progress which gives guidelines for European fisheries’ policies, 
though many of the directives will take time to implement.350   
 
Subsequent to second generation agreements, third generation agreements have been recommended as a 
means of undoing some of the follies of traditional cash for access, and second generation agreements. 
Under third generation agreements, the elimination of subsidies for EU fleets operating in West African 
waters and more coherence between the EU fishery, development, and cooperation directorates is 
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mandated. However, investment in land infrastructure, the employment of indigenous populations, local 
landings and processing, and more participative cooperation in scientific research and resource 
management remained important priorities for improving the spread of benefits resulting from fishery 
agreements.351  
 
There are a number of important benefits that can be derived for the European Union from these 
agreements. First, they provide an additional yearly supply of some 2.5 million tonnes of fish, which 
represents around 40% of the catches of the EU fleet, to the European industry. Second, these agreements 
provide employment for an estimated 40 000 European workers and opportunities for around 3 000 
vessels.352 The EC also highlights that the contribution of European Community fleets to employment in 
third countries is significant:  
 
In our partner countries, the financial contribution is important in terms of budget revenues as well 
as of impact on the national economy such as providing jobs (of the 30,000 jobs guaranteed by the 
FPAs [Foreign Partnership Agreements] 75% are non EU).353  
 
The European Commission also notes that fishery partnership agreements with less developed countries 
have evolved from more rudimentary cash for access agreements to incorporate greater development 
cooperation: 
 
With the reform of the CFP in 2002, the agreements we have with these countries have undergone a 
transformation. What were once access arrangements with a financial compensation have now 
become genuine partnerships for the development of sustainable and responsible fisheries 
(Fisheries’ Partnership Agreements - FPAs). The idea is to help the developing countries put in 
place their own fisheries’ policies that can help them meet their aim of economic development 
while protecting fish resources.354  
 
The European Community also suggests that under such Partnership Agreements, political dialogue 
between the two parties is reinforced. A percentage of the financial contribution for the agreement is also 
earmarked for supporting third country sectoral fisheries’ policies with a “view to introducing responsible 
and sustainable fishing.”355 
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Under the reformed fisheries’ agreements the method for calculating license fees under FPAs are based 
on the fishing opportunities allowed to the European fleet, while taking ‘indepth’ market studies of the 
value of catches for the different species into account. For tuna fleets the new CFP stipulated a 35-65 
partition of payments between vessel owners and the EC.356  
 
Despite attempts to enhance the sustainable development implications of fisheries’ arrangements in third 
countries, the cleavage between the EU's business interests and its development cooperation incentives 
can be illustrated by the EU's investments in fisheries’ agreements and development cooperation 
initiatives respectively. Between 2000 and 2005 an average of €150 million was allocated by the EU to 
fishery agreements, during the same period €30 million was allocated under EU-ACP development 
cooperation.357   
 
Above and beyond the potentially detrimental effects subsidized EU fishing activities may have for local 
fishing enterprises, Beatrice Goréz notes that certain other provisions of EU-ACP fishery agreements also 
fail to protect the long term development of ACP fishery industries. These provisions are: 
! The under estimation of fishing effort, through a failure to grant access according to catch limits 
while basing access on Gross Tonnes (GRT) or the number of boats. 
! The usage of destructive fishing practices, such as inappropriate trawling activities and Fish 
Aggregating Devices (FADs), that increase the incidence of by catch, particularly of juvenile fish. 
! The over exploitation of ACP fishery resources, since in many cases access to fully exploited or 
over exploited stocks is offered, and these offers are accepted by the EU358 
 
Further, monitoring, control and surveillance programmes are highlighted as being weak in the following 
areas: 
! Observer programmes tend to fail since observers are paid directly by vessel owners and satellite 
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data are not provided in real time to third countries. 
! Under reporting of catches is a problem since reports on EU catches in ACP waters are  
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generally considered unsatisfactory.359 
 
Benefits for local fishery industries are also viewed as being insufficient under EU-ACP arrangements for 
two main reasons: 
! Local landings are seen to be diminished through arrangements where vessel operators can escape 
their obligations to land catches in the country of origin through the payment of a fee. This fee is 
thought to be as low as € 20 per GRT in certain cases. 
! Employment of local crew is often an obligation that is not sufficiently adhered to.360 
 
In addition to these concerns, the accountability of EU-ACP fishery agreements is found to be generally 
poor. ‘An audit from the European Court of auditors found that several aspects of the EU-ACP fisheries’ 
agreements do not ensure proper monitoring of the implementation of the agreements nor to evaluate their 
benefits.’361   
 
Goréz also notes that the negative impacts of EU-ACO fisheries’ agreements are indicative of a lack of 
coherence between EU-ACP fisheries’ agreements and the goals of EU-ACP Development Cooperation, 
as outlined in the Cotonou Agreement section on sustainable development and poverty reduction.  In 
order to address this lack of coherence the EU has taken some steps to embrace sustainable development 
objectives with the signing of EU-APC fisheries’ agreements. One such step was the 2003 Council 
Conclusions on an Integrated Framework for FPAs with ACP countries.362  
 
These FPAs represent changes from traditional access agreements in the following areas:  
! The conceptualization of a plan of action to eradicate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing.  
! The conceptualization of a plan of action to improve stock assessment outside of EU waters.  
! The prevention of over fishing of stocks that are important to local people. As such, and in 
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keeping with the already well established UNCLOS principle, FPAs should not seek access to 
already fully or over exploited resources. 
! The realization of greater coherence with WTO rules mandating that financial contributions under 
CFP, FPAs are to the mutual benefit of both parties and to the sustainable development of third 
country fisheries. EU financial contributions are thus to be disconnected from access fees, and 
vessel owners to pay these access fees themselves. This development has, however, yet to be 
realized. 
!  Subsidies for transfer of vessels to ACP nations are to continue, but are no longer to be paid 
directly by the EU, but rather by the relevant ACP state.  
! The importance of acting upon monitoring and control of fishery activities at a regional level is 
stressed by the EU council’s conclusions.  
! Since 1 January 2003, the EU is legally obliged to conduct impact assessment studies of all its 
policies including FPAs with ACP countries. Such studies are to include economic effects of 
FPAs on local stake holders, environmental impact analyses, and social impact analyses.363   
 
As far as the realization of these changes is concerned, a number of comments can be made: 
First, the extent of the implementation of the plans of action for improving stock assessment and 
eradicating Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing are not clear. What is clear is that there is to 
date, a definitive lack of information concerning either of these two actions. Second, in some cases, 
namely the EU agreements with Senegal for access to demersal stocks, the EU appears to have continued 
to access resources that are thought to be fully or over exploited. Third, until the EU uncouples its 
financial contributions to ACP countries from payments for access to fish resources, the note on greater 
WTO compliance remains impotent. Fourth, whether subsidies for the transfer of vessels to ACP states 
are being paid indirectly by the EU using the relevant ACP state as a conduit is unclear. Fifth, the 1996 
protocol signed between Senegal and the EU was the first to implement “targeted actions” that aimed to 
assist with development issues such as fishery management schemes and infrastructural and financial 
support to the artisanal sector. There have also been strong rules in the Senegal protocol regarding landing 
catches locally.364 Last, the EU has commissioned a project that attempts to identify the economic effects 
of FPAs on local stake holders, as well as environmental and social impacts of FPAs in ACP states. This 
project is named the ECOST project. The methodology to be used aims to assess the social, 
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environmental and economic impacts of EU FPAs in ACP states.365   
 
The perspectives on how fisheries’ agreements should be changed vary from group to group. Some argue 
that agreements should be stopped all together, while others have suggested that there are some benefits 
to the agreements, and that these benefits can be capitalized upon if fisheries’ agreements are modified to 
second or third generation agreements. These groups argue for:  
! Higher financial compensation for access to fisheries’ resources. 
! The channelling of compensation toward fisheries’ management initiatives. 
! Larger portions of local landings and processing of catches. 
! Improved market access for coastal state fishery exports. 
! Greater cooperation between European fisheries’ companies and coastal state fishers, processors 
and exporters.366  
 
At the same time, there are others who feel that second or third generation agreements may simply serve 
to underpin mechanisms that currently promote the export of excess capacity in fisheries from Europe to 
Senegal.367  
 
The extent to which developments in fisheries’ policy discourse have been successful should be reflected 
upon with reference to the most recent agreement between Senegal and the EU. In turn, having set out 
some of the differences between the principles behind modern fishing agreements and institutional 
arrangements at International and EU levels, African institutional responses to fisheries’ management 
challenges will be explored. 
 
The 2002-2006 Senegal – EU Agreement 
Attempts to improve EU fisheries’ agreements with southern nations have generally accorded with 
broader goals for developing more desirable fisheries’ relations between north and south, as well as those 
highlighted by the first objective of the delivery plan for Fisheries of the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, which aims to maintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce 
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the maximum sustainable yield: for depleted stocks and where possible not later than 2015.368 However 
the execution of the 2002 – 2006 fishery agreement between the EU and Senegal clearly illustrates that 
serious political and practical obstacles remain in achieving more desirable fisheries’ arrangements.  
 
Today the most recent EU-Senegal fishery agreement is no longer valid, and has not been renewed since 
its expiry in 2006.  The nature of the agreement remains important however from the point of view of 
understanding the extent to which reforms in the EU's Common Fisheries’ Policy (CFP) were a success in 
Senegal. Further it is important to understand points where the agreement can be improved upon in the 
event of a new agreement between Senegal and the EU. 
 
Brown argues that the 2002 – 2006 access agreement with Senegal was very much a ‘business as usual 
agreement’, rather than it was a more highly evolved partnership agreement. The agreement, providing 
access for about one hundred and twenty five EU vessels, covered the period from 1st July 2002 until the 
30th June 2006. The total cost of the agreement to the EU budget was € 64 million, and 19% of this sum 
was destined for monitoring and surveillance, safety measures and some support for small scale local 
fisheries.369 
 
The agreement incorporated the following improvements on the former one: 
! Fishing areas for EU vessels were limited in favour of local fisheries’ activities, particularly those 
the artisanal fleet. 
! Rest periods, by catch limits, and increased mesh sizes for certain nets were also mandated in 
accordance with biological considerations. 
! Observers were to be installed on all vessels, and at least 50% of crew members were to be 
Senegalese nationals.370 
 
Despite these improvements, the agreement stated that reduced fishing opportunities will be accompanied 
with reduced payment, thus inhibiting impetus for Senegalese decision makers to recommend catch 
restrictions.371  Further, under these agreements catches allowed are still not based upon catch quotas but 
rather vessel size, measured in GRT. Brown supports our observation that this system of estimating catch 
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levels is viewed as inefficient since the size of the vessel is a poor indication of its fishing capacity as 
technology and overall effort may vary between vessels.372  Thus managing effort in terms of GRT does 
not imply a very strong relationship between fishing effort and catch, though there are arguments that 
suggest that GRT, although imperfect, is one of the more practically feasible approaches.373 This being 
said, the poor performance of EU vessels when it comes to reporting catches remains a problematic issue 
for managing EU fishing activities in the waters of third countries such as Senegal. 
 
Additionally, under the 2002-2006 agreement, ‘to protect commercial interests of the EU fleets, all 
information related to the execution of the West African agreements, such as actual volume or 
composition of catches, data on effort and other vital information, were not reported to the coastal 
countries despite the contractual obligation to do so, nor are the data made public in Europe.’374 These 
factors undermine efforts to improve fisheries’ management through attempts to compare their ecological 
impact with their economic and social benefits or costs.  
 
Goréz plainly highlighted in her 2005 study that:  
The raison d’être of FPAs is to maintain the presence of the European Long Distance Water Fleets 
(LDWF) in the EEZs of third countries, to protect its interests and to maintain employment and 
other social and economic benefits linked to its activity. Thus, the driving force behind the 
conclusion of fisheries’ partnerships will continue to be the commercial and related interests of the 
EU fishing sector.  
Likewise, the financial contribution paid to ACP countries in the framework of fisheries’ 
partnerships will continue to be mainly determined by the fishing opportunities accessible to the EU 
fishing fleet.375 
 
 
It is therefore on relatively commercial grounds that the 2002 – 2006 fisheries’ protocol has not been 
renewed. Although there is currently little published information on the matter, the general impression 
among people on the ground is that the EU is disinclined to renew the protocol with Senegal because 
certain of the country's fish stocks that are targeted by EU fleets are too heavily depleted to make it 
worthwhile to pay for access to those stocks.376 The possibility of the Senegalese fisheries’ authorities 
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signing a new protocol with the EU for lower access fees raises a number of questions for the institutional 
capacity among African states for managing fisheries’ objectives without placing the ecological integrity 
of the resources in severe, or more severe, jeopardy. These questions will be discussed further throughout 
this case study and especially in chapter twelve. 
 
The extent to which solutions to fisheries’ management issues in the south can be solved by southern 
institutions thus depends to a large extent upon their ability to manage sometimes conflicting sets of 
interests in accordance with their own development goals. Projects stemming from The New Partnership 
for African Development (Nepad) are thus a source of hope. 
 
African Institutional Responses 
Fisheries’ management in West Africa is given important meaning by the shared nature of many fish 
stocks that frequent the waters of these states. For this reason attempts to strengthen regional cooperation 
saw the realisation of the Commission for the Conservation and the Preservation of Fish Ressources in 
1976 which became the Sub Regional Fisheries’ Commission (SRFC) in 1985.377  
 
Membership to the SRFC includes six states, Cape Vert, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, 
Mauritania, and Senegal. The goals of the commission are to harmonise regional policies for the 
preservation, conservation and exploitation of fishery resources. This is to be achieved through the 
adoption of common strategies in international contexts, the development of regional cooperation for 
surveillance activities, and the development of capacity for member countries to interpret fisheries’ 
research in accordance with the sub regional strategy.378   
 
However Renaud Bailleux, director of the Fisheries’ Agreements Division of the SRFC suggests that 
despite the potential for the organisation, the SRFC itself has been an empty shell for more than twenty 
years. The reality of the organisation is quite different to the objectives and activities expressed on paper, 
with some projects unable to get off the starting blocks, while many others lack momentum due to 
political and financial difficulties. For example the goal of achieving regional cooperation on a common 
resource management strategy and monitoring a control system is hindered by significant political and 
financial obstacles that will last into the foreseeable future.379 While even at a very basic level the SRFC 
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has budget and human resource problems, with erratic financial contributions from some members.380   
 
These factors are contextualised within a broader regional context in which Senegalese fishery 
administration has a number of reciprocal fishing deals with countries of the SRFC, including Mauritania, 
Cape Vert, and Gambia. These deals permit both artisanal and industrial fishery groups to frequent the 
waters of states with which agreements have been signed. Fishing effort is restricted using a range of 
tools and measures including GRT limits, numbers of vessels, mileage limits, catch reports, payments on 
the basis of catches made, and the presence of observers.  Although these agreements are typically 
reciprocal, vessels benefiting from such an agreement are required to pay license fees for the fishery 
resources that they access within the EEZs of other states.381  
 
The agreements also stipulate that a certain number of nationals from the country where the fishing is 
taking place must be employed on the industrial vessel conducting the fishing. For example the 2005 
agreement between Senegal and Gambia stipulated that two Gambian fishers should be employed for 
Senegalese vessels smaller than 300 GRT, and three fishers should be employed in cases where the vessel 
capacity exceeded 300 GRT. The rule applies to both states on a reciprocal basis.382     
 
The agreements also make provision for cooperation between signatory states on research and training, 
and monitoring and control of the West African fishery.383 These agreements can therefore be seen as 
important from the point of view of cooperation and transfer of technology at a sub regional level. 
Although the agreements do not stipulate access for large numbers of industrial vessels, the numbers of 
artisanal vessels fishing under such agreements can be large, and there is a perception that the Senegalese 
artisanal fleet is too pervasive in the waters of some neighbouring countries, notably Mauritania.384 
Further, there is a perceived problem of IUU fishing on the part of both industrial and artisanal vessels 
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within the sub region, and the extent to which this can be addressed will depend in some measure upon 
the extent to which regional cooperation for monitoring and control can be achieved. 
 
Catanzano argues that as a result of fisheries’ agreements and management strategies not being made in 
accordance with comparative advantages, third countries subject their own fleets to increasing difficulty, 
many of which now exercise fishing effort in the waters of neighbouring countries.385 In some cases 
artisanal fishers, fishing inside the EEZs of neighbouring countries are obliged to pay license fees. In 
Mauritania, the waters of which are frequented by numerous Senegalese artisanal fishing groups, access 
regulations are being developed.386 
 
A number of additional factors inhibit the effectiveness to SRFC cooperative initiatives. One of these can 
be explained as a kind of prisoners’ dilemma that takes place between member states as they jostle for EU 
access agreements.     
 
As Carolyn Deere has explained, that despite the existence of fisheries’ regulations in West African 
states, many “lack the infrastructure, personnel, financial resources, communications systems, and 
institutional structures needed to establish monitoring and surveillance systems.”387 Kaczynski and 
Fluharty argue that as a result, there is a debilitating lack of accurate data on fishery resources, the 
bargaining power of coastal states is diminished and benefits from access agreements may be skewed.388 
Further, Deere has suggested that the EU also weakens the bargaining position of West African states by 
negotiating fishing deals separately with each state. This creates a fear that if states do not comply 
sufficiently with EU demands, the fishing deal will be lost to neighbouring states, along with the financial 
compensation that accompanies it.389 
 
The situation illustrates how at a regional level the fisheries’ politic is diffused by conflicting interests. At 
an intercontinental level the trends are not much different. There have been various institutional attempts 
to address these issues, but most have failed to address any more than the symptoms of conflicts.   
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Between 22nd and 25th August 2005 the Nepad Fish for All Summit was held in Abuja, Nigeria, in order 
to bring attention to the role that fisheries can play in realizing Africa's developmental objectives. 
Technical support for the summit was provided by the Nepad secretariat, the World Fish Centre and the 
UNFAO. The agenda for the summit was to ‘endorse common African objectives for the future of 
fisheries and aquaculture in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals.’390  
 
The summit was seen to have achieved the following main objectives: 
! The establishment of a shared understanding among key stake holders from public, private and civil 
society sectors of the current status and likely future trends in African fisheries and aquaculture. 
! Agreement on priorities for investment in the future development of fisheries and aquaculture in 
Africa within the context of the Nepad Programme. 
! Agreement on the future direction for research and capacity building in support of  these investment 
priorities.391  
 
The main output of the workshop was the Nepad Plan of Action for the Development of African Fisheries 
and Aquaculture.392 It is arguable that the plan probably provides the most comprehensive reflection of 
the imperatives of African leaders and experts since it was attended by one hundred and twenty experts 
from twenty six African countries and a number of NGOs.393  
 
The plan identified ‘priority areas where further investment can help to increase the developmental value 
of the fisheries’ sector.’394 These priority areas pertain to three fisheries’ areas: inland fisheries, coastal 
and marine fisheries, and aquaculture. Since the present study concerns only marine fisheries, we will 
outline the recommendations for this group only. These are: 
! Preparation and implementation of long term fisheries’ management plans and policies that support 
sustained production. 
! Building capacity in African countries for harnessing the full benefits of marine and coastal fisheries. 
! Improvement of fisheries’ governance and participatory management mechanisms. 
! Improvement of the management of coastal and marine environments. 
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! Strengthening access to regional and international trade possibilities for African countries. 
! Supporting post harvest activities through appropriate investments and policies. 
! Promotion of the development of enterprises through enabling institutions and policies. 
! Increasing the consideration afforded to the role of coastal and marine fisheries in national and 
regional policies and actions for promoting food security.395 
 
Based on these and other aims for aquaculture and inland fisheries, on 25th August 2005, and under the 
chairmanship of Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, the Heads of State Summit approved and 
adopted The Abuja Declaration on Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa.396  
 
Senegalese Institutional Responses 
Efforts to develop the Senegalese fisheries’ sector have been made since the 1970s. Although these 
efforts have permitted the mobilisation of a total of US$ 250 million from the USA, among other 
financial resources from other sources, these efforts have been thwarted. The reasons for the lack of 
success concerning the development of the Senegalese fisheries’ sector into one which supports the 
country's economic advancement are numerous. Notably the efforts for the elaboration of fisheries and 
aquaculture between 1982 and 1998 have suffered from attempts to satisfy only the short and middle term 
objectives for the sectors and their stake holders. Despite efforts to systematically fine tune these 
arrangements, obstacles have been encountered in some important areas. These can be described as being 
the following: 
 
! The elaboration of management strategies has been insufficiently inclusive of the perspectives of 
local communities and other interested parties. 
! Strategies have tended to focus on stimulating the production of fish resources rather than on 
choosing and implementing effective fisheries’ management strategies. 
! As a result of this latter point, fisheries monitoring and evaluation systems have suffered neglect.  
! External financial assistance has tended to tie fisheries’ activities and operators in to meeting the 
demands of foreign financiers. 
! Strategies have not been sufficiently in line with a visionary approach for ensuring long term and 
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sustainable fisheries’ activities.397 
 
The 2003 UN FAO report also suggests that an absence of clearly defined working groups and work areas 
for fisheries’ management and administrative systems inhibits good governance in the Senegalese 
fisheries’ sector. Notably, these poorly defined relationships are seen to exist between the Cabinet du 
Ministre with la Cellule d’Etudes et de Planification  (Cabinet Ministry of the Unit for Inquiries and 
Planning), which coordinates, defines and monitors the execution of public policy, the Directorate for 
Maritime Fishing, the Directorates for Continental Fishing, Aquaculture, and Surveillance, which is 
responsible for executing sectoral policies, and the various 'grass roots' institutions in the field that are 
responsible for implementing chosen projects. The absence of structured monitoring and evaluation of 
related activities at ministerial and technical levels leads to a lack of coherence to the efforts of the 
different components of the fisheries’ management sector. In the same way, weak fisheries’ surveillance 
capacities and poor monitoring of adherence to fishing regulations has had a negative impact upon the 
management of fisheries’ resources.398   
 
Ultimately, the report suggests, these factors are exacerbated by the absence of a clearly defined policy 
framework for managing access to fishery resources. Put another way, the absence of a clear policy 
orientation for managing fishing effort is a serious impediment to fisheries management plans at both 
administrative and practical levels.399  
 
The FAO report also highlights an absence of a clear strategy for financing industrial fishing activities, 
and that this is problematic because in many cases the price of fishing equipment and other inputs for 
fishing activities are too high to allow for profitable fishing activity. As a result the Senegalese state has 
given massive assistance to the fisheries’ sector, which has been perceived, particularly by the artisanal 
sector, as being for free. This has led to conflicts between fishers and the state because state actions, to 
recuperate monies lent or diminished support, have been seen as attempts to rationalize fisheries’ 
activities.400    
 
In 1980 Senegal was the first Sub Saharan African country to negotiate an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
with the IMF, and a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the World Bank. These agreements 
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were suspended and then cancelled shortly afterwards due to Senegal not meeting the performance 
criteria. Subsequently in 1986 a three year structural adjustment facility was signed. The provisions under 
the SAP were to orientate the fishing sector towards export.401 
 
In order to help exports, the Senegalese government placed first a 15% and later a 25% subsidy on canned 
tuna, and later all fish products. In 1994 the franc CFA was devalued by 50%, the effect of this was to 
encourage a shift in effort toward export oriented industries which compensated for the subsidies. This 
also encouraged the export of fish that had formerly been consumed locally.402  When 2003 saw the debut 
of the DSRP, which provides the reference for Senegalese government projects for poverty reduction and 
economic growth, public investments in the Senegalese economy and society were made in accordance 
with the priority areas as demarcated by the SRFC.403 These investments therefore focused on the 
following key areas: 
! Reinforcing the capacity for basic social services (health, education, drinking water, electrification, 
transport and sewage) 
! The creation of wealth through the improvement of primary activities (mining, agriculture, fishing, 
animal husbandry) 
! The protection of vulnerable groups.404 
 
For the fisheries sector, 4 968million francs CFA were allocated in 2003 between sixteen projects and 
services. Table 8.1 on the following page describes these allocations. 
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Table 8..1 Composition of Public Financial Allocations for the Senegalese Fisheries’ Sector in 2003 
 
        (Dione, D. Et al. 2005)  
Recipients Allocations (in millions of francs CFA)
Infrastructure and equipment for fisheries’ surveillance 340 
Creation of a coastal tele-surveillance system 1000 
Acquisition of  six surveillance vessels 1 860 
Repairs to Fouta patrol vehicle 405 
Service to surveillance airplanes 500 
Extension of the Richard-Toll pisciculture station 135 
Renovation and extension of the Almadies fish cleaning st 85 
Creation of a network for the collection of data and surveil
for continental fisheries 74 
Support for the development of oyster farming 38 
Study on the erosion of the fishing quay at Joal 30 
Fitting out of transformation area of Thiaroe 167 
Support to the fishing centre at Missirah 30 
Modernisation of the national centre for education in fishin
techniques 50 
Education of fishers 20 
Support to the improvement of statistics 185 
Improvement of the Rufisque processing site 49 
Total 4 968 
Education of fishers 20 
Support to the improvement of statistics 185 
Improvement of the Rufisque processing site 49 
Repetition 4 968 
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Investments in the fisheries’ sector account for 16.8% of internal resources committed to the primary 
sector and 2.9% of the country's national public investments budget for 2003.405 These investments in the 
fisheries’ sector can be classed in five main categories. Table 8.2 below lists the categories and the 
investments falling under each.406 
 
Table 8.2  Public Investments in the Senegalese Fisheries’ Sector by Category 
Category Contribution (in millions of francs CFA)
Fisheries’ surveillance  4 105 
Continental fisheries and aquaculture 332 
Infrastructure for artisanal fisheries 276 
Education of fisheries’ actors 70 
Statistics and monitoring 185 
         
(Dione, D. Et al. 2005. Loc cit) 
 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 clearly illustrate a public commitment to ensuring the well being of fisheries’ activities 
and those that depend upon them in Senegal. Ironically, as it has been suggested in chapter seven, it is not 
a lack of commitment but rather a lack of a clear policy approach to fisheries’ management that is central 
to Senegalese fishery management dilemmas concerning the trade offs that may exist when resources are 
allocated to different user groups. Below and beyond this problem of policy orientation there exist a range 
of other challenges associated with the activities of the different user groups frequenting the Senegalese 
fishery. 
    
Conclusion 
There are a number of other reasons for the poor coherence between national fisheries’ management 
policies and fishing effort. It has been argued that one of these is a lack of interest on the part of decision 
makers regarding designing policies aimed at preventing over exploitation through the establishment of 
regulations on resource access rights.407  
 
                                                 
405Ibid. p 35. 
406Ibid. p 36. 
407Catanzano, J. 2003. Op cit. p 3. 
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Henry and Rojat have argued that since natural resources are public goods, establishing access rights 
inevitably should accompany a sharing of responsibility between the state and user groups. However the 
theoretical validity of this idea is divergent with practical experience of its implementation.408 Further 
simply sharing responsibility for access rights between groups is not necessarily a sufficient condition for 
effective governance of the natural resource; there are naturally a number of other important factors that 
impact upon resource sharing regimes independently of the level of responsibility sharing.  
 
Mutume identifies three of the main issues that he believes can be linked to the governance challenge 
facing the Senegalese fishery today: 
 
[1] The Senegalese government had signed a number of agreements with foreign fleets during the 
1980s, to advance the then poorly performing fishing industry. 
[2] The Lomé Convention, a preferential trade agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean 
and Pacific nations, precipitated fish exports by guaranteeing duty-free access to the EU market. 
[3] The 1994 devaluation, by 50 per cent, of the CFA franc, the currency of the community of 
former French colonies in West Africa, made exports cheaper.409 
 
 
Thus it can be argued that no one issue or set of issues should be identified as being to blame for fisheries' 
governance challenges, but that these challenges exist within a far broader ensemble of contextual factors, 
which include institutional arrangements. 
 
It is the purpose of the following two chapters to further reinforce the readers understanding of the 
Senegalese fisheries’ context with reference to the user groups participating in the fishery.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
408F. Henry & D. Rojat. [No date] Investir dans la Gouvernance des Ressources Naturelles: Exemple de la Gestion 
Concertée de la Pêche Crevettière à Madagascar. (Grey Copy) 
409Mutume, G. 2002. Africa Seeks to Safeguard its Fisheries. With an Eye on Sustainability, Senegal Orders EU Boats 
Out of its Waters. Africa Recovery, www.un.org.  
 161 
 
Chapter Nine.  Introduction to User Groups: The Artisanal Sector  
  
The effects of CFAs are normally evaluated in terms of effects on resources, employment and 
value added, and public revenues and costs. However there are a number of more qualitative 
effects that are just as important.410 
 
Introduction 
A number of studies have employed a value added approach to evaluating the economic contribution of 
various fishing activities in Senegal. Notably the approach was employed in the Senegalese Ministry of 
Fisheries' 2002 evaluation of the fishing agreements signed between the EU and Senegal that was 
concluded by MPG African and IDDRA France.411 The 2005 UNFAO study conducted by Senegalese 
economists, Djibril Dione, Aloune Badara Sy, and statistician Mam Siga Ndiaye, which sought to 
evaluate the social and economic contribution made by artisanal fishing to the Senegalese economy also 
used the value added approach.412 Value added approaches typically aim to evaluate the value that is 
added to a product when it is processed and marketed. Value added is thus derived from production and 
marketing processes that lead to the sale of a finished product.413 The concept is important since to some 
extent it can explain the economic value of an activity or set of activities within a broader economic 
system and this is why value added is often considered when comparing the economic importance of 
different fisheries’ activities within their broader economic context.  
 
The contributions made by fisheries’ activities to the Senegalese economy include direct financial 
contributions, other direct non financial economic contributions, and indirect economic contributions. 
Direct financial contributions may include payments to the Senegalese government for fishing licenses or 
fishery access fees, while indirect contributions may include the provision of jobs, export earnings, and 
value added generated from the processing and sale of fishery products. The 2005 study conducted by 
Dione et al suggests that in 2003, the direct payments made by the fishing sector to the Senegalese 
government accounted for 1.68% of the Senegalese public budget. These payments stem from three main 
sources: license fees paid by the industrial sector, fines paid for transgressions of fisheries management 
                                                 
410Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op cit. 
410Dione, D., Sy, A.B., & Ndiaye, D.M.S. 2005. Op cit. 
410Wikipdia. 2007. Value Added. www.wikipedia.org.  
410Ibid 410 Catananzano, J. 2002. Op cit. p 7. (Loosely Paraphrased) 
411Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op cit. 
412Dione, D., Sy, A.B., & Ndiaye, D.M.S. 2005. Op cit. 
413Wikipdia. 2007. Value Added. www.wikipedia.org.  
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rules, the sale of permits for fish mongering, and access fees for EU fleets.414 Table 9.1 below illustrates 
the composition of these direct contributions for 2003. 
 
  
Table 9.1 Fisheries Related Public Receipts for Senegal in 2003 
Fisheries related public receipts Amount (million francs CFA) 
License Payments 772.5 
Fines for Transgressions 57.28 
Fish Export Permits 16.02 
EU Access Fees 10 495.31 
Total 11 341.11 
      
(Adapted from: Dione, D. et al. 2005. Op cit. p 38.) 
 
Economic contributions resulting from fishery activities can be identified as including the provision of 
jobs, the generation of value added through the processing, sale and export of fishery products, as well as 
other indirect economic contributions related to the fisheries’ expenditures. Although it is these factors, 
and value added, that are often focussed upon when considering the economic importance of fisheries’ 
activities in Senegal, there is a broader range of indirect economic impacts that stem from the 
implications of fisheries’ activities for a range of factors that are considered important from the point of 
view of sustainable development.  
 
If we consider factors such as food security and the ecological welfare as comprising a part of the 
economic status of the fishery, as a sustainable development view would suggest that we do, another 
category of indirect costs and benefits accruing to the Senegalese economy as a product of fisheries’ 
activities can be identified. As we have suggested, this category, which can be measured relative to 
impacts for a spread of conditions for sustainable development, should comprise a range of factors that 
are not usually accounted for when management authorities aim to evaluate the contributions that 
different fisheries’ activities make for to the Senegalese economy.  
 
                                                 
414Ibid. 
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When we explore the heterogeneity of the social, economic, environmental, and public budget 
implications of the activities of the three fishery user groups that we have identified, significant 
differences can be noticed in the nature of the roles played by each group in Senegal's macro economy, 
and importantly, sustainable development status. This chapter reviews the implications of the activities of 
fishery user groups with respect to four broad categories of factors, these are: 
 
! The regulation of the sector's activities, and the government revenues earned from that regulation. 
! The capital investments in machinery and equipment made in each sector.  
! The catches, and post catch usage of fishery products of each sector. 
! The employment benefits accruing to the Senegalese population as a result of the fishing activities of 
each sector.  
  
Catches by Sector 
The core issues surrounding fisheries’ management in Senegal include maximising the benefit to society 
that result from fishery activities, and ensuring that the ecological capital stock that provides the basis for 
the generation’s societal well being is exploited in a sustainable way.  
 
One of the observations that impacts upon latter point is that in cases where there is a high discount rate 
the impetus to exchange fish in the sea for money in the bank is high. This dynamic has already been 
elaborated on in chapter two in which we saw that at an international level less developed countries with 
high discount rates will be inclined to sell access to natural resources. The exchange of resources for 
money makes sense because having the money in the bank today is thought to be more profitable than 
having resources in the earth or sea tomorrow, and this logic manifests itself for individuals as well as 
governments.    
 
There are a number of problems with this approach, notably that sustainable development requires that 
productive natural capital remains healthy and intact over time. Aside from this and related concerns, 
there are two problems that should be highlighted here. First, extracting all the fish today requires 
significant investments in fishing equipment since, as we saw in chapter six, the economics of the returns 
to fishing effort are governed by decreasing marginal returns. Once the fish are gone much of this capital 
investment will become redundant. Second, the tendency toward exchanging fish in the sea tomorrow for 
money in the bank today raises a number of questions about the demographic distribution of societal and 
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social economic welfare resulting from either scenario.  The key question here concerns how well 
financial returns from an already depleted fish stock can be distributed for the benefit of a nation, country 
or region when compared with the benefits that would result from harvesting a fishery resource in a 
sustainable way over time. 
  
An argument for maintaining the well being of natural capital stocks has already been made in this 
dissertation on the basis of attempts to fulfil the criteria for sustainable development that stipulate the 
maintenance of the well being of four categories of capital stocks over time. Once this has been achieved, 
we can argue that the next important step is to ensure that the societal benefits accruing to fisheries’ 
activities are distributed effectively and in accordance with the conditions for sustainable development. 
 
Figure 9.2. Evolution of Landings for Artisanal and 
Industrial Sectors between 1992-2002 
    
 
(Adapted from: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
Since the activities of different fisheries’ sectors can be seen to have different impacts for the realization 
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of sustainable development in a given region it is important to explore fisheries’ activities in Senegal with 
regards to the split between catches made by the artisanal and industrial sectors respectively.  
Figure 9.2 above illustrates the split between artisanal and industrial landings in the Senegalese fishery 
between 1992 and 2002. 
 
The graph clearly shows a strong dominance of the artisanal sector in terms of landings, and this can be 
seen as the result of the cultural, dietary, and economic importance of the artisanal fishing sector for the 
local Senegalese population.  
 
This does not, however, diminish the importance of the industrial sectors as playing a crucial role in 
providing good quality exportable fishery products. Further the industrial sector provides an important 
stepping stone between labour intensive artisanal fishing and labour saving industrial fishing, that 
becomes desirable as the opportunity cost of labour rises as an economy develops and other employment 
opportunities increase. 
 
Figure 9.3 below has been generated from data contained in the statistical reports on fisheries’ activities 
created each year by the Senegalese Ministère des Pêches and subsequently the Ministère de l'Économie 
Maritime. 
 
The graphic represents data for the years between 1998 and 2003, the years for which the Ministry for the 
Maritime Economy's statistical reports were available for this study, describing the split between total 
catch, catches made by the artisanal sector, the local industrial sector, the EU industrial sector, and the 
industrial fishing vessels attributed to non EU fishing nations. 
 
The figure again shows a clear dominance for the artisanal sector in terms of catch, with the local 
industrial sector a distant second place with catches generally less than 50 000 tons per year. Catches 
made by the EU and other foreign industrial fleets take third and fourth place respectively with catches 
generally under 25 000 tons per year. Problematically it is difficult to know to what extent the statistical 
reports produced by the Ministry for the Maritime Economy contain accurate data concerning the catches 
made by foreign fleets when it has been commonly suggested that catch reports are generally only poorly, 
if ever, made by foreign fishers.  
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Figure 9.3 Evolution of Catches by the Artisanal, Local Industrial, and EU Industrial Fleets 
between 1999 and 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from: Ministere de L'Economie Maritime. 1999-2003415) 
 
This combined with the problem of Illegal Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing in Senegalese 
waters as well as those of other states of the SRFC raises important concerns regarding the extent to 
which available statistics provide an accurate reflection of catch levels.416 In this thesis we take the 
approach that the production of credible statistics and the eradication of IUU fishing can result from 
improved infrastructural capacities that should go hand in hand with the sustainable development of the 
fishery and broader economy. Until this time it is necessary to make the best informed decision using the 
data that is available combined with qualitative interpretations of the issues as a means to directing 
fisheries’ management structures in the general direction of sustainable development.  As such, the 
characteristics of each of three user groups or sectors: the artisanal sector, the local industrial sector and 
the EU industrial sector, must be given. This chapter outlines some of the characteristics of the artisanal 
sector, while chapter ten will be relied upon to provide details regarding the local and foreign industrial 
                                                 
415Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 1999. Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes 1999. Dakar, 
  Ministère de l'Économie Maritime de Senegal; Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2000. Résultats Généraux des 
Pêches Maritimes 2000. Dakar, Ministère de l'Économie Maritime de Senegal; Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 
2001. Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes 2001. Dakar, Ministère de l'Économie Maritime de 
Senegal;Ministère de l'Économie  Maritime. 2002. Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes 2002. Dakar, Ministère 
de l'Économie Maritime de Senegal; Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Résultats Généraux des Pêches 
Maritimes 2003. Dakar, Ministère de l'Économie Maritime de Senegal.    
416 Stilwell, J. 2003. The International Political Economy of Fishery Management: the Case of Pirate Fishing off the 
Senegalese Coast. Masters Thesis, Department of Political Studies, School of Human and Management Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. p 63. 
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sectors operating inside Senegal's EEZ.  
 
The Local Artisanal Sector  
In Senegal the artisanal fishing sector has appreciated massive growth in recent years due to great 
versatility in terms of time, mobility, and target resources.417 The sector has historically been open access, 
though recent plans to implement regulatory measures are making progress.418 The regulatory measures 
envisaged under these plans include the imposition of artisanal fishing licenses, and boat numbers. 
Although the numbers of licenses are currently not limited, fishers wishing to benefit from a fuel subsidy 
for artisanal fishers must possess a valid fishing license in order to be able purchase the fuel at the 
subsidized rate. The registration of pirogues with boat numbers is currently in progress using a system of 
satellite fisheries’ administration offices situated nearby to fishing centres.419 Other than these two 
measures the sector remains relatively open access since the government is under significant electoral 
pressure to ensure that fish is provided to the local population at reasonable cost.  
 
Although the sector is by far the largest in terms of fleet size, employment and total catch, it is also 
relatively informal, and as such it produces the lowest direct income for the public budget though license 
fees and other regulatory measures. Despite this the sector is afforded significant political influence in 
terms of electoral power420 as a product of its size and importance to the Senegalese population as a 
source of employment and food security. Unlike the foreign industrial sector, the artisanal sector employs 
almost entirely Senegalese folk and also lands its catches at numerous sites along the Senegalese coast. 
Landing catches locally has several important benefits for the Senegalese economy and population, 
especially those found in remote coastal areas.  
 
Regulation of the Artisanal Sector 
In their 2005 report Dione, Sy, and Ndiaye explain that the general belief is that the direct contribution of 
the artisanal fishing sector to the public budget is poor, especially when measured in terms of direct 
contributions. The authors explain this as being a product of the following factors: 
! Contrary to the industrial sector, the artisanal sector is characterised by free and open access which 
means that the state does not benefit from the payment of access rights. As a result of this, plans have 
been made to establish fishing permits for the artisanal sector. This measure is expected to come into 
                                                 
417Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op Cit. p 36. 
418Author’s Interview . 2006. Direction des Peches Maritime de Senegal. Dakar, November. 
419Field work observation. Dakar, November 2006. 
420Author’s Interview. Of the Centre de Recherche Océanographique Dakar-Thiaroye. 2006. Dakar, November. 
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force in 2006/2007. 
! The artisanal fishing sector benefits from important fiscal advantages in terms of subsidised and tax 
exempt fishing equipment and fuel. This policy was initiated by the state in an attempt to increase 
production in the fisheries’ sector.421 
 
Until 1994 the state earned revenue from the commercialisation of fish products through the imposition of 
a compulsory fish selling license or carte de mareyeur. In 1994 however, this license was not longer 
obligatory for those wishing to sell fish commercially. These cards usually cost 30 000 francs CFA per 
year and the receipts from these payments went to the Caisse d'Encouragement à la Pêche et à ses 
Industries Annexes (CEPIA) (Fund for the Promotion of Fishing and Associated Industries), which is a 
special fund for supporting fisheries and fisheries related activities.422 Although this act has lead to 
decreased public revenues for the government, but can be seen to have provided stimulus for the sector, 
which may have certain other macro economic benefits.  
 
Other revenues from the artisanal sector concern payments made by to GIEs for the usage of quays. These 
receipts are in turn used for the management of the quay and do not contribute to the public budget. Since 
estimates for the receipts earned through quay management are not available, for the purpose of this 
study, and in accordance with the advice of Mr Sy of the DPM, we will assume that the public budget 
receipts stemming from the artisanal sector are negligible.423  
 
In general however, the artisanal sector can be seen to cost the public budget money in that it absorbs 
millions of francs CFA in fuel subsidies each year, and brings in almost nothing in terms of license 
revenues. In 2003 the sector is described as having cost the public budget 7407 million francs CFA net 
through fuel and equipment tax exemptions.424 These subsidies will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
 
Capitalisation of the Local Artisanal Sector 
In 1998 the Senegalese artisanal fishery was comprised of approximately 10 000 pirogues, of which 90% 
                                                 
421 Dione, D., Sy, A.B., & Ndiaye. 2005. Op cit. p 37. 
422Ibid. p 38. 
423 Author’s Interview. 2007. La Cellule de l'Étude et de la Planification, Direction des Pêches Maritime de Senegal. Dakar, 
July. 
424Cellule de l'Étude et de la Planification. 2007. Revue des Dépenses Publiques Liées au Secteur des Pêches. Dakar, 
DPM. p 43. 
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were motorized. The size of these vessels varies between 4m and 20m and the fishing methods used 
include purse seine nets, hand lines, cast nets, gill nets, mesh basket traps, conical fish traps as well as 
other devices.425   
 
Artisanal fishing in Senegal is reinforced by state financial support, mostly in the form of tax exemptions 
on fuel and fishing equipment. All imported equipment such as outboard motors, nets, and safety 
equipment, can be bought by artisanal fishing enterprises at prices that are exempt of import duties and 
value added taxes. In order to take advantage of this state support, purchasers are required to make an 
application for tax exemptions from the DPM. This financial support constitutes important help to the 
artisanal sector since with the exception of fishing pirogues, that are acquired locally, almost all other 
fishing equipment is imported.426 
 
The most recent estimates, made in 1996, suggest that an average of nine hundred and ten new pirogues is 
purchased each year. When comparing this figure with data on the structure of the artisanal fishing fleet 
that emerged from the 1998 OEPS census, the authors calculate that approximately 608 million francs 
CFA are invested in the purchase of fishing pirogues annually. The authors suggest that this figure, 
combined with that concerning the purchase of imported equipment leaves total investment in the 
industry at 3 040 million francs CFA  per year.427  
 
The same study suggests that figures for investments in the secondary artisanal fish mongering and 
processing sectors can be evaluated from the basis of the findings of a 1998 study conducted by the Projet 
d’Appui à la Pêche sur la Petite Côte (PAPEC) (Project for the Support of Fishing on the Petite Côte) 
which sought to evaluate the financial needs of maritime fisheries related sectors. Existing data suggests 
that investment in fish mongering activities, characterising investments in vehicles and containers, can be 
estimated at 1 134 million francs CFA per year. Concerning the artisanal fish processing industry, the 
study only examined investments in working capital that were necessary for the functioning of processing 
operations. An estimated 1 205.9 million francs CFA were seen as the necessary annual working capital 
for the sector. This figure combined with those of the fishing and fish mongering sectors gives an annual 
figure for private investments in the artisanal marine fisheries’ sector of 5 379 59 million francs CFA.428 
                                                 
425UNFAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
426Ibid. p 33. 
427Ibid. 
428Ibid. p 34. 
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The study also shows that when compared with the 4.08% contribution that the artisanal fisheries’ sector 
makes to national GDP, public investments in the sector are disproportionately small at 0.56% of public 
investment.429  
 
Artisanal Sector Catches and Landings 
Maritime artisanal fishing is practiced in seven coastal regions of Senegal. The activities account for 80% 
of landings and 60% of the products supplied to fish export companies.430 Between 1965 and 2000, fish 
catches in Senegal rose from 50 000 tons to 390 300 tons respectively.431 Figure 9.4 below illustrates the 
spread of landings between the seven regions where artisanal fishing is practiced. 
 
The diagram illustrates a strong dominance of Thiës for artisanal sector landings, with 71.62% of landings 
for that year. Dakar comes a distant second place in terms of landings with 10.47%, followed by St Louis 
with 8.96%, Zigcinchor with 5.04%, Fatick with 2.97%, Louga with 0.75%, and Kaolack with 0.23% of 
artisanal landings for 2003. 
 
Average annual consumption of fish products for the Senegalese population, of 10 127 809 inhabitants, 
was estimated a 32.67 kg for 2003, and this evaluation is based exclusively upon the consumption of 
products supplied by artisanal production.432 Figures for consumption of fish products are naturally 
skewed toward coastal areas where fishing activities are prevalent, but despite this the aggregated figure 
gives some indication as to the importance of the sector in terms of food security. 
 
The DPM estimated that between 1988 and 2003 the annual landings of pelagic species by the artisanal 
sector was an average of 230 547 tons while the total landings for pelagic species including those of the 
industrial sector was estimated at an average of 260 812 tons. Landings of pelagic species by the artisanal 
sector during the same period represented 53% of the total average with 64 369 tons.433  
 
 
 
                                                 
429Ibid.  p 36. 
430Ibid. p 11. 
431Field work observation. July 2007, Dakar. 
432Ibid. p 30. 
433Ibid. p 11. 
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Figure 9.4  Artisanal Sector Landings by Region for 2003 
         
(Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
Domestic production for the artisanal sector was estimated by the DPM in 2003 at 385 776 tons. The 
landings, comprising 128 species, can be differentiated between fish, crustaceans, and molluscs.434  The 
artisanal transformation of fish products performs important social and economic functions since the 
activities have experienced large growth in recent years. The DPM estimates that between 1999 and 2003 
the volume of products processed by the sector, employing mostly women, rose from 23 000 tons to 39 
000 tons.435 The most important products for this sector are Tambadiang (dried and smoked fish) (3358 
tons in 2003), Guedj (grilled and dried fish) (4223 tons in 2003), Kéthiakh (fermented and dried fish) 
(26956 tons in 2003), and Salé-seché (salted and dried fish) (2664 tons in 2003). Table 9.5 below shows 
                                                 
434Ibid. p 39. 
435Ibid. p 12. 
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the composition of these landings in more detail. 
 
Table 9.5 Artisanal Fishery Production in Senegal for 2003 
Product type Volume (Tons)
Small pelagic fish 315 936
Large pelagic fish 6 415
Demersal fish 42 747
Crustaceans 1 868
Molluscs  15 755
Total 382 721
      
(Adapted from: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
Senegalese fishery exports flow from the primary artisanal fishing sector which supplies fish products to 
artisanal transformation and export sectors, which in turn export the landed catches. These artisanal 
export and transformation sectors are typically not supplied by industrial activities. In 2003 the DOPM 
estimated that 18 015 tons of artisanal catch were exported this way.436 On the other hand the artisanal 
fishing sector does supply industrial processing and export plants. In 2003 the quantity of primary 
products supplied by the artisanal sector to the industrial processing sector was estimated at up to 53 380 
tons.437 Combined these figures make artisanal catches for export 71 395 tons, and landings for local 
consumption around 314 600 tons.  
 
Figure 9.6 below shows the usage of artisanal catch for 2003. The diagram shows that more than half of 
the catch was commercialised directly by fish sellers, 31% was destined for artisanal processing, 15% was 
consumed fresh, and 3% was destined for the industrial processing sector.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
436Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit.  
437Ibid. p 30. 
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 Figure 9.6 Destinations of Artisanal Sector Landings for 2003        
      
(Ministere de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit.) 
 
Processed products exported by the artisanal sector in 2003 the same year were estimated at 53 298 tons, 
this figure combined with exports of fresh fish products comes to 53 647 tons (measured as the weight of 
fresh raw material).438 This shows a dominance of processed fish product exports over the export of fresh 
fish. However, the sector is subject to hygiene problems,439 and this can be seen as an impediment to 
exporting to developed markets such as those in Europe where minimum hygiene standards are relatively 
high. 
 
The use of polystyrene cold storage boxes by artisanal fishers has reinforced fishing capacities for higher 
value species by allowing fishers to stay at sea longer and preserve target species.440  
                                                 
438Ibid. p 30. 
439Field work observation. Dakar, November 2005. 
440Johnstone, N. 1996. Op cit. p 13. 
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The use of these cold storage boxes does not solve the problem of hygiene standards since catches may 
spend many days at sea before being landed, and even when landed the hygiene standards of the landing 
facilities may be poor. 
 
Employment Provided by the Artisanal Sector   
Employment in the Senegalese fishing, transformation and commercialisation sectors for fish products is 
estimated at 600 000, and artisanal activities account for most of this employment. 1996 estimates suggest 
that this figure accounts for 7.1% of the total population and 17% of the vocationally active population, 
thus 352 800 men and women of working age. In other words, one in six vocationally active Senegalese 
people were employed directly or indirectly by the fisheries’ sector.441 
 
DPM estimates suggest that in 2003, 56 239 people were directly employed by the artisanal fishing 
sector, this figure represents an increase compared with that of 51 931 for 2002. However, the numbers of 
fishers are inclined to fluctuate throughout the year. For example 67 441 fishers were counted in January 
2003 compared with 44 644 in October the same year. These changes can be explained in part by the 
mobility of artisanal fishers who are able to fish for long periods outside of Senegal's EEZ, though remain 
able to return to the Senegalese mainland at almost any time. This tends to skew attempts to develop 
accurate data sets on employment.442 
 
The last national census for the national artisanal fishery was conducted  by the Observatoire Économique 
de Pêches au Sénégal (OEPS) (Economic Observatory for Senegalese Fisheries) in 1998, and estimated 
that 44 257 fishers were actively employed in the artisanal maritime fishery. By comparison DPS 
estimates suggest that in 2003, 5 300 individuals were employed by the industrial fishing sector.443  
 
The result of the census found that 6 631 people were employed in the Senegalese artisanal fish 
processing sector. Of this number 5 971, or 91%, were women compared with 660 men. Of this figure 
246 of those employed were of non Senegalese nationality. The census estimated that each 
‘transformatrice’, employed an average of three helpers. This leaves the total figure for permanent 
employment in the artisanal processing sector at about 26 500 jobs.444 
                                                 
441UNFAO. 2005. Loc cit.  
442Dione, D. Et al. 2005. Op cit. p 31. 
443Ibid. 
444Ibid. p 32. 
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The number of fish sellers is evaluated by the DPM by counting the number of fish sellers in possession 
of a ‘carte de mareyeu’' which is a permit for fish sellers. Since a great number of fish sellers operate 
without the necessary permit, exact figures are a bit sketchy. In 2003 the number of fish sellers in 
possession of a valid carte de mareyeur was 25 232, though total numbers of persons working as fish 
sellers is likely to be significantly larger.445 
 
Adding the numbers of fishers, processors, and fish sellers employed in the fisheries’ industry in 2003 
gives us a figure of 88 099. It is however very important to consider that since the artisanal sector is 
informal a number of other jobs are created and not accounted for.446 The figure however remains 
substantially lower than the UNFAO estimate of 600 000 and substantially higher than those for the jobs 
created by the industrial sector. As such we will round the number off to a conservative estimate of 90 
000. 
 
Conclusion 
In Senegal, regional constituencies are capable of extracting public revenue from the fisheries’ sector 
through the imposition of various license and tarrification measures. The contribution of the fisheries’ 
sector to these constituencies therefore constitutes an important part of the contribution made by the 
sector to the national budget. Information concerning the contributions made in this way is scarce. 
Despite, and due in part to, this scarcity, the authors have provided a break down of the payment made by 
the sector to the coastal municipality of Joal, south of Dakar on the Petit Côte.447 
 
The means of collecting revenue from the artisanal sector in Joal are two fold. The first means is indirect 
through the management of the fishery quay by an Groupement d'Intérêt Economique (GIE)(Economic 
Interest Group), comprised of local professional artisanal fisheries’ organisations, which manage the use 
of the fishers’ quay for the local town council. The GIE collects funds from fisheries and fishery 
associated activities and in turn redistributes them for the upkeep of the quay. 40% of the products from 
this activity are paid to the town council. The second means for collecting funds is through the imposition 
of taxes and permits for certain fisheries related activities, such as taxes on the processing of fishery 
                                                 
445Ibid.  
446Author’s Interview. 2007. La Cellule de l'Étude et de la Planification, Direction des Pêches Maritime de Senegal. 
Dakar, July. 
447Ibid. p 39. 
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products, the export of processed products, and the parking of large vehicles used to transport fishery 
products.448 
 
In 2004 the Joal GIE brought in 70 960 750 francs CFA for the municipal budget. In addition to this the 
receipts earned through the management of artisanal fisheries related activities brought in 26 609 750 
francs CFA, making a total of 97 570 500 francs CFA for municipal revenues from the management of 
artisanal fishing and associated fisheries’ activities. Since the total 2004 budget for the Joal municipality 
was 355 000 000 francs CFA, the receipts recovered directly and indirectly from the artisanal fishery 
sector accounted for 27.48% of the municipal budget.449  
 
This means of generating public money from the Artisanal fishing sector provides an important potential 
alternative to relying upon money attached to fisheries’ agreements, especially in the light of the non 
renewal of the 2002-2006 access agreement with the EU. Unfortunately information regarding this 
method of generating public income from the artisanal fishing sector in other constituencies is scarce and 
as a result it is not possible to make accurate extrapolations regarding what may be possible in terms of 
collecting public money from the artisanal sectors in other regions. Despite this it is important to consider 
that this alternative to dependence upon finance tied to access agreements, and this additional benefit to 
artisanal fishing, exists. 
 
This chapter has outlined the importance of the artisanal fishing sector using both quantitative and 
qualitative descriptions of the artisanal sector. These descriptions need to be compared with similar ones 
for the industrial sectors of the Senegalese fishery if meaningful comparisons between the contributions 
of each sector are to be made. It is the purpose of the following chapter to describe the industrial sectors 
of the Senegalese fishery in a similar way to the one in which this chapter has described the key 
characteristics of the artisanal sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
448Ibid. 
449Ibid. 
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Chapter Ten.   User Groups continued: The Industrial Sectors 
 
The history of so called industrial fishing in Senegal blends inextricably with the history of ideas 
what industrial fishing is and should be. The reconstruction of facts and representations (mainly 
about economic policies) from the first European fisheries on the “Saharan coasts” to the 
development of Senegalese policy about the industrialisation of fishing after independence shows 
how industrial fishing is conceived as being opposed to African small scale fishing which is 
inconsistent with the usually complex and fluctuating relations between industrial and small scale 
fishing.450   
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter illustrated that industrial fishing activity in Senegal accounts for a relatively small 
part of total catch for the fisheries’ sector, especially when compared with catches made by the artisanal 
sector. Catches made by industrial fisheries’ sectors can again be divided between catches accruing to the 
local industrial sector and those being made by foreign fishing fleets fishing under access agreements. 
Figure 10.1 below shows the composition of industrial catch by type of industrial fishing for 2003.   
 
The chart shows the divide between local industrial and foreign industrial catches for 2003 representing a 
split of 68% and 32% respectively. Catches made by the foreign industrial sector can again be divided 
between catches made by EU fleets and those made by other foreign industrial fleets.  
 
Table 10.2 on the other hand illustrates the figures used to generate Figure 9.3 in chapter nine.451 The 
table shows that catches made by non EU fishing vessels in 1999 represented almost half of catches made 
by foreign fishing groups. This was mostly attributed to the presence of Russian long distance water fleets 
targeting trawl species and tuna. When Russian fleets left Senegalese waters in 2000, catches made by 
non EU fleets dropped off significantly, since in 1999 these fleets accounted for 44 549 tons of the 57 791 
ton catch made by non EU fleets.452 Since 1999, catches have been made by a fleets originating in Japan, 
Panama, the Gambia, Cape Vert, Venezuela, Antilles and St Vincent-Grenadine, but there appears to have 
been little consistency during the period between 1999 and 2003 with no particular fleets dominating 
catches year to year. 
 
 
                                                 
450Chaveau, J.P. 1989. Histoire de la Pêche Industrielle au Senegal et Politiques d'Industrialisation. Cahiers  
des Sciences Humaines. Vol 25, no.s 1-2. p 238. 
451Note that 1998 data was only available for total catch and artisanal catch. 
452See reports: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes.1999-2003. 
  Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes. 
 178 
 
 
Figure 10.1 Industrial Catch By Foreign versus National Fishing for 2003 
       
(Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
The increase in catch made by non EU fleets in 2003 compared with 2002 can be attributed to the 
presence of Dutch Antilles tuna vessels, which accounted for 516 tons, thus almost half, of the 1148 catch 
made by this sector in that year.453  
 
Although the catches made by the industrial sectors comprising fishing effort exerted in the Senegalese 
EEZ are relatively small compared with those made by the Artisanal sector, these sectors remain 
important from a number of points of view. One of these is the financial assistance that accompanies 
access agreements with foreign fishing nations. This compensation, particularly in the EU case, includes 
not only direct financial payments, but also 'auxiliary actions' which aim to boost the sustainable 
                                                 
453Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Résultats Généraux des Pêches Maritimes 2003. Dakar, 
 Ministère de l'Économie Maritime de Senegal. 
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development of local fisheries’ capacities. 
 
 
Table 10.2 Catch by Sector for the Senegalese Fishery between 1998 and 2003  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Catch (T) 406882 394961 390256 380485 358245 275944
Artisanal Sector Catch (T) 325149 313637 338209 332360 311536 385776
Local Industrial  Catch (T) NA 64488 41388 48125 46709 42399
EU Catch (T) NA 12042 13141 12848 7968 10839
Other Industrial Catch (T) NA 5791 2242 632 501 1148
     
(Adapted from: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime.1999-2003.) 
 
Table 10.3 below illustrates the composition of EU fisheries’ related payments to Senegal for 2003. 
 
The table shows that access fees paid by the EU also contribute to a number of programmes on top of the 
contributions made to the public budget. The composition of these contributions is for the four year 
fishing deal between 2002 and 2006. The largest part of these payments concerns financial compensation 
for fishing rights while other amounts are channelled towards research programmes, education and 
training, control and surveillance, as well as other institutional support. 
 
It is clear that compensation such as that which is described above provides significant impetus for the 
Senegalese government to conclude fishing deals with the EU. On the face of it, such compensation 
seems even more attractive when considering the relatively small catches that are made by this sector 
when compared with those made by the artisanal sector. Although this view may seem legitimate at face 
value, this thesis has argued that there are a number of overarching considerations that need to be taken 
into account before assigning fishing rights to foreign fishing groups. 
 
These considerations concern the extent to which fisheries’ policies comply with the realization of 
sustainable development in the fisheries’ sector, and the extent to which the sector can contribute to the 
economic well being of the Senegalese economy and population.    
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For these reasons this chapter will explore the impacts that the local industrial and EU fishing sectors 
have for what have been identified as some important criteria for sustainable development.  
 
Table 10.3 Components of Access Fees Paid by the EU to Senegal in 2003 
Components of access fees paid by the EU Amount (Million francs CFA)
Financial compensation 8 921 
Research programmes 327.98 
Education and training 459.17 
Control and surveillance 459.17 
Institutional support 327.98 
10 495.31 
       
(Adapted from Dione et al. 2005. Loc cit.) 
 
The National Industrial Sector 
The national industrial fishing sector has been comprised by out dated fishing vessels, most of which are 
moored in port in Dakar where advantage can be taken of port and freezer facilities. There are three kinds 
of vessels that comprise this fleet; these concern the capture of sardines, tuna, and other less discriminate 
trawl activities.454  
 
As such industrial fishing in Senegal can be categorised into four broad categories. These are: trawl 
fishing, sardine fishing, tuna fishing, and foreign industrial fishing.455 
 
The DOPM estimated that there were two hundred and five vessels operating in Senegal’s EEZ in 2003. 
This number was comprised of: 
! 161 trawlers, of which 29 were foreign vessels fishing under access agreements. 
! 3 sardine vessels. 
                                                 
454Dione, D. Et al. 2005. Loc cit. 
455Ibid. p 13. 
 181 
 
! 41 tuna vessels, of which 37 were foreign vessels fishing under access agreements.456  
 
Figure 10.4 below illustrates the composition of landings made in 2003 by industrial fisheries’ activities 
operating in Senegalese waters, thus local and foreign industrial fleets, by type of fishing.  
 
 
Figure 10.4 Industrial Landings by Type of Fishing for 2003  
     (Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     (Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
                                                             (Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
The figure shows a clear dominance of landings attributed to trawl activities targeting demersal species 
accounting for 70% of these landings. Tuna fishing takes second place with 27% of total landings, while 
sardine fishing accounts for only 3% of landings. Although the figure above represents landings for the 
entire industrial fishing sector, the results are coherent with the trend in the local industrial sector leaning 
towards demersal trawling, with tuna fishing and sardine fishing accounting for less catch and less fishing 
                                                 
456Ibid. 
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effort in terms of numbers of boats.   
 
Regulation of the National Industrial Sector 
The Senegalese national industrial fishing sector is regulated, but competition for fishery resources exists 
between artisanal and local industrial since these fleets sometimes seek the same coastal species that 
occur on the continental shelf within Senegal's EEZ. Since landings of fish caught by this sector are 
mostly done in Dakar, it is somewhat easier to manage by comparison with the artisanal sector. But this 
also means that a smaller spread of people benefit in terms of food security and employment as a result of 
its activities. Further, in a series of interviews of Senegalese industrial fishers in port at Dakar, of ten 
fishers interviewed, six had worked on EU boats, and all six suggested that working conditions and pay 
were poor on the national fleet, especially when compared with those on EU vessels.457 
 
Since it is regulated, the national industrial sector does make a contribution to the national public budget 
through the payment of license fees. However, when compared with the financial gains associated with 
the EU access agreements, the contributions of the local industrial fleet are small. This is illustrated below 
in Table 10.5 
 
Table 10.5 Fisheries Related Public Receipts from the Local Industrial Sector in millions of Francs 
CFA for 2003 
Fisheries related public receipts Amount (million francs CFA) 
License Payments 772.5
Fines for Transgressions 57.28
Fish Export Permits 16.02
Total 845.8
           
     (Adapted from: Dione et al. 2005. Loc cit) 
 
Despite these license payments, the sector in fact absorbs a significant amount of public money through 
fuel subsidies. In 2003, fuel subsidies for the sector accounted for approximately 17 654 million francs 
                                                 
457Author's Survey of Senegalese Industrial Fishers. Dakar, Senegal. November 2006. See Annex for details. 
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CFA.458 If we subtract the contributions shown in the Table above, the sector still cost the public budget a 
16 808 million francs CFA net in 2003. 
 
Capitalisation of the National Industrial Sector 
The national industrial fleet is considered obsolete in terms of upkeep and technological sophistication. 
This is mostly the result of poor maintenance.459  
 
In 2000 the Senegalese industrial fleet was comprised of one hundred and seventy seven vessels, of which 
less than 20% were grounded due to mechanical failures. One hundred and sixty seven, or 94%, of these 
boats were trawlers, while only five vessels targeted tuna and another five targeted sardines.  In March 
2001, one hundred and seventeen of one hundred and seventy seven registered vessels were party to 
exportation agreements, and most of these were freezer trawlers. During this time, 45% of the local 
industrial sub sector was dominated by only eight enterprises, operating one hundred and one fishing 
vessels. The rest of the sub sector was occupied by smaller enterprises that operated only one or two 
boats.  
 
Species are usually targeted by different enterprises according to the size and number of vessels being 
operated. Vessels with refrigeration facilities are the most pervasive of vessel types, while vessels with 
freezing capabilities are more common among enterprises that possess more than one boat.460 
 
In 2002 there were four sardine vessels or 'sardiniers' compared with nine in 1994. The size of these 
vessels ranges from between 20m and 25m in length and their GRT can range between 60 GRT and 120 
GRT. By comparison, in 2002 the Senegalese trawl fleet was composed of one hundred and forty two 
vessels. During the same period, the tuna fleet was composed of thirty vessels (pole and line, bottom line, 
and seiners). Of these, seven were based at Dakar and debarked most of their catch there, of the other tuna 
vessels, some debarked catches in Dakar only occasionally.461   
 
As a result of attempts by foreign fishing companies to export some of their excess fishing capacity, a 
growing number of boats of non Senegalese origin have been registered as part of the country's national 
                                                 
458Cellule de l'Étude et de la Planification. 2007. Loc cit. 
459FAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
460Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op Cit. p 37. 
461FAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
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fleet. In 2001, fifty three of fifty six vessels that were inspected by Senegalese authorities flew the 
Senegalese flag, however an audit conducted by the country's authorities shows that of one hundred and 
fifty industrial demersal trawl vessels, comprising the most part of the Senegalese fleet, almost all were 
formerly European.462  
 
There currently exist numerous European fishing operators in Senegal, fishing on the basis of 'mixed' 
corporations, or exported vessels, where certain operators can even benefit from European Instrument 
Financer d'Orientation de la Pêche (IFOP) (Financial Instrument for providing Orientation to Fishing) 
funds. For example in 2000, thirty one Spanish vessels flew the Senegalese flag, of which sixteen were 
fishing under the guise of mixed corporations, and were receiving government subsidies from their 
country of origin. These vessels supply the European market primarily though the conditions under which 
they fish have been described as being deplorable.463 
 
Commentators suggest that although many of these boats fly the Senegalese flag, most are operated by 
European or Asian nationals who export fish directly without first allowing value to be added in 
Senegal.464 Interviews with actors in the industry suggest that the trend toward freezer trawlers indicates 
the new strategy of freezing catches and exporting them directly to foreign markets since this strategy 
increases the profitability of vessels.465  
 
It can be argued that the national industrial sector can be seen as important since it represents an 
significant stepping stone between unregulated labour intensive artisanal activities and more 
sophisticated, well regulated and labour saving industrial activities. More formal processing facilities also 
represent the possibility of increasing export revenues through the production of fish products in 
accordance with stringent international food safety laws. The artisanal processing sectors are less likely to 
achieve this due to weak hygiene standards. 
 
The preponderance of non Senegalese actors participating in the national industrial fleet can be seen more 
as the result of poor regulation, than as a result of the government condoning their activities. Individual 
fishing rights are allocated directly to foreign operators without state intermediation, through case by case 
                                                 
462Ibid. p 1. 
463CFFA. 2002. L’Iceberg de la Pêche Européenne dans les Eaux Sénégalaises. Paris, Co repêche. p 1. 
464Ibid. 
465Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. p 5. 
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license delivery mechanisms, or without a change of flag.466 As a result if can be argued that  the growing 
number of foreign operators fishing as part of the national fleet are doing so by taking advantage of a loop 
hole in national policies.  
 
These policy failures form part of a broader ensemble of insufficiently effective policies and policy 
implementation that can be seen to play an important role in the non prevention of overcapacity in the 
Senegalese fishery.  
 
National Industrial Sector Catches and Landings  
Between 1991 and 1999 most of the industrial coastal catch of pelagic species was made by foreign 
trawlers, with Senegalese sardine vessels making more and more marginal hauls of between 5% and 10% 
of industrial catches.467 In 1998 the national fleet landed 1 688 tons on which 80% were round sardines, 
15% were flat sardines and the remaining 5% was nondescript. The commercial value of these catches 
was estimated at 59 405 000 francs CFA.468 
 
The DPM estimated total landings for the industrial sector at 41 818 tons in 2003. This represented 9.78% 
of total landings for Senegalese maritime fishing in that year.469 These volumes for each category of fisher 
can be described as follows: 
 
! Trawlers: 38 683 tons. 
! Sardine vessels: 1 539 tons. 
! Tuna vessels: 1 596 tons.  
 
Statistical results for 2003 show a predominance of the artisanal sector in terms of catch. But as the 
authors argue, the situation is more nuanced when the value of landings are taken into account. The 
species landed by the industrial sector, such as large coastal demersal species and shrimps, are generally 
of high commercial value in comparison to those of the artisanal sector for which the predominant 
landings are small pelagic species like sardines. Thus with only 9.78% of landings the industrial sector 
accounted for an estimated 24.52% of the total value of landings for 2003 with the value of those landings 
                                                 
466Catanzano, J. 2003. Op cit. p 4. 
467Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Op cit. 
468UNFAO. 2005. Loc cit. 
469Dione, D. Et al. 2005. Op cit. p 13.  
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estimated at 26 791 997 000 francs CFA.470 Table 10.5 below illustrates the composition of Senegalese 
industrial fishing sector according to vessel type, number of vessels, quantity of catch and the estimated 
value of that catch, where trawl vessels target mostly deep water demersal species. 
 
The industrial sector is important from the point of view of on shore activities since numerous cold 
storage and transformation plants are considered an extension of the industrial fisheries’ sector. As such 
almost all of the industrial catch is for export.  
 
Table 10.6 Local Industrial Sector by Vessel Type, number of Vessels, Landings, and Commercial 
Value of Catch for 2003. 
 
Vessel Type Number of Vessels Landings Commercial Value of Catch
Trawlers 132 38683 tons 25 695 450 000 F CFA
Tuna Vessels 8 3744 tons 173 384 865 F CFA
Sardine Vessels 3 1 539 tons 58 130 000 F CFA
       
(Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
 
In 2003 the DOPM estimated exports from the local industrial sector at around 41 800 Tons.471 Catches 
for local consumption are too small to be included in the national annual statistical reports,472 thus for this 
study, we will assume the contribution of the sector in terms of landings for local consumption to be 
negligible.  
 
This is the case since occasionally industrial fleets have treatment plants on shore that fall within the same 
legally recognised enterprise as the fishing fleet. The Bureau de Contrôle des Produits Halieutiques 
(BCPH) (Bureau for the Control of Marine Products) estimated that in 2003 of eighty nine on shore 
enterprises, twenty three were out of action.473 
 
Although the strategy of freezing catches and exporting them directly to foreign markets may increase 
                                                 
470Ibid. p 14.  
471 Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Op cit. 
472 SY, A.B. 2007. Loc cit. 
473Ibid. p 13. 
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productivity and also provide a means to avoiding hygiene problems with land based processing plants, 
the strategy operates to the detriment of those land based processing industries. Further, the strategy does 
not afford land based processing industries the direct means or incentives to improve the hygiene and 
other standards of the service that they provide.    
 
Employment Provided by the National Industrial Sector 
Although the Senegalese industrial fishing sector employs mostly Senegalese nationals, the contribution 
that this sector makes toward providing jobs to the Senegalese population is far lower than that made by 
the artisanal sector. As such DPS estimates have suggested that in 2003, 5300 individuals were employed 
by the industrial fishing sector.474  
 
The EU Industrial Sector 
Most of the foreign vessels were of European origin operating under the provisions of the EU/Senegal 
access agreement.475 
 
The negative impacts of access agreements between the EU and West African states are frequently 
highlighted, although there are certain benefits to these activities and these will be highlighted in this 
chapter. For now, the negative impacts are seen to include: 
 
! The disruption of small scale, and other less efficient local fisheries. 
! The disruption of food security associated with the provision of fish to local markets. 
! The transfer of overcapacity into local fisheries.  
! Inadequate management of subsidized foreign fisheries’ enterprises.476  
 
The supply of fish to international markets by EU fleets has a negative impact for local industries as the 
subsidised activities, and supply of fishery resources at low costs to markets can have negative impacts 
upon the market process for those stocks.477 Beatrice Chaytor has suggested that as a result of access 
agreements to octopus stocks in Mauritania, after two months of fishing by the EU, the price per ton of 
                                                 
474Dione, D. Et al. 2005. Op cit. p 31. 
475Ibid. p 13. 
476Deere, C. 1999. Op cit.  p 41. 
477Ibid. 
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octopus fell by US$ 200 per ton.478  
  
Regulation of EU Fishing Activities 
The EC suggests that “stricter monitoring for third country vessels has to be placed within the framework 
of EU's efforts to ensure sustainable fisheries.” For this reason EU highlights the responsibility that 
member states have for ensuring that their vessels comply with the EU conservation rules applicable 
while operating outside EU waters. 
 
The progress achieved in consolidating monitoring and surveillance in the fishing sector would 
have been unthinkable a few years ago. Increased transparency in the monitoring system, ability to 
cross check data, stricter surveillance of third country vessels and better cooperation between 
Member States will make the EU monitoring, control and surveillance system one of the most 
coherent in the world.479  
 
Under the 2002-2006 fisheries’ agreement between Senegal and the EU, EU activities were limited to a 
maximum capacity of 1 500 GRT each quarter for coastal demersal trawlers fishing for both fish and 
cephalopods. These trawlers were also obliged to land and sell part of their catches in Senegal, though the 
amounts landed and sold in Senegal are not clear. For bottom long liners and deep water demersal fish 
trawlers (that do not land their catches in Senegal) effort levels were limited to a yearly average of 3 000 
GRT per month. For deep water demersal freezer trawlers fishing for crustaceans maximum capacity was 
fixed at a yearly average of 3 500 GRT per month. These fleets’ vessels were not obliged to land their 
catches in Senegal.480 
 
For tuna fishing, the Protocol made provision for sixteen pole and line vessels, thirty nine tuna freezer 
seiners and twenty three surface long liners. The GRT measures for these vessels have not been published 
on the EC web page dealing with fisheries’ agreements with Senegal,481 nor do the figures appear in the 
agreement itself.482 This, the agreement outlines, is because payments for access for tuna fleets are made 
                                                 
478Chaytor, B. 1999. International Trade and Legal Rules to Support Marine Biodiversity, Fisheries International Trade 
and Biodiversity. Draft manuscript. IUCN, Gland. p 3. 
479European Commission. 2006. About the Common Fisheries Policy: Monitoring and Control of 
   Fisheries’ Activities. Available at: www.ec.europa/fisheries.   
480European Commission. 2006. About the Common Fisheries Policy: Senegal. Available at:  
   www.ec.europa/fisheries.   
481Ibid. 
482 EC. 2002. Protocol Setting out Fishing Opportunities and Financial Contribution Provided for in the Agreement 
between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on Fishing off the Coast 
of Senegal for the Period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006.Official Journal of the EC. p 349. Available at: www.eur-
lex.europa.eu.  
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on the basis of catches made.483 
 
Remuneration for the Senegalese has typically had two parts. The first part concerns a direct payment by 
the European Union to the Senegalese government in return for access to the countries fishery resources 
for a certain number of EU vessels. The second part concerns license fees paid by individual vessel 
operators on the basis of catches made.484 This part requires that the EU vessels report catches, for which 
they are billed accordingly. Table 10.7 below shows the composition of EU financial payments to the 
Senegalese government for fisheries’ access in 2003. 
 
Note also that this Table represents only one aspect of the fees paid by the EU. Table 11.3 illustrates that 
the total payment made by the EU for 2003 was 10 495.31 million francs CFA. 
 
Table 10.7 Remuneration associated with EU-Senegal Fisheries’ Access Agreements in millions of 
francs CFA for 2003 
 
Access agreement EU/Senegal: 8 000.00 
Payments from trawl vessels: 689
Payments from tuna vessels: 5 50
Total:  8 694.50  
         
(Adapted from: Dione et al. 2005. Loc cit) 
 
Problematically, catch reports are seen to be generally inaccurate. Since the access agreements are not 
based on catch quotas or limits, but rather on vessel size measured in GRT, which is a controversial 
means of measurement because vessel size is not viewed as being a very accurate determinant of catch. 
However this may be a one of the more practically feasible approaches,485 and since catch reports are 
generally not always accurate, it is difficult to quantify catch levels accruing to EU vessels in comparison 
with compensation accruing to the Senegalese government. In an article for the United Nations 
                                                 
483 Ibid. 
484 Johnstone, N. 1996. Op cit. p 2. 
485For a fuller debate see Pascoe, S., Tingley, D., & Mardle, S. 2002.  Appraisal of Alternative Policy Instraments to 
Regulate Fishing Capacity. Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources, University of Portsmouth. 
Available at: www.spc.int. 
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Development Programme (UNDP), Oli Brown highlights unsatisfactory catch reports as an important 
source of controversy over EU fishery access agreements in Senegal.486  
 
In order to regulate the activities of EU fleets, certain other technical measures are prescribed under 
fishing agreements with Senegal in order to reinforce the ecological viability of the country's fishery 
resources. Such measures include mileage limits for fishing vessels, demarcation of fishing zones, 
biological rest periods and minimum sizes, and by catch limits for less selective fishing activities.487  
 
Although such technical measures may have scientific credibility, there exist a range of practical 
problems for their implementation. These practical problems can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including insufficient financial resources for monitoring and control, and large operating areas for highly 
autonomous fleets. Problematically, the implementation of these measures is not easy to improve using 
new technology, as is the case with global positioning system technologies that are used to monitor 
adherence to demarcated fishing zones.  
 
Under agreements signed with Senegal a number of other non compliance problems exist. For example 
the 1997-2000 agreement with the EU, a biological rest period of two months was stipulated in principle. 
However, what were not stipulated were the species concerned and when the rest periods were to be 
implemented.488     
 
Similarly, by catch limits seem to be relatively impotent as a means to limiting by catch, preventing 
dumping at sea and falsified by catch declarations, as it is extremely difficult to control this type of 
measure, especially when financial resources are limited.489 Although regulating adherence to demarcated 
fishing zones is facilitated by improved technologies, there are still incidences where vessels are found 
fishing inside offshore limits, or outside the latitudinal frontiers. 
 
Further, the CFA agreements with Senegal have been using the idea of 'carried over effort' where fishing 
rights that are not used up in one period can be carried over to the next. Problematically this could lead to 
                                                 
486Brown, O. 2005. Op cit. p 6. 
487Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op cit. p 23. 
488Ibid. 
489Ibid. p 25. 
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an accumulation of effort at a time when it may be ecologically undesirable.490 
 
In return for access to fishery resources, foreign nations usually pay a lump sum access fee while the 
fleets pay a tax on catches.491 Access agreements between the EU and Senegal are important since the 
levels of catch permitted allow for a diverse range of species to be harvested. Among them tuna, cod, 
prawn, various cephalopods and crustaceans, guilt head sea bream, dungat grouper, and red pandoras.492  
 
Capitalisation of the Foreign Industrial Sector 
Gareth Porter suggests that under EU subsidies for access agreements, the EU pays between 70% and 
90% of the costs of accessing the fishery.493  
 
Although under the Lomé and Cotonou agreements the Senegalese have enjoyed some favourable access 
to European markets, the subsidized fishing industries of European and other fishing groups frequenting 
West African fisheries, as well as other NTBs subdue the potential comparative advantage of Senegalese 
fishers. Access to foreign markets and even export favorable currency ratios do not make local fishing 
industries sufficiently competitive. Fisheries’ subsidies in this case tend to transfer benefits from 
taxpayers to subsidized producers, whose costs of production are lowered by the subsidy, and consumers 
who enjoy the support for lower prices which result there from. In this case the costs of the subsidy are 
borne by European tax payers, and unsubsidized foreign fishers who face market exclusion as a result of 
the NTB.  
 
Catches and Landings made by EU Fleets 
The EU is the largest market for fish products, and in 1999 fisheries’ access agreements provided about 
one quarter of the fish consumed in the EU. In 2000 the EU paid €137.45 million for these agreements.494  
 
Landings for the whole fisheries’ sector in 2003 can be divided between the local industrial and artisanal 
sectors at a 42 000 tons versus 386 000 ton split.495  With 16 517 tons of the industrial landings deriving 
from European vessels, most of which it is claimed by the Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries, was tuna for 
                                                 
490Catanzano, J. 2003. Op cit. p 12. 
491Johnstone, N. 1996. Op cit. 
492Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Loc cit.  
493Deere, C. 1999. Op cit. p 42. See also: Porter, G. 1998. Fisheries Subsidies, Overfishing and Trade. Geneva, UNEP. p 
36. 
494Brown, O. 2005. Op cit. p 3.  
495Ibid. p 13. 
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the local tuna canning industry which serves export markets.496 As such, only an extremely negligible 
quantity of the fish landed by EU fleets is for local consumption.497 
 
Although some other catches made by EU fleets are landed as ‘transbordements’ in port at Dakar for 
direct export, these products do not count as exports for Senegalese industries since they remain in the 
hands of foreign company owners.498    
 
Table 10.7 below describes the EU industrial sector operating in Senegalese waters in terms of vessel type 
or type of fishing, number of vessels, reported catch, and local landings. A subtle but important 
distinction is made between reported catch and true catch since the data available naturally only illustrates 
figures for reported catch. 
 
The table shows a relatively similar numbers of vessels for both trawlers and tuna vessels with twenty 
eight and thirty of each respectively. The difference between reported catch for trawl activities and that of 
tuna vessels is large with values of 9 458 tons and 1 318 tons respectively. 
 
The difference between landings made by trawlers and tuna vessels respectively is also large with each 
representing 817 tons and 11 777 tons respectively. These figures illustrate that while trawlers tend to 
export most of their catch directly, landing very little in Dakar, EU tuna fleets land significantly more 
tuna in Dakar than they reportedly catch within the country's EEZ. This is possible because fleets making 
catches outside of Senegal's EEZ land catches in Dakar. 
Table 10.8 EU Industrial Sector by Vessel Type, Number of Vessels,  
Catch and Landings for 2003 
 
Vessel Type Number of Vessels Reported Catch Landings 
Trawlers 28 9458 817 
Tuna Vessels 30 1318 11777 
Sardine Vessels NA NA NA 
                                 
  (Adapted from: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit) 
                                                 
496Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Op cit. pp 6 & 83. 
497Sy, A.B. 2007. Loc cit. 
498Ibid. 
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This trend is positive for land based infrastructure and activities in Senegal, even if the companies 
benefiting from these landings are held by EU or partly EU corporate entities. This is because tax, 
employment, transfer of technology, and foreign exchange benefits accrue to the Senegalese economy as 
result of these landings and the subsequent processing, and export of fish products.   
 
Employment provided by the EU Industrial Sector 
According to estimates for the 1997-2001 agreement, the approximately one hundred and fifty five 
European vessels allowed access to Senegalese waters accounted for an annual average of between two 
hundred and forty and three hundred and seventy jobs for Senegalese nationals. Eighty of these jobs could 
be accounted for by observers.499 
 
Statistics on the numbers of jobs created by EU fisheries’ activities for Senegalese workers under the 
2002 – 2006 agreement are not clear. Other reports concerning the prior agreement suggests that the 
thirteen hundred EU vessels operating in southern waters under agreements with ACP countries provided 
twenty thousand jobs in the fisheries’ sector500 although these primary activities support many more land 
based jobs in the European fish processing sector.501  For the period between 1997 and 2001, the 
estimated number of Senegalese employed on EU vessels is one hundred and eighty three.502 Thus, even 
though the EU fleet of fifty nine boats503 was compelled to ensure that 50% of crew members were 
Senegalese under the 2002-2006 agreement, as opposed to 33% under the former agreement.504 
 
Given a decrease in the numbers of EU vessels operating in Senegalese waters, from around forty tuna 
vessels and forty trawlers for 1997-2001 and around thirty tuna and thirty trawlers in 2003,505 combined 
with the larger employment quotas for Senegalese nationals working on EU boats under the new protocol, 
we will make a loose, and probably generous, estimate of employment provided to the Senegalese 
population by the sector of three hundred jobs for 2003.  
 
                                                 
499Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op cit. p 7.  
500Brown, O. 2005. Op cit. p 3. 
501European Commission. 2004. Summary of the Final Report of the Study “Employment in the Fisheries 
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502Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal. 2002. Op cit. p  128. 
503Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003. Op cit. p 83. 
504 Europa. 2006. The Cotonou Agreement. Available at: www.ec.europa.com. 
505 Ministère des Pêches, République de Sénégal.1999-2002. Op cit. & Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, 2003.Op cit. 
 194 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide both quantitative and qualitative insights as to some of 
the key characteristics of the Senegalese local industrial fishing sector and that of the EU. The chapter has 
aimed to provide these descriptions with reference to the impacts that the activities of each of these 
sectors have for the four types of capital that have been identified as being key factors for the realization 
of sustainable development. The next chapter will examine certain of these characteristics for each of the 
user groups described in this chapter as well as in chapter nine in a more quantitative way, which will 
enable some important comparisons to be drawn between the impacts upon different capital types. The 
more qualitative information that has been given in this chapter and in chapter nine will serve an 
important role as a means to identifying trends that will be able to provide indications as to how more 
quantitative factors interact and may interplay under different fishery management circumstances. 
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Chapter Eleven. Actors and Policy Dynamics in Senegalese Fisheries’ Policy Discourse 
 
What is the purpose of fishing? For the individual fisherman this is easy to answer. If asked, he 
would probably say, 'to make as decent a living as possible' or something like that. From the point 
of view of the economy as a whole the answer is similar, even if the perspective is slightly 
different.506 
  
Introduction 
At a conceptual level it may be quite acceptable to suggest, as Robert Hanneson has done, that the 
practical purpose of fishing does not differ a great deal between fishers and fisheries’ management 
authorities. But at a political level, achieving resonance between the objectives of individual fishers and 
that of 'making as decent a living as possible' for the economy as a whole, can pose significant challenges. 
 
Attempts to balance the nexus between private and public interests for fisheries’ governance authorities 
have been outlined throughout this thesis with reference to the cleavages that exist between micro and 
macro rationality in decision processes. Where more unified macro rational decision processes can be 
seen as holding potential for providing linkages between multiple (and sometimes conflicting) micro 
rational interests, and the longer run sustainability of the fishery. As we have already seen in chapter four, 
theories of state suggest that among the main roles of states are to advance the economic interests of the 
state while providing the necessary infrastructures for the sustenance and proliferation their societies.507 
However, although these broad goals place management in a position of responsibility regarding the 
macro or broader public interest, decision making authorities are frequently accountable directly or 
indirectly to those who desire their private interests to be met through a range of governance processes, 
including electoral ones.  
 
The core objective of this chapter is to describe the political dynamics that lead to the adoption of public 
policies in Senegalese fisheries’ discourse. The chapter outlines the main stake holders, and divides these 
into three main groups. These groups comprise actors operating at local Senegalese levels, at EU levels, 
and other actors, including non-government organisations, that operate at Senegalese, EU, and 
international levels. The information presented in this chapter has been gained through a number of 
methods. Sources consulted include the usual spread of published books and academic journal articles, 
internet sites, other media sources, and fieldwork observations. Since there is little published information 
                                                 
506Hanneson, R. 1993. Loc cit. p 15. 
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on the details of the policy dynamics that lead to the adoption of fisheries’ policies, I have relied upon a 
number of anecdotal observations made by stake holders and researchers as well as a confidential survey 
of stake holders and policy researchers engaged in Senegalese and EU fisheries’ policy discourse. The 
questionnaire was sent to fifteen researchers and policy actors. Among these were seven Senegalese 
actors, of whom one is an independent researcher while the other six are formally engaged members of 
the CRODT, and the DPM. Other actors approached include three researchers based in Europe who have 
been formally engaged in research work funded by both EU and the Senegalese fisheries agencies. Two 
actors formally engaged in EC fisheries policy processes were also approach. The questionnaire was also 
administered to two actors representing NGOs operating at Senegalese, EU and international policy 
levels, and one actor formally engaged in research for the United Nations. Due to the political sensitivity 
of certain of the questions, and opinions expressed by the contributors, their specific identities as well as 
certain of their information and views will remain anonymous.  
 
Of the fifteen questionnaires administered by email, five responses were received. These comprised a 
representative of the EC Foreign Fisheries’ Relations, a representative of the DPM, a former fisheries’ 
policy advisor to the Senegalese government, a researcher who has conducted fisheries’ research for the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a policy researcher that has worked extensively 
with both EU and Senegalese governments. Unfortunately a number of other policy researchers and 
representatives of NGOs failed to respond to the survey.  
 
The chapter has three main parts. The first part reviews the main stake holders and the interests that they 
represent. The second part of the chapter discusses the conclusion of fisheries’ agreements as a particular 
case which to some extent represents national fisheries’ policy, and the dynamics that underpin those 
policies. The third part briefly discusses how governance authorities can be seen to aim to fulfil the 
political interests of a range of stake holders while still allowing fishery access to all user groups. This is 
seen to translate into significant and probably unsustainable pressure on the fishery. The chapter 
concludes that this sustainability question makes it important to understand the sustainable development 
implications of different user groups as a means to planning for the future of the fishery.    
 
It is argued on these grounds that a SDD approach should be implemented as a means to assessing the 
extent to which the activities of contemporary fishery user groups contribute to, or detract from, the 
principles of sustainable development as it has been defined in this thesis. 
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Actors and their Interests: Local Senegalese Actors 
The Senegalese and EU fisheries’ policy discourses are continually evolving and changing. In the 
response to the email survey administered, the EC external fisheries relations made it explicit in their 
response that for this reason, combined with the fact that fisheries’ agreements are negotiated between the 
two entities every four years, it is important to recognise the changing nature of these discourses when 
aiming to outline the policy dynamics that can be seen to emerge from them.508 For this reason this 
chapter will first explain the key actors engaged in current fisheries’ discourse for both regions, and will 
subsequently outline some of the mainstay actors, interests, and policy dynamics that played a role in the 
formation of the 2002-2006 EU/Senegal fisheries’ protocol. This will be done as a means to identifying 
the broad trends in the way that national fisheries’ decisions are taken in Senegal, relative to the more 
constant forces that impact on these decisions over time.    
 
Senegal is a parliamentary electoral democracy, which means that the office of the President of the 
Republic is the highest decision making authority, with the office of the Prime Minister below, and 
cabinet ministries below that.   
 
At ministerial level Senegalese national fisheries’ decisions are taken by the Ministère de l'Économie 
Maritime (Ministry of Maritime Economy), which until 2003 was the Ministère de la Pêche (Ministry of 
Fishing). These decisions are only taken after consultations with other inline ministries, notably the 
Ministry of Finance, as well as the offices of the Republic and the Prime Minister.509 The Ministry of 
Maritime Economy supervises the activities of the Direction des Pêches Maritimes (DPM) (Directorate 
for Maritime Fishing) which  also until 2003 was known as the Direction de l'Oceanographie et de la 
Pêche Maritime (DOPM) (Directorate for Oceanography and Maritime Fishing), and is in charge of 
technical and administrative aspects to maritime fishing.510 While there are currently a total of seven 
different directorates that engage with fisheries related issues,511 the DPM will be focussed upon since it 
is the primary directorate in charge of national fisheries’ policy affairs. 
 
The key functions of the DPM are to:  
                                                 
508European Commission. 2005. DG Fisheries: External Relations. Response to Author’s Survey. April.  
509Author’s Interview. 2007. Direction des Pêches Maritime de Senegal. Dakar, July. 
510Deme, M. et al. 1998. Op cit. p 23.  
511Details on the Ministries and Directorates of the Senegalese government can be found at: www.gouv.sn.  
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! Support the development of national fishing fleets. 
! Maximise benefits from available resources. 
! Ensure the abundant supply to the Senegalese population of rich and relatively affordable  animal 
protein.  
! To ensure the supply of foreign exchange for the purpose of maintaining the country’s  balance 
of payments equilibrium. 
! Minimise unemployment and create jobs.512  
 
Perceived as a means of reinforcing synergies between fisheries’ research, fisheries’ management, and the 
development of artisanal fishing, public fisheries’ authorities have inserted local fisheries’ councils along 
the length of the Senegalese coast. These councils are responsible for ensuring the relationship between 
research and the development of the fishing industry. They incorporate “all” of the actors of the artisanal 
sector, and a number of councils have been created for the mediation and arbitration of fisheries’ 
conflicts. The councils have also contributed to the reduction of fisheries’ conflicts as well as capacities 
for the monitoring and control of fisheries’ activities.513  
 
 As they form part of the national fisheries’ administration, the councils have become an integral part of a 
new collaborative pilot project between the Senegalese government and the World Bank called the 
Gestion Intégrée des Ressources Marines et Cotiers (GIRMaC) (Integrated Management of Marine and 
Coastal Resources).514 The project was launched in 2003 and aims to test community management 
programmes for Senegalese marine resources. Since the project is currently in pilot phase and concerns 
mostly regional fisheries’ management,515 its current impact upon national fisheries’ policy is relatively 
insignificant.  
 
Other entities called Groupements d'Interet Economiques (GIEs) (Economic Interest Groups) play an 
important role in administration of Senegalese artisanal fisheries’ administration. The GIEs are organized 
in a satellite structure with numerous groups operating in numerous geographical areas. The groups 
facilitate the participation of a wide range of actors across a large geographical area, and serve to 
administer and represent the interests of the artisanal fishing sector. The GIEs, with more than 10 000 
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members countrywide, that are organised in a pyramid structure with the Federation Nationale des GIEs 
des Pêches (Fenagie) (National Federation of Fisheries GIEs) at the top. Fenagie is in turn composed of 
representatives of the Bureau of the National Federation which comprises members of the Bureaus of 
Departmental Federations. Bureaus of Departmental Federations are composed of members of the 
Bureaus of Regional Federations, which are composed of members of Local Unions of GIEs, which are in 
turn composed of individual GIEs.516 The GIEs themselves are in turn composed of individuals 
representing particular fisheries related industries in particular regions. 
 
Fenagie activities concern the administration of financial support to the fisheries’ sector in response to 
economic conditions that support greater dependence upon fishing activities as a means to securing food 
security and livelihoods for local populations.517 In addition Fenagie states that it aims to support 
communication between more localised fisheries’ workers and stake holder unions and broader national 
and international fisheries’ structures as a means to harmonising fisheries’ administration structures from 
global to local levels.518 As a result of its size and administrative importance Fenagie enjoys interaction 
and collaboration with government offices ranging in rank from the DPM and other directorates, to the 
Ministry for Maritime Economy.519  
 
Fenagie membership is restricted to GIEs and other organisations and as such does not allow membership 
to single individuals. Thus parallel to Fenagie are a number of other workers’ organisations serving the 
interests of fish workers, and allowing individual membership.  
 
The first and probably most politically important of these is the Collectif National des Pêcheurs Artisans 
du Senegal (CNPS) (National Association for Artisanal Fishers). With more than 10 000 members the 
CNPS has been established as a ‘bottom-up’ structure for representing the interests of artisanal fish 
workers. The core objectives of the CNPS are to protect the interests of fishers, to improve the condition 
of fishers' lives, and to enhance safety at sea. The CNPS currently does not have a great deal of 
interaction with the government administration.520 Although CNPS representatives did not give reasons 
for this during the author’s interview, Alassane Samba outlines that the relationships between different 
Senegalese fish worker's associations and government are complex. For example the Fenagie groups are 
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viewed as being pro government since its management and power structure is top down, while bottom up 
organisations such as the CNPS are not seen as pro government as a function of their bottom up power 
structures.521  
 
The Federation Nationale des Transformatrices et Mareyeuses du Sénégal (FENATRAMS) (National 
Federation of Senegalese Fish Processors and Sellers) is a women only workers union that represents the 
interests of transformatrices or fish processors. The current membership of the Orgaisation is 10 000 
women and 400 GIEs.522 The main objectives of the organisation are to secure finance for supporting the 
fish processing activities of member transformatrices, to assist in taking collective decisions on the behalf 
of members, to reinforce solidarity between transformatrices, to conduct market research, and to provide 
packaging services for processed goods. Membership is restricted to women because they feel better able 
to communicate their interests as a united 'women-only- forum.523 
 
Despite its large membership, an author’s interview with FENATRAMS representatives indicated that the 
only official relationship between the organisation and the government administration concerns the 
procurement of government money for FENATRANS activities, though a certain amount of funding 
comes from unspecified NGOs.524  
 
The Federation Nationale des Mareyeurs de Sénégal (FENAMS) (National Federation of Senegalese Fish 
sellers) is an organisation that was created with the main objective of supporting the commercialisation of 
fish products.525 The main achievement of the organisation has been the establishment of the Société 
Nationale de Mareyage (SONAMAR) National Company for Fish Selling, which facilitates the export of 
fish sellers’ products to Europe. The only official interaction between FANAMS and the governance 
administration concerns the procurement of government funds for FENAMS activities.526    
 
The Union Nationale des GIE des Mareyeurs de Sénégal (UNAGIEM) (National Union of GIEs for 
Senegalese Fish Sellers) was created in 1998 and the main objectives of the organisation are to provide a 
forum where fish sellers can meet as a means to creating and maintaining solidarity, to facilitate the 
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education and training of GIE members, to promote possibilities for female fish sellers, to participate in 
the protection of the environment, and to facilitate the creation of organisations that can be useful to the 
profession.527 Among the achievements of the project is the creation of a fund for fish sellers as well as 
the creation of a union for protecting the interests of fish sellers called the Syndicat Démocratique des 
Mareyeurs  (SUDEMS) (Democratic Union for Fish Sellers). UNAGIEM benefits from direct contact 
with the Ministère de l'Économie Maritime and also the Dakar Chamber of Commerce.528 
 
Although organisational and administrative differences exist between these organisations, in general the 
global vision of these groups is relatively coherent, since united these organizations provide political 
expression for the interests of fish workers across the entire fisheries’ sector,529 and to act to ensure the 
provision of jobs and the commercial viability of fisheries’ activities. In order to enhance the united 
political power of these groups, Fenagie, CNPS, FENATRAMS, and UNAGIEM have decided to 
cooperate in the creation of a single united organisation called the Confederation Nationale Inter-
professional de Pêche Artisanal du Sénégal (CONIPAS) (National Inter-professional Confederation of 
Senegalese Artisanal Fishing).  
 
The main objective of the organisation is to provide political representation for the interests of the entire 
artisanal fisheries’ sector when interactions take place with the government.530 As yet the extent of the 
interaction between CONIPAS and the administration has concerned collaboration with the Ministère de 
l'Économie Maritime on a project concerning the insertion of fishing permits and vessel registration for 
the artisanal sector.   
 
Although none of these organisations have direct power in the upper echelons of governance in Senegal, 
they can communicate their interests to the President of the Republic via the Conseil National de 
Concertation et de Cooperation des Ruraux (CNCCR) (National Council for Consultation and Rural 
Cooperation) which represents the interests of agriculturalists and fishers.531 However, a Fenagie 
representative suggests that the fisheries industry aims to distinguish itself from the CNCCR grouping by 
way of the CONIPAS, and as a function of its size and relative importance.532  
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As a result of the size of the population engaged directly or indirectly with the artisanal sector, these fish 
workers’ unions can be seen to have significant political power, especially in view of their formal and 
informal links with the general electorate. These links can be seen formally as through the supply of 
fishery products at a formal level and through informal relationships with other members of the 
electorate.  
 
In parallel to the representation of the artisanal fisheries’ sector, the interests of the industrial fishing 
sector in Senegal is represented by the Groupement des Armateurs et Industriels de la Pêche au Sénégal 
(GAIPES) (Group for Senegalese Fisheries Vessel Owners and Industrialists). Three core objectives are 
espoused by GAIPES. These are:  
! To ensure the availability of fisheries’ resources for future generations. 
! To ensure the provision of vital fisheries animal proteins to the Senegalese population. 
! To make a profit from fisheries and fishing activities.533 
 
GAIPES also asserts that cooperation between the EU and local industrial sectors can assist in the transfer 
of technology, the development and implementation of improved monitoring systems, including Vessel 
Monitoring Systems, and the development of improved fisheries’ governance structures, and for these 
reasons, partnership agreements between Senegalese and European fishing companies should be 
encouraged.534  
 
This ensemble of actors is accompanied by a range of EU actors and decision processes that also have an 
impact upon the Senegalese government’s fisheries’ policies.  
 
EU Actors 
James Brown has outlined that at EU levels, the College of Commissioners of the EC represents 
government decision making with all commission proposals and action plans requiring consensus across 
all DGs of the EC.535 EC initiatives, including general communications, specific proposals for regulations, 
and decisions and directives are prepared by the relevant DG. They are subsequently discussed with the 
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relevant DGs and are amended if necessary. Proposals for legislation are then checked by the EC Legal 
Service. After this, proposals are put on the agenda of a forthcoming EC College meeting by the Secretary 
General who in turn reports directly to the President of the Commission. If agreement is reached 
regarding particular proposals, it is then sent to the Council of the European Parliament, where a decision 
to adopt or reject a given proposal is made by the College, usually by a majority vote.536 
 
For fisheries’ proposals the EC has outlined two general objectives concerning external fisheries’ 
relations. These are:  
! To help improve world governance in fisheries through existing legal frameworks and 
strengthening regional cooperation. 
! To implement an approach based on fisheries’ partnership agreements, particularly with  
developing countries.537  
 
As such the EC has made commitments to establish new dialogue at community levels with all stake 
holders, at international levels with regional fisheries’ organisations, and at bilateral levels with third 
countries.538 However, the extent to which the inclusion of stake holders of third country’s is realized in 
practice remains unclear. 
 
The European Commission believes that it is essential to engage in dialogue with the fisheries 
industry and other groups affected by the Common Fisheries’ Policy (CFP). Real dialogue is a 
prerequisite for successful policies as it generates an exchange of views with fishermen and other 
stakeholders and provides the Commission with better knowledge about their problems and 
expectations which in turn can be taken into consideration when proposals for fisheries’ rules are 
drafted by the Commission. The industry is also more likely to accept and implement CFP rules if it 
has been involved in the formulation of these rules.539  
 
For the reasons given above, the European Commission has taken a number of measures to strengthen 
dialogue with the fisheries’ sector and other interested parties over the years. One of the first measures in 
this regard was the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries in the early 1970s. The 
Advisory Committee was subsequently reformed in 2000 in an attempt to make dialogue with the fishing 
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industry and other stakeholders more inclusive, and to increase efficiency.540  
 
Like Senegalese fisheries’ governance processes, those in Europe engage a range of stake holders with 
sometimes conflicting or overlapping interests. For example, the EC suggests that (foreign) Fisheries’ 
Partnership Agreements must be seen as “a public and commercial investment in the mutual interests of 
the EC and the coastal states.” At the same time, the EC outlines the core objectives of DG Fisheries as: 
! To maintain the presence of the European fleet in third country waters while contributing to 
sustainable fisheries’ activities in those waters. 
! To ensure the supply of fishery products to the European market while respecting hygiene 
standards and market regulations.541 
 
In 2000, the involvement of new interest groups including NGOs saw the evolution of the Advisory 
Committee on Fisheries into the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA), and the 
inclusion of yet another set of interests. ‘The ACFA is made up of 21 members representing different 
interests ranging from vessel owners and fishermen to fish farmers and NGOs. It is consulted by the 
Commission on measures related to the CFP or it issues an opinion on its own initiative.’542  
However: 
Despite the progress achieved in terms of strengthening the dialogue with stakeholders, the 
consultation of the fisheries’ industry in the framework of the 2002 reform to the CFP clearly 
showed that there was a need to do more. Stakeholders did not feel sufficiently involved in some 
important aspects of the CFP, such as, for example, the provision of scientific advice and the 
adoption of technical measures. Many fishermen, in particular, believed that their views and 
knowledge were not sufficiently taken into account by managers and scientists.543  
 
As a response to this the EC proposed the creation of a network of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs). 
RACs were designed to include fishermen, scientists and other regional stakeholders. A common 
framework for RACs aims to enable the fishing sector to: 
work more closely with scientists in collating reliable data and discussing ways of improving 
scientific advice. RACs will submit recommendations and suggestions on any aspects of the 
fisheries they cover to the Commission and the Member States concerned.544  
                                                 
540Ibid. 
541Ibid. 
542Ibid. 
543Ibid. 
544Ibid. 
 205 
 
 
The EC has also held a number of stake holder conferences in which industry, NGOs, and governments 
participated in discussion regarding the reforms to the CFP. Brown (James) notes that both NGOs and 
industry felt that they had influenced the tabled proposals regarding the EFF (‘Extended Fund Facility’ 
for providing financial support for the activities EU fleets).545 
 
NGO Actors 
At a European level, the fishing industry is generally seen as better organised compared with NGO 
groups, and is also seen to benefit from better access to politicians and greater resources. That being said, 
Brown (James) notes that NGOs are becoming increasingly well organised at an EU level and have 
contributed to fisheries’ policy through the provision of important technical information and discursive 
engagement with stake holders.546 The main NGO groups engaging in EU fisheries’ policy discourse are 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Greenpeace, the International Union or the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), and the Coalition for Fair Fisheries’ Arrangements (CFFA). These groups are also the most 
apparent environmental NGOs engaging in Senegalese policy.  
 
In 2001, the EU began to reform its CFP. WWF and others campaigned for a policy incorporating several 
changes that were expected to accord with the following major outcomes:  
! A reduction in fishing capacity through the abolition of subsidies for building new fishing boats 
and more stringent conditions for subsidies for the modernization of old boats. 
! The incorporation of a more ecosystem based approach to fisheries’ management through the 
introduction of recovery plans for threatened stocks and management plans for non threatened 
stocks. 
! A reduction in fishing effort through increased charges for the scrapping of vessels as part of the 
fisheries’ recovery plans. 
! Improved promotion of sustainable development in developing countries through a new framework 
for negotiating fishing access agreements between the EU and other countries.547  
 
Subsequently the WWF claimed that the 2002 WWF's Stop Overfishing Campaign scored a major victory 
by helping to put environmental concerns and long term resource sustainability at the heart of the EU’s 
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fisheries’ policy.’548 The organisation claims to have helped change the EU common fisheries’ policy. 
However WWF notes that much work remains to be done to eliminate harmful government subsidies, 
improve fishing methods to reduce by catch, and to protect breeding grounds, and promote the 
consumption of sustainably caught fish through the development of consumer awareness and eco-
labelling of fish products.549  
 
Other more recent WWF activities more closely related to the Senegalese situation, mounted in 2006 
include publicising over fishing and unsustainable fisheries’ activities to consumer groups. The WWF is 
also monitoring the impacts of EU fishing access agreements on local economies and ecosystems, and 
supporting the EU in seeking coherence between the development and fisheries’ policies of the European 
Union.550 
 
Greenpeace activities in Europe appear to be focused on the European marine environment ahead of the 
impacts of EU policy in third countries. The European Unit of Greenpeace works within a coalition of 
marine orientated environmental NGOs. “The coalition has focused its work on strengthening the content 
of the EU's Thematic Strategy on the Marine Environment, which is a product of the EU's Sixth 
Environment Action Programme (EAP), adopted by the European Parliament and Council in 2002. In 
October 2005, after three years of consultation, the Commission adopted the Marine Strategy and related 
proposal for a new EU marine law.”551 The group is also noted among Senegalese actors for providing 
important information to Senegalese stake holders concerning the activities of certain fishing fleets, and 
their impacts upon certain fish stocks.552  
 
The IUCN is the world’s largest conservation network, and is also an important NGO actor for the 
governance of marine resources in Senegal. The Union brings together eighty three States, one hundred 
and ten government agencies, more than eight hundred non governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
approximately ten thousand scientists and experts from one hundred and eighty one countries. The 
Union’s mission is to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the 
integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and 
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ecologically sustainable.553  
 
IUCN activities related to the Senegalese fishery tend to be focused in Senegal with relatively little 
activity based in Europe, an example of these activities will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Another group, the CFFA is a platform of NGOs based in Brussels that was formed in 1992 and works 
toward “fundamental change in EU Fisheries’ Policies, with the aim of supporting a multi-functional 
fisheries’ model that works for everyone involved,” both inside and outside of Europe. As such the CFFA 
documents the development and environmental implications of EU-ACP fisheries’ relations on small 
scale fishing communities. CFFA also works on specific campaigns with other networks such as 
Eurostep.554 Such campaigns usually involve petitions, other activities designed to enhance public 
awareness, the coordination of formal lobbies, writing of letters, and the provision of research results to 
the public and decision authorities.555 
 
The following activities are carried out by the CFFA as a means to achieving these goals: 
! Supplying of detailed information on issues surrounding future fisheries’ relations between the EU 
and ACP states: general information as well as more targeted information for our partners’ specific 
cases. 
! Providing advice on ways partners (NGOs in Europe and in ACP countries, professional ACP 
fisheries organizations) can influence negotiations on these fisheries’ relations with the EU.  
! Documenting developments in ACP-EU fisheries’ relations and their impact on coastal 
communities. 
! Creating awareness among partners as a means to dealing with these issues and providing 
opportunities for meetings to debate these subjects and plan common strategies and action. 
! Nurturing dialogue with ACP and European institutions, including decision makers as well as 
scientists, as a means to stimulating consultation between institutions, artisanal fisheries’ 
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organizations and support NGOs.556  
 
The ability of international environmental NGOs to permeate international and interregional boundaries is 
can be seen as adding an important interregional catalyst and consistency to efforts to manage fisheries’ 
arrangements between the two regions. An example of this was when in 1997 three NGO groups, the 
CFFA, Eurostep and the EU-NGO Liaison Committee campaigned for greater coherence between EU 
development cooperation for third countries and the practice of fisheries’ arrangements.557  
 
Since this time an interesting link between Senegalese and European NGO activities was established as a 
result of the perceived competition for resources between local and foreign fishing enterprises, when 
certain Senegalese artisanal fishing communities banded together with NGO groups in Europe in attempts 
to spur reforms in fisheries’ access agreements. The broad aims of these efforts have been first to educate 
the European public, national departments and public officials about some of the societally undesirable 
impacts of the agreements, and second to lobby EU officials to “change the nature and content of 
agreements.”558  
 
Another, and important example of this is the Programme Régionale de Conservation des zones Côtièrs 
et Marines (PRCM) (Regional Programme for the Conservation of Costal Zones) which seeks to improve 
the negotiation abilities of member countries of the CSRP,559 and can perhaps be viewed as one of the 
most impressive acts of international, interregional, and inter-organisational cooperation that has been 
facilitated by NGO groups. 
 
In a partnership between the member countries of the CSRP,WWF, IUCN, the Fondation Internationale 
pour le Banc d'Arguin (FIBA) (International Foundation for the Arguin Banc), and Wetlands 
International the PRCM aims to improve the negotiation abilities of member states of the CSRP. By 
boosting participation and collaboration between member states and concerned actors, it was hoped to 
improve transparency for the management of marine resources in the West African region.560 
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The participants of the project identified six key problems that the PRCM should address: 
 
! The poor ability, among representatives of SRFC countries, to negotiate fishing deals. 
! The lack of coherence and coordination among SRFC states when negotiating fishing deals with 
foreign partners. 
! The lack of transparency, and participation of all actors who are concerned by the negotiation 
process. 
! Insufficient knowledge about the marine resources for which access rights are sold. 
! Insufficient follow up monitoring on the implementation of fishing agreements. 
! The economic and political dependence of SRFC countries upon fishing agreements.561 
 
Three sub projects have been envisaged as a means to effect positive change concerning the nature of 
fishing agreements reached between SRFC states and, particularly, the EU.  
 
First, in June 2005 and under the direction of the IUCN, the WWF and the member countries of the 
CSRP, the PRCM implemented an effort aimed at reinforcing the ability of SRFC countries to negotiate 
fishing agreements more effectively. Four objectives were pursued: 
 
! Reinforcement of institutional and human resources in the theory, practice and implementation of 
negotiation. 
! Reinforcement of evaluation and multidisciplinary monitoring of fishing agreements.  
! Reinforcement of institutional capacities to anticipate and respond to changes in the rules of the 
WTO and other international factors. 
! Identification and analysis of alternatives to the financial dependence of SRFC states upon fishing 
agreements.562  
 
The PRCM also aims to conduct projects aimed at the valuation of shared resources, the development and 
management of marine protected areas, the sustainable management of marine resources at Kayar, and the 
reinforcement of NGOs and fish workers associations.563   
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Second, in September 2005, a European WWF project under the supervision of the MAVA (Mid-Atlantic 
Venture Association) foundation, initiated an attempt to influence the communal fisheries’ politics in 
Europe. The broad aims of the project are to influence the development of new partnership agreements 
between European and SRFC stake holders, to influence the politics of development aid to the CSRP, and 
to contribute to the reduction of the impacts of IUU fishing. Four aims have been identified in an attempt 
to provide fishing agreements that accord with principles of sustainability and the needs of local 
communities: 
 
! To seek greater accord with principles of sustainability through application of the FAO's Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 
! To combat IUU fishing, incidental and discarded by catch. 
! To achieve ecosystemic fisheries’ management through the application of the principles of 
preservation and conservation, and the consideration of marine protected areas as tools for 
development. 
! To seek greater coherence between the EEC's DG XIV fisheries and DG VIII development 
cooperation. 
! To promote communication between the EU, developing countries and all concerned parties for the 
realisation of improved circulation of information.564  
 
Third, the West African Project for a Regional Strategy for the Negotiation of Fishing Deals, was initiated 
on the 19th and 20th of September 2005. In collaboration between the member states of the SRFC, WWF, 
IUCN, FIBA and Wetlands, and with the financial backing of the MAVA foundation, this project seeks 
improved negotiation of fishing agreements through a participative approach, combining all stake holders 
interested by fisheries agreements. Participants, mostly from NGOs and member states of the SRFC, 
identified six priority themes:  
 
! Incoherence and a lack of coordination at a sub regional level. 
! Poor negotiation abilities. 
! Insufficient monitoring of fishing deals. 
! Lack of transparency and participation during negotiation processes. 
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! Insufficient knowledge of marine resources.  
! Economic and political dependence on fishing deals.565  
 
Three working groups were then created for the purpose of elaborating further on solutions to highlighted, 
and prioritised problems, and also to identify potential opportunities for the improvement of fisheries’ 
management in the sub region. The groups identified numerous ways in which to improve coherence and 
collaboration between member states, and other bodies. Importantly, the three groups focused on the 
following three priority areas:  
 
! Reinforcement of negotiation abilities of member states of the CSRP. 
! Improved coherence and coordination at the sub regional level.  
! Improved transparency and participation during negotiation processes.566  
 
What must be noted upon consulting the details of Annexure 3 of the said document is that during the 
workshop no definitive attention was paid to the question of finding alternatives to the economic and 
political dependence upon fishing agreements for SRFC states. The development of this part of the plan 
has been reserved for working groups scheduled for late 2006 and early 2007.567 Information concerning 
the outcomes of these meetings appears to still be unavailable to the general public.  
 
Despite these cooperative arrangements appearing relatively well organised, Renaud Bailleux director of 
the Fisheries’ Agreements Division of the SRFC outlines that there are currently no strong relationships 
between the SRFC on the ground and the NGO lobby groups in Brussels, and that these relationships 
remain more in principle than in concrete collaboration or action.568 
 
Further, he suggests that there are no concrete or very promising outcomes of the workshops that have 
been held under the PRCM, notably none on seeking alternatives to financial dependence on fishing 
agreements.569 
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This being said, the ‘in-principle’ collaboration between these actors illustrates a growing participation of 
NGO groups in seeking means to managing fisheries’ activities relative to new and nuanced 
circumstances faced by fisheries’ authorities.  
 
Another example of such cooperation is the Improved Scientific and Technical Advice for Fisheries 
Management (ISTAM) project.570 The project is financed by the EU and aims to coordinate technical and 
scientific activities related to fisheries in order to enhance fisheries information systems for fisheries 
activities in Europe and West Africa.571 Although the actors engaged in the project mainly concern 
European or European funded research institutions, the in principle cooperation that the project fosters 
across North/South lines may be a promising for of non-government cooperation regarding fisheries 
management issues. 
 
Views regarding the extent of the impact of such a range of different stake holders for fisheries’ policies 
remain divergent, with some groups, including NGOs arguing that they have little impact. In counter 
point, the fishing industry indicates that NGO statements to this effect are aimed at supporting the case 
for NGO involvement in fisheries’ policy discourse.572 
 
Certain other commentators within governments suggest that the inclusion of NGOs and industry stake 
holders only serves to reinforce existing disagreements than can be found within and between EU 
member governments.573 Although the roles played by these groups are not well understood, the fact 
remains that they are important components of the fisheries’ governance landscape in Europe, West 
Africa, and around the world. 
 
Catanzano has argued that NGO efforts are not always founded upon “relevant analyses or expertise 
adapted to the fisheries’ sector.”574 While anecdotal evidence suggests that the Senegalese government 
administration is often anti NGOs because certain actors believe that these groups tend to criticise the 
government unnecessarily in order to gain finance for their projects. Despite this, Alassane Samba 
suggests that NGOs are seen by some to play an important role as information providers, and they are 
                                                 
570 Istam Project. [No Date] Available at: www.halieut.roazhon.inra.fr.  
571 Ibid. 
572Brown, J. 2006. Op cit. p 10.  
573Ibid. p 11. 
574Catanzano, J. 2002. Op cit. p 4. 
 213 
 
viewed as entities that aim to influence actors and stake holders through the provision of this 
information.575 An example of this is the role that NGOs such as Greenpeace have played in providing 
information to the Senegalese government regarding the IUU activities of certain fleets frequenting 
Senegal’s EEZ.576 
 
These conflicting views regarding the role of these groups are in accordance with what is commonly 
argued to be poor knowledge and understanding of the nature of the policy impacts of NGO groups. In a 
2007 article I argued that although the exact policy implications of NGO activities remain unclear; in 
Senegalese fisheries’ policy discourse their activities hold promise as a means of placing sustainable 
development higher on the agenda of governance authorities, by traversing some of the rigid policy 
interests of other more micro rational actors.577 Although the impacts of groups are themselves frequently 
subject to limitations imposed by their own, sometimes narrow focus areas, the ability of these groups to 
traverse spatial, temporal, and administrative boundaries remains a promising component for the quest for 
more sustainable fisheries’ governance arrangements across regions in the long run.578 This has been 
argued on the basis of the international interconnectedness, or interdependence, of sustainable 
development problems and attempts to address them, where efforts to address such problems require 
international coordination that can be facilitated by NGO groups.579  
 
NGO groups therefore take their place as one of a range of different groups within a broader political 
environment that plays a role in determining the outcomes of Senegalese fisheries’ policy processes. 
Diagram 11.1 below provides a schematic outline of the main actors that influence Senegalese fisheries’ 
policy, describing the issues they represent and the level of governance that they influence. 
 
The diagram shows the interests of each of the actors that have been described so far, with arrows 
indicating the highest levels of governance upon which each organisation exerts direct influence (note 
that the absence of arrows to lower levels of governance does not mean that there is no direct exchange 
between given organisations and those levels of governance). 
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Certain actors, such as the General Electorate, the CNCR, and the EU DG Fisheries can be seen to have 
direct influence upon the upper levels of the governance structure. Other actors such as the artisanal fish 
workers unions have indirect influence upon the upper reaches of governance through their organisational 
affiliations.  
Diagram 11.1 Senegalese National Fisheries’ Policy: Actors and Levels of Influence  
 
* Arrows represent two highest levels of influence held by particular groups over Senegalese fisheries administration, with 
exception of that for the ‘General Electorate’ for which the arrow represents the single highest level of direct influence. 
 
Still other actors such as environmental and other NGOs can be seen to have little direct influence over 
upper levels of governance, although their influence upon lower levels can be transferred to the upper 
levels through the governance structure. 
 
Notable is the influence of the general electorate who has a direct and very important influence over the 
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President of the Republic, and the complex and overlapping interests and demands that different groups 
place on the governance structure.   
 
Council to the Minister of Maritime Economy, points out that the nature of the influence that is exerted by 
these different groups is further complicated to some extent by the Senegalese media’s reporting of the 
fisheries’ issues of the day. The source suggests that the governance structure is generally sensitive to the 
content of Senegal’s active media since it provides an important linkage with the general electorate, thus 
creating fairly strong linkages between governance structures and civil society.580 It is therefore important 
to remember that above and beyond the direct influence that individual groups may have upon 
governance authorities, there is a very important aggregation of indirect influence that is catalysed by the 
media. In a 2006 Article Nwabufo Uzodike and I argued that such media linkages have both advantages 
and disadvantages from a sustainable development point of view.581 Although the point will not be 
developed further here, it is one that will be touched on again in chapter thirteen. 
 
Diagram 11.1 illustrates how the fisheries’ governance process in Senegal is layered and complex, and the 
way that this process leads to fisheries’ policy decisions will be described in more detail later in the 
chapter. For the time being the next sections will explore the negotiation of fisheries’ agreements between 
Senegal and the EU as a means of describing how these layered forces come together to produce concrete 
national fisheries’ governance decisions.  
 
The Negotiation Processes for Senegal-EU Fisheries’ Agreements 
The negotiation of fisheries’ agreements normally takes place in rounds that alternate between Brussels 
and Senegal, and it is not uncommon for the number of rounds to exceed three or four as the delegations 
aim to reach a suitable agreement.582 
 
From the Senegalese side, before each round all fisheries related actors are invited to have their say on 
how they would like the negotiations to proceed. During these time conflicts between the delegates that 
will be present at the negotiations are resolved so that conflicts are not arrived at during negotiations with 
the EU.583 After this process of broad consultation, a delegation proceeds to the negotiating table. 
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The Senegalese delegation is composed of the following stake holders: 
! The Directeur des Pêches (Director of Fisheries), who holds that chair of the Senegalese 
delegation. 
! A representative of the Ministry of Finance. 
! A representative of fisheries’ research. 
! Technical council for the President of the Senegalese Republic. 
! Technical council for the Prime Minister of the Senegalese Republic.  
! A representative of the Grouping of Senegalese Industrial Fishing Vessel Owners (Groupement des 
Armateurs Industriels de la Pêche au Senegal (GAIPES) 
! A representative of Fenagie Pêche. 
! A representative of the Federation Nationale des Mareyeurs de Senegal (FENAMS)  
(National Federation of Senegalese Fish Sellers).584 
 
The power structure within the delegation is dominated by the Chef de la Délégation, who is accountable 
to the Minister of Fisheries, which normally coordinates proposals with other relevant ministries, notably 
the Ministry of Finance.585  
 
From the European side, the EC outlines that the negotiation of fisheries’ agreements are conducted in 
four main stages. Stage one takes place prior to the negotiation of a new agreement and involves ex-ante 
and ex-post evaluations of the social, environmental, economic, and institutional considerations for the 
given fisheries’ agreement. This allows the EC to prepare negotiating guidelines and obtain a negotiating 
brief from the Council. Stage two involves the identification of the elements necessary for building a 
partnership with the third country through negotiation processes. This stage is concluded with the 
initialling of a text agreed to by the two parties. Stage three involves the setting up of an FPA (Foreign 
Partnership Agreement) setting out the rights and obligations for both parties. Stage four sees the 
implementation of the protocol.586  
 
During negotiation the EU often includes representatives of European embassies in Senegal who perform 
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information collecting functions on the ground ahead of official negotiations. For example representatives 
of the French embassy in Dakar are able to access a great deal of information via contacts with the French 
Institute for Research on Development (IRD), and access to this information gives the EU an important 
advantage in the conclusion of fishing deals with Senegal.587 The extent to which this information is 
granted to the French delegation and not the Senegalese delegation is however questionable. 
 
During the negotiation of fishing agreements, a great deal of importance is placed upon the knowledge of 
coastal states with regards to the state of their fish stocks and the impact that license agreements may 
have upon those stocks. It is especially important that coastal states have a good level of knowledge when 
compared with that of their EU counterparts.588 
 
For example the current stand off resulting from the non renewal of the 2002-2006 agreement is 
characterised by a situation where the EU wants similar access conditions compared with the previous 
agreement. However they demand lower access fees because they understand that certain stocks are 
already heavily fished.589 
 
Kaczynski’s and Fluharty’s motion that agreements signed with the EU generally do not reflect the true 
value of the oceanic resources that are extracted by license holders since there is a debilitating lack of 
accurate data on fishery resources. As a result the bargaining power of coastal states is diminished and 
benefits from access agreements may be skewed.590  
 
For example, it has been argued in the 2002 Senegalese Ministère des Pêches’ report that under the most 
recent agreement signed between Senegal and the EU in 2002, a lack of research and scientific knowledge 
concerning the state of fish stocks, resulted in the agreement being only as good, if not worse than it was 
when the last agreement was signed in 1997.591 Thus the technical measures that are put in place in order 
to protect fishery resources can be viewed more as precautionary measures than scientific ones, especially 
since there exists a poor understanding of the state of the stocks that are exploited by European fleets.592  
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If these measures were not put in place in response to scientific evidence, it is reasonable to argue that 
they were put in place in response to political forces. How these different political forces impact upon 
fisheries’ policies and governance measures is therefore an interesting question.  
 
Political Interests in the Conclusion of Fisheries’ Agreements 
From the review of fisheries’ actors and their interests offered in the first part of this chapter we can 
identify six broad interests that are represented in Senegalese fisheries’ discourse. These are:  
 
! Ecological sustainability of the fishery,  
! public budget receipts for the Senegalese government,  
! the protection of livelihoods for Senegalese user groups (which also includes the larger food 
security benefits associated with those livelihoods),  
! realisation of EU aid connected with access agreements,  
! the maintenance of EU fishing capacity, and 
! the protection of EU fisheries related jobs.   
 
In an author’s email survey of perspectives among European and Senegalese fisheries' stake holders and 
policy researchers, respondents were given this list of overlapping interests and asked to rank them 
according to the following conditions. Firstly, according to how these interests are represented by the 
Senegalese fisheries’ authorities versus how they should be represented and secondly according to how 
these interests are represented by EU foreign fisheries’ authorities versus how they should be represented 
by these authorities. 
 
Responses to the first round of questions showed four of five respondents identifying public budget 
receipts as the main priority reflected by Senegalese fisheries agreements’ negotiators, with no clear 
second place for the next most important priority.593 Contrary perceptions on how priorities should be 
ranked saw four out of four respondents identify ecological sustainability of fisheries’ activities as the 
most important priority. 
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Responses to the second round of questions showed five out of five respondents identifying the export of 
excess fishing capacity as the main priority of EU fisheries agreements’ negotiators, with no single 
objective clearly taking second place. In contrast, ecological sustainability was identified as the most 
important objective that EU fisheries’ agreements should embrace by four of five respondents. The 
remaining respondent supported the export of excess fishing capacity as the priority that should be 
adopted by EU negotiators.594 
 
The results of this small survey generally reflect quite clear differences in how both Senegalese and EU 
negotiators actually prioritise fisheries’ objectives compared with how they perhaps ideally should 
prioritise these objectives from a sustainable development point of view.  
 
It can be argued that the political ability of the DPM to prioritize fisheries objectives is retarded as a result 
of the very powerful nature of the sometimes-conflicting pressures placed upon Senegalese fisheries 
policy makers. The heterogeneity of the policy forces being placed on Senegalese fisheries management 
authorities can be seen to translate into conflicting pressures that are placed upon the country's fishery 
management authorities. It is arguable that fisheries policy decisions stemming from these pressures can 
in turn lead to policies that allow ecologically unsustainable levels of fishing effort on a common 
resource. Moustapha Deme and Karim Dahou have supported this view, specifying that the demands 
being made of the resource concern employment, food security and foreign trade, and as such these 
demands upon the resource generate important questions for governance authorities.595  
 
Simultaneous to the range of pressures placed upon fisheries governance authorities by local and NGO 
actors, EU interest in negotiating fisheries access agreements can be seen as a means for Senegalese 
authorities to provide some of the financial resources that also form part of the ensemble of demands that 
are made on these governance bodies. 
 
The concurrent political importance of each of the pressures placed upon Senegalese governance 
authorities can thus be seen to lead to a situation where, when asked which of its objectives are 
prioritised, the DPM insists that all of its objectives are priority objectives.596  
 
                                                 
594 Ibid. 
595Deme, M. & Dahou, K. 2001. Loc cit. 
596Fenatrams Representatives. 2007. DOPM. Dakar, July. .   
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Diagram 11.2 below presents a schematic illustration of how a multitude of policy forces impact upon 
DPM fisheries policy decisions. The decisions that are taken can be seen as the product of political 
demand for public services, food and job security, and access to fish stocks on the one hand, and the 
extent to which fisheries governance authorities view the activities of different user groups as supplying a 
means to providing those goods on the other hand. Broader and less observable political forces are 
probably also at play, but their elusiveness means that their importance and nature cannot be clearly 
explained.   
 
Each of the decisions themselves reflect the political interests that the DPM (and those who have 
influence over their policies) believe can be satisfied by supporting the fisheries activities of the different 
user groups in presence. However, the activities of these groups in turn has an important impact upon the 
ecological resource which can be described as having poorly explained consequences for the 
sustainability of the larger fisheries system in the long run. This sustainability question emerges since our 
ability to clearly explain the consequences of different fisheries governance decisions is retarded as a 
result of the complexity and heavy interdependence that characterises the relationships between the 
social, ecological, and economic factors that impact upon the fishery.   
 
Three main factors encouraging the political 'acceptability' of supporting overlapping interests and 
objectives this way can be identified. 
 
First, the economic inequality between the EU and West African coastal states, with which access 
agreements are signed, also impacts significantly upon the policy dynamics that determine the nature of 
Senegalese fisheries’ governance procedures. Many of these coastal states have significant national debt, 
less well organised local fishing sectors, and as a result the finances received for access agreements 
constitute important contributions to their national treasuries.597  
As a result it has been argued that African States do not insist on more stringent fisheries regulations (and 
greater compliance with existing regulations) by EU fisheries entities for fear of loosing compensation for 
the agreements.598  
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the past even when there has been no clear surplus demersal fish 
                                                 
597   Chaytor, B. 1999. Fisheries, International Trade and Biodiversity. Draft manuscript. IUCN, Senegal. p 4. 
598 Porter, G. 1998. Fisheries Subsidies, Overfishing and Trade. Geneva, UNEP . p 8.  
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stock to be sold to the EU, the then Ministry of Fisheries is said to have concluded that there were excess 
stocks for demersal species on the basis that there existed surplus stocks for other small pelagic species. 
The argument that is made in support of this approach suggests that fisheries agreements with the EU 
needed to be viewed within their broader context of cooperation between Senegal and the EU and for this 
reason requested access to desired fish stocks should be granted to EU fishing companies.599 
 
Diagram 11.2 National Fisheries’ Policy Dynamics in Senegal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, prior to the negotiation of the 2002-2006 agreement, fishers and fisheries’ biologists were 
against the conclusion of a significant access agreement with the EU due to their beliefs that demersal fish 
stocks targeted by the EU were already fully exploited. However the Fisheries’ Ministry maintained that 
access to these stocks could be sold on the basis that a surplus existed among small pelagic stocks. The 
kind of argument that is made for such an approach asserts that fisheries’ agreements with the EU needed 
                                                 
599Catanzano, J. 2003. Fisheries Agreements and Access Rights with Reference to the Various Situations  in West Africa. 
International Seminar, ACP/EU Fisheries Relations: Toward Mutual Benefits. Brussels, ACP Secretariat. p 2.  
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to be viewed within their broader context of cooperation between Senegal and the EU and for this reason 
requested access to desired fish stocks should be granted to EU fishing companies.600  
 
Second, and as Joseph Catanzano has outlined , agreements signed with Senegal form part of a broader 
ensemble of possibilities for the EU to access other West African countries EEZs. Thus, events such as 
the non renewal of the EU agreement with Morocco, and the extension of the one with Mauritania, can be 
seen as related to changes in Senegal's strategy regarding their own fishery agreements with the EU.601 
Further and due in part to the interconnectedness of West African marine resources, such advents can be 
seen as having an impact upon the management strategies adopted by Senegalese fisheries authorities.  
 
The WWF has also argued that the EU weakens the bargaining position of West African stets by 
negotiating fishing deals separately with each states. This creates a fear that if states do not comply 
sufficiently with EU demands, the fishing deal will be lost to neighbouring state, and so will the financial 
compensation that accompanies the agreements.602  
 
Third, a weak understanding of the longer run costs and benefits that are associated with the activities 
performed by each of the user groups the participate in the fishery. 
  
The poorly explained nature of the long term sustainable development implications of fisheries decisions 
means that imprudent fisheries management is disguised in the short run by a lack of accurate information 
for explaining the consequences of management decisions. From a governance point of view this means 
that mismanagement of the fishery may be likely to go relatively unnoticed until the point when the 
consequences of these decisions become more severe, more clearly observable, and above all more 
politically contentious. 
 
A lack of accurate information for explaining the longer term consequences of fisheries decisions can also 
be seen to lead to confusion, and thus political gerrymandering, regarding who is to blame for whatever 
problems may manifest themselves as a result of the unsustainable management of the resource. In this 
way political objectives can be seen to contribute, and sometimes cause, mismanagement of fishery 
resources. 
                                                 
600Ibid. 
601Ibid. p 4.  
602Porter, G. 1998. Too Much Fishing Fleet, Too Few Fish: A Proposal for Eliminating Global Fishing Overcapacity. 
Washington, WWF. In Deere, C. 1999. Loc cit. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed some of the main policy actors in Senegalese fisheries’ discourse with 
reference to the political pressure that their demands place on the fisheries governance administration. We 
can see how it may be rational from a political point of view for governance authorities to aim to fulfil the 
imperatives of all the important actors engaging in the fishery. However an overarching question 
concerning the inter temporal ecological, and thus social and economic sustainability of the ensemble of 
fishery activities that are either supported, encouraged or simply permitted by fisheries’ governance 
authorities, raises some serious questions for the future viability of the resource. As we have seen in 
chapter four, from a political point of view, the lack of clear and immediate knowledge concerning the 
nature and potential implications of the sustainability question can lead to governance processes that 
reflect the aggregation of micro rational interests of stake holders. It can be argued that this aggregation 
of micro rational interests can be tempered by the identification of a common vision for managing 
fisheries activities that is capable of making the linkages between the micro rational interests that drive 
fisheries actors decision processes and a more macro rational vision of the fishery as a (ideally 
sustainable) interface between ecological, economic, social, and governance processes.   
 
Developing information systems that are capable of delivering some indication of the larger sustainable 
development consequences, incorporating economic, social, and ecological information, of fisheries’ 
governance decisions may therefore provide a means to providing orientation to governance processes 
that transcends the conglomeration of micro rational interests. This view is supported by Garcia who 
argues that fisheries’ decision processes are linked to research and research needs to integrate 
interdisciplinary systems for evaluating fisheries’ questions.603 This approach is also compatible with 
chapter three's recommendation for the need to develop information systems that can be used to create 
'identification systems' for uniting the objectives of different fisheries' agents. 
 
Due to the inability of purely market based information, for describing the sustainable development 
consequences of different economic activities. Chapter four advanced the view that at a theoretical level 
both economic and non economic information cannot be successfully incorporated into models for 
forecasting the sustainable development consequences of different economic activities. As a result chapter 
five proposed the usage of a descriptive method for identifying broad trends in the sustainable 
                                                 
603Garcia, S.M. 2004. Recherche Halieutique et Gestion des Pêches. Aquatic Living Resources Vol 17. p 91.  
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development impacts of different activities, and the governance processes that underpin those activities.  
 
It is the objective of the following chapter to apply this method, conveniently referred to as the SDD 
approach, to the Senegalese fishery. 
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PART FIVE: Application of the New Model to 
the Case Study, Results and Conclusions 
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Chapter Twelve.  Implementing the SDD Approach. 
It may be taken for granted that all information that fisheries’ authorities can possibly obtain about 
the biological and economic aspects of the fishery already exist within the fishing industry.604  
 
Introduction 
Hannesson argues that the fisheries can be seen as one of many activities that contribute to the well being 
of a nation. He suggests that the well being of a nation is described in material terms as a function of the 
resources that are available to the nation at any point in time. As we have already seen, these resources 
may vary between different types of capital and equipment that can be put to use in different ways. The 
author argues that “...the task is to do this as efficiently as possible so as to provide the highest possible 
level of well being, including that which must be set aside for economic growth (enhancement of well 
being in the future).”605 He suggest that well being has both material and immaterial aspects, though 
fishing activities contribute primarily to material well being by providing food and a source of foreign 
currency that can in turn be exchanged for other commodities that contribute to material well being. In 
order to make the appropriate divisions of resources between fisheries and other activities, Hannesson 
argues that it is necessary to measure the contributions of fisheries’ activities in terms of a single common 
measure. This he argues can and has been effectively achieved with monetary measures because the price 
of a good reflects its contribution to well being relative to other goods.606 It has been argued throughout 
this thesis, and notably in chapters four, that using a single common measure for assessing the sustainable 
development implications that economic activities have for society is a theoretically flawed proposition.  
 
Indeed the monetary or value added implications of different fisheries’ activities are viewed as important 
considerations for governance processes, though it is arguable that the way in which this value is added is 
at least as important. As a consequence of this, an argument has been made for a system of evaluating the 
sustainable development implications of economic activities in a descriptive way using multiple 
indicators. These indicators include value added as well as a range of indicators for describing the social, 
ecological and governance implications for the ways in which that value, or those values, are added to the 
fishery system. 
 
Although as part of his idea of Minimum Information Management for fisheries, Arnson proposes that the 
                                                 
604 Arnson, R. 2004. Op cit. p 15. 
605Hanneson, R. 1993. Loc cit. p 16. 
606Ibid. 
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information that is required to manage fisheries’ activities can be found within the fishery itself,607 the 
interdependencies that are observed between important factors observed both within and exterior the 
fishery would indicate that the authors definition may require extension to include the fishery as well as 
related systems. As a result we can propose that the information required by fisheries’ managers already 
exists within the fishery and related economic, social, and ecological systems.  
 
While the approach purported by Arnson with regard to observing existing fisheries and fisheries related 
information concerns evaluating exclusively economic, monetary based, implications of fisheries’ 
activities,608 the method employed in this thesis evaluates a far broader set of information with a view to 
describing the sustainable development implications of these activities. This is done as a means to 
describing the sustainable development status of the fishery with a system that aims simply to observe 
and describe existing information concerning the status of a range of fisheries and fisheries related capital 
types.    
 
The chapter is therefore dedicated to the practical implementation of the SDD approach that was outlined 
in chapter five. 
 
The chapter has three main parts. The first part introduces a first information set that will be used to 
describe the sustainable development impacts of the activities of different user groups through providing 
information concerning the impacts that these groups have for different capital types. The indicators that 
are employed, and the origins of the data used are discussed before the tabulated information set is 
provided. A brief discussion of the results of the first information set introduces the second part of the 
chapter which introduces a second information employed in accordance with the SDD approach which 
aims to provide some useful ratios as a means of comparing the impacts that different fishing groups have 
for different capital types in more detail. This second part follows the same format as the first part, though 
a slightly more in depth discussion of the results is made. The third part of the chapter offers some 
reflection on the results, and outlines certain considerations that must be taken into account when 
interpreting the results of both tabulated information sets. The chapter concludes that the results of the 
SDD approach should be contextualised within a broader political economy context, and this task is left 
for the next and final chapter.    
 
                                                 
607Arnson, R. 2004. Loc cit. 
608Ibid. 
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The First Tabulated Data Presentation for the SDD Approach 
The SDD proposes assessing the impact that fisheries’ activities have for economic, natural, human, and 
public institutional capital.  
 
It is necessary to identify appropriate indicators for each of these capital types, with the overall purpose 
being to help enhance the institutional capacity for fisheries’ governance institutions. Institutional 
capacity is described by Pousse as an organisation's ability to achieve its objectives in the most efficient 
way and at the lowest possible cost.609 The provision of indicators that meet institutional demands for 
information concerning a range of fisheries related  questions can be seen as being directly linked with the 
usefulness of the indicators. However, as Laloë has argued, a complete finite set of indicators that 
satisfies all institutional requirements cannot be achieved unless we pretend to know all of the 
information needs of decision makers.610 As a result the author proposes the usage of sets of indicators 
constituting an (incomplete) “base” for indication thus must be seen “as intermediate steps in the context 
of a decision process.”611  
 
The contextual limitations regarding the availability of data in the Senegalese fisheries’ context mean that 
in accordance with the above views, the practical viability of the SDD approach will depend to some 
extent upon an ability to identify useful and available indicators. As such these indicators will provide an 
intermediate step for decision makers concerned by the sustainable development of the Senegalese 
fishery. The parameter estimates for these indicators in turn concern the impacts that the activities of 
different fishing groups have for ecological, economic, social, and governance factors that are perceived 
as a necessary condition for the sustainable development of the fishery. 
 
Garcia et al argue that fishery governance indicators are used for four main reasons: firstly, to observe 
changes in the properties of different elements of the fisheries’ system for example, biomass, catch, value 
added and so on; secondly, to monitor progress towards reference values representing either targets such 
as TAC and MSY levels, or constraints and limitations such as minimum population size; thirdly, to 
                                                 
609Pousse, E. 2002. Evolution du Cardre Institutionnel dans le Secteur Rural: Le System D'analyse et le 
Developpement de Capacire Institutionelle. Châtenay-Malabry, Institutions et Developpement. p 6. 
610 Laloë, F. 2007. Information at the Interface Between Supply and Demand for Indicators : The use of a Model with 
Estimated Parameter Values as a Base Indication in Multicriteria Analyses. Int. J. Sustainable Development. Vol 10, 
no.s 1-2. p 34. 
611 Ibid. p 44. 
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construct early warning systems for alerting fisheries’ managers to potential future problems; and finally 
to ‘assess and compare performance’ of different fisheries’ usage or management strategies.612  
 
Similarly Rey et al outline that socio economic impacts can be categorised as being either direct impacts 
on flora and fauna, or impacts that can be measured using monetary valuation. These impacts can be 
further distinguished between as the indicators of economic and social sustainability of fisheries’ 
activities, socio economic indicators of driving forces and pressures that affect the sustainability of 
fisheries’ activities and socio economic indicators regarding the capability of fisheries’ systems to 
respond to threats to their sustainability.613 
 
Essentially the objectives of the SDD approach are primarily to assess and compare performance of 
different fisheries’ usage strategies by outlining some of the differences between the impacts made by 
different user groups. However this larger objective requires that we are also able to understand changes 
in the properties of different elements of the fisheries’ system that are linked with the activities of 
different user groups, as well as provide early warning systems for alerting fisheries’ managers to 
potential future problems that may be linked with the activities of these different groups. 
 
Thus the indicators required here concern the impacts that different fishing activities have, or have had, 
and the potential implications that aspects to these activities may have for the future. Based on the 
contextual limitations and the functions the indicators are required to perform, the following quantitative 
indicators have been identified for evaluating changes in the four capital types associated with the 
activities of the three main fishery user groups. A number of indicators identified have been identified in 
the absence of  perfect availability of information as proxy indicators that are seen as providing indirect 
indications of a quality we wish to measure. For example ‘Catch’ is relied upon as a proxy indicator for 
natural capital. This is because it is not possible to know the precise impact that different fishing groups 
have for natural capital. Since catch levels are viewed as providing at least some indication of the 
ecological impact that different user groups have for the fish population, catch has been incorporated as a 
proxy indicator for natural capital. The full list of  proxy indicators includes:  
 
                                                 
612Garcia, S.M., Rey-Valette, H., Bodigel, C. & Bianchi, G. 2007. Loc cit. 
613Rey-Valette, H., Bodiguel, C. Cunningham, S., Degnobol, P., Hegland, T.J., Sverdrop-Jensen, S. & Aps, R. 2005. 
Review of the usage of Socio-Economic Indicators on the Environmental Impact of Fishing Activities. INDECO. 
www.ieep.org.uk.  
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1. Kb (Business Capital) will be described by the value added to the Senegalese economy by the 
fishing actions of each user group. 
2. Kh (Human Capital) will be described by employment created and catch for local consumption 
as a contributing factor to food security. 
3. Kn (Natural Capital) will be described by Total Catch, as well as catch for demersal, small 
pelagic and large pelagic species respectively as a means to distinguish between the impact upon 
different species groups. 
4. Kpi (Public Institutional Capital) will be described by the financial contribution made to 
government by the activities of each group. 
5. Local landings will be used to describe the locality of the benefits derived from landings, and 
will distinguish between landings for local consumption and landings for export as indicators for 
contributions made to Kh and Ke respectively. 
6. The Regional Distribution of Landings will be incorporated to describe the spatial distribution of 
economic and social (Kb and Kh) benefits relating to the distribution of landings made by the 
different fishery user groups, as well as the spatial distribution that may accrue to government 
fisheries’ authorities.  
  
The only indicator mentioned here for which data has not already been discussed in chapters seven to 
eleven, is value added. It is therefore necessary to provide some background to the concept as well as 
origins of the data that will be provided for this indicator. 
 
 Value added refers to the contribution made by the different Factors of Production (FOPs) used to create 
a good by raising the value of that good. In monetary terms this value corresponds to the prices paid for 
the FOPs.614  
 
At a macro economic level total value added has two dimensions. The first is direct value added which 
refers to the amounts that are paid for the FOPs used to make a particular good. The second refers to the 
value that is added to other areas of the economy as a product of the demand for goods resulting from the 
                                                 
614Wikipdia. 2007. Value Added. Available at: www.wikipedia.org.  
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initial production process.615 These indirect effects are linked with the idea of a multiplier effect which 
refers to increased output for economic activities that are somehow related to the primary activity.616 
 
As a result of this multiplier dynamic, different value added estimations may differ as a function of the 
number of activities taken into account and how well related they are to each other. In cases like the 
Senegalese fisheries’ sector, where one important sector, the artisanal sector, is informal, different 
estimations of the value added by the sector may vary a lot as a result of different estimations taking 
different measures into account.    
 
The value added figures that will appear in the tables presented in this chapter will be based upon the 
estimations offered in the 2002 Ministère des Pêches report. However, since the report does not give 
estimations for 2003, the estimations given for 2003 here are extrapolations that have been calculated by 
multiplying the sales figures (chiffres d'affaires) for each sector in 2003 by the ratios of sales 
figures/value added that are provided in the 2002 report.617 This is certainly not an ideal way of coming 
up with a figure for the value added by each sector in 2003. However, since estimations of value added by 
all sectors for 2003 are currently not available and nor are any other estimations more recent than those 
contained in the 2002 Ministère des Pêches report,618 this approach has been seen as the most favourable 
option. This approach has also been favoured because the purpose of the tables presented in this chapter is 
to offer comparison between sectors, and for this reason it is desirable that the origin of the figures given 
are as coherent as is possible. Thus we can hope that any errors that arise as a result of the crude 
extrapolations made for the value added estimations will be reproduced relatively proportionately for each 
sector. It is also important to remember that the very essence of the approach that is being applied here is 
that we enable the usage of relatively imprecise estimations for identifying general trends and trajectories 
rather than picture perfect impressions.     
 
As a means to protecting the credibility of the other data offered in this chapter, all of the remaining data 
provided (pertaining to other non economic factors that are taken account by the SDD approach offered 
here) are data that have already been discussed in chapters seven, eight, nine, and ten. Thus Table 12.1 
                                                 
615Ministère des Pêches. 2002. Loc cit. p 149.  
616Wikipedia. 2007. Multiplier Effect. Available at: www.wikipedia.org.  
617See “Value Added Calculations for 2003 Figures” in  annex for calculations. 
618Sy, A.B. 2007. Loc cit. 
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below illustrates the results of this first phase to the SDD evaluation of the fisheries’ activities of the three 
fisheries’ groups being examined here as an ensemble of data for the indicators that have been discussed. 
Note that numbers presented have been rounded to the nearest hundred, with the exception of figures for 
Financial Contribution to Government and Value Added which are rounded to the nearest 1 million francs 
CFA. 
Table 12.1 First Tabulated Information Set of the  
SDD Approach: General Statistics For 2003 
 
Artisanal Local Industrial EU Industrial 
Total Catch (T) 386 000 T 42 400 T 11 900 T 
Demersal Catch (T) 42 700 T 38 700 T 9 500 T
Small Pelagic Catch (T) 315 900 T 1 500 T Very Negligible
Large Pelagic Catch (T) 6 400 T 1 500 T 2 500 T
Local Landings (T) 386 000 T 41 800 T 12 500 T 
Geographical Distribution of Landings 7 Regions 1 Region 1 Region
Quantity of Catch for Export (T) 71 400 T 41 800 T 16 500 T
Landings for Local Consumption (T) 314 600 T Negligible Negligible 
Total direct  Employment Created 90 000 5 300 300 
Net Financial Contribution to Government -7 407 Million F CFA - 16 808 Million F CFA 10 495  Million F CFA
Value Added 63 320 Million  F CFA 18 782 Million F CFA 16 363 Million F CFA  
 
Chapter eleven explained the fisheries’ activities of the three user groups in terms of the objectives that 
governance authorities wish to fulfill. The artisanal sector was viewed as a means of fulfilling imperatives 
by securing the geographical distribution of catches, providing fish for local consumption, creating 
employment, and supporting some export potential. The local industrial sector was viewed as a means of 
fulfilling political imperatives concerning the supply of fish for export, earning some public revenue, and 
maintaining the technical and capital investments in the local industrial industry. The EU industrial sector 
on the other hand was viewed as a means of securing public money, and ensuring a supply of landings for 
export. 
 
Table 12.1 is useful because it illustrates the extent to which the activities of each of these sectors can be 
seen to contribute to the realisation of these objectives. The artisanal sector clearly leads in the 
geographical distribution of landings, catch for local consumption, job creation, and exports. Specifics 
regarding the composition of catches made by the sector will be given in the following information set. 
The sector performs poorly when it comes to financial contribution to government by actually costing the 
government 7407 million francs CFA net due to government fuel and equipment tax exemptions. 
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The local industrial sector in turn provides a catch for export and also a number of jobs, but like the 
artisanal sector actually costs the public budget 16 808 million francs CFA. The EU industrial sector on 
the other hand provides very few jobs, but a significant contribution to the public budget, and a 
reasonable portion of catch for export compared with that provided by other sectors. 
 
Thus in general the activities of each group can be seen to correspond with the objectives that the 
management authorities have for them. At a more economic level the value added by each group differs 
significantly between groups. The artisanal is very clearly the leader in the generation of value added 
while the local and foreign industrial sectors comes a distant second and third place respectively.       
 
The Second Tabulated Data Presentation for the SDD Approach 
Since the value added, and other figures, for each sector differ significantly and partly as a product of the 
heterogeneity of fishing groups regarding factors such as employment, catch levels and catch 
composition, fishing techniques employed (among other factors), the next section will describe the 
activities of each sector with reference to the rates at which different outputs are produced. For example 
on the basis of the information provided in Table 12.1 we are able to evaluate the rate at which different 
sectors might produce public revenue for the Senegalese government per ton of catch, or per ton of catch 
landed locally. This process provides an important aspect to reflections as to which sectors are more 
efficient in the production of different outputs. This information will be given on the basis that it may 
provide insights for decisions on how fishing activities can be adjusted in accordance with a given set of 
management objectives. These ratios can also be useful for evaluating the impact that a particular 
decision might have on the balances between particular parameters within the fishery. 
 
In accordance with the prescriptions of the SDD approach, these results will next be reformulated in order 
to give more nuanced information pertaining to two factors: first, the efficiency of different user groups in 
the production of sustainable development benefits; and second, potential warning signs concerning 
factors for which significant quantitative data is currently unavailable.      
 
The two factors that are described by the second stage of the SDD approach are broken down into three 
categories. 
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First, ratios describing catches made by each group as a percentage of the MSY for the given fish 
population. Since it is possible that a given population may be either over or under exploited at catch 
levels below MSY, an additional indication will be given as a means of showing whether the population 
is moderately, fully, or over exploited. The impressions regarding the extent to which the population is 
exploited will be based upon the discussion of the ecological state of the fishery that appeared in chapter 
seven.  
 
Second, ratios describing the impact that each ton of catch has for each of the variables representing the 
four capital types will be derived as a means to indicating the efficiency in the production of sustainable 
development benefits of each group per ton of catch. The same approach applies in the third group of 
information which describes the impact that each dollar of value added has for each of the variables 
representing the four capital types and is derived from the information provided in Table 12.1. 
 
The fourth step of stage two involves giving qualitative information that can be used as an early warning 
system for identifying potential threats to the sustainable development of the fishery. Since the overall 
aim of the SDD approach is to provide a comparison between the sustainable development implications of 
the activities of different fishing groups, potential threats that emerge from the activities of the separate 
groups will be described. The factors that have been identified are:  
 
! The probable balance of payments implications of different activities. 
! The likelihood of capital flight (potential for the profits of fishing being invested abroad rather than 
in Senegal). 
! The quality of employment provided (on board living conditions, general treatment of employees, 
prevalence of pension schemes and social benefits, and pay).  
! The usage of environmentally harmful fishing methods. 
 
The qualitative information provided on these factors will be based on qualitative insights gained through 
published opinions, interviews with stake holders, and fieldwork observations. The information given will 
indicate potential threats to the sustainable development of the fishery, related to each of these factors for 
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each of the three user groups. The system that will be used is a purpose built one that uses three values: 
'not problematic', 'potentially problematic' - requiring investigation, and 'clearly problematic' - requiring 
action.  
 
The precautionary principle will help to mitigate against reckless usage of the system in two ways. The 
first way is the usual one which helps us adopt a more cautious approach when making statements about 
the sustainability of a certain activity. The second way that will be used here is one that will help us to be 
more cautious about adopting perhaps unnecessarily overly pessimistic views about the unsustainability 
of a given activity. This idea is based upon a growing awareness of issues surrounding a worst case 
scenario approach to fisheries’ information. This was outlined in Ray Hilborn's 2006 article titled 'Faith-
based Fisheries', which discusses the problems that the popularity of sensational worst case scenario 
information on fisheries poses to scientifically credible (not politically delicious) fisheries’ research.619 
For this reason, the approach I offer here also uses the precautionary principle to mitigate against 
unrealistically cautious observations.  
 
Therefore, in accordance with this mitigating role of the precautionary principle, if there is any doubt 
about the existence of a sustainability threat posed by the activity of a particular group, the factor being 
investigated is immediately given a rating of 'potential threat'. In turn if there is any evidence of this 
potential threat having clear negative consequences for the sustainability of the fishery, the factor being 
investigated is immediately rated more severely as posing a  'clear threat'. At the same time, if there is 
reasonable doubt regarding the existence of a clear negative consequence posed by a given factor to the 
sustainability of the fishery, then the factor is given a rating as posing a 'potential threat' warranting 
further investigation. The result of this mitigation process is that only clear immediate threats are rated as 
'clear threats' warranting action, and only clearly sustainable activities are rated 'no threat'.   
 
Based on this ensemble of information Table 12.2 below provides a useful comparison of the implications 
of the fishing activities of the three user groups in question.  
 
First and foremost the table illustrates catch levels as a percentage of MSY, first with respect to total 
                                                 
619Hilborn, R. 2006. Faith-based Fisheries. Fisheries, Vol 31, no. 11. p 554.  
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catch and total MSY and subsequently with respect to the catches for the different broad species groups. 
The results illustrate that catches are generally close to MSY levels for all species groups. While catch for 
demersal species is below MSY levels, from the qualitative accounts regarding these species that was 
offered in chapter seven, it is reasonable to assume that catch levels are only below MSY for these stocks 
because they are already over exploited. Based on the qualitative information from chapter seven, small 
pelagic species are described as fully exploited, while catch for large pelagic species are described as 
fully exploited. Notable is the relative egality between demersal catches made by the artisanal and local 
industrial sectors with around 28.4% and 27.7% respectively.  
 
Table 12.2 Second Tabulated Information Set of the SDD Approach: Useful Ratios  
and other Qualitative Insights for 2003 
 
Artisanal Local Industrial EU Industrial 
Total Catch as % of Total MSY 80.42% 8.83% 2.48%
Demersal Catch as % of  Demersal MSY
28.47%
(over exploited)
27.73%
(over exploited)
6.33%
(over exploited)
Small Pelagic Catch as % of Small Pelagic MSY
70.20%
(fully  exploited)
0.34%
(fully exploited)  Very Negligible
Large Pelagic Catch as % of Large Pelagic MSY
42.77%
(fully exploited)
10.64%
(fully exploited)
16.74%
(fully exploited)
Employment per Ton of Catch 0.23Jobs 0.13 Jobs 0.03 Jobs
Local Landings per Ton of Catch 1 T 0.99 T 1.05 T
Landings for Local Consumption per Ton of Catch 0.82 T Negligible Negligible
Net Financial Contribution to Gov. per Ton of Catch -0.02 M F CFA -0.4 M CFA 0.88 M F CFA
VA per Ton of Catch 0.16 M F CFA 0.44 M F CFA 1.38 M F CFA
Employment per M F CFA of V.A. 1.5 Jobs 0.3 Jobs 0.02 Jobs
Local Landings per M F CFA of V.A. 6.1 T 2.23 T 0.76 T
Landings for Local Consumption per M F CFA of VA 4.09 T Negligible Negligible 
Net Financial Contribution to Gov. per M F CFA of V.A. -0.12 M F CFA -0.89 M F CFA 0.64M F CFA
Balance of Payments Potential not  problematic potentially problematic not  problematic
Investment of Profits Abroad not  problematic potentially problematic not  problematic
On-board Health and Safety clearly problematic potentially problematic not  problematic
W astefulness of Fishing Methods not  problematic clearly problematic clearly problematic  
 
* Small pelagic stocks described as fully exploited across years. 2003 catch for these species  
are described as being unusually lower than average.  
 
 
By comparison, the EU sector accounts for around 6.3% of demersal catch as a percentage of MSY for 
demersal species. The artisanal clearly dominates catches for small pelagic species accounting for about 
70.2% of small pelagic catch as a percentage of MSY for pelagic species with the local industrial sector 
accounting for roughly 0.3%. Catches are for large pelagic species are also lead by the artisanal sector but 
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with a smaller margin with around 42.8, 16.7, and 10.6% accounted for by the EU and local industrial 
sectors respectively.    
 
Employment per ton of catch is led by the artisanal sector with around 0.2 jobs per ton of catch, followed 
by the local industrial sector with a little more than half of the employment created by artisanal activities 
at around 0.13 jobs per ton of catch. At 0.03 jobs per ton of catch, employment provided to Senegalese 
nationals by the EU industrial sector per ton of catch can be described as marginal compared with that 
provided by the other two sectors. 
 
All sectors make roughly similar contributions in terms of local landings per ton of catch at around one 
ton landed locally per ton of catch for all sectors. By contrast, the artisanal sector makes a massive 
contribution to landings for local consumption per ton of catch with around 0.8 tons per ton of catch 
compared with the negligible contributions made by the industrial sectors.  Conversely the EU industrial 
sector makes massive contributions to the public budget per ton of catch with around 0.9 million francs 
CFA per ton of catch compared with the cost of 0.4 million francs CFA per ton of catch imposed by the 
local industrial sector and the cost of 0.02 million francs CFA imposed by the artisanal sector. The case is 
similar for value added per ton of catch with the EU industrial sector leading the local industrial sector 
almost three fold with the sectors contributing around 1.4 million francs CFA per ton of catch and 0.4 
million francs CFA respectively. The contribution of value added per ton of catch made by the artisanal 
sector takes a distant third place with about 0.16 million francs CFA per ton of catch. 
 
Employment per million francs CFA of value added is dominated by the artisanal sector with 1.42 jobs 
per million francs CFA compared with 0.28 jobs and 0.02 jobs per million francs CFA for the local and 
EU industrial sector's respectively. Local landings per value added are equally dominated by the artisanal 
sector with around 6.1 tons compared with 2.23 tons and 0.8 tons for the local and EU industrial sectors 
respectively. Landings for local consumption are also dominated by the artisanal sector with roughly 4.1 
tons compared with the negligible contributions made by each of the industrial sectors. However the 
contributions made by the EU sector per value added of roughly 0.6 million francs CFA obviously 
outweighs the net costs of 0.12 and 0.89 million francs CFA imposed by the artisanal and local industrial 
sectors respectively.     
A number of comments are necessary regarding the more qualitative information displayed in Table 12.2. 
First balance of payment evaluations were based on the composition of imports versus exports for the 
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activities of the given fishing sector. As we saw in chapter nine, the artisanal sector imports very little 
fishing gear, and exports a large amount of fish. By comparison we saw in chapter ten that the local 
industrial sector relies heavily on costly equipment imports, and in fact exports less fish than the artisanal 
sector. As such these sectors were rated 'not problematic' and 'potentially problematic' respectively. 
 
The situation for the EU industrial sector is a little more complicated. Although the payments paid by the 
EU for fisheries’ access agreements are large, we must take into consideration that fact that the 2002 
Ministère des Pêches’ report outlines in the value added calculations that the EU landings provided to 
Senegalese tuna canning factories are in fact paid for.620 As a result, these tuna landings can be seen to 
constitute imports. Although the large access fees paid by the EU far outweigh the payments made by 
Senegalese canning factories for tuna landings, thus affording the sector a rating of 'not problematic' it 
remains important to note these landings as imports.     
 
The investments of profits abroad indications are based on the author's interviews of artisanal fishermen 
and fish sellers. When this group was asked how it would spend any extra earnings gained, eighteen of 
twenty respondents suggested that they would invest their earnings in Senegal. The other 2 respondents 
did not know what they would do with the extra earnings.621 For this reason the artisanal sector has been 
rated as 'not problematic' in terms of capital flight. The growing number of foreign nationals investing in 
industrial fishing activities in Senegal, combined with the view advanced by Roman Grynberg suggesting 
that industrial fisheries in less developed countries frequently result in capital flight away from the less 
developed country,622 has earned the local industrial fleet a rating of 'potentially problematic'. In chapter 
eight we saw that EU fisheries’ activities have pre determined direct financial contributions to the public 
budget, as well as investment schedules for investments in local Senegalese fisheries’ infrastructure, 
education schemes, management programmes, monitoring and control programmes as well as a host of 
other areas. On this basis the sector is given a score of 'not problematic' from an investment of profits 
abroad point of view. 
 
On board health and safety standards on artisanal fishing pirogues was considered poor, especially by 
                                                 
620Ministère des Pêches. 2002. Op cit. p 111. 
621See annex for details. 
622Grynberg, R. 2003. Loc cit. 
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comparison to EU standards, with several reports each year of deaths at sea for the artisanal sector.623 
(Author's interviews with industrial fishermen indicate that fishers who have worked on both Senegalese 
and EU vessels unanimously agree that salary as well as health and safety measures are much better on 
EU vessels than on Senegalese ones.)624 EU vessels are subject to EU Health and Safety regulations 
which are well developed.625 Although there have been some attempts to improve health and safety 
standards on Senegalese artisanal and industrial fleets, evidence from discussions and interviews with 
fishermen indicates that health and safety standards are generally much better onboard EU fleets. 
 
For these reasons, the artisanal sector has been rated as 'clearly problematic', with the local and EU 
industrial sectors being rated as 'potentially problematic' and 'clearly problematic' respectively. 
 
The last of the qualitative measures concerns the wastefulness of fishing methods, which is meant to refer 
to the economic and food security utility that is derived from the by catch products and the general 
ecological harmfulness of fishing techniques, including the production of by catch. The artisanal sector 
has been rated as 'not problematic' because although the sector does produce some by catch, non target 
species that are landed can be used as bait or are sold to the local market.626 The techniques used by the 
sector can also be considered to have a relatively small ecologically harmful impact. The fishing 
techniques used by both EU and local industrial fleets, notably trawling methods, can be recognised as 
producing significant by catch as well as having a harmful ecological effect on the fishery through the 
catch of undersized specimens and the destruction of rocky reef habitats and breeding grounds.627 As a 
result the local and EU industrial sectors have both been rated as 'clearly problematic' as a result of the 
partly indiscriminate fishing and ecologically harmfulness of the fishing practices used by these sectors.    
 
Reflections on Results and Method  
The objective behind the presentation of information that has been given in this chapter has been to 
identify the sustainable development implications of the activities of each of three fisheries’ sectors. The 
                                                 
623Brown, P. 2002. Summit Agrees Deal to Save Fish. Available at: www.guardian.uk.  
624See annex for details.  
625Osha. 2007. EU Occupational Safety and Health Good Practice. Available at: osha.europa.eu.  
626Field work observation. Dakar, July 2007. 
627UNEP. 2004. Mise en Oeuvre de Measures de Conservation et Gestion Durables des Ressources Halieutiques: le 
Cas du Sénégal. Nairobi, UNEP. pp 38-54.  
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intention has been to base the identification of these sustainable development consequences upon the 
different affects and effects that the different fisheries’ activities have for the different capital types that 
have been described as playing an important role for sustainable development. Problematically, there 
currently is no clear recipe for sustainable development in that we do not know exactly what balances 
need to be reached between the different capital types, and in what measure these balances should be 
reached. This idea has been outlined throughout this thesis, and notably in chapter four.  
 
The SDD approach addresses this problem by taking a minimum information approach. While we do not 
have a precise blue print for comparing the sustainable development status of the Senegalese fishery with, 
the need remains urgent to understand the implications that different activities have for the sustainable 
development of the fishery. As a result of this the SDD approach offers an array of information that can 
be used to make general observations about the balances between the impacts on the different conditions 
for sustainable development that result from the activities of different fishing sectors. The observations 
that are made are made under the hypothesis that the best fisheries’ regime from a sustainable 
development point of view is one that maximises positive affects for the different capital types, while 
minimising negative effects on those or other capital types. From this basis decisions can be made in a 
view to observing the effects these decisions have upon the balances between the different capital types. 
As such the information provided by the SDD evaluation takes on a meaning as being one intermediate 
step in a governance process, where the essence of the approach is in the assertion that decision support 
can be made on the basis of descriptive rather than explanatory information pertaining to the impacts 
different groups have for the sustainable development of the fishery. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious set of indications that are illustrated in Table 12.2 concern the artisanal sector. 
The sector displays significant efficiency in the generation of employment; catch for local consumption, 
as well as in the geographical distribution of landings. In terms of the balance of payment potential, 
investment of profits abroad, production of by catch, and wastefulness of fishing methods, the sector can 
be perceived as not problematic from a sustainable development point of view. The sector however 
performs poorly in terms of the generation of financial resources for government, and value added per ton 
of catch. However, this latter factor can be explained by the fact that the sector catches a large quantity of 
low value species which perform very important functions in terms of food security. 
These results must however be viewed with respect to one of the important limitations of the SDD Tables, 
 241 
 
which do not incorporate information on the geographical origin of catches. This means that we cannot be 
sure to what extent catches made in other areas of the West African seaboard produce direct and indirect 
welfare benefits for the Senegalese population. The results for the artisanal sector particularly must 
therefore be viewed with respect to the vast regional mobility of artisanal fishing units and therefore the 
likelihood that many of the benefits from artisanal catches are benefits resulting from catches made in the 
waters of neighboring states. Two recommendations can be made with reference to this point. First, it 
should be taken into consideration during governance processes that the significant welfare gains 
provided by the sector are not gained through the exploitation of fish stocks found exclusively inside 
Senegal's EEZ. Second, that governance decisions regarding the artisanal sector must be made with a 
view to the potential political conflicts that the size and mobility of the Senegalese artisanal fleet pose at a 
regional level. 
 
The most notable results concerning the industrial sectors concern the poor performance of the local 
industrial sector in terms of the production of benefits when compared with the EU industrial sector. The 
sector accounts for more than three times the EU catch of demersal species, a little more than half the EU 
catch for pelagic species, and a small amount of catch of small pelagic species not targeted by EU fleets. 
The sector also creates more jobs than the EU sector, though when compared in real numbers with those 
created by the artisanal sector the jobs created by the sector are relatively marginal. Further, the sector 
imposes significant costs upon the public budget through fuel subsidies.  
 
Thus, the sector does not make any contributions to the fishery that cannot be made by either the EU 
industrial sector or the artisanal sector, nor does it make any of these contributions more efficiently than 
any other sector. This point is worrying from the point of view of partnership agreements between EU-
ACP fishing enterprises which appear to be both popular and increasing in number. Thus one of the 
important recommendations that can be made in this chapter is that joint venture agreements between 
local and foreign fishing enterprises must be viewed cautiously by governance authorities.  
 
The efficiency with which the artisanal sector translates catch into support for human and business capital 
makes the sector important from a sustainable development point of view. However the poor contribution 
that the sector makes to public institutional capital leaves a gap in the sustainable development status of 
the fishery. This gap can however be filled by the EU industrial sector which translates catch into public 
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institutional capital with great efficiency. Investments in public institutional capital coming from the EU 
industrial sector activities are made through direct payments to the public budget as well as through 
support to fisheries’ management infrastructure.  
 
In the light of the current perceived need to regulate artisanal sector effort, the public institutional capital 
contribution of EU activities is probably non negligible from a sustainable development point of view. 
Simultaneously the importance of the artisanal sector in terms of human and business capital indicates 
that in terms of the SDD approach the most desirable fisheries’ regime for Senegal would be one in which 
the artisanal sector retains its important status, while being regulated using financial as well as technical 
and other expertise contributed by access agreements with the EU. In support of the central hypothesis of 
the thesis these recommendations clearly indicate that if managed effectively, heterogeneity of user 
groups can be used to greater advantage for the sustainable development of the fishery than is currently 
the case. 
 
The extent to which this will be achieved, or can be achieved, from a political point of view remains a 
pressing question that will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to describe some of the different consequences that the fisheries’ activities of 
three user groups in terms of their impacts upon different capital types that are seen as important for the 
realization of sustainable development. As such the chapter has aimed to identify and measure the 
information pertaining to the sustainable development of the fishery that is already contained within the 
fishery itself. 
 
The intention of this chapter has not been to provide direct policy advice for Senegalese governance 
authorities. Doing this would imply the pretence of being able to understand as well or better than the 
Senegalese governance authorities themselves, the broader socio economic, political, geo political, 
developmental, and bureaucratic along with many other considerations that make up the Senegalese 
fishery governance landscape. This is certainly not the case. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to 
provide information that can potentially be useful for fisheries’ management decisions, and as such is 
important to outline some of the methodological limitations of the approach, as well as some general 
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interpretation of results within the broader political economy environment. 
 
This will be done in the following and final chapter. 
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Chapter Thirteen.   Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
La prise en compte d'un univers complexe, dans lequel plusieurs formes de coordination et donc 
d'équilibres sont possible, invite à ré-élaborer la notion de la rationalité réclamée par le jeu 
flexible que permet cette pluralité.628  
 
“Understanding a complex universe in which numerous forms of coordination, and thus 
equilibrium, are possible, requires the re-definition of the notion of rationality that is instigated by 
the flexibility that permits this plurality.” 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has aimed to engage with complex and interdependent issues pertaining to the governance of 
fishery resources that are frequented by a heterogeneous set of user groups. An important element of 
understanding the governance of these resources has been to understand the rationality that reinforces and 
underpins these governance processes. Simultaneously the complexity of the interdependence between a 
spread of ecological, economic, and social forces that are affected by, impact upon, and thus are integral 
to, these governance processes has been seen as an obstacle to informing the rationality of governance 
processes in accordance with the implications that these processes may have for the sustainable 
development of the fishery.  
 
The central aims of the project have therefore been centred on providing the means to informing the 
rationality of the actors and processes, which determine the nature of governance processes, in 
accordance with the broader and more over arching ethic of sustainable development.        
 
This fourteenth and final chapter has six main parts. The first part provides some reflections on the results 
of chapter twelve and places these results within a broader political economy context. The particular issue 
of the non renewal of the 2002-2006 fisheries’ agreement with the EU is discussed, and comments are 
made. The second part of the chapter discusses the extent to which the central hypothesis of the thesis can 
be found to have been validated by the study. The third part discusses the extent to which the core aims of 
the research project have been achieved in a more general way. This part revisits the core objectives that 
were outlined in the beginning of the thesis and discusses the extent to which these aims have been 
realized. The fourth part of the chapter identifies certain limits to the methodology and results of the study 
which should be considered when interpreting the research findings. In turn the fifth part of the chapter 
makes recommendations based upon the findings and limits of the study, while the sixth part discusses the 
                                                 
628Thevenot, A. 1989. Equilibre et Rationalité dans un Univers Complexe. Revue Economique. no. 2. pp 147-197. 
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originality and theoretical and practical importance of the contribution that is made. 
 
Reflections on Results of the Study and the Future of the Senegalese Fishery 
The theoretical review offered in this thesis served several important functions, fitting with two broad 
purposes. The first broad purpose was to provide a conceptual foundation for the development of the 
approach that has been taken to the research problem. Above and beyond this, the theoretical review also 
provided the means to justifying the theoretical credibility of the chosen approach, as well as justifying 
why this approach was chosen instead of other existing alternatives. The most notable example of this is 
the critique that has been made of attempts to measure or evaluate the sustainable development status of 
systems involving an interface between economic, ecological, and social systems, using a common 
monetary measure. A discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the substitutability between capital types 
was used to support the theoretical credibility of descriptive, and multi indicator, methods for evaluating 
the sustainable development status of fisheries systems. It was subsequently agued on the basis of the idea 
that we currently cannot clearly explain the interactions between these diverse systems, and thus the 
sustainable development implications of the relationships (and changes in the relationships) between 
them, that the descriptive SDD method incorporating multiple indicators should be used instead of a 
system employing a single monetary measure that might over generalize the relationships between 
heterogeneous factors.    
 
A second important function of the theoretical review was to provide theoretical context that could be 
used to explain events in fisheries management discourse. An example of such an event is non-renewal of 
the 2002-2006 EU-Senegal fisheries agreement. 
 
Chapter three's discussion of Principal Agent theory provided some theoretical basis for understanding 
why until 2006 Senegal appeared to be at a disadvantage regarding the negotiation of fisheries’ 
agreements with the EU. The unevenness of these negotiations was seen as an impediment to reaching 
agreements that sufficiently met the needs of both parties, where Senegal's needs were described in terms 
of ensuring the sustainability of the fishery, and the EU's needs were described as ensuring the export of 
excess fishing capacity and a steady supply of high grade fish products to the European market. Nicole 
Saam's notion of Identification Systems was discussed as a potential basis for seeking more even relations 
between Senegal and the EU, by making linkages between the interests of both parties. The provision of 
an argument that is capable of making linkages between actors’ micro and macro rational interests, and 
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thus explaining the benefits of a sustainable development view of the fishery, was subsequently seen as a 
means to achieving these linkages. 
 
Since 2006, however, Senegalese authorities have abandoned the renewal of the fishing protocols that 
previously existed with the EU. Although little available information is known of the reasons for this, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the EU was offering too little financial compensation for the Senegalese 
to be sufficiently interested in the deal. Simultaneously, heavy pressure on the Senegalese fishery 
resources, and a general perception of there being a need to reduce fishing effort converged to make a 
relatively strong argument for abandoning access agreements with the EU as a means to reducing fishing 
effort.   
 
In retrospect of the implementation of the SDD approach, EU fishing activity seems to place relatively 
little ecological pressure on the resources compared with other groups, while providing significant public 
budget, monitoring and control, research, infrastructural and other benefits that are not made by other 
groups. As a result of the provision of financial and other resources that are seen to be necessary for the 
sustainable development of the fishery, the sector can in fact be seen as playing a non-negligible role in 
the sustainable development of the fishery.    
 
Conversely, from an international trade perspective it is argued at WTO (World Trade Organisation) 
levels that EU fishing activities in ACP waters are bad because they restrict access to the EU market for 
ACP states such as Senegal.629 Naturally this is seen to go against the H-O theory of international trade 
that was discussed in chapter three. Thus on free trade grounds the Senegalese may have won a victory 
for the principles of free trade by not renewing the fisheries’ agreement, though the action probably 
remains little more than a victory of principle.  
 
This is because 2003 figures suggest that in reality the artisanal and local industrial sectors combined 
exported almost thirteen times more fish products than the EU sector caught.630 At the same time the 
artisanal sector created roughly nine times less value added per ton of catch than the EU sector, while the 
local industrial sector created roughly three times less value added per ton of catch than the EU sector.631 
                                                 
629 World Trade Organization [No Date] Uruguay Round Agreement, Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling 
Measures . www.wto.org. Article V, ASCM. 
630See Table 13.1. 
631See Table 13.2. 
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This can, however, be explained by the fact that artisanal sector catch composition is skewed toward low 
(monetary) value species that play a very important role in food security and thus have significant value 
from other points of view, notably the support of human capital. Simultaneously both sectors made 
negative contributions to the public budget through the absorption of subsidies, and as such the sectors 
can be seen as absorbing rather than supporting public institutional capital.632 Further the lack of hygienic 
cold storage facilities in the artisanal sector, coupled with the relatively poor state of the local industrial 
fleet means that increasing export capacity for these sectors is likely to be a costly and lengthy process. 
The apparent costliness of the subsidies provided to the industrial and artisanal sector also raise important 
questions about how profitable exports from these sectors really are from a macro economic point of 
view. However, the most critical question concerns whether exports from these sectors can be more 
profitable than simply selling fishery access to the EU. 2003 figures indicate that the answer to this 
question is probably no.   
 
From an economic point of view, the reasons why the Senegalese have decided against fisheries’ 
negotiations with the EU therefore remain to be clarified. The answer to the same question from a 
sustainable development point of view remains equally vague in retrospect of the insights offered by 
chapter twelve of this thesis. 
 
One possibility is that from a political point of view it may have seemed unwise to sell fishing rights to 
the former colonial powers at a time when the electorate, and several strong lobby groups, were acutely 
aware of an overcapacity problem in the country's fisheries, and more importantly the employment and 
food security implications that this problem carried with it. We need also to remember that 2007 was an 
election year. 
 
In a personal communication, Council to the Senegalese Ministère de l'Économie Maritime, pointed out 
that the Senegalese administration is sensitive to negative publicity.633 Thus given the country's relatively 
free and active media, it is not unlikely that the administration may have wanted to avoid public criticism 
from fish workers’ unions for signing a fishing agreement with the EU at a time when local industries are 
facing serious overcapacity problems. One director of the DOPM and former technical council to the 
Senegalese Ministère des Pêches,  also suggests that Senegal is no longer as financially dependent on EU 
fisheries’ agreements as it once was, and this has made non renewal of the 2002-2006 protocol easier 
                                                 
632See Tables 13.1 & 13.2. 
633Author’s interview: Ministère de l'Économie Maritime. 2007. Dakar, July. 
 248 
 
from a public budget point of view.634  
 
It is understandable how an electorate may not see the logic in selling access to an already heavily 
exploited resource when local industries linked to that resource are facing severe challenges. Thus from a 
democratic governance point of view, the rationale for not renewing the 2002-2006 agreement with the 
EU is clear. Let us not forget that European administrations are frequently criticised for supporting 
industries on the basis of similar electorate based rationale despite the sometimes clear economic 
irrationality of offering this support. The fishing industry is a case in point.  
 
The cleavage between political rationality motivated by the private interests, or micro rationality of the 
electorate, and the macro rationality in managing the Senegalese fishery in accordance with the principles 
of sustainable development must be reconciled if the sustainable development of the fishery is to be 
realised. 
 
Perhaps ironically, Nicole Saam's identification systems need their place not only in Senegal-EU fishery 
relations, but between the Senegalese government and their electorate as well.  To that end the 
government could put the country's active press and interested readership to good use as a means of 
communicating the sense in fisheries’ management strategies that accord with the sustainable 
development of the fishery. In a 2006 article, Uzodike and I suggest that a strong linkage between state 
and civil society, facilitated by the media, can be seen as one of the important advantages of having well 
developed media and civil society checks on governance activities from a sustainable development point 
of view.635 Research that develops the applicability of this idea to the Senegalese fisheries’ context may 
indeed be a useful contribution toward the sustainable development of the fishery. However, since such a 
project transcends the scope of this thesis, the idea will not be developed any further here, and will have 
to form the basis for a recommendation for further research.     
 
This thesis has provided a fair amount of insight and information that could be put to use as a means to 
bridging the divides between sustainable development and more complex political processes at 
international as well as local levels. The extent to which these insights and this information, as well as 
similar offerings from other researchers, are put to good use can play a determining role in the future of 
                                                 
634Author’s Interview. 2007. Former Director of the DOPM and Former Technical Council to the Senegalese Ministère des 
Pêches. Dakar, July. 
635 Stilwell, J. & Uzodike, N. 2006. Op cit. p 38.  
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the Senegalese marine fishery. It thus is on this basis that recommendations for action and further 
research will be made.    
 
First it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which this thesis has achieved its core objectives. 
 
Achievement of Core Aims for the Study 
The following two core aims or this research project were outlined in the beginning of the thesis: 
 
! To develop a theoretically credible and practically feasible means to understanding both the 
economic and non economic implications that the fisheries’ activities of different user groups 
have for the longer term well being of the Senegalese marine fishery. 
! To implement this method to the case of the Senegalese fishery as a means to providing policy    
orientation for Senegalese fisheries’ governance structures that address the longer term 
developmental consequences of different fisheries’ activities.  
 
Both of these two objectives have been addressed. First, an extensive discussion of, and engagement with, 
relevant theory has permitted the development of a basic approach to understanding both the economic 
and non economic implications that the fisheries’ activities of three different user groups operating in 
Senegalese marine fishery. These theoretical reflections regarding the development of the approach were 
simultaneously reinforced by an engagement with theory concerning the practical usefulness of such an 
approach for the governance of a fishery comprising diverse user groups. 
 
Second, the approach has been successfully applied to the case of the Senegalese fishery, and indications 
regarding the sustainable development consequences of the activities of three user groups were outlined 
and discussed. This has further contributed to testing and verifying the practical feasibility of the 
approach. An example of this is the information that has been provided concerning the relatively poor 
performance of the Senegalese industrial fishing fleet regarding the production of sustainable 
development benefits. Although other approaches may be capable of providing similar insights regarding 
the sustainable development implications different fleets, the particular information provided by the SDD 
approach can be seen as a useful elaboration for providing more precision regarding particular areas of 
strength and weakness of different sectors from a sustainable development point of view.  
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However, the extent to which the approach is found to be credible is also determined to some extent by 
the extent to which the central hypothesis of the thesis has been validated in the study.  
 
The Central Hypothesis of the Thesis: Valid or Invalid? 
The following central hypothesis for this thesis was given in chapter one: 
 
The non comprehension of the economic and non economic implications of different fisheries’ 
activities can be seen as an impediment to identifying the hallmarks of sustainable fisheries’ 
regimes characterized by heterogeneous user groups. Understanding the economic and non 
economic implications of these different activities can therefore help governance authorities to 
identify fisheries’ policy strategies that are able to capitalise on the sustainable development 
advantages that might be associated with the heterogeneity of different user groups.  
 
The subsequent development and implementation of an approach to evaluating the economic and non 
economic consequences of the activities of heterogeneous user groups resulted, in chapter twelve, in the 
identification of a general fisheries’ regime that can take advantage of the sustainable development 
benefits associated with the heterogeneity of two of the present user groups. The presentation of these 
insights as well as the other information that go along with them can clearly help governance authorities 
identify decisions that could assist in the realization of the sustainable development of the fishery.  
 
On these grounds, it can be argued that the central hypothesis for the thesis is valid. However, the results 
of the study remain subject to some important limitations which must be outlined in order to understand 
the results presented with respect to their potential weaknesses.  
 
Limits for the Study 
Four main limits to this study have been identified. 
 
The first methodological constraint for the study that must be noted is the absence of up to date and 
highly reliable data. Although the SDD approach incorporates uncertainty through aiming to identify 
general trends rather than pinpoint information, a lack of up to date and reliable data still remains a 
constraint upon the accuracy of the information and impressions that have been given in this chapter. That 
being said the approach remains a credible means of providing information that can help push governance 
processes in the general direction of sustainable development until such time as the sustainable 
development process renders more, and better quality, information available.    
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The second limitation to this study concerns that fact that the results of the SDD approach advocated by, 
and employed in it, are static in that they cannot predict how the impacts of different user groups may 
change and evolve as other fishery conditions change over time. This means that the approach will need 
to be reimplemented. A positive relationship between the frequency of the implementation of the 
approach and the accuracy of the inter temporal fisheries’ information that is produced (ceteris paribus) 
may be seen as impetus to implementing the approach at regular intervals which would be demanding of 
time as well as financial and human resources. However, this limitation of the approach, is 
simultaneously a limitation and a strength because adopting a descriptive approach that requires 
refreshing also avoids the massive problems with theoretically flawed and thus practically unreliable 
predictive approaches. The need to refresh the approach also corresponds to the Directrice of the DOPM, 
Mme Diop's view that managing the Senegalese fishery is a constant process that requires new 
information that keeps pace with the dynamism of the fishery.636  These constraints must therefore be 
contextualised within the global philosophy of the approach which suggests that it is acceptable to do the 
best that can be done with available resources until more and better quality resources become available.  
 
A third and extremely important limit to this study has been in that it has not explored the implications of 
the activities of non EU industrial fishing nations. While the study has shown that official statistics 
suggest that the catches made by non-EU foreign fleets are negligible, the consequences of these 
unofficial activities can be seen to pose a serious potential threat to the governance of the fishery along 
sustainable development lines. As it has been stated in chapter one it is due to the fact that the activities of 
these fishing fleets are not transparent and therefore it has not been possible to investigate them in this 
study. 
 
The fourth and final limit for the study that will be identified here concerns the impact of financial and 
thus time constraints. Due to these factors it has not been possible to spend as much time in the field as 
may otherwise have been desired. Despite this, every effort has been made to deepen the quality of the 
case study through paper sources, as well as through discussions and peer review.   
 
Based on these limitations to the study a number of recommendations both for action and for further 
research can be made.   
 
                                                 
636Author’s Interview. DOPM. 2007. Loc cit. 
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Recommendations 
In retrospect of this study a few important recommendations for action and further research can be made. 
Four recommendations will be made. The first is considered a key recommendation for the advancement 
of the observations made in this thesis, while the subsequent three are considered important 
recommendations that can enhance the overall feasibility of governing the Senegalese marine fishery in 
greater accordance with the principles of sustainable development. 
 
The first recommendation is one for further research. This study has highlighted some of the political 
economy dynamics that can be seen to impact upon national fisheries’ policies in Senegal. The thesis has 
provided the basis for illustrating certain of the sustainable development pros and cons associated with the 
activities of different fisheries’ groups, but this information remains largely geared toward governance 
authorities. We have seen however that these authorities are driven to a large extent by the preferences of 
Senegalese civil society. One of the points that have been made, but not developed, in this thesis is the 
idea that from a political point of view it may be advantageous for Senegalese fisheries’ governance 
authorities to communicate the sustainable development rationale behind their fisheries’ plans to 
Senegalese civil society. In fact this would seem to be a pre requisite for ensuring the harmonisation of 
fisheries’ policies that aim to manage the activities of heterogeneous user groups in accordance with the 
sustainable development of the fishery.  
 
On these grounds a recommendation for further research in the domain of political studies, or sociology, 
on the feasibility of establishing stronger identification systems between governance authorities and civil 
society can be made. 
 
In addition to these key recommendations, two additional recommendations for action and two additional 
recommendations for further research can be made.  
 
The second recommendation is one for action concerning the urgent need for greater transparency 
regarding the activities of non EU industrial fishing fleets operating in Senegalese waters. This lack of 
transparency hinders the management of the fishery, and action should be taken by all interested parties, 
including Senegalese governance authorities, EU stake holders, workers groups, and NGOs to promote 
greater transparency. 
 
 253 
 
The third recommendation, also for action, is based on the observations made in chapter twelve regarding 
the poor performance of the local industrial sector in terms the production of sustainable development 
benefits when compared with those made by the artisanal and EU industrial sector. Based on this insight 
and on the basis of the precautionary principle, it is recommended that private partnership or joint venture 
agreements between Senegalese and non Senegalese nationals should not be granted until evidence 
regarding the sustainable development benefits of these ventures is available.     
 
The fourth and final recommendation concerns refreshing the SDD approach that has been implemented 
here so as to include the information that may be provided by the further research that has been 
recommended, as well as other subsequent research concerning the fishery that may be useful for a 
refined implementation of the SDD approach. The credibility and reliability of the SDD approach will be 
significantly enhanced with the inclusion of such information, and it is on the grounds of these kinds of 
refinements that the approach can be viewed to hold its greatest potential as a fisheries’ management tool 
over time. 
 
The Originality, Theoretical and Practical Importance of the Contribution made by the 
Dissertation  
The originality of this thesis lies both in the subject matter and methodological approach, as well as in the 
fact that this thesis has made a topic that is more frequently addressed in French audiences accessible to 
English only audiences. 
 
At a theoretical level the thesis has contributed to the existing body of knowledge by conceptualising and 
re orientating questions of governance and sustainable development within existing economic, political, 
and political economy theories. Of particular interests is the conceptualisation of sustainable development 
questions in terms of the cleavage that appears in both economic and political discourse between micro 
and macro rationality, and thus has important implications for governance processes, especially those 
concerning political economy aspects to governance questions. 
   
The thesis has also reinforced the theoretical credibility descriptive, rather than predictive, approaches to 
questions surrounding the pursuit of, and measurement of, progress toward sustainable development.   
 
At a more practical level, the thesis can be seen to have made three main contributions. The first 
contribution concerns the development of a relatively user friendly descriptive means to understanding 
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the sustainable development considerations pertaining to different fisheries’ activities, that can be useful 
in data poor environments. The second practical contribution concerns the provision of a refreshed and 
relatively impartial view regarding the state and governance of the Senegalese marine fishery. The third 
and final practical contribution of the study pertains to the implementation of the SDD approach and the 
recommendations that have been made, as well as the information that this has provided in a coherent and 
fairly accessible format.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This study has aimed to contribute to the management of the Senegalese marine fishery in accordance 
with the principles of sustainable development. The preoccupation of this thesis with the rationality of 
decision makers and those who inform their decisions has been informed by the belief that better 
information systems can in fact lead to more encompassing rationality for both actors and decision 
makers. Where the benefits of this approach can be seen to catalyse a transcendence of diffused policies 
resulting from attempts by different actors to maximise their private welfare ahead of the welfare of 
society, thus finding their location in a status quo where different actors work together for a united goal. 
Within the context of H-O theory of international trade, it seems almost obvious that in the long run 
economic synergies can be realized between sometimes competing entities on the basis of comparative 
advantages. The adoption of a sustainable development view can be seen to further unite conflicting 
actors through the identification of a common ethic or set of goals based on the pursuit of economic as 
well as non economic synergies in the way economic activities and relationships are managed. From this 
point of view this thesis has to some extent provided some information that may contribute to the 
realization of a more encompassing and synergistic fisheries’ management ethic.  
 
However, what the thesis has not, and cannot, do is transform an irresponsible fisheries’ manager into a 
responsible one. This requires something more than the provision of simple sets of information. 
 
If it were possible to model sustainable development in a concrete and quantitative way, the task would 
be easier. Under these circumstances it would be possible to illustrate the clear long term rationality in 
adopting a sustainable development approach to economic projects, or governance dilemmas. From this 
base, the accountability of governance authorities regarding the extent to which their actions accord with 
the realization of sustainable development would be clearer. Since we currently do not even have a very 
clear idea of how sustainable development would be, and thus should be realized, it quite simply is not 
possible to do this. It has been argued throughout this thesis that the next best thing to a more predictive 
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approach is to evaluate the sustainable development impacts of given activities post hoc. This provides 
the means to making management decisions in accordance with what we perceive at a given time to be 
the criteria for sustainable development, which in turn creates a space for the evolution of a concept. 
Since the route to sustainable development is not clearly defined, it becomes necessary to validate the 
trajectory at each juncture, and have faith that the process will lead us to where we want to go.         
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Annexure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents: 
! Survey questions and results & notes of formal discussions and interviews. 
! Tables not appearing in the main text. 
! Data used to generate Figure 10.3. 
! Value Added Calculations for 2003 Figures 
! Calculations for ratios appearing in Table 13.2.  
! Fish names index. 
 
Note:  
! Notes informal discussions have not been included. 
! Original responses to questionnaire on perceptions regarding the negotiation of fisheries 
agreements between Senegal and the EU have not been provided in accordance with 
stated commitment to protect the identity of respondents.  
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Survey Questions and Results & Notes of Formal Discussions and Interviews 
 
November 2005, Dakar, Senegal. 
 
Questionnaire administered to fishermen in Dakar, Senegal.  
At two sites: Hann Pêcheur and Yoff. 
 
Questions: 
! How long have you been a fisherman? 
! What was your previous occupation? 
! Why did you choose to become a fisherman? 
! Have catches increased or decreased in the last 10 years? 
! How much money do you make per outing? 
! How many outings do you make per month? 
! Are you in competition with foreign fishers for fish? 
! Is the number of artisanal fishermen on the increase? 
! Would you like to change professions? 
! Are your fish sold to the local or the foreign market? 
! Which market is more lucrative? 
! How much do you sell your catch for? 
! How much does it cost you to fish per day? 
 
 
Notes: 
 Industrial boats often guide artisanal fishermen. 
 Many fishers have degrees but fish because they can’t find work. 
 Fishing further away costs more but is more profitable. 
 
 
 November 2005 Fish Prices at Hann Fish Market, Dakar. (Francs CFA/Kg) 
 
Thiof GPM – 7000 CFA/kg. 
MénouTamne GPM – 6000 CFA/kg 
Ménou Noire – 4000 CFA/kg. 
Dorate – 2500 CFA/kg. 
Badige Moine 2200 CFA/kg. 
San Blane Ioié Maman 2500 CFA/kg. 
Malbré 2700 CFA/kg. 
Rascace 6500 – 7000 CFA/kg. 
Barakuta – 2000 CFA/kg. 
Pampanon – 1800 CFA/kg. 
Pulppul (Octopus)      – 2kg – 2900 CFA/kg. 
! 3 kg – 3000 CFA/kg. 
! 700g – 1200 CFA/kg. 
! + 1 kg – 2800 CFA/kg.  
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Interview with Boubacar Ba. Le directeur de la Cellule de l'Étude et de la Planification. (Ancienne 
observatiore économique de la pêche) (Nov 14) 
 
November 2006, Dakar, Senegal. 
 
 
1. Are artisanal fishers in competition with industrial and foreign industrial fleets?  
Yes, where they compete for similar species. 
2.Which species, if any, that are caught by foreign fleets are debarked in Senegal? 
Tuna. 
3.How are access agreements with Europe calculated? 
Per tonne. GT. 
4.Are there agreements with other foreign nations? 
No. Only EC fleets. 
5. Which sector is the most important for the countries economy? 
Artisanal sector. 
6. If you could ask a researcher to provide any information what would it be? 
Stats concerning TAC of species. 
7.How is rent from access fees distributed? 
Between research, infrastructure and surveillance as well as amounts going to the minister of finance for 
the national treasury. 
8 Do European fleets take more than they pay for? 
No, they take less than they pay for. 
9.How are amounts for access fees calculated? 
A figure is negotiated around what catch level can be taken as surplus. 
10How many delegates negotiate these deals? 
Normally four or five of each. Sometimes more, depending on where it is as travel is costly. 
 
 
Discussion with Abdoulaye Samba and Alassane Seck (Animateur chargé du Volet Environnement) 
of 'la Federation Nationale des Gis de Pêcheurs du Senegal' (FENAGIE). (Nov 15) 
 
Notes: Points to consider. 
1. Artisanal fishers sometimes fish for the same resources as the industrial fleets and are 
therefore in strong competition with them. 
2. There has been a marked increase in the number of fishermen in the artisanal sector, largely 
due to the droughts that have plagued the interior of the country and the fact that there is little 
work to be found elsewhere. And because the government financially assists certain fishing 
projects. 
3. The artisanal sector is the most important sector to the economy of the country because it 
provides people with an economic activity as well as food. However this sector is informal 
and is not well regulated by government. 
4. In terms of formal fishing sectors, it is the more regulated industrial sector that is very 
important.  
5. There are not enough surplus fish from the Demersal fishery to warrant increased export of 
these species as fresh fish. 
6. Rents earned by government for the fishing deals with foreign countries are not well 
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distributed. The last time that FENAGIE received any money from such agreements was in 
1996. 
7. There are sufficient numbers of little pelagic fish to be exported but in that case the Dutch 
fleet fishes for those species and sells them to the European market. In Holland pelagic fish is 
a popular food.  
8. It is a series of political problems that prevents an increase in local debarkations of fish caught 
by foreigners. 
9. FENAGIE does take part in rounds of negotiations concerning access agreements. 
10.There exist certain other access arrangements with other countries, such as Korea and 
Japan, the nature   of which is discreet. There is no information on the quantities caught, the 
amounts paid, species targeted, the level of effort. 
11.Such agreements are dangerous and it the result of the government doing badly by its 
citizens. 
12.There also exist a number of bilateral agreements between CSRP states.  
 
Notes: Main points to consider here are:  
1. The sardines for which there is a foreign market are taken by Dutch trawlers.  
2. There exist agreements with other countries the natures of which are secret. 
3. There are bilateral agreements between CSRP countries.  
4. An increase in the numbers of artisanal fishermen is the result of underdevelopment, drought, 
and associated job shortages and government funded fishing projects.  
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Questionnaire Administered to Artisanal Fishers, Fish Sellers, and Industrial Fishermen Operating 
in and out of Dakar  
 
         November 2006, Dakar, Senegal 
 
Questions: Artisanal fishers and fish sellers.  
1. Profession. 
2. How many are you in your household? 
3. Are there people in your household who go to school? 
4. How much do you spend on their education? 
5. Is fishing/fish selling your only source of revenue? 
6. In no, what is your secondary activity and how much do you earn from it? 
7. During the last three months, how much have you spent on health care for your family? 
8. How much do you spend on spend on petrol, salaries and fishing gear per outing? 
9. Do your earnings allow you and your family to eat well enough? 
10.  If you had a larger budget, how would your spend the extra money? 
11.  Do you manage to save any money? 
12. How much do you earn each month? 
 
 
Questions for industrial fishers. 
1. How many are you in your household? 
2. Are there people in your household who go to school? 
3. How much do you spend on their education? 
4. Is fishing/fish selling your only source of revenue? 
5. In no, what is your secondary activity and how much do you earn from it? 
6. During the last three months, how much have you spent on health care for your family? 
7. Do your earnings allow you and your family to eat well enough? 
8. How much do you spend on spend on petrol, salaries and fishing gear per outing? 
9. How much do you spend on government Taxes. 
10.  If you had a larger budget, how would your spend the extra money? 
11.  Do you manage to save any money? 
12. How much do you earn each month? 
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Taxes for Artisanal Fisheries’ Sector etc. (November 2006)  
Fishers: 
Category A Fishing licence (fishing from shore) : 5000 per year 
Category B (boat smaller than 13 meters) : 15 000 per year. 
Category C (boat larger than 13 meters) : 25 000 per year.  
  
Fish sellers: 
Certificate de controle de l'origine et de la salubrité : 500 per day 
Taxe de stationnement pour les vehicles :1000 per day 
Taxe de marche for sale in the market 29 00 per day. 
Taxe de quay (duty) 500 per day. 
 
Notes: 
Aide aux pêcheurs. 
Fuel is subsidised. 
Fishing gear is exempted from taxes. 
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  Survey of Senegalese Fish Workers Associations 
 
July 2007, Dakar, Senegal 
         
ORGANISATIONS ET ASSOCIATIONS DE PECHEURS AU SENEGAL 
 
FENATRAMS 
 
Responsable: Mbathio niang, présidente. 
  Kine diop 
  Diaba diop 
  Mamboup war 
 
Objectif :  
Solidarité, Financement, prise de décision, recherche de marché, emballage. 
 
Date de création : 
 13 juillet 2001 à mbour sous la présidence du ministre des pêches Cheikh sadibou fall. 
 
Nombre de membres :  
10.000 femmes. 400 GIE (groupements d’intérêt économique). 
 
Réalisations : 
 Du 3 au 17 novembre nous avons participé à une caravane d’hygiène et de qualité, pour vulgariser nos 
produits. Nous faisons souvent des caravanes vers les pays de la sous région à la recherche de partenaires. 
Nous avons créé une mutuelle d’épargne et de crédit MEC FENATRAMS . 
Nous organisons des formations leadership et des formation GERM pour mieux gérer une entreprise. 
Nous sommes considérées  pour une PME (petite et moyenne entreprise). 
 
Partenaires : 
Nos partenaires sont : 
Le ministère de l’économie maritime( DOPM) 
- appui matériel et formation 
Le PAOA : le projet d’appui aux organisations de l’artisanat. 
- don d’ordinateurs, de blouses, de gants, de brouettes et de pelles. 
Le PAPES : Le projet d’appui aux petites entreprises qui dépend du ministère de l’artisanat. 
Le CONIPAS: le conseil interprofessionnel de la pêche au sénégal.  
Les ONG : Organisation non gouvernementale 
- appui matériel et formation 
Le ministère de la femme 
- appui financier 
Avant nous faisions partie d’organisations mixte. On s’est rendu compte qu’on n’était pas associés aux 
prises de décisions . C’est pourquoi nous avons créé notre propre organisation qui est composé 
uniquement de femmes. 
La majorité de nos membres sont analphabètes donc il est nécessaire de les  former pour qu’elles puissent 
gérer leur entreprise. 
Chaque zone est autonome. Ainsi un bailleur de fond ou une ONG qui se trouve à Mbour peut travailler 
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avec les GIE de Mbour uniquement. 
Pour ce qui est de notre mutuelle, elle été mise sur place sur fond propre et sur financement du ministère 
de la femme. Pour avoir accès aux prêt, l’apport est de 20 pour cent. 
Nous privilégions les prêts des groupements sur les prêts individuels. 
Notre problème majeur c’est l’accès aux finances, l’écoulement des produits, l’emballage et des moyens 
de transport nous permettant d’accéder au produit. 
 
CNPS 
 
Responsable: Doa gaye : Président 
Assane diop 
 
Objectif :  
Défense des droits des pêcheurs 
Meilleurs conditions de vie 
 Sécurité en mer 
 
Date de création : 
Le CNPS a été créé en1987 à hann. 
 De  1966 à 1978, les pêcheurs du sénégal étaient organisés en coopérative. 
Après la dissolution des coopératives par l’état ,il y avait les sections villageoises de 1979 à 1982. Puis 
sont venus les GIE(groupements d’intérêt économique). 
Il se trouve qu’il y a un de nos amis qui a fait ses études à Genève (Aliou sall) et qui travaille avec les 
ONG(Organisation non gouvernementale) qui œuvre avec les organisations de pêcheurs. Il nous suggéra 
de nous organiser en syndicat afin que nous puissions revendiquer nos droits. 
Lorsqu’il est arrivé en1983, il a fait le tour de tous les villages de pêcheurs pour discuter avec ces derniers 
de cette opportunité. C’est  finalement qu’il nous suggéra de créer le CNPS et nous promis de nous 
épauler pour asseoir cette organisation. 
En ce moment il y avait Mbaye diouf comme ministre de la pêche. Et le gouvernement de l’époque 
pensait que si cette organisation était mise sur pied elle serait difficile à canaliser. C’est pourquoi ils nous 
ont toujours refusé de nous délivrer un récépissé jusqu’en 1991.C’est en fin 1991 que nous avons eu notre 
récépissé et  ceci grâce à l’appui de la coopération française. 
En mission en France nous nous sommes rendus à Concarneau qui était jumelé à Mbour. 
Sombédioune lui était jumelé à la bretagne, Hann à Cherbourg, Saint-louis à la Boulogne Kayar à Lorient 
et Joal à Doidenet (France). 
Nos activités étaient relatées par les journaux Le Monde et le Marin qui paraissait à lorient. 
En 1991 le gouvernement a mis sur pied la FENAGIE pour contrecarrer notre mouvement. Mais nous 
avions refusés d’y adhérer. 
 
Nombre de membres :  
12000 membres de Saint-louis à Cap-skiring. 12 comités locaux. 
 
Réalisations : 
Réunions dans les villages de pêcheurs. 
En 1988 lors du conflit de Kayar nous nous sommes rendus sur place comme médiateur. Nous leur avons 
donne une contribution de 200.000 francs pour réparer les dégâts causés par ce conflit. 
En 1989 lors du problème de la mauritanie, nous nous sommes rendus à Saint-louis et avons donné 
150000 francs aux pêcheurs saint-lousiens. Par la même occasion nous avons obtenus de l’état le 
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dédommagement des pêcheurs qui avaient perdu leur matériel en mauritanie.  
Nous participons à la signature des accords de pêche. 
Avons décroché une subvention pour les pêcheurs dans les accords de pêche. 
 
 
FENAMS 
 
Responsable:  
Babacar n’diaye : Adjoint au président de la fédération 
  Assure actuellement la présidence car le président est décédé. 
 
Objectif :  
Commercialisation du poisson. 
 
Date de création : 
Le FENAMS a été créé en 1998 à Dakar. 
 
Réalisations : 
Création d’une société dénommée SONAMAR( société national de mareyage), en 2005. 
Cette société permet aux mareyeurs d’exporter directement leurs produits en europe et ailleurs sans passer 
par les usines. 
C’est une société créé sur fond propre (cotisation des mareyeurs) avec un capital de 10.000.000 de francs 
logés à la CNCA. 
Chaque région du pays a son président régional ; et ce sont eux qui se réunissent pour élire le président 
national. 
 
Partenaires : 
Il y a une ONG (Organisation non gouvernementale)qui se trouve en casamance , qui aide nos membres 
qui sont là-bas. 
Nous avons essayer de nouer plusieurs contact avec des bailleurs de fond sans résultat. 
Actuellement nous sommes en négociation avec la coopération française pour la construction d’une usine 
de congélation et d’une fabrique de glace. Le projet est déjà ficelé et on attend la réaction de nos 
partenaires. 
Le ministère de l’économie nous a offert 50 chaises d’une valeur de 10.000 francs chacune. 
Il nous avait promis un ordinateur mais nous ne l’avons pas encore reçu. 
La coopération française nous a aidé à réfectionner notre siège. 
 
CONIPAS 
 
 
Responsable:  
Takha samb 
Bakre fall 
 
Objectif :  
L’objectif principal du CONIPAS est : tous ceux qui intervient autour de la pêche puissent avoir un seul 
interlocuteur au niveau des centres de prise de décision ; c’est à dire du gouvernement. 
L’idée est venue de le FENAGIE-PECHE.  
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Toutes les organisation de pêche, de mareyage et de transformation, se sont réunies pour mettre sur pied 
le CONIPAS qui devrait être leur seul et unique interlocuteur auprès du gouvernement et des décideurs. 
Chaque organisation était représentée par dix membres. 
Lors de l’assemblée générale constitutive du CONIPAS il a été décidé ce qui suit : 
La présidence du CONIPAS est assurée par le CNPS (Dao gaye). 
La vice-présidence par la FENAMS (Gaoussou gueye). 
Le secrétariat général par  la FENAGIE-PECHE (Takha samb). 
La trésorerie par la FENATRAMS (Mbathio niang). 
Le chargé de la communication par l’UNAGIEM (Thioune mbaye khaly). 
 
Les autres représentants sont logés dans les commissions : 
- Commission chargée des finances. 
- Commission chargée des équipements. 
- Commission chargée des relations extérieures. 
- Commission chargée de la formation. 
- Commission chargée de l’organisation. 
- Commission chargée des relations avec le public. 
 
Date de création : 
Le CONIPAS a été créé en 2004 à Mbour. 
 
Réalisations : 
Nous avions envisagé de former des cellules régionales et départementales. 
Mais seules les cellules de Fatick et Casamance sont fonctionnelles. 
Nous avions effectué avec le ministère de la pêche une tournée de sensibilisation sur les permis de pêche, 
l’immatriculation des pirogues et le port du gilet de sauvetage. 
Nous devrions tenir une assemblée générale tous les deux ans, mais depuis sa création aune assemblée 
générale ne s’est tenue. 
 
Partenaires : 
     - L’ANCAR (agence nationale de conseil et d’assistance aux ruraux). 
D’ailleurs notre siège est à l’ancar qui est chargé de nous encadrer. 
! Le ministère de la pêche 
! Le CRAES (Conseil de la république pour les affaires économiques et sociales) 
! Le CONIPAS est représenté au CRAES par son président. 
 
 
UNAGIEM 
 
Responsable: Mame ousmane gueye, président. 
  Modou fall, Enquêté 
  Mamadou diop thiandioum 
  Pape faye 
 
Objectif:  
! Constituer un lieu de rencontre regroupant tous les mareyeurs opérant sur l’étendu du 
territoire. 
! Créer et maintenir entre eux des liens de fraternité et de solidarité. 
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! Mobiliser les énergies pour le développement de la filière mareyage – pêche au senegal. 
! Faciliter la formation, l’information des membres des GIE. 
! Œuvrer pour la promotion des femmes mareyeurs. 
! Participer à la protection de leur environnement. 
! Faciliter la création d’organismes pouvant apporter leurs appui et assistances aux mareyeurs 
(mutuelles de crédits, centres de gestion agréé, prévoyance maladie…) 
 
Date de création : 
L’UNAGIEM a été créé le 12 décembre 1998 à Dakar, par les fédérations départementales de Rufisque, 
Dakar, Pikine, Thies, Touba et Mbour. Chaque fédération est autonome. 
Avant il existait la FENAGIE- Mareyeurs de 1991 à 1998 ; c’est par la suite qu’elle s’est subdivisée en 
deux organisations : La FENAMS et L’UNAGIEM. 
Son siège social se trouve au marché central de pikine. 
 
Réalisations : 
! Création d’une mutuelle des mareyeurs. 
! Création d’une coopérative de consommation de cent personnes. 
! Création d’une coopérative d’habitat. 
! Création d’un syndicat pour la défense des intérêts des mareyeurs le SUDEMS (syndicat 
démocratique des mareyeurs) qui est affilié au CSA (confédération des syndicats autonomes). 
! Participe a des séminaires. 
! Organisation d’un séminaire international avec la CNTS confédération national des 
travailleurs du senegal. 
!  Participe a des caravanes pour  la vulgarisation de nos produits frais et transformés. 
 
Partenaires : 
! Chambre de commerce de Dakar, qui soutient les PME (petites et moyennes entreprises) et les 
appuis dans les voyages et relations internationales. 
! ONG AQUADEV (west africa  ong international) qui participe à la gérance de notre mutuelle. 
! Le ministère de la pêche. 
Depuis la création de la CONIPAS toutes les autres organisations régionales sont en 
léthargie ; car les responsables sont partis au sommet et délaissent le travail à la base. 
Seules  les organisations départementales continuent à faire leur travail du fait de leur 
autonomie. 
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Email Survey, April 2007. 
 
Questionnaire for Evaluating Perceptions Regarding the Negotiation Process for Fishery Access 
Agreements Signed Between Senegal and the European Union.  
 
Compiled by Jonathan Stilwell, April 2007. 
 
Please note:  
! You are welcome to respond to this questionnaire in French or English. 
! All parts of the questionnaire can be filled out directly on the questionnaire, which can be 
returned to me by email at: jpstilwell@yahoo.com. 
 
Section 1. 
 
1. Please rank the following fisheries management objectives in terms of the order of importance that you 
perceive Senegalese negotiators to have given them. (You can simply place a number next to each policy 
objective. eg: 1 = most important, 2 = second most important... etc)   
 
Ecological sustainability -  
Public budget receipts - 
Protection of livelihoods for national user groups - 
Realisation of EU aid connected with access agreements - 
 
2. If you would like to add other objectives, please do so and provide brief justification for their 
relevance. 
 
3. According to your view, how should these objectives ideally be heirarchisized Senegalese 
negotiators in accordance with sustainable development in the Senegalese fisheries sector? 
 
Ecological sustainability -  
Public budget receipts - 
Protection of livelihoods for national user groups - 
Realisation of EU aid connected with access agreements - 
 
 
4. What measures should be taken to realize the changes that you propose, if you do propose 
changes. 
 
Section 2. 
 
5. Please rank the following fisheries management objectives in terms of the order of importance 
that you perceive EU negotiators to have given them.   
 
Job protection - 
Export of excess fishing capacity - 
Ecological sustainability - 
Development cooperation with Senegal -  
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Protection of livelihoods of local user groups -  
 
2. If you would like to add other objectives, please do so and provide brief justification for their 
relevance. 
 
6. According to your view, how should these objectives ideally be heirarchisized by EU 
negotiators in accordance with sustainable development in the Senegalese fishery sector?  
 
Job protection - 
Export of excess fishing capacity - 
Ecological sustainability - 
Development cooperation with Senegal -  
Protection of livelihoods of local user groups -  
 
 
7. What measures should be taken to realize the changes that you propose, if you do propose 
changes. 
 
 
8. Briefly, please explain how you feel that the outcomes of the 2002-2006 agreement signed 
between Senegal and the EU reflect these priorities. 
 
Section 3. 
 
9.  Since I have found very little published regarding the nature of the negotiation  process 
between European and Senegalese negotiators, I would be very grateful for any anecdotal insights that 
you may be willing to share in the space below. Key points of interests are: The format of negotiations, 
who is present during negotiations, who is consulted during and prior to negotiations, and other insights 
you may choose to share.   
 
Many thanks for your cooperation. 
Best regards 
 
Jonathan Stilwell 
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Tables Not Appearing in the Main Text 
 
Tabulated Responses to the Questionnaire: Questionnaire for Evaluating Perceptions Regarding 
the Negotiation Process for Fishery Access Agreements Signed Between Senegal and the European 
Union.  
 
* Please not that minor inconsistencies are the result of one suggesting that they were not qualified to 
answer the questions concerning Senegalese authorities, and another respondent requesting to have the 
following fields added to their responses:  
! Harvest of off-shore stocks for a Senegalese objectives 
! Supply of fishery products to the EU market for a European objective. 
 
Responses to Questionnaire Questions about how Senegalese Authorities Prioritise Objectives for 
the Negotiation of Fisheries Agreements with the EU  
  
Rank 
Ecological  
Sustainability 
Public Budget
 Receipts 
Protection of Local
 Livelihoods 
EU Aid/Development 
Cooperation 
Harvest of
off-shore stocks 
1 0 4  
2 1 3  
3 2 1 1 1
4  3 
5 1  
 
 
Responses to Questionnaire Questions about how Senegalese Authorities Should Prioritise 
Objectives for the Negotiation of Fisheries Agreements with the EU  
 
Rank 
Ecological  
Sustainability 
Public Budget 
Receipts 
Protection of 
Local Livelihoods 
EU Aid/Development 
Cooperation 
Harvest of 
off-shore stocks 
1 4 
2  1 2 1
3  2 2
4  3 1
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Rank 
Ecological  
Sustainability 
Public Budget 
Receipts 
Protection of 
Local Livelihoods 
EU Aid/Development 
Cooperation 
Harvest of 
off-shore stocks 
5  1
 
 
Responses to Questionnaire Questions about how EC Fisheries Relations Authorities Prioritise 
Objectives for the Negotiation of Fisheries Agreements with Senegal  
 
 
Rank 
Protection of 
 EU Jobs 
Export Excess  
Fishing Capacity 
Ecological Sustain-
ability of the Resource 
EU Aid/Development 
Cooperation 
Protection of 
Local Livelihoods 
Secure Supply for 
EU Markets 
1  5  
2 3  1  1
3 1  1 3  
4 1  2 3 
5   2 1 1 
6   1 
 
 
Responses to Questionnaire Questions About how EC Fisheries Relations Authorities Should 
Prioritise Objectives for the Negotiation of Fisheries Agreements with Senegal  
 
Rank 
Protection of 
 EU Jobs 
Export Excess  
Fishing Capacity 
Ecological Sustain-
ability of the Resource
EU Aid/Development 
Cooperation 
Protection of
Local Livelihoods
Secure Supply for
 EU Markets 
1  1 4  
2   2 1 1
3 1  2 3 
4 1 3 1  
5 3 1 1  
6   1 
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Value Added Calculations for 2003 Figures 
 
Total VA for Artisanal Sector based on 2000 Calculations
Activity VA (M FCFA) sales figures (M F CFA)
Fishing 52648 66441 
Artisanal Processing 2961 3439 
Sales for Local Consumption 2124 2421 
Sales to Interior Market 5887 7522 
Direct Fish Selling 1178 1178 
Sales to Processing Plants 91915 123087 VA/SF
Total 156713 204088 0.767869742  
*Calculation: Total VA/Total Sales Figures = VA/SF 
 
Total VA for Local Industrial Sector based on 2000 Calculations
Activity VA (M FCFA) sales figures (M F CFA)
Fishing 24120 32862 
Industrial Processing 7794 9551 
Canning 8514 15425 
Farine Production 2909 3972 VA/SF
Total 43337 61810 0.701132503  
*Calculation: Total VA/Total Sales Figures = VA/SF 
 
Calculating Sales Figures for EU Industrial Sector in 2003
Local Industrial Sector Tonnages and Sales Figures
Landings (T) Sales Figures (M F CFA) Sales Fig/Landings
Trawlers 38683 25985 0.671742109 
Tuna Vessels 1596 748 0.468671679 
EU Industrial Sales Figures as a a Function of Landings and Sales Figures/Landings ratio.
Landings (T) Sales Fig/Landings Sales Figs (M F CFA)
Trawlers 817 0.67 547.39 
Tuna Vessels 15700 0.47 7379 
Total 16517 NA 7926.39  
*Calculations: 1st: Sales figures/Landings  
2nd: Landings x Sales figures/Landings = Sales Figures 
 
 
Extrapolation for Value Added per Sector in 2003 (All values in M F CFA)
Previous Sales Figures Previous VA 2003 Sales Figures Estimated 2003 VA 
Artisan 204088 156713 82462 63320.0747 
local Industrial 61818 43337 26792 18782.31104 
EU Industrial 5086 10500 7926 16363.15376  
* Calculation: (Previous Sales figures/Previous VA) x 2003 Sales Figures = Estimated VVA for 2003 
 
Data sources:  
! 2003 Data: Ministère de l’Economie Maritime. 2003. Loc cit. 
! 2000 Data, and Data marked ‘Previous’ : Ministère des Pêches. 2002. Loc cit.  
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Calculations for Ratios Appearing in Table 13.2. 
 
 
Tonnage Ratios
Value Tons Value/Ton
Employment per Ton of Catch
Artisanal 90000 386000 0.233160622 
Local Ind 5300 42400 0.125 
Foreign Ind 300 11900 0.025210084 
Local Landings per Ton of Catch
Artisanal 386000 386000 1 
Local Ind 41800 42400 0.985849057 
Foreign Ind 12500 11900 1.050420168 
Landings for Local Consumption per Ton of Catch
Artisanal 314600 386000 0.815025907 
Local Ind neg 42400 neg
Foreign Ind neg 11900 neg
Contribution to Gov. per Ton of Catch
Artisanal -7408 386000 -0.01919171 
Local Ind -16808 42400 -0.396415094 
Foreign Ind 10500 11900 0.882352941 
VA per Ton of Catch
Artisanal 63320 386000 0.164041451 
Local Ind 18782 42400 0.442971698 
Foreign Ind 16363 11900 1.375042017  
* Caculation: Value/Ton = Value per Ton 
 
Catches as % of MSY
Catch (T) MSY (T) Catch as %
Total Catch as % of Total MSY
Artisanal 386000 480000 80.41666667 
Local Ind 42400 480000 8.833333333 
EU Ind 11900 480000 2.479166667 
Demersal Catch as % of Demersal MSY
Artisanal 42700 150000 28.46666667 
Local Ind 38600 150000 25.73333333 
EU Ind 9500 150000 6.333333333 
Small Pelagic Catch as % of Small Pelagic MSY
Artisanal 315900 450000 70.2 
Local Ind 1539 450000 0.342 
EU Ind NA 450000 NA
Large Pelagic Catch as % of Large Pelagic MSY
Artisanal 6415 15000 42.76666667 
Local Ind 1596 15000 10.64 
Foreign Ind 2511 15000 16.74  
* Calculation: (Catch x 100)/MSY 
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Value Added Ratios
Value V.A. Value/ V.A.
Employment per $ of V.A.
Artisanal 90000 63320 1.421351864 
Local Ind 5300 18782 0.282185071 
Foreign Ind 300 16363 0.018334046 
Landings for Local Consumption per M CFA of VA
Artisanal 314600 63320 4.968414403 
Local Ind neg 18782 neg
Foreign Ind neg 16363 neg
Local Landings per $ of V.A.
Artisanal 386000 63320 6.096020215 
Local Ind 41800 18782 2.225535087 
Foreign Ind 12500 16363 0.763918597 
Contribution to Gov. per $ of V.A.
Artisanal -7408 63320 -0.116993051 
Local Ind -16808 18782 -0.894899372 
Foreign Ind 10500 16363 0.641691621  
*Calculation: Value/Value Added = Value per Value added. 
Data source: 
! Data Sources discussed in Text: See Table 13.1, Chapter Thirteen. 
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Fish Names Index 
 
Fish Species Discussed in the Text Sorted by Common  
English Name, Common Local Name/s, and Scientific Name   
 
Common English Name Common French/Local 
Name (s) 
Scientific Name 
Atlantic Sailfish Espadon Voilier Istiophorus Albicans
Benguela Hake Merlu Merluccius Polli 
Bigeye Tuna Patudo Thunnus Obesus 
Black Spot Sea Bream Sparide Pagellus Bogaraveo
Blue Spotted Sea Bream Pagre a Points Bleux Pargus Caeruleostictus
Dungat Grouper Merou (de Gorée) Epinephelus Goreensis
Guilt Head Sea Bream Dorade Sparus Aurata 
Lesser African Threadfin Petit Capitain/Thiekem Galeoides Decadactylus
Little Tunny Thonine Euthynnus Alletteratus
Red Pandora Pageot Pagellus Bellottii 
Senegalese Hake Merlu Noir Merluccius Senegalensis
Senegalese Sole Sole Solea Senegalensis
Senegalese Tounguesole Langues Cynoglossus Senegalensis
Skipjack Tuna Listao/Bonite à Ventre Rayé Katsuwonus Pelamis
Small Mouth Sea Catfish Mâchoirons Arius Heudelotii 
Sword Fish Espadon Xiphias Gladius 
West African Goatfish Rouget Pseudupeneus Prayensis
West African Spanish Mackerel Maquereau Bonité Scomberomorus Tritor
White Grouper Thiof Epinephelus Aeneus
Yellowfin Tuna Albacor Thunnus Albacarus
     
     
   (Further information can be obtained at: www.fishbase.org.) 
 
 
 
 
 
